Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
This suit was commenced on the 1st of March, 1883, in a Circuit Court of Illinois, by an information or bill in equity, filed by the Attorney General of the State, in the name of its people against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, a corporation created under its laws, and against the city of Chicago. The United States were also named as a party . defendant, but they never appeared in the suit, and it was impossible to bring them in as a party without their consent. The alleged grievances arose solely from the acts and claims of the railroad company, but the city of Chicago was made a defendant because of its interest in the subject of the litigation. The railroad company filed its answer in the state court at the first term after the commencement of the suit, and upon its petition the case was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. In May following the city appeared to the suit and filed its answer, admitting all the allegations of fact in the" bill. A subsequent motion by the complainant to remand the case to the state court was denied. 16 Fed. Rep. 881. The pleadings were afterwards altered in various particulars. An • amended information or bill was filed by the Attorney General, and the city filed a cross-bill for affirmative relief against the State and the coippany. The latter appeared to the cross-bill and answered it,'as did the Attorney General for the State. Each party has. prosecuted a separate appeal.
The object of the suit is to obtain a judicial determination of the title of certain lands- on the east or lake front, of the city of Chicago, situated between the Chicago River and Six- ■ t'eenth street, which have been reclaimed from the waters of the lake, and are occupied by the tracks, depots, warehouses, piers arid other structures used by the railroad company in its business; and also óf the title claimed by the company to the submerged lands, constituting the bed of the lake, lying east of its tracks, within the corporate limits of the city, for the distance of a mile, and between the south line of the south pier near Chicago River extended eastwardly, and a line
We agree with the court below that, to a clear understanding of ■ the numerous questions presented in this case, it was necessary to trace the history of the title to the several parcels of-land- claimed by the company. And the court, in its elaborate opinion, (33 Fed. Rep. 730,) for that purpose referred to the legislation of the United States and of the State, and to ordinances of the. city and proceedings thereunder, and stated, with great minuteness of detail, every material provision of law and every step taken. We have with great care gone over' the history detailed and are satisfied with its entire accuracy. It would, - therefore, serve no useful purpose to repeat what is, in our- opinion, clearly and fully narrated. In what' we may say of the rights of the -railroad company, of the State, arid of the city, remaining after the legislation and proceedings taken, we shall assume the correctness of that history.
The State of Illinois was admitted-into the Union in 1818 on an eqpal footing with the' original States in all respects. Such was one of the conditions of the cession from Virginia ■of the territory northwest of the Ohio Eiver, out of which the State was formed. But the equality prescribed would have existed if it had not been thus stipulated. There cari be no distinction between the several States of the Union in the character of the jurisdiction, sovereignty and dominion which they may possess and exercise^over persons and subjects within -their respective' limits. The boundaries of the State were prescribed by Congress and accepted by'the State in its original Constitution. They are given in the bill. It is sufficient for our purpose to observe that they include within their eastern line all that portion of Lajre Michigan lying east of the main land of the State and the middle of the lake south of latitude forty-two degrees and thirty minutes.
The same doctrine is in this country held to be applicable to lands covered by fresh water in the Great Lakes over which is conducted an extended commerce with different States and foreign nations. These lakes possess all the general characteristics of open seas, except in the freshness of their waters, and in the absence of the ebb and flow of the tide. In other respects they are inland seas, and there is no reason or principle for the assertion of dominion and sovereignty over and ownership by the Stats' of lands covered by tide waters that is not equally applicable to its ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by. the fresh waters of these lakes. At one time the existence of tide waters was deemed essential in determining the admiralty jurisdiction of courts in England. That doctrine is now repudiated in this country as wholly inapplicable to our condition. In England the ebb and flow of the tide constitute the legal test of the navigability • of waters. There no waters are navigable in fact, at least to any great extent, which are not subject to the tide. There, as- said in the case of The Genesee Chief,
But in this, country the case is different. Some of our rivers are navigable for great distances above the flow of the tide; indeed, for hundreds of miles, by the largest vessels-used in commerce. As said in the case cited: “ There is certainly nothing in the ebb and flow of the tide that makes the waters peculiarly suitable for admiralty jurisdiction, nor anything in the absence of a tide that renders it unfit. If it is a public navigable water’, on which commerce is carried on between different States or nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely the same. And if a distinction is made on that account, it is merely arbitrary, without any foundation in reason ; and, indeed, would seem to be inconsistent with it.”
