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Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. v. State Land Board
439 P.2d 575
Or.
1968
Check Treatment

*1 r Argued April 10, petition fo March reversed rehearing denied June Re CO., CORVALLIS SAND & GRAVEL spondent, v. LAND STATE BOARD , Appellant. P. 2d *2 Attorney Herman, Assistant General,

Peter 8. appellant. argued for him on the cause With Salem, Attorney Y. General. Thornton, Bobert was the briefs argued Tongue, Portland, H. cause Thomas respondent. were Bobert him on briefs Mix, With Dale & Port- Strader, and Tongue, Hicks, Corvallis, land. and Chief Justice,

Before Perry, McAllister, and Jus- Denecke Lusk, Goodwin, O’Connell, Sloan, tices. J.

LUSK, brought by equity Corvallis Sand a suit This is enjoin corporation, State a Co., Gravel & through acting the State Oregon, Board, Land ejectment commenced prosecuting an action of from corporation. The state de- the state ground complaint that its alle- on murred equitable defense to the constitute “do not gations brought by ejectment action allegations of

32L Oregon”; the de- trial court overruled refusing рlead a de- further, murrer the state and, plaintiff. The favor of was entered cree appeals. alleges ejectment complaint action in the sovereignty, and at now, virtue of its state, into the has Union, admission

all the state’s times since lying Eiver of the bed of the Willamette the owner been par- in a Linn location Benton and Counties within ticularly defendant Corvallis Sand described; wrongfully and for six withholds, now Co. & Gravel filing complaint, years immediately prior continuously possession wrongfully withheld, has property the state and that the rea- of such real property said real annual use of value of the sonable Judgment asked for the immediate was $50,000. damages property possession sum such *3 of $300,000. (hereinafter plaintiff, referred to as the cor-

The filing of a poration) before instead in the suit us, complaint ejeсtment pleading filed a in action, in the allegations equity, which be summarized of the corporation that the state owns denies as follows: damaged question property in or has been as real the alleges ejectment alleged that as a re- action; in the change in the channel of the Wil- avulsive of an sult of new in November channel was Eiver, lamette private held in over land owner- flowed formed, which ship channel underwent further said avulsive and changes extensive excavations result of made as the prede- that about 1920 the to 1918; from 1913 therein operation corporation commenced aof the of cessor gravel the avulsive channel and business on sand and ownership present corporation “of the bed claims the high of the Willamette River below water marks” in controversy; gravel in the location that such sand and corporation business has been conducted and its predecessors continuously, openly notoriously and year present since the such 1920; business at the time grosses per year, capital $1,000,000 has value in ex- employs many persons, cess as 100 $500,000, has payroll supplies an annual in excess of and $400,000, per gravel of the used in cent sand construction vicinity of Corvallis and obtains most of its allegations from channel. There follow materials said part intended to show laches on the of the bringing ejectment to wit: The state has action, operation corporation been aware of the prior predecessor corpora- its since private ownership prior tion’s claim of of such channel; filing ejectment through action the state, Land filed two suits to еstablish its claim Board, ownership to the result- channel, first, involuntary plaintiff ing in an nonsuit “because the had prove and the re- case,” second, failed to its voluntary sulting state. Further- dismissal alleged prejudice are to show to the cor- more facts delay resulting long poration of the state in from the rights expense litigation, pay- asserting —the corporation property on the real ment of taxes difficulty establishing, long dispute, and the so surrounding facts the formation event, after the prayer channel. The decree of the avulsive prosecuting enjoining perpetually the state any legal prosecuting action in ejectment action any por- maiding claim whatsoever to the premises or *4 question. River in the bed Willamette tion going question will be decided before procedural A adopted in the аmendment 1917, Since to 'the merits. authorizing in now ORS the defendant a law 16.460, np equitable action to an set defense in his answer, corporation’s complaint, as the cross-bills, such have permissible. not been Prior to .the amendment the stat- “except ute abolished as hereinafter men- cross-bills, provided and that “where the defendant tioned,” arising requiring entitled to out of facts relief, interposition equity, of a court of material to his may, upon filing he his answer also defense, therein, complaint plaintiff, equity, file a in in the nature of stay proceedings which shall cross-bill, at law,” § L L etc., O 390. Under ORS 16.460 cross-bills are any exception, provision abolished without and the filing by complaint equity the defendant of a in the nature of a cross-bill is eliminated and in its place frequently familiar is substituted the now provision authorizing filing invoked of what has equitable an become known as answer. question passed upon Hopka was 294 P

