*3
judgment under the collateral order doc-
OPINION
However,
trine.
as this court
previ-
has
WELLFORD, Circuit Judge.
ously
“[ujnder
explained,
doctrine
Jones,
Johnson v.
[515 U.S.
Plaintiff
Bertha
administratrix of
(1995),]
L.Ed.2d 238
the estate of decedent Adolph Boyd, Jr.
court cannot review on interlocutory ap-
(“Boyd”), filed a 42
U.S.C.
1983 action
peal a district court’s determination that
against
Cleveland
officers Matthew
genuine
issue of
trial,
fact
for
exists
Baeppler and
David
police chief
jurisdiction
we retain
legal
over the
Pollutro,
Rocco
and the City Cleveland,
question
qualified
immunity,
i.e.,
asserting constitutional claims arising out
given
whether a
set of facts violates
death
shooting
The case
clearly established law.” We review de
was removed from state court to the feder-
novo the district court’s
of quali-
denial
al district court. Subsequently, defen-
fied immunity.
moved
dants
for
summary judgment,
Sizemore,
Hoard v.
198 F.3d
plaintiff
opposed. The
court
district
(citations
Cir.1999)
omitted). Plaintiff con-
denied defendants’ motion for summary
jurisdiction,
tends we lack
because the dis-
judgment with respect to officers Baeppler
trict court denied summary judgment
and Wilsman and
judgment
reserved
as to
defendants
qualified
immunity upon
defendants Pollutro and the City of Cleve-
finding
genuine
“that
issues of fact exist”
land, concluding that:
as
use of deadly force. Defendants
Based
presented
evidence
by
argue, however, that
“genuine
issues of
plaintiff, the Court finds
genuine
fact,
by
found
the district court are not
issues of fact exist as to whether the
genuine
material,
and that this appeal
amount of force used by the offices was presents purely legal questions based on
justified.
essentially uncontroverted material facts.”
A
Specifically,
issue of fact
as to
defendants assert
exists
that the dis-
whether it
trict
court:
objectively reasonable to
(1)
use
force where
a suspect is
erroneously applied a fleeing felon anal-
running
away
the officers in an
ysis, and
governmental
misidentified the
attempt
to escape;
the officers did
interest at stake in this self defense
not witness the suspect fire the weapon;
case. The facts
cited
the District
to the reasonableness
irrelevant
judgment
are
summary
precluding
Court
Baep-
and Office
rel-
Officer Wilsman’s
analysis are not
both
under its erroneous
with which
to the threats
reactions
pler’s
where
inquiry,
a self defense
evant
Again,
agree.
were faced.”
they
at stake
interests
government
Boyd posed
are whether
in this case
issues
this re-
officers.
lives of
to officers Wilsman and
threat
dis-
do not
Appellants [defendants]
gard,
and,
so,
of force
if
use
District
identified
the facts
pute
The district
was reasonable.
response
denial
basis
as the
Court
there remained
finding
no
made
court
those facts
because
summary judgment
issues.
material to those
dispute
facts
the relevant
material to
are not
Nonetheless,
review
record
we will
case.
in this
immunity issues
shall
issue
ing
court’s
appealability
Denial
controverted issues
cludes a
every
under the
nonappealable.
;¡:
explain, we
of
Johnson
We
assertion
material fact does
such denial
#
agree,
determination that
summary
of its
circumstances
surely does
that
believe
&
qualified
there
of material
judgment often
summary judgment
therefore, as we
#
that
not
set forth.
immunity
were
*4
the district
destroy the
%
mean that
there are
fact
genuine
[*]
rul
in-
lack
decision,
window
decide
sert.
walking
jeans and white
Arvai
around
affidavit
gunshot
feet
Witness, Steve J.
jurisdiction
tall,
stated that
whether,
holding a dark colored
west on
11:10 or
and
stating that
wore a dark
otherwise,
saw
his home
tennis shoes and
Buckeye
under the district
a black
11:15
the male was
plaintiff
Arvai,
on
and
p.m.,
blue
near
male armed
April
defendants
looked
maintains, we
submitted
jacket,
East
automatic.
about
appeared
heard a
out the
court’s
122nd.
blue
and
as-
six
point
that he saw
man
added
Arvai
claim on
permits petitioner
Johnson
Wendy’s
outside
people
at three
gun
conduct which
appeal that all
any
sight of him.1
he then lost
that
sufficiently sup-
deemed
District Court
op-
event,
police
called the
promptly
Arvai
summary judg-
purposes
for
ported
observations.
reported his
erator
Fitzgerald, 457
[v.
the Harlow
ment met
undisputed.
evidence was
This
73 L.Ed.2d
U.S.