The Great Lakes are not in any appreciable respect affected by the tide, and yet on their waters, as said above, a large commerce is carried on, exceeding in many instances the entire commerce of States on the borders of the sea. When the reason of the limitation of admiralty jurisdiction in England Was found inapplicable to the condition of navigable waters i,n this country, the limitation-and all its incidents were discarded. So also, by the common law, the doctrine of the dominion over and ownership by the crown of lands within the realm under tide waters is not founded upon the existence of the tide over the lands, but upon the fact that the waters are navigable, tide waters and navigable waters, as already said, being used as synonymous terms in England. The public being interested in the use of such waters, the possession by private individuals of lands under them could not be per-' mitted except by license of the crown, which could alone exercise such dominion over the waters as would insure freedom in their use so far as consistent with the public interest. The doctrine is founded upon the necessity of preserving to.. the, public the use of navigable waters from private interruption and encroachment, a reason as applicable, to navigable fresh watdSrs as to waters moved by the tide. We'hold, there
The city of Chicago is situated upon the southwestern shore of Lake Michigan, and includes,-'-with other territory,- fractional sections 10 and 15, in township 39 north, range 11 east of the third principal meridian, bordering on the lake, which forms their eastern boundary. Lor,- a long time' after the organization of the city its harbor'was the Chicago Liver, a small, narrow stream opening into the lake near the centre of the east and west line of section 10, and in it the shipping ■ arriving from other ports of the lake and navigable waters was moored or anchored, and along it were docks and wharves. The growth of the- city in subsequent years in population, business and commerce required a larger and more convenient harbor, and the United States, .in view of such expansion and growth, commenced the construction of a system of breakwaters and other harbor protections in the waters of the lake in front of the fractional sections mentioned. In the prosecution of this work there was constructed a line of breakwaters or cribs of wood and stone covering the front of the city between the Chicago Liver and Twelfth street, with openings in the piers- or lines of cribs for the entrance and departure of vessels, thus enclosing a largo, part of the lake for the uses of shipping and commerce; and creating an outer harbor for Chicago. It comprises a space about one mile and one-half in length from north to south, and-
The case proceeds upon the-theory and allegation that t.he-defendant, the Illinois Central Railroad Company, has, without lawful authority,- encroached,, and continues to encroach, ■upon the domain of the State, and its original ownership and control of the waters of the harbor and of the lands there-' under, upon a claim of rights acquired under'a grant from the State and ordinance of the city to enter the city and appropriate land and -water two hundred feet wide in order to construct a track for a railway, and to erect thereon warehouses, piers and other structures in front of the city, and upon a claim of riparian rights acquired by virtue of ownership of lands- originally bordering on the lake in front of the citv. It also proceeds against the claim asserted by the railroad company of a grant by the State, iml869, of its right and title to the submerged lands, constituting the bed of Lake Michigan lying east of the tracks and breakwater of the company, for the distance of one mile, and between the south line of the south pier extended eastwardly and a line extended in the same direction from the south line of lot twenty-one south of and near.the machine shops and round-house, of the company ; and of a right thereby to construct at its pleasure^ in the harbor, wharves, piers and other works for its use.
And first, as to lands in the harbor of Chicago possessed and used by the railroad company under the act of Congress of September 20, 1850, (9 Stat. 466, c. 61,) and the ordinance of the city of June 14, 1852. By that act Congress granted to the State of Illinois a right of way, not exceeding one hundred feet in width, on each side of its length, through the public lands, for the construction of a railroad from the southern terminus of the Illinois and Michigan Canal to a point at or near the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, with a branch to Chicago and another via the town of G-alena to a point opposite Dubuque in the State of Iowa, with the right to take the necessary materials for its construction. And, to aid in the construction of the railroad and branches, by the same act it granted to the State six alternate sections of land, designated by even numbers, on each side of the road and branches, with the usual reservation of any portion found to be sold by the .United States, or to which the right of preemption had attached at the time the route of the road and branches was definitely fixed, in which case provision was made for the selection of equivalent lands in contiguous sections.
The, act was formally accepted by the legislature of the State, February 17, 1851, (Laws of 1851, 192,193.) A few days before, and on the 10th of that month, the Illinois Central Eailroad Company was incorporated. It was invested generally with the powers, privileges, immunities and franchises of corporations, and specifically with the power of acquiring by purchase or otherwise, and of holding and conveying real and personal estate which might be needful to carry into effect fully the purposes of the act.