Forbes, 91, where the court 342, at said, page 93: filing by

“The of a cross-bill defendant in a interposing equitable law action, defense to the longer permissible By no under our code. action, chapter especially Laws of cross-bills were procedure existing prior and the abolished thereto very simplified much amended statute.” Hughes Flier ux., et Or See, also, P2d 992. contrary ruling Meade,

A Churchill v. Hopka P was not cited v. Forbes, overruled that decision Churchill v. Meade sub but properly opinion so, because the silerdio, give changes fails to effect to the latter case *5 in statute to which we have called attention and, par- cross-bills. ticular, provision abolishing as Treating complaint, however, though in an affirmative defense of lachеs was set forth equi we are of table answer filed to pursuant statute, that is not available to the such defense opinion an action at law and Ejectment is laches corporation. a the aid seeking available of only against party that It is an of the doctrine equity equity. application as stated “in only by Pomeroy, aids the vigilant or, may applications properly regarded some its a form of more yet general principle, special 2 Pomeroy’s must do equity.” He who seeks equity “Laches (5th Jurisprudence ed) 169-170, §418. Equity to in suits applicable equity”: is a doctrine peculiarly Note numerous cases. This §419, 7, citing Idem, 172, as a the doctrine of laches court has never applied ex rel. action at law. The case of to an defense District No. & Trust v. School Co. Security Savings only P2d seem 31 P2d This the rule. was prоceeding to exception ing “action at law” in the denominated warranto, quo laches The defendants pleaded 30.510. OES statute, this defense and the latter urged of the relators This court held in suits equity. only available was before it the proceeding available because the defense of the After a brief review in nature. equitable court said: warranto, history quo * “* * chancery from a court Issuing foreign a nature to a return of commanding ' it follows that law, the courts writs of was an authorized ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍proc- warranto law quo common nature equi- remedy of a assertion for the ess defendant disclosure namely, table, claim the franchise exercises he under which ' question. Oregon gives remedy “The statute in lieu quo law of the common writ of warranto and calls remedy merely an action at law. It is in truth statutory proceeding equi- a table as well as the exercise of the right compel mentioned, disclosure as above whether the determine franchise being legally question is exercised.” 148 atOr 285- By recognition gave this decision court rule that laches not be used as a defense *6 purely legal. prevailing It a claim is the rule in to this-countrv. In addition the authorities above cited, Conklin, v. 314, 326-327, Wehrnman 155 US 15 see S Ct Eq Horner v. 13 Jobs, L ed NJ Clark 129, 167; 19; 39 Clapp, Thorpe 248; v. 14 RI v. Wm. Filene’s Co., Sons (DC Mass); F2d Kitchens v. Wheeler, 40 269 200 Ark v. 671, 34; Lofton, 141 SW2d Fox 681, 185 Ga 195 456, Lowry Lyle, v. Mich 573; SE 226 676, 684, 198 245; NW Equity (2d ed) on MeClintock 75-76; 1 Wood on Limi ed) (4th Ejectment § 287; tations 898, 28 CJS 49. equity merged

In a few states where law and are apply. the doctrine under consideration does not But, we Bank held Gellert v. Nat. Assn., of California 214 P 377, 107 Or ORS 16.460“does not abol ish the distinction between at law actions and suits although equity, it avoids some of the inconveni formerly away ences suffered аnd does with a few of merely steps previously formal which were re hardly quired.” corpora And it need be said that the by filing seeking enjoin tion did suit the state’s not, ground law on the action at succeed in laches, con equity. verting that action into suit in assumption plea But even on'the of laches corporation be otherwise available to the would public' bringing ejectment negligence officers 326 pre- for the now he stated,

action reasons cannot, obtaining the state from the relief to which it clude in a this claims to be entitled case of character. touching will now review our decisions this

We brought question. In two suits the state to cancel swampland deeds to issued the defense of laches it, Valley v. Co., State Warner Stock 56 sustained: Oregon Hyde, P v. 861; P State 283, 106 780, 108 Or Ann P P Cas 88 Or 171 1918E 1, 757, 582, 688,. holdings quo There which more later. were similar Seсurity Savings rel. warranto actions: State ex & supra; District No. ex Trust Co. v. School State rel. 9, Hallgarth District No. v. School 179 Or Teegarden High rel. v. School, P2d State ex Union 655; ex rel. 53 P2d State 1047; 152 Or 412, Weatherford Hayworth, In P2d these cases by private were sued out relators and it the writs Security Savings that in ex rel. should be noted District No. court & Trust v. School called Co. 286) following (148 at statement attention O’Leary Reiner, A 9 NJ Misc 120: “Although lapse be conceded that of time *7 through attorney-general will not bar the successfully prosecuting quo pro- a warranto from rights ceeding of the state are involved, where the application where the writ has no this doctrine private In such a un- a relator. case, sued out may delay part on relator reasonable maintaining pro- preclude properly him from ceeding.” Hallgarth