“objective legal rea-
] standard
Baeppler and
police officers
Defendant
sonableness.”
to the effect
affidavits
submitted
they
were
night
question,
in
on the
Scott,
that
F.3d
Turner
driving
Pelletier,
together,
Cir.1997)
duty
Behrens v.
(quoting
call,
Arvai’s
car,
shortly after
and that
299, 312, 313, 116 S.Ct.
U.S.
to a “Code
respond
called
(1996)).
they
were
We determined
L.Ed.2d
indi-
dispatch
radio
emergency
pure-
over
jurisdiction
One”
that we had
Turner
a
was a male with
that there
court’s
cated
questions despite
district
ly legal
Road,
Buckeye
120th
area of East
of mate-
issues
stating
genuine
order
given
description
general
met the
existed;
it
who
were otherwise
“[i]f
fact
rial
to the area
proceeded
Defendants-
its Arvai.
always insulate
court could
district
headquarters
radio
Wilsman notified
interlocu-
immunity rulings from
East
they approached
As
their arrival.
appropriate
by mouthing
tory review
Baeppler and Wilsman
Buckeye,
Defendants
119th
There is no but that this was the weapon, genuine issue remained regard- information furnished these two defendant ing carried, had pointed, or a dangerous officers: and emergency situ- fired the persons that five ation testified public on Cleveland streets at a time that he held in his hand they when near ob- midnight involving an armed man served him that fateful night.2 The reportedly who had dis- potentially trict court indicated no endangering dispute others in the area. to whether Boyd was armed. Baeppler and Wilsman testified that they then saw who sufficiently met The district court made the following the description given them and inwas brief findings factual that are pertinent at immediate reported, area running toward juncture: them with a in hand. Baeppler 1. There reported stopped the marked car in the inter- that an “African-American male had section of Buckeye Road and 119th East allegedly fired a gun.” Street, and both exited with weapons drawn, Wilsman with a shotgun. Both 2. A description of the suspect was fur- they testified that ordered nished, and “[t]his man turned out to *5 stop and identified police, themselves as be decedent Adolph Boyd.” although it seems clear to us that “Boyd 3. received several fatal shots should have been anyone obvious to pres- that effectuated his death.” ent at the time. 4. Officer Wilsman only one shot police Cleveland officers Zbikowski and with shotgun “that led to Boyd’s Nabowski, who also amved on the scene death.” pursuant police broadcast, testified that at Buckeye and East 120th Street 5. Officer Baeppler at least six they person saw a matching the descrip- additional and “thirteen given tion of the suspect walking west on entrance wounds were discovered.” Buckeye and into a parking lot and that he 6. The officers “assert Boyd pos- that was with a gun. armed Zbikowski added sessed a weapon, he aimed or suspect that ran down Buckeye and weapon in the direction that he reported his information on his car of the officers.” No officer wit- radio. Both of these officers also drew nessed “Boyd fire a weapon.” their weapons when they observed the sus- pect at range. close 7. Baeppler and “pursue[d] Boyd foot,” after ignored he Boyd did not stop, ordered, nor order to stop, fired the did he drop gun which had been ob first Boyd, shots at it is unclear served in his by hand a disinterested wit whether any of those shots hit the ness by four police different officers at target. close range. We do not it deem genuine issue of disputed fact Boyd that “The shotgun 8. blast” fired Wils- was suspect so observed and man, that he who claimed Boyd that was was armed. We therefore give do not pointing weapon him, at wound- credence to counsel’s contention ed and felled brief, plaintiff's In Baeppler’s that claim ufactured the Boyd contention that was Boyd first saw object with armed, black in his hand because found at the scene (Pl.’s was dismissed as "incredible.” Br. at was not traced to and identifiable 9.) speculated, Counsel unfairly believe prints produced. were not justification, and without that man- further conceded was a issue of fact as to whether district court
The if resolu only is ‘material’ its in Boyd fleeing attempt fact was the officers “[a] the contro fact, affect the outcome of tion will escape. court district as however, put precisely, more versy.” It is fleeing, may sumed that was and this Inc., Liberty Lobby, in Anderson v. have been what caused it to apply the 91 L.Ed.2d U.S. However, analysis. Tennessee v. Garner (1986): material issue here is not law materiality, As to the substantive fleeing, but whether identify facts are material. will Boyd pointed weapon the officers Only disputes might over facts that af- posed and thus an immediate threat the outcome of the suit under the fect them. The district court did not address governing properly preclude law will this issue all. From what has been summary Factual entry judgment. stated, previously it is clear that when first that are irrelevant or unneces- disputes officers, observed generally sary will not be counted. See officers, running toward the hand. Alan Arthur R. Wright, 10A Charles officers, response Each of the four Miller, Kane, Mary Kay Federal & observation, weapon, drew his or her pp. Practice and Procedure 93- not in any attempt pursue or chase (1983). in- materiality inquiry is This fraught but to confront situation separate dependent of and danger. An independent witness had incorporation of the evi- question of the reported gunshots, that he heard and then summary dentiary standard into the saw pointing armed is, That while judgment determination. people public outside a restaurant. The materiality determination rests on recognized Boyd suspect law, it the substantive is the substantive the area in which he been had observed of which facts are law’s identification and in apparently which he lived.4 *6 and which facts are irrelevant critical police independently themselves confirmed governs. that Boyd was armed but none saw indicated, already As have the issue heard him fire a shot. Defendants or Boyd before us this case is not whether Boyd stop, identifying dered to them a Tennessee presented these officers with They Boyd pointed selves. testified that fleeing v. Garnet3 felon situation —the sit gun ignored at them and their com to which court uation as the district found Boyd stop. away, mands to As he moved genuine that there remained issues of dis at the allegedly point gun continued to rather, Boyd puted fact—but whether outset, then, was Boyd officers. At the to these presented an immediate threat running away from the officers. As with an un they officers to which reacted him, ignored the officers confronted degree of force. We now re allegedly continued to orders view what the district court identified gun attempted at them as he to point his “genuine” issues of fact to determine flee. disputed
whether these
facts
material
to the issues before us.