It was also authorized to survey, locate, construct and operate a railroad, with .one or more tracks or lines of rails, between the points designated and the branches mentioned. And it was declared that the company should'have a right of way upon, and might appropriate to its sole use and control, for the purposes contemplated, land not exceeding two hundred feet in width throughout its entire length; and might enter upon and take possession of and use any lands, streams and materials of every kind, for the location of depots and stopping stages, for the purpose of constructing bridges, dams, embankments, engine-houses, shops and other buildings necessary for completing, maintaining and operating the road. All such lands, waters, materials and privileges belonging to •the State were granted to the corporation for that purpose; and it was provided that, when owned by or belonging to any person, company or corporation, and they could not be obtained by voluntary, grant or release, the same might be taken and paid for by proceedings for condemnation as prescribed by law.
It was also enacted that nothing in the act should authorize the corporation to make a location of its road within any city without the consent of its common council. This consent was given by an ordinance of the common council of Chicago,
Ey the ordinance the company was required^ to erect and maintain on the western or inner line of the ground pointed out for its main tracks on the lake shore such suitable walls, fences or other sufficient works as would prevent animals from straying upon or obstructing its tracks, and secure persons and property from danger; and to construct such suitable-gates at proper places at the ends of the streets, which were then or might thereafter be laid out, as required by the common council, to afford safe access to the lake; and provided that, in the case of the construction of an outside harbor, streets might be laid out to approach the same in the manner provided by law. The company was also required to erect and complete within three years after it should have accepted the ordinance, and forever thereafter maintain, a continuous wall or structure of stone masonry, pier-work or other sufficient material, of regular and sightly appearance, and not to exceed in height the general level of Michigan Avenue, opposite thereto, from the north side of Randolph street to the southern bound of Lake Park, at a distance of not more than three -hundred feet east from and parallel with the western.or inner line of the company, and continue the works to the southern boundary of the city, at such distance outside of the track of the road as might be expedient; which structure and works should be of sufficient strength and magnitude to protect .the entire front of the city, between the north line of Randolph street and its southern boundary, from further damage or injury from the .action of the waters of Lake'Michigan ; and that that part of the' structure south of Lake Park should be commenced and prosecuted with reasonable despatch after acceptance of the ordinance. It was also enacted that the company should “ not in any manner, nor for any purpose whatever, occupy, use or intrude upon the open ground known as ‘ Lake. Park,’ belonging to the city of Chicago, lying, between Michigan Avenue and the western or inner line before mentioned, except so far
The company was allowed ninety days to ¿ccept this ordinance, and it was provided that upon such acceptance a contract embodying its provisions should be executed and delivered between the city and the company, and that the rights and privileges conferred upon the company should depend upon the performance on its part of the requirements made. The ordinance was accepted and the required agreement drawn and executed on the 28th of March, 1853. •
Tinder the authority of this ordinance the railroad company located its tracks within the corporate limits of the city. Those running northward from Twelfth street were.laid upon piling in tbe waters of the lake. The shore line of the lake was, at that time, at Park Row, about four hundred feet from the west line of Michigan Avenue, and at Randolph street about one hundred and twelve and a half feet. Since then the space between the shore line and the tracks of the railroad company has been filled with earth under the direction of the city and is now solid ground.
After the tracks were constructed the company erected -.a breakwater east of its roadway-upon a line parallel with .the west line of Michigan Avenue, and afterwards filled up the space between the breakwater and its tracks with earth and stone.
