Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego, 365 Or. 422

Background

Oswego Lake is largely ringed by private property; Lake Oswego Corporation holds riparian rights and limits lake access to shareholders; the City owns three downtown waterfront parks (Millennium Plaza, Sundeleaf Plaza, Headlee Walkway) and a small resident-only fenced swim park that does not provide access to the open lake.
City adopted a resolution prohibiting anyone from entering Oswego Lake from the three downtown waterfront parks; signs at Millennium Plaza warn "Private Lake. Please stay on the steps." The swim park is limited to city residents and open seasonally.
Plaintiffs (non‑shareholders/nonresidents) sued for declaratory relief, alleging: (1) public-use doctrine grants access across uplands to the water, (2) public-trust doctrine (state ownership of submerged/submersible lands) grants access from public upland, and (3) the swim-park and waterfront restrictions violate Oregon Const. Art. I, § 20 (Equal Privileges and Immunities).
Trial court assumed, without deciding, that the lake might be a public waterway but granted summary judgment to defendants, holding neither common-law doctrine nor Article I, § 20 required the declarations plaintiffs sought; Court of Appeals affirmed in part; plaintiffs sought review.
Oregon Supreme Court assumes (for purposes of decision) Oswego Lake could be a navigable public water, holds: public-use doctrine does not authorize access across abutting upland; public-trust doctrine (if lake is publicly owned) includes a right of access from abutting public upland and restrictions must be objectively reasonable; Article I, § 20 challenges largely fail (waterfront resolution does not grant a government-created privilege; swim-park residency restriction is rationally related to facility management).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether "public use" doctrine (waters navigable in a qualified sense) creates a right to access water across abutting upland owned by others	Kramer: public-use easement includes incidental right to use abutting upland to enter public water	City/Lake Oswego: public-use doctrine protects navigation on water only; right ends at water's edge; upland entry would require eminent domain	Held: No — public-use doctrine does not grant a general right to cross abutting upland; right of navigation ends at the water's edge (summary judgment for defendants affirmed on this claim).
Whether public-trust doctrine (state ownership of submerged/submersible lands) includes a right to enter public water from abutting public upland and limits a city's power to restrict that access	Kramer: public trust protects recreational access and may require means of public access from public upland; city may not bar entry from public parks	City/State: even if state owns bed, that does not require allowing access from city upland; city can restrict use of its land	Held: If lake is subject to public trust, public has a right to access the publicly-owned water from abutting public upland; any restriction must be objectively reasonable under trust purposes; city (as state instrumentality) is likewise limited. Genuine factual issues exist; summary judgment for defendants on this claim reversed and remanded.
Whether the waterfront parks resolution violates Art. I, § 20 by effectively granting a privileged class monopoly on lake use	Kramer: neutral rule has practical exclusionary effect because private shareholders monopolize shoreline access, disadvantaging nonshareholders	City: resolution is facially neutral and does not grant any state-created privilege to a class	Held: No — Art. I, § 20 targets state-created privileges; the waterfront resolution is facially neutral and does not grant a government-created exclusive privilege to shareholders (summary judgment for defendants affirmed on this claim).
Whether the resident-only swim-park policy violates Art. I, § 20	Kramer: excluding nonresidents creates an unconstitutional local monopoly over access to a commonly held natural resource; user fees would be less exclusionary	City: facility is small, cost‑limited, legitimately managed for residents who pay local taxes; classification is rational	Held: No violation — swim park access is a city-created recreational privilege restricted to residents; the residency classification is rationally related to legitimate management/cost concerns (summary judgment for defendants affirmed on this claim).

Key Cases Cited

Corvallis Sand & Gravel v. Land Bd., 250 Or. 319 (1968) (describing state title to beds of navigable waters as held in trust for the public)
PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012) (federal law governs which waters were navigable at statehood under equal-footing doctrine)
Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Or. 625 (1936) (Oregon public-use doctrine recognizes public easement for waterways "navigable in a qualified sense")
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (classic public-trust principle limiting state disposal of navigable-bed lands)
Darling v. Christensen, 166 Or. 17 (1941) (discusses littoral/riparian right of access and characterization of meandered land)
Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 285 Or. 197 (1979) (public-trust doctrine allows state action that does not substantially impair public interest and serves greater public need)
Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 90 Or. 13 (1918) (navigability for recreational uses and limits on landing on private upland)
Lebanon Lumber Co. v. Leonard, 68 Or. 147 (1913) (navigability does not create right of way on private land; navigation right ends at water's edge)
Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445 (1870s) (narrow, necessity-based exception allowing incidental, temporary use of private bank to accomplish public navigation)
Eagle Cliff Fishing Co. v. McGowan, 70 Or. 1 (1914) (private lessee of submersible land has a right of access "to and from" the river as incident to occupation)
Smith Tug v. Columbia-Pacific Towing, 250 Or. 612 (1968) (discussion of public rights in tidelands, submersible and submerged lands)