Similarly rel. District in ex Schоol v. Teegarden ex rel. v. Union that State No. 23 we said Hay- High rel. and State ex School Weatherford instances which this court two recent worth “are acting upon it is when the state, that laches bars held a private from party, relation of challenging of a school district.” validity (Italics added.) 179 Or at 461. City Pendleton v. this court held in

Further, Holman, 532, 177 Or 164 P2d 162 ALR 434, 249, the defense of laches was available in a suit aby mu nicipality to foreclose for a street improvement lien assessment. The of the decision was that ground to collect city, attempting act assessment, was capacity. 177 Or at 551. ‹ ing its proprietary the other On we have held hand, laches was not a bar to a suit state to escheat of a property Vincent, State v. deceased person: 205, P2d 203. said: We stated,

“As appealing defendants interpose objection thаt been plaintiff has guilty laches.

By the weight the defense of authority, laches is not available against state or government, in a suit national, by it to enforce a or public right protect interest: C. J., Subject: page section Equity, authorities cited in note It cannot be gainsaid that suit by this ‹ Blue City Union, hold, 75 P2d does not suggested corporation’s brief, undertaking by that an city proprietary activity when is an “from which it derives a revenue.” We said that case: ** great Now, no matter how nor how numerous “* distinguishing be the difficulties between these ca- pacities, corporation it is established law that when a exer- purely corporate proprietary private function, cises a or example, operation such for as the maintenance aof municipal airport public utility, system, wharf or or or water revenue, subject from whiсh it derives a it is suit without statutory authority, any similarly the same as individual en- * * gaged 159 Or at 11-12. municipality It was not the mere fact that derived a revenue particular activity, type activity but which was question municipality engaged determinative of the whether a governmental proprietary undertaking. ain *8 public right protect

the state seeks to enforce a public at 214. a interest.” 152 Or in In re The same doctrine was enunciated Estate of validity Moore, 190 223 P2d where a devise of to the lands United States Grovernment question govern- was it was contended that asserting claim. ment was late employed have also held that laches not be We proceeding brought in a disbarment defense instrumentality Oregon which is “an Bar, State Department government of the of the Judicial Kelly Oregon”: Farris, In re 9.010; J. ORS P2d 229 Or estoppel. Industrial is akin to In Rohde v. State

Laches Com., Ac 108 Or 217 P claimant с. compensation from the Industrial Accident Fund for urge estopped contended that the commission insufficiency application compensation. of his of the commission held that the fund hands We money; Compensation Law that the Workmen’s is trust power, governmental, police under the was enacted goverm proprietary all and that “in function; not a proprie distinguished from mere affairs as mental any tary the state nor of its officers neither matters, any capacity estopped acting governmental in a any at 438. The court went such officer,” act of following People approval quote with on Ill 435: Brown, prevent policy, loss to “Public negligence

through the forbids officers, estoppel application of the doctrine representa- growing the conduct out of state, ground thе same officers. On of its tions consequence of government from the is excused *9 by negligence it should not be affected laches, the any (Ci- willfulness even one of its officers. omitted.)” tations at 438-439. Commission, In v. Tax Johnson P2d Or acknowledged applied we what 302, ception was to be an ex- general to and held in a case involv- rule, ing obviously governmental collection of taxes ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍— government estopped it function—that was when taxpayer regarding misinformed a to his loss time required exemption within which he was to establish from valorem tax his ad on automobile. This doctrine rarely only applied was and said to be when to refuse apply high degree.” “inequitable be to it would to a very

Finally, question before whether us, viz., against laches can be invoked state when asserting its title to the of the Willamette Eiver, bed open MсVey, 121 P2d was left State v. by P2d 181. This was a suit the state for