Boyd
weapon?
2. Did
fire the
away
Boyd running
1. Was
actually
weapon
Boyd
Whether
attempt
escape?
in an
officers
to
is
wholly
is
immaterial here. The issue
blush,
so. It
might
At
it
that the whether or not he threatened
do
appear
first
reported
Boyd
there
to the officers that
had
finding
district court made
was
1,
1694,
4.
had an
3. 471 U.S.
105 S.Ct.
The principal issue in Tennessee v. Gar
*7
ner,
1,
471
1694,
U.S.
105 S.Ct.
85 L.Ed.2d
The inquiry
in
1983 actions
(1985),
1
involved
of deadly
use
force
against
officer for unlawful or
by police in pursuit of an unarmed minor
unconstitutional use
objective
of force is an
(a
burglar
“non-violent suspec[t]”) was not
one based upon the “information pos
before the court with respect to these de
sessed”
the police officer involved.
claiming
fendants
qualified immunity. Anderson
Creighton,
v.
635,
483
641,
U.S.
Garner, 471
10,
U.S. at
Where the officer has probable
pler
cause to
would have believed that it was lawful
believe that the suspect poses a threat of under the circumstances to use the same
physical harm,
serious
either to the offi- degree of force used by those officers. We
it, Boyd “pointed
information Wilsman saw
at
already
reviewed the
have
head,
acted,
...
at
I
right my
me
could see
initially
down
upon which the officers
barrel,
thought
and I
I
goner.”
was a
personal ob-
upon
based
the officers’
some
Wilsman then fired the
at
shotgun
activity
We view
scene and
servation.
down,
went
still in hand.
then,
the reason-
perspective,
from the
approached Boyd telling
Wilsman
him to
police officer at the scene based
able
drop
gun. Again, Boyd
ignored that
and what
reports and information received
again,
command.
did
fire
Connor,
Wilsman
v.
he has observed. See Graham
partner, Baeppler-threatened-fired
ad-
L.Ed.2d
109 S.Ct.
U.S.
ditional
at closer range.
shots
(1989);
Clay County,
205 F.3d
Scott
(6th Cir.2000).
Wilsman did not
when he fired at
know
Boyd, whether the latter had fired his own
II. LIABILITY OF WILSMAN
pistol
thought
them which Wilsman
“a semi-automatic.” Boyd “appeared to fit
one shot from his
Wilsman fired
description given”
for a
male
towards
shotgun
“propelled
“supposed
shooting.”
to be
Wilsman’s affi-
one, including plaintiffs
No
ground.”
davit was consistent with his statement
or
that Wils-
expert, testified
contended
response
questions,
but it added
deadly
force that
man’s shot was
fired,
that before he
he “feared for [his]
question
brought about
death.
life,
partner,
own
the life of
[his]
oth-
case, then,
in
whether he
Wilsman’s
”
....
ers
Plaintiff concedes
her brief
degree
used “a
of force that was unreason
any Baep-
“it is unknown whether
under the circumstances and
viola
able
pler’s
Boyd.”
struck
It
earlier shots
rights,”
tion of decedent’s
not whether
Wilsman,
unknown to
who heard
deadly
guilty
administering
himself was
Baeppler, Boyd,
perhaps
or
some
force, and whether he acted in concert
one
Plaintiff
else had
these shots.
Baeppler
administering deadly
describes
stated observations of
Wilsman’s
force.
Boyd’s pointing
at him
run-
while
view,
perspective
In our
from the
(Pl.’s
12.)
ning as incredible.