¥e do not deem it material, for the determination of any questions presented hr this case, to describe in detail, the extensive works of the railroad company under the permission given
The railroad company never acquired by the reclamation from the waters of the lake of the land upon which its tracks are laid, or by the construction of the road and works connected therewith, an absolute fee in the- tract reclaimed, with a consequent right to dispose of the same to other parties, or to use it for any other -purpose than the one designated — the construction and operation of a railroad thereon with one or more, tracks and works in connection with the road or in aid thereof. The act incorporating the company only granted to it a right of way over the public lands for its use and control, for the purpose contemplated, which was to enable it to survey, locate, and construct and operate a railroad. All lands, waters, materials and privileges belonging to the • State were granted solely for that purpose. It did not contemplate, much less authorize, any diversion of the property to any other purpose. The use of it was restricted, to the purpose expressed. Whilst the grant to it included waters of streams in the line of the right of way belonging to the State, it was accompanied with a declaration that it should not be so construed as to authorize the corporation to interrupt the navigation of the streams. If the waters of the lake may be deemed to be included in the
"We shall hereafter consider Avhat rights the company acquired as a riparian owner from its acquisition of title to lands bn the shore of the lake, but at present' we are speaking only of what rights it Acquired from the reclamation of- the tract upon which the railroad and the Avorks in connection with it'are built-. ' The construction of a pier or the' extension of any land into navigable waters for a railroad or other purposes, by one not the owner of lands on the shore, does not' give the builder of such pier or extension, whether, án individual or corporation, any riparian rights. Those rights are incident ' to riparian ownership. They exist with such ownership and pass with the transfer of the land. And the land must not only ' be contiguous to the water, but in contact with it. Proxiihity. without contact is insufficient. The riparian right attaches to land on the border of navigable water without any declaration to that effect from the'former owner, and its designation in a conveyance by him- Avould be surplusage.' (See Gould -on .Waters, § 148, and authorities there cited.)
•The .riparian proprietor is entitled, among other rights, as held in Yates v. Milwaukee,
. In this case it appears that fractional section 10, Avhich was included within the city limits bordering on the lake front, was, many years before this suit was brought, divided,, under the authority of the United States, into blocks and lots, and the lots sold. The proceedings taken and the laws passed on the subject for the sale of the lots are stated Avith great particularity in the opinion of the court below, but for our purpose it is sufficient to mention that the lots laid out in fractional section 10 belonging to the United States were sold, and, either directly or from purchasers, the title to some of them fronting on the lake north of Randolph street became vested in the railroad company, and the company, finding the lake in front of those lots shallow, filled it in and upon the reclaimed land constructed slips, Avharves and piers, the last three piers in 1872, 1873, 1880, and 1881, which it claims to own and to have the right to use in its business.
According to the law of riparian ownership, which we have stated, this claim .is well founded so far as the piers do not extend beyond the.point of navigability in the waters of the lake. "We are not fully satisfied that such is the case from the evidence Avhich the company has produced, and the fact is not conceded. Nor does the court below find that such navigable point had been established by any public authority
The same position may\_be taken as to the claim of the company to the pier- and docks erected in front of Michigan Avenue between the lines of Twelfth and Sixteenth streets extended. The company had previously acquired the title to certain lots fronting on the lake at that point,, and, upon its claim of riparian rights from that ownership,'had erected the structures in question. Its ownership of them likewise depends upon the question whether they are extended beyond or are limited to the. navigable point of the watérs of the lake, of which, no satisfactory evidence was offered.
Upon the land reclaimed by the railroad company as riparian proprietor in front of lots into which section ten was divided, which it had purchased, its passenger depot was erected north of Randolph street, and, to facilitate its approach, the common council, by ordinance adopted September 10,1855, authorized it to curve' its tracks westwardly of the line fixed by the ordinance of. 1852, sq as to cross that line at a point not more than two hundred feet south of Randolph street, in accordance with a specified plan. This permission was given upon-the condition that the company should lay out upon its own land west of and alongside its passenger house a street fifty feet wide, extending from Water street to Randolph street, and fill 'the same up its entire length, within two years from the passage of the- ordinance. - The company’s tracks were curved as permitted, .the-street referred-to was opened, the required filling was done, and the street has ever since been used by the public. It being necessary that the railroad company should have additional means of approaching and using its station grounds between Randolph street, and the Chicago River, the. city, by another ordinance adopted September li>, 1856, granted it permission to enter and use, in perpetuity, for its line of; railroad and other works necessary to protect the same from.the lake, the space between its then breakwater and a line drawn from a point thereon seven hundred feet south of the north line of Randolph’ street extended, and running thence on a straight line to the. southeast corner of