461, 123 proceeds gravel accounting of the sand, rock the river the defendant from the bed of removed enjoin removing further such defendant from laches was held that the issue of materials. The court pleaded not and not not case because it was expressed below, court and added that it raised in the opinion was available no whether laches 168 Or at 356-357. a case of this nature.” state “in rely corporation on the Warner Counsel misplaced. Valley reliance is we think their but ease, given, sought were be cancelled there The deeds was com in 1899. The suit the last first limitation statutes of Until 1903 the in 1907. menced Deady’s applicable expressly to the state, made were year was amended the statute § In that Code 13. apply not to the state

providing limitations should рublic corporations, Oregon page or other Laws 18. Such has been the law ever since. OIíS 12.250. The only Valley cause of suit in Warner case held be barred laches involved deed issued in 1883. govern Statutes of do not limitation, course, suits equity, applied by analogy, but and that is what the court did. The case was before court on complaint demurrer to the and the court held: “More statutory period elapsed than the of limitation had [the deed’s] since its execution when this suit appears prima commenced, thus it facie plaintiff guilty such as will bar the laches, suit, delay unless excuse for the is shown.” 56 atOr allegations complaint It was then held that the *10 adequate failed to an state excuse and, therefore, the suit was barred as to the 1883 deed. That all is that question. analysis held court on this See Valley City Warner in ease Pendleton v. Holman, supra, 177 Or at 542-546. As we there said with refer- give “[T]he ence to the 1883 deed: court did effect to the statute of limitations.” years

When, 1918, the court in therefore, 15 after applicable the statutes of limitation ceased to be to the Valley Oregon the Warner state, cited case in State Hyde, supra, following v. to the statement: “We are principle that the committed to the doctrine of laches applicable upon is to the state”: at it rested 40, proposition an insecure foundation. To buttress the cited two authorities. court other One was United (CC 1883), White, States v. 17 Fed D 561, 565 Cal, patent govern- suit States cancel United ground holding ment lands on the of fraud. The in government that United States was sub- case, contrary ject long defense of laches, to the line Supreme Court of the of cases decidеd United

331 will hereinafter referred to. some of which be States, v. Commonwealth Phila was authority The other B. M. Turnpike Co., B. & Pa 25 delphia, 47, 153 St cited in the foot A 1105. As from the cases appears Pennsylvania 34, 114, *11 Hyde re (and case expressed The views 541. Trust & Co. School ex rel Sec. Sav. in

peated on at their 9, No. appear District 287) supra, and, again, govern all-encompassing face to be was not dis question nongovernmental versus mental considered. or, apparently, cussed in this of authority country iveight great

By gov- the defense of laches not available by state or in a suit it to ernment, national, enforce public right protect public or State v. interest, Vin- supra; Equity § cent, 30A CJS Such suit, by Supreme it is held of the Court United States, government’s right is one to establish the title or to, public in, California, lands. United States v. 332 US presented ques- L 19, 67 S ed Ct tion whether the United States California owns the submerged lands off the coast California between mark and low water the three-mile limit. The state up among government set defense, others, enforcing rights by prin- was barred from reason of ciples estoppel possession. similar to or adverse laches, rejecting In the court this contention said: *

“* * assuming And even that Government agencies negligent failing recog- been have nize at or assert the claims of Government great earlier interests of the date, the Government in this area are not to be forfeited a re- ocean The which holds its sult. interests Government, people, here for all the as elsewhere trust is not by deprived ordinary to be interests those designed particularly private court rules dis- individually putes pieces property; over owned authority dispose and of Government who have no at all officers by property сannot their conduct rights cause the to lose its valuable Government acquiescence, their or failure to act.” laches, at 39-40. US principle that lands of the United States are government trust and that the is there-

held negligence estopped fore not of its officers to lands has been its title to such stated numer- assert Supreme ous other eases Court United Francisco, States San States: United US

333 L 749, 60 S Ct 84 ed v. 32, 1050; States, Utah United 534, 284 US 52 S Ct 76 L 545-546, ed Utah 232, 469; Light Power & States, Co. v. United 243 US 389, 409, Causey L 387, 37 S Ct 61 ed 791; States, v. United 240 US 36 S Ct 60 L ed 365, brought

We are thus determination question Oregon, holding whether the State of dealing underlying navigable with the lands waters governmental within its boundaries, so its does merely proprietary capacity. in a These lands were granted away by during never the United States period government, of territorial but were “held as a purpose being ultimately whole for the administered by and dealt with for the benefit the State” after completely it organized should “have become a com munity.” Shively Bowlby, v. 50, 152 US 14 1, S Ct affirming Bowlby Shively, L ed 548, 38 331, v. 22 Or Oregon P 410, 30 154. When, therefore, was admitted acquired submerged into the Union, title lands by grant not from the United but States, virtue of sovereignty. Taney As stated Chief Justice Martin Waddell, 16 Peters 41 367, 410, US 234, place, L people ed “when the revolution took 997, sovereign; of each state became themselves right navigable character hold absolute to all their and the soils under waters, for their own them, com subject only rights mon since use, surrendered general government.” the constitution to the This true of the thereafter likewise states admitted into equal footing” original “an with Union on thir Bowlby Shively, supra, teen. See Or at 417. It explained noted here as this court that, should be Shively speaking there of case, tidelands, sovereignty” “by phrase of its virtue is not to be taken right meaning grant that the state had no these away. Referring lands Warren, to Hinman v. and the in that court’s reliance on Pollard’s case Hagan al,

