Lair v. Murry
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68688
D. Mont.2012Background
- Plaintiffs challenge Montana campaign finance and election laws §§13-35-225(3)(a), 13-37-131, 13-37-216(1),(3),(5), and 13-37-227.
- Preliminary injunction granted in part; vote-reporting and political-civil libel injunctions issued; contribution limits and corporate ban not enjoined at that time.
- By stipulation, some claims resolved by summary judgment while others require a bench trial.
- Hearing on summary judgment held May 12, 2012; the court resolves some issues by summary judgment.
- Court grants summary judgment to plaintiffs on vagueness challenges to sections 13-35-225(3)(a) and 13-37-131, and on the prohibition of corporate contributions to committees that use funds for independent expenditures; grants summary judgment to defendants on corporate direct/indirect contributions ban to candidates/parties.
- Preliminary injunction from February 24, 2012 is dissolved; remaining claims to be resolved at bench trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vote-reporting requirement constitutional? | Lovell argues vagueness and overbreadth; fails strict scrutiny. | Montana contends reasonable bounds and severability. | Unconstitutionally vague; not severable; summary judgment for plaintiffs on vagueness. |
| Political civil libel statute constitutional? | 13-37-131 is vague and infringes on speech. | Statute properly restricts false or reckless campaign misrepresentations. | Unconstitutionally vague; not severable; summary judgment for plaintiffs. |
| Can governments ban direct/indirect corporate contributions to candidates and parties? | Ban violates First Amendment by restricting corporate speech. | Ban permissible to prevent corruption; traditional regulation. | Constitutional; summary judgment for defendants. |
| May governments restrict corporate contributions to committees that use funds for independent expenditures? | Such contributions are effectively contributions to independent expenditures and barred by Citizens United. | Anti-circumvention and regulation of contributions allowed. | Unconstitutional; summary judgment for plaintiffs. |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1976) (defines vagueness and speech boundaries in campaign finance law)
- Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 1998) (vagueness standard; reasonable notice required)
- Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (U.S. 2006) (standards for severability and overbreadth in campaign finance)
- Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (avoid unnecessary constitutional rulings)
- Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (U.S. 2010) (cannot ban corporate independent expenditures)
- Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2011) (anti-circumvention of contribution limits)
- Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010) (independent expenditures and contributions framework post-Citizens United)
- Yamada v. Weaver, 872 F.Supp.2d 1023 (D. Haw. 2012) (contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures)
- Beaumont v. FEC, 539 U.S. 146 (U.S. 2003) (upholds state bans on direct corporate contributions)
- Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431 (U.S. 2001) (limits on contributions and independent expenditures context)