Br. at
Most
based
the information
brief, however,
is directed
plaintiffs
to him and the circumstances
available
officer
and his actions.
at the
he fired the
viewpoint
from his
time
justifi-
We do make all reasonable and
shot,
single
we believe that
entitled
he was
plaintiff,
in favor of
able inferences
qualified immunity, and we therefore
Liberty Lobby,
Anderson v.
non-movant.
summary judg-
REVERSE the denial of
477 U.S.
regard..
contemporane-
ment in this
His
(1986).
not, however,
L.Ed.2d 202
This is
report
emergency
indicated an
call to
ous
concerned, a
insofar as officer Wilsman is
“for male
p.m.
the scene
about 11:30
case
to whether he used
force
gun, shooting.”
with a
Other
re-
felon,
capture
fleeing
excessive force to
ported seeing
suspect “running
*8
suspect attempting
escape.
or a
As to
hand,”
in
gun
with a
and Wilsman then
Wilsman, it is a case of whether he acted
Boyd
me ...
a
“running
saw
towards
with
reasonably
response
dangerous,
in
to a
in
in uni-
right
hand.”
night
encounter late at
with
split-second
form, yelled “stop, police,”
Boyd
disre-
have been
reported
armed man
garded
warning, proceeding “diagonal-
shooting
he had in hand
at
ly
Buckeye.”
across
Wilsman “turned to
officer.
squad
run around the
car to cut him off.”
mission,
upon
City
on this
Plaintiff relies
Russo
running
While
'
(6th
Cincinnati,
Cir.1992),
F.2d
couple
“heard a
of shots.” He then saw
claim,
Boyd
running ...
but that case held that in the
“still
looked back at us
context,
must
qualified immunity
“plaintiff
...
...
As
pointed his
back
us.”
present
supported by
‘evidence sufficient
create
defendant
officers is
objective
genuine issue as to whether the defendant
and reasonable evidence. The
”
“clearly
in fact’
law”
eyewitness testimony
per-
violated
established
of a number of
taking the action he did. “Whether
sons and the broadcasts to the defendants
genuine issue of material fact exists” is a
support a conclusion that the deceased was
Russo,
armed,
question of law.
Id. at 1043. In
probably
even that he had
emphasized
that we
“look to the weapon.
must
Plaintiffs “counter-narrative”
particular
‘facts and circumstances
each
Boyd
carrying
her brief that
was not
...
suspect pose[d]
view,
case
whether the
an gun, in our
is not
based
sub-
safety
Bell,
immediate threat to the
of the offi-
stantial and material evidence. See
others,
(fin-
cers or
and whether he [was]
the statement from Smith v. 954 qualified immunity respect fir- to his (6th Cir.1992), F.2d ing one shot shotgun from his Thus, Graham, under we must avoid under essentially uncontested material
substituting personal our notions facts. We find as fact proper police procedure for the instanta- armed and could be considered an immi- neous decision of the officer nent threat and a to a danger scene. We must never allow the theo- partner officer and to his in Wils- retical, sanitized world of our imagina- man’s circumstances. replace dangerous tion to and com-
plex
policemen
every
world that
face
III. LIABILITY OF BAEPPLER
day. What constitutes “reasonable” ac-
may
quite
tion
seem
different to some-
prior
Much of our
ap
discussion
facing
possible
one
assailant than to
plies
Baeppler,
to defendant
particularly as
analyzing
question
someone
at lei-
to his initial
may
may
shots that
sure.
have struck
Certainly, these shots
Connor,
(citing
Id.
Graham v.
490 U.S. neither immobilized
incapacitat
nor
386, 396-97,
loose,
L.Ed.2d
ed him.
remained on the
ap
(1989)).
also,
armed,
in a
parently
See
somewhat com-
potentially
still
dan
parable situation,
City
Bell v.
gerous.
East
We concede that
question
Cleveland,
96-3801,
No.
pler’s
enth, objectively Russo reasonable. Cf. Cincinnati, 1036, 1047 953 F.2d
City of Cir.1992)
(6th quali (stating, in context of § 1983 failure to immunity defense to
fied claim, do not believe that “we
train given are to be no experts
opinions [rjeliance testimony expert
weight .... on where, here, appropriate particularly ex directly upon the
the conclusions rest by the provided materials
pert’s review of itself’).
City otherwise, and holds
Today majority the unfortunate continues
its decision of this by other members
trend noted unto itself the panel “arrogating
court of a the factual dis resolving appeal
role of immunity
putes presented v. Clay action.” Scott
defense Cir.2000) (6th 867, 881
County, 205 F.3d J., (citing Claybrook v.
(Clay, dissenting)
Birchwell, Cir. 199 F.3d 359-60
2000)). I that the record believe Because court’s conclusion the district
supports disputes regarding remain rea conduct was
whether the defendants’
sonable, I therefore dissent.