Lessee v. et 3 Howard US L ed Mr. “The Justice Lord said: there decision, jus pri is based on the idea that the state fore, has *13 distinguishable jus vatum in the tide lands, from the publicum, may convey private which it as to sell so by phrase, interests hence its therein; the virtue of sovereignty, preclude any private was not intended to by grantee use which did not interfere with the state’s public rights” rights.” “public 22 the Or at 418. These navigation fishery rights are the of and and the authority submerged dispose has no of the lands rights. in such a manner as to interfere with these Accordingly, said Bros. v. we in Winston Co. State regard P2d with Com., Tax Or 62 underlying navigable waters the state, lands “* * * although passed title to the state merely rights by sovеreignty, ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍its were virtue of its ownership public. In its . a trustee for the those of people, represents and the the state thereof, people ownership sov- their united public ereignty, themselves remain while waters naviga- may persons the same for use so that all and-fishing. are for lands held trust tion These ** fishery, public navigation *. and uses they ju,ris; publici Being subject in other are trust, to this they use of are held for the words, * * *” large. people at at no can make that the state concluded was therefore It navigable underlying disposal its of the soil sale or public prevent such the use waters so as fishing. navigation purposes for waters Dabney, 139 P 721. Or Cook See, also, subject pronouncement is the on this recent most Our following Dredg. Corp., Land Bd. West-Pac. page P2d where we said at 186: “It consistently underlying been

has held that the lands nаvigable of the waters state are held the state people in trust for the benefit of the whole of the citing state,” the Winston Bros. case. concept jus aof twofold interest of the state —

publicum jus privatum the tidelands and the —in navigable underlying lands waters derives from prerogative the ancient Gould on Crown, Waters (3d edj § submerged 17. So far as relates to the lands the doctrine seems to have abandoned been Bros, quoted. what was said in the Winston above case, ownership “In repre- thereof” we said “the state people, ownership sents the and the is that of the people sovereignty, in their united while waters persons themselves remain so that all use navigation fishing.” the same 156 Or at 511. *14 theory It was in with accordance this that Gatt v. Hurlburt, P was decided. In plaintiff acquired case the contended that had he title to thе bed of the Willamette Eiver the below low water by possession. rejected mark adverse court This this contention. The court said: “Upon into the admission of this state the Union, acquired Oregon the state of all of title to the lands

lying ordinary high water mark between the and navigable the low water mark of all af- streams by tide the and flow of the which fected ebb are acquired within borders. It these located its lands capacity proprietary and the in its became absolute dispose and of them and entitled to sell of owner and, seen, them it fit as we have the lands as saw high bordering upon river the Willamette below granted mark low water mark were water and above adjacent the the of land. At the same owners to time, that the this state was admitted into Union acquired proprietary capacity in a but title, not sovеreign capacity, say its is to trustee . navigable public, for to the all of the bed of streams dis- Within its borders. These it could not sell or right any pose grant orof the to make use of them impair impede navigation. It could which would grant right and of land did to owners lying above the low water mark to extend wharves navigable parts low mark and the water between wholly . in aid commerce of the but this of river, loading unloading and to afford access cargoes, transportation passengers, articles of commerce. and other every must obvious one that no “Now, it be to acquire possession person to title adverse could ' any submerged lying between the low water land navigable navigable waters, river and the mark of acquire do would be to title adverse for to possession so plaintiff’s Hence, the state. pоsses- acquired has title adverse that he claim part river bed of the Willamette sion fronting lying mark and on the low water below Security Savings property and Trust right navigate company The these untenable. every right privilege one and the is the waters all exclusive in no one. is common “* * * The title to [*] # [*] *. soil [*] underlying itself, the river to the bed of vested that is water, sovereign by held and is in the state capacity and the for the adverse as trustee long person no however continued possession at 560-561, title.” 131 Or it of its can divest holding apply equally for this adduced reasons employed as a clefense that laches claim *15 ejectment. of action state’s legislative with the treat- accords conclusion This