We proceed to consider the claim of the railroad company to the ownership of submerged lands in the harbor, and the right to construct such wharves, piers, docks and other works therein as it may deem proper for its interest and business. ’The claim is founded upon the third section of the act of the legislature of the State passed, on the 16th of April, 1869, the material part of which is as follows:
“ Sec. 3. The right of the Illinois Central Eailroad Company under the grant from the State in its charter, which said grant constitutes a part of the consideration for which the said company pays to the State at least seven per cent of its gross earnings, and under and by virtue of its appropriation, occupancy, use and control, and the riparian ownership incident to such grant, appropriation, occupancy, use and control, in and to the lands submerged or otherwise lying east of the said line running parallel with and four hundred feet east of the west line. of Michigan Avenue, in .fractional sections ten and fifteen, township and range as aforesaid, is hereby confirmed; and all the right and title of the State of Illinois in and to the submerged lands constituting the bed of Lake Michigan, and lying east of the tracks and breakwater of the Illinois Central Eailroad Company, for the-distance of one mile, and; between the south line of the south pier extended eastwardly and a line extended eastward from the south line of lot twenty-one, south of and near to the round-house and machine shops of said company, in the south division 'of the said city of Chicago, are hereby granted in fee to the said Illinois Central Eailroad Company, its successors and assigns: provided, however, that the fee to said lands shall be held by said company in perpetuity, and that the said company shall not have power to grant, sell or convey the fee to the same; and that all gross receipts from use, profits, leases or otherwise of said lands, or the improvements
The act, of which this section is a part, was accepted by a resolution of the board of directors of the company at its office in the city of New York, July 6, 1870; but the acceptance was not communicated to the State until the 18th of November,' 1870. A copy of the resolution was on that day forwarded to the Secretary of State, and filed and recorded by him in the records of his office. On the 15th of April, 1873, the legislature of Illinois repealed the act. ■ The questions presented . relate to the validity of the section cited of the act and the effect of the repeal upon its operation.
The section in question has two objects in view: one was to confirm certain alleged rights of the railroad company under the grant from the State in its charter and under and “ by virtue of its appropriation, occupancy, use and control, and the riparian ownership incident ” thereto, in and to the lands submerged or otherwise lying east of a line parallel with and four hundred feet east of the west line of Michigan Avenue, in fráctional sections ten and fifteen. The other object was to grant to the railroad company submerged lands in the harbor.
The confirmation made,-whatever the operation claimed for it in other respects, cannot be invoked so as' to extend the riparian right which the company possessed, from its owner-' ship of lands in sections ten and fifteen on the shore of the lake. Whether the piers’ or docks constructed by it, after the passage of-the act of 1869, extend beyond the point of navigability in the waters of the lake, must be the subject of judicial
As to the grant of the submerged lands, the act declares that all the right and title of the State in and to the submerged lands, constituting the bed of Lake. Michigan, and lying east of. the tracks and breakwater of the company for the distance of one mile, and between the south line of the south pier extended ' eastwardly. and a line extended eastwardly from the south line of' lot twenty-one, south of and near to the round-house and machine shops of the company “ are granted in fee to the railroad company, its successors and assigns.” The grant is accompanied with a proviso that the fee of the' lands shall be held by the company in perpetuity, and that it shall not have the power to grant, sell or convey the fee thereof. It also declares that nothing therein shall authorize obstructions to the harbor or impair the public right of navigation, or be construed to exempt the company from any act regulating the rates of wharfage and dockage to be charged in the harbor.
This clause is treated by the counsel of the company as an absolute conveyance to it of title to the submerged lands,'giving it as full and complete' power to use and dispose of the same, except in the technical transfer of the fee, in any manner it may choose, as if they were uplands, in no respect covered or affected by navigable waters, and not as a license to. use the lands subject to revocation by the State. Treating it as such a conveyance, its validity must be'determined by. the consideration whether the legislature was competent to make á grant of the kind.
The act, if valid and operative to the extent claimed, placed
The circumstances attending the passage of the act through the legislature were on the hearing the subject of much .criticism. As originally introduced, the purpose of the act .was to enable the city of Chicago to enlarge its harbor and to grant to it the,title and interest of the State to. certain lands adjacent to the shore of Lake Michigan on the eastern front of the city, and-place the harbor under its control, giving it all the necessary powers for its wise management. But during the passage of- the act its purport was changed. Instead of providing for the cession of the submerged lands to the city, it provided for a cession of them to the railroad company. It was urged that the title of the act was not changed to correspond with its changed purpose, and an objection was taken to its validity on that account. But the majority of the court were of opinion that the evidence was insufficient to show that
The question, therefore, to be considered is whether the legislature was competent to thus deprive the State of its ownership.of the submerged lands in the harbor of Chicago, and of the consequent control of its waters; or, in other words, whether the railroad corporation can hold the lands and control the waters by the grant, against any future exercise of póweV over them by the State.