337 Except navigable for. .of the beds of rivers. ment stat 1876, › to be utes: enacted 1874 limited lands Legislature higli water marks,, tween. low аnd .has part-with to until never, 1963, authorized;the McVey, supra, 168 to its river beds. State title See Or at 347.. Legislature

In -Land 1920 the authorized Board, navigable pur- to the beds rivers lease of pose removing-gravel, therefrom, of rock sand paid net-proceeds over to irre- of such leases -to Oregon-Laws ch This 32. ducible .school fund: material, amendments not-now is. still statute, with 274.530. It was we-said enacted, effect: ORS Olcott, & Or 253, 261, in Salem Sand Gravel Co. the state in its P “for the use and benefit of sovereign capacity.” provision for the sale

As stated, made navigable tidal non- the beds of rivers, of both (5); express opin- no. tidal: 274.005 274.915. We ORS validity According ion as to the of statute. this corporation allegations complaint and its -the taking gravel predecessors have been interest years disputed for 45 is, channel 1920,’ since During filing ejectment prior action. years private person acquired could have those no any portion River of the Willamette the bed

title ought by conveyance It not be held from the state. › These given in Pacific Elevator Co. v. were effect statutes By way Portland, P NS what 46 LRA concluding paragraph of the court said to be caveat seems opinion: conveying subjacent upon land the state “The restrictions generally navigable think, should, we rivers to the waters navigable waters, speaking, apply or below under to lands proper ordinary dis- mark, of a river as the bed or low-water Chicago tinguished Water- as in bank shore from its Or at 402. case.” 65 front *16 practical purposes, conveyance

that what is, a to corporation, accomplished negli- could' be gence public charged duty of the officers with the asserting rights. the state’s

In Land Lee, Board v. through P we Mr. said, Justice Harris, general rule a that statute limitation in- does not government upon legal clude'the is not “founded expressed tempus fiction in the maxim nullum occurrit regi” but that “sound reason for the rule found in necessary public policy the fact that as a matter of it is preserve public rights, property to revenues and injury negligence public and loss officers.” support Like the rule which unavail- reasons makes government against the in a able the defense of laches public right protect a in- or to suit enforce eject- state’s action in terest. that character is the Of complaint gives mag- idea of the ment. The here some nitude that interest. opinion that the court erred over-

We are of the ruling complaint. to the the demurrer argued thing It is remains to be said.

One other properly any demurrer was sustained event the cоmplaint allegations of the it admits because private over of the river flows that the channel effect change property avulsive of an as the result complaint though it to treat elected haveWe equitable under statute. The alle- answer were place in no such an gations would have referred to statutory conformity procedure with the but answer, just pleaded, separately as the issues made should equi- separately out when the tried would be them considered have, therefore, failed. We defense table legal purely ignore defensive matter in proper to only validity complaint and to determine equitable defense of laches. . and the suit with- decree is reversed dismissed corporation’s right plea prejudice to enter

out ejectment complaint in and to further state’s opinion. proceedings in action conformable to this specially concurring. DENECKE, J., only solely upon ground I that laches is concur party seeking equitable relief and a defense *17 eject- a of a defense to law action ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍not available as ment. dissenting.

O’CONNELL, J., enjoin eject the state’s action of Plaintiff’s suit to resting a defensive maneuver is, substance, ment theory delay bringing upon that the state’s principal question is, laches. action constitutes can the defense of laches be asserted whether then, ample authority against Oregon There the state. general proposition that elsewhere for the as well as laches is available the state un defense of proper circumstances. ‹ Defendant how contends, der holding attempt the state was in the cases so that evеr, right public proprietary ing than a a rather enforce brings an action right when the state to- en and.that right, public it defendant contends did in a force ‹ Thus Oregon Hyde, 1, 40, 757, 88 Or P v. 169 of in State prin (1918), are committed to the court said: “We is 171 P 582 applicable state: State ciple of laches the doctrine that Co., 283, (106 780, Valley 108 304 Pac. 56 Or. Stock Warner v. ' 861).” Pac. (1952); 541, 562, Reed, P2d 283 also, 243 194 v. See Withers 23, Hallgarth No. 179 Or District v. School ex rel State Savings Security Trust Co. v. (1946); & ex rel P2d 655 172 179, 273, 751, 181 P2d 36 P2d 31 148 Or No. School District 532, 542-47, Holman, Cf., City 177 Or (1934). of Pendleton (1945). ALR 249 P2d

bringing ejectment appli not the'doctrine is action, (1936) Vincent, cable. State P2d 203 support and- other cases defendant’s contention that apply not laches does to the state when is enforc right. › ing public a Plaintiff concedes eases argues plaintiff present so hold. However, right only public proprie case does not involve but tаry right. having parties been drawn,

The battle line so argument'to their of whether narrow issue then bed of a assertion of its interest navi state’s gable pro of a or of a stream is the assertion narrowly right. prietary is even more drawn The issue rights plaintiff right such as the concedes because fishing, navigation, of of recreational use various right public rights, but contends that the are kinds dispose navigable the bed stream the state proprietary right. fi gravel is a therefrom or the satisfactory that “no now well established test It is distinguishing governmental from been devised for has Harper proprietary James, functions.” & Torts (1956). pp. As the all observe, authors § 1621-22 29.6, government “are—or should be— functions of *18 immunity government public The of benefit.” the for by attempting determined then be should not from suit categories, gov- two whether one of case into to fit the pub- public-private, jus ernmental-proprietary, necessary licum-jus privatum. it is to ascer- Rather, public on one interest of the hand the case in each tain person asserting a claim of the interest and the weighing interests these de- after and other, the on it › See Moore, (1950). 223 P2d 393 re Estate of In frequently upon made between the distinction relies ® Plaintiff privatum. jus publicum jus the and the them under cide which of should, circumstances, given preference. be the choice is not diffi Sometimes cult make. fl easy enough Thus, to decide that is public having in the interest use of stream purposes purposes or for economic recreational prevail transport person over the interest shall pursuit license from the state without who, private gain, public ivith that use. But interferes complexion problem takes on а different when the community clearly of the entire do not so interests predominate. Such the case when the state under is lands. (cid:176) only public The benefit takes to sell acquisition flowing from such sales is addi money by tional the state and its eventual use for state purposes. The same true when state leases the purpose navigable for the of remov beds of streams (OBS 274.530). engages ing gravel. When the state regarded it should be in transactions of this kind person position private standing than a different in no any preferential be treat not accorded it should point litigation The transactions. over such ment Law Administrative Treatise Davis, well stated (1958): p. § 17.01, «* * * readily why gov- [0]ne cannot see dealings property in its business

ernment subject same fairness rules of not should engaging apply to others such courts that the inquiry problem dealings. is: To that invites engages government in activities extent counterpart, why private should have which fl govern is not difficult where the choice cases In those policy function. mental-proprietary rubric serve intended present guidance, however, where gives cases like the one It no private balancing public and a more subtle involves choice interests. (cid:176) The provided for, e.g., in power land is to sell 274.040, 274.&15. 273.420, and ORS ORS ORS

342

government principle a be immune from of fairness developed guide that has been the determination private parties'?” of issues between controversy present real In the case the is over the gravel right question, type in the channel in a property which dealt with the state in property by private is dealt with same manner as such given pref- persons. Therefore the state not be .should disposition and the of this case treatment, erential “principle fair- controlled the same should be applicable litigation in between that would be ness” applicable parties. private The doctrine of laches private parties applied litigation should between proper in the circumstances. to the state I that there are such circumstances believe plaintiff’s present state demurred to Since the case. complaint, relevant to the defense of laches the facts complaint. garnered The recitation must be complaint plaintiff’s can be read to the facts asserting plaintiff had basis for claim mean that ground question that an avul on the channel occurred; the river had movement of sive early plaintiff knew that and its as 1933 state as ownership claiming private predecessor were expended large plaintiff has sum channel; plant; money and that due of its in the construction delay bringing the evidence estab suit to the state’s longer lishing plaintiff’s claim is no available. These the defense of laches. – to establish are sufficient facts disposed subsidiary problem of. remáins to be A – 713, Whitney Fox, 637, L 17 Ct 41 Ed 1145 166 US S v. See Ordway, L (1897); 15 S Ct 39 Ed 158 US Abraham Railroad, Mansfield, (1895); Coldwater Etc. Foster v. McCann, (1892); L Ed 899 Denison Ct US 13 S argued plaintiff It is must lose because the state can *20 not be sued without its consent. Plaintiff’s viewed suit, apart ejectment, action the state’s of would be by proscription. plaintiff’s barred that But suit is not to be a defensive maneuver considered; so necessary ejectment by the action. Plain made state’s essentially posture tiff defendant are the same parties Shinkle, the were in State v. here as (1962), excеpt that in the 373 P2d 674 Shinkle legal case the action law and a defense was was at by that if raised answer. There we held the state em ploys machinery justice of to enforce a claim it is subject plaintiffs. The defenses available to other by sepa same can where the defense is raised be said enjoin or as it was rate suit to the state’s suit action, present case. deny majority plain- Apparently relief to would against though tiff laches could be asserted even may ground “that laches not be this on the used state; purely legal.” If as a a claim a de- defense barring recovery by equitable fendant has an basis why plaintiff, it should it is difficult to understand proceeding any he seeks whether the make difference equity brought in a in a court of court to bar was Although we have retained the distinction be- law. of neсessary jurisdiction, equity it is not and law tween unreasonably. distinction to extend the points Abraham, (1946). Ky As the court out 197 SW2d supra US at 421: 158 “* * * upon equity grounds which courts of one guilty plaintiff of laches is the in- relief where refuse justice necessity upon imposing of mak- the defendant long past, protect ing proof in order to himself of transactions during period, rights enjoyment which, a considerable adversary, unchallenged by full knowl- passed with his have edge the circumstances.” of all (cid:127) majority opinion also holds that even if Cor- equitable had an vallis Sand & G-ravel Co. defense'to ejectment sepa- it could not asserted in a action, be rate but would have to raised answer. suit ORS provides 16.460