That the State holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan, within its limits, in the same manner that the State holds title to soils under tide water, by the common law, we have already shown, and that title necessarily carries with it control- over the waters above them whenever the lands aré subjected to use. But it is a title different in character from that which the State holds in lands intended for sale. It is different from the title which the United States hold in the public lands which are open to preemption and sale.- It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that they may .enjoy the navigation of the watez’s, carry on coznmerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed, frozn the obstruction or interference' of private parties. The interest of the- people in the navigation of the watez’s and in commerce over them may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks and piers therein, for which purpose the. State may grant parcels of the submerged lands.; and, so long as their dispositiozi is made for such purpose, no valid Objections can be made to the grants. It is grants of parcels of lands under navigable waters, that may afford foundation -for wharves, piers, docks and other structures in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the public interest in-the lands and waters remaining, that are chiefly considered and sustained in the adjudged cases as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently with thé tzmst to the public upon which such lands are held by the State. But that is a very diffez’ent doctrine from the one which would sanction the-abdication of the general control of the State over lands ujider the
The harbor of Chicago is of immense value to the people of the State „of Illinois in the facilities it affords to its vast and constantly increasing commerce; and the idea that its legislature can deprive the State of control over its bed and waters and place the same in the hands of a private corporation created for a different purpose, one limited to transportation of passengers and freight between distant points and the city, is a proposition that cannot be defended:
The area of the submerged lands proposed to be ceded by the act in question to the railroad .company embraces something more than a thousand acres, being, as stated by counsel, more than three times the area of the outer harbor, and not only including all of that harbor but embracing adjoining submerged lands which will, in all probability, be hereafter included in the harbor. It is as large as that embraced by all the merchandise docks along the-Thames at London; is much larger than that included .in the famous docks and.basins at Liverpoolis twice that of the port of Marseilles, atid nearly if not quite equal to the pier area along the water -frontlof the. city of New York. And the arrivals áh'd clearings of vessels at the port exceed in number those of New York, and; are equal to those of New York and Boston combined.- Chicago •- has nearly twenty-five per cent of the lake-carrying trade as’ compared’with the arrivals and clearings of all the leading ports of our great inland seas. In the year ending June 30, 1886, the joint arrivals and clearances of vessels at that port amounted to twenty-two' thousand and ninety-six, with a tonnage of over seven millions; and in 1890 the tonnage of the vessels reached nearly nine mili ions. As stated by counsel, since the passage of the Lake Front Act, in 1869, the population of the. city has increased nearly a million souls, and the increase of commerce has keo.t pace with it. It is hardly conceivable that the legislatuha'can divest the State, of the control
Any grant of the kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which the- property was held by the State can be resumed at any time. 'Undoubtedly there may be expenses incurred in improvements made under such a grant which the State ought to pay; but, be that as it may, the power to resume the trust whenever the State judges best is, we think, incontrovertible. The position advanced by the railroad company in support of its claim to'the ownership of the submerged lands and the right to the erection of wharves, piers and docks at its pleasure, or for its business in the harbor of Chicago, would place every harbor in the country at the mercy of a majority of the legislature of the State in which the harbor is situated.
We cannot, it'is true,- cite any authority where a grant of this kind has been held invalid, for we believe that no instance exists where the harbor of a great city and its commerce have been alio wed to pass, into the control of any private-corporation. But the decisions áre numerous which declare that such property is held by the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for the public?. The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor and of the lands under them is a subject of public concern to the whole people of the State. The trust with which they are held, therefore, is governmental and-cannot be alienated, except in those instances mentioned of parcels used in the improvement of the interest thus held, or when parcels
This' follows necessarily from the public character of the property, being held by the whole people for purposes in which the whole people are interested. As said by Chief .Justice Taney, in Martin v. Waddell,
In the case of Stockton v. Baltimore and New York Railroad Company, 32 Fed. Rep. 9, 19, 20, which involved a consideration by Mr. Justice Bradley, late of this court, of the nature of the ownership by the State of lands under the navigable waters of the United States, he said:
“ It is insisted that the property of the State in lands under its navigable waters -is private property, and comes strictly, within the constitutional provision. It is significantly asked,
Many other cases might be cited where it has been decided that the bed or soil of navigable waters is held by the people of the State in their character as sovereign in. trust for public*
' In People v. New York amd Staten Island Ferry Co.,
“ The title to lands under' tide waters, within the realm of England, were, by the common law, deemed to be vested in the king as a public trust, to subserve and protect the public right to use them as common highways for commerce, trade, and intercourse. The king, by virtue of his proprietary interest could grant the soil so that it should become private property, but his grant was subject to the paramount right of public use of .navigable waters, which he could neither destroy nor abridge. In every such grant there was an implied reservation of the public right, and so far as it assumed to interfere with it, or to confer a right to impede or obstruct-navigation, or to make an exclusive appropriation of the use of navigable waters, the grant was void. In his treatise De J ure Maris (p. 22) Lord Hale says: ‘The jus privat/um that is acquired by the subject, either by patent or prescription, must not prejudice the jus publicum, wherewith public rivers and the arms of the sea are affected to public use; ’ and Mr. Justice Best, in Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & A. 268, in speaking of the subject, says: ‘ The soil can only be transferred subject to the public trust, and general usage shows that the public right has been excepted out of the grant of the soil.’ . . .
“The principle of the common law to which we Have adverted is founded upon the most obvious principles of public policy. The sea and navigable rivers are natural highways, and any obstruction to the common right, or exclusive appropriation of their use, is injurious to commerce, and if permitted at the will of the sovereign, would be very likely to end in materially crippling, if not destroying it. The laws of most nations have sedulously guarded the public use of navigable waters within, their limits against infringement, subjecting it only to such regulation by the State, in the interest of the public, as is deemed consistent with the preservation of the public right.”
The soil under navigable waters being held by the people of the State in trust for the common úse and as a portion of their inherent sovereignty, any act of • legislation concerning their use affects the public welfare. If is, therefore, appropriately within the exercise of the pbliee power of the State.
In Newton v. Commissioners,
As counsel observe, if this is true doctrine as to the location of a county seat it is apparent that it-must apply with greater force to the control of the soils and beds of navigable waters; in the great public harbors. held' by the people in trusty for
The legislation of the State in the Lake Front Act, purporting to grant the fee of the submerged lands riientioned to the railroad company, was considered by the court below, in view of the preceding measures . taken for the .improvement of the harbor, and because further improvement in the same direction was contemplated, as a mere license to the company to prosecute such further improvement as an agency of the State, and that to this end the State had' placed certain of its resources at the command, of the company with such an enlargement of its powers and. privileges as enabled it to accomplish the objects in view.. And the court 'below, after observing that the act might be assumed as investing the- railroad company, with the power, not given In' its original charter, of erecting ' and maintaining wharves, docks ánd piers in the interest of commerce, and beyond the necessities or legitimate purposes of its own .business as a railroad corporation, added that it wa$ unable to perceive why it was not competent for the State; by subsequent legislation, to repeal.the act and withdraw the additional powers of the company, thereby restricting it to the
It remains to consider the, claim of the city of Chicago to portions of the east water front and how such claim, and the rights áttached to it, are interfered with by the railroad company.
'The claim of the city is to the ownership in fee of the streets, alleys, ways, commons and other public grounds on the east front of the city bordering "on the lake, as exhibited on the maps, showing the subdivision of fractional sections ten and -fifteen,' prepared under the supervision and direction of United States officers in the one case and by the canal comr' missioners in the other, and duly recorded* and the riparian rights attached to such ownership. - Ey a statute of- Illinois the making, acknowledging and recording of the plats operated to.vest the title to'the streets, alleys, ways and commons, and other public grounds designated on such plats, in the city, in trust for the public uses to which they were applicable. Canal Trustees v. Havens, 11 Illinois, 556; Chicago v. Rumsey, 87 Illinois, 354.
Such ■ property, besides other parcels, included the whole of that portion of fractional section fifteen which constitutes Michigan Avenue, and that part Of the fractional section lying •east of the- west line of Michigan Avenue, arid that portion of-fractional section tén designated on one of the plats as “public ground,” which was always to remain open and.free from any buildings.