“(2) In action at law where defendant is arising requiring out entitled to of facts relief, interposition his without equity, of a court material up he necessity suсh matter answer, set

defense, complaint filing on the ** equity (Emphasis court; side 'the added.) legislature language It from this seems clear equitable prohibit-the raising of an did not intend to party so. cross if a chooses to do bill, defense *21 (1919) P 368 so Churchill v. Meade, 92 Or the holds. There court said: language new that the “It will be noted mandatory. permissive It is and not

enactment allows but does interpose compel litigant not the to' equitable con- at defenses. -This the action law apparent the read that when struction is when we pro- equitable interposed the case matter is shall equitable equity issues until the as a suit in ceed are not is this statute The effect of determined. giving change operation a of the old rule to try party at law and, out defenses an election to his urge grounds equitable his if unsuccessful, by figure by proper a It said a suit. be relief opens into a new speech door statute that the chancery through before, law- whereas courts, entry in that suit been a direct must have with is a matter of election before, As forum. equitable litigant initiate his he shall whether . original suit.”' 92 an in the law action defense Or at 632-33. Hopka P 342 Forbes, v. Later, filing (1931), that “The cross- states court interposing action, a law- a defendant bill longer permis no equitable action, defense to. of Churchill No mention is made under our codé.” sible explain attempt supra, made and no Meade, already language I have as which, of the statute mandatory permissive rather than is cast indicated, Hopka court in seems obvious terms. It carefully supra, the matter not consider did Forbes, controlling treat it as I would not and for that reason now. † upon us of laches in the thаt the defense hold

We should raised-by plaintiff’s properly present suit case was ejectment. enjoin action of the state’s † It raising party equitable defense has been said seeking equitable separate must also affirmative relief in. suit restraining injunction the action at See law. in addition to (5th 1941). Jurisprudence Pomeroy, Equity 1369 at 990 Ed I § requirement adopt I not it. Pome for this do see no reason supra, suggested pure rejects de roy, distinction between ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍a However, even affirmative relief. and one which also seeks fense adopted, prayer plaintiff’s requirement com were. if-the request quieted plaint title be could be construed “wholly regarded though plaintiff its action as defensive.” notes 30A CJS Equity § this question. are in a decided minority upon decisions that court holds Pennsylvania in a governmental laches even when it аcts barred by v. Stahl in a recent decision, For example, capacity. Co., Pa. Bank. & Trust Pa 191 A2d First 121, St it was held that laches an escheat proceeding, contrary available the state. This ruling Vincent, State v. decision also supra, to our escheat case. in Warner to justify Valley there anything Nor is for the that proposition the conclusion stands its administering Oregon holding the State of ca acts in a purely nongovernmental lands decision has been stated and The basis of the pacity. counsel or the the briefs of there is no suggestion was even con question court this opinion it should have why no reason indeed, There is, sidered. limitation effect at that time statute of for the been, all activities, governmental state in applied Hutchinson, 35 Or 253, 257, otherwise. Schneider Paul v. 474; City St. Am Rep St P Co., Minn Ry. & P. 48 NW M. St. Chicago, Holman, at Pendleton supra, City 17. Cf.

Case Details

Case Name: Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. v. State Land Board
Court Name: Oregon Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 10, 1968
Citation: 439 P.2d 575
Court Abbreviation: Or.
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