." The estate, real and personal, held by the trustees' of the' town of Chicago was vested in the city of Chicago by the act of March 4, 1837. It followed that when the Lake Front Act of 1869 was passed the fee was in the city, subject to the public uses designated, of all the portions of section ten -and fifteen, particularly, described in the decree below. • And we agree with'the-court below that the fee. of the made or reclaimed ground between Randolph street and Park Row, embracing the ground upon which rest the tracks' and the
. We also.agree with the court below that the city of Chicago, as riparian owner of the grounds on its east or lake front of the city, between the north line of Randolph street and the north line of block twenty-three, each of the lines being produced to Lake Michigan, and in virtue of authority conferred by its chartei*, has the power to construct and keep in, repair ,on the lake front, east of said premises,' within the lines mentioned, public landing places, wharves, docks and levees, subject, however, in the execution of that-power, to the authority of the State to prescribe the lines beyond which piers, docks, wharves and other structures, other than those erected by the general government, may not be extended into the navigable waters of the harbor, and to such supervision and control as. the United States may rightfully exercise.
It follows from the views expressed, and it is so declared and-adjudged, that the State of Illinois is the owner in fee of the submerged lands constituting the bed of Lake Michigan, which the third section of the act of Aprií 16, 1869, purported to grant to the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and that the' act of April 15, 1873, repealing the same is valid and effective
But the decree- below, as it respects the pier commenced in 1872, and the piers completed in 1880 and 1881, marked 1, 2, and 3, néar Chicago River, and the pier and docks between and in front of Twelfth and Sixteenth streets, is modified so as to direct the.court belo.w to order such investigation to be made as may enable it- to determine- whether those piers erecte'd by the company, by virtue of its riparian proprietorship of lots formerly constituting part of section ten, extend into the lake beyond the point of practical navigability, having reference to the -manner in which commerce in vessels is conducted on the lake; and, if it be determined upon such investigation that said piers, or any of them, do not extend beyond such point, then that the title and possession of the railroad company to such piers shall be affirmed by the court ; but if it be ascertained and determined that such piers, or any’ of them, do extend beyond such navigable point, then the said court shall direct the said pier or piers, to the excess ascertained, to be abated and removed, or that other proceedings relating 'thereto be taken on the application of the State as may be authorized by law; and also to order that similar proceedings be taken to ascertain and determine whether or not the pier and dock, constructed, by the railroad company in front of the shore between Twelfth and Sixteenth' streets extend beyond the point of navigability, and to affirm the title and possession o-f the company if they do not extend beyond such point, and, if they do extend beyond such point, to order the abatement and removal of the excess, or that other' proceedings'relating thereto be taken on application of the State as may be authorized by law
Except as modified im, the particular.‘s 'menUonech, the decree im each of'the three cases on appeal must be afivrmed, with costs against the railroad company; and it is so ordered.
Dissenting Opinion
with whom concurred Mr. Justice (U-bast and-Mr. Justice Brown, dissenting.
Thus- it was said in Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57, 65, that “upon the admission of California into the Union upon equal footing with the original States, absolute property in, and dominion and sovereignty over, all soils under the tide waters within her limits passed to the State, with the consequent right to dispose of the title to any pct/rt of said soils' in such manner as she might deem proper, subject only to the paramount right of navigation over the waters, so far as such navigation might be required by the necessities of commerce with foreign nations or among the several States, the regulation of which was vested in the general government.”
In Hoboken v. Pennsylvania Railroad,
In Stevens v. Paterson & Newark Railroad, 5 Vroom, (34 N. J. Law,) 532, it was declared by the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey that it was competent for the. State to grant to a stranger lands constituting the shore of a navigable river under tide water below the tide-water mark, to be occupied and used with structures-and improvements.
Langdon v. New York City,
These -citations might be indefinitely multiplied from authorities both Federal and Staté.
The State of Illinois,' by her information or bill of complaint, in this case, alleges that “ the claims of the' defendants a're a great and irreparable injury to the State of Illinois as a proprietor <md owner of the bed of the lake, throwing doubts and clouds upon its title thereto, and preventing an' advanta^ geous sale or' other disposition thereof; ” and in the prayer' for relief the State asks that “ its title may be established and confirmed, that the claims made by the-railroad company may be declared to be unfounded, and that the State of Illinois may be declared to have the sole and exclusive right to develop the harbor of '■Chicago by the construction of docks, wharves, etc., and to 'dispose of sueX rights at its pleasure”
Indeed, the logic of the State’s case, as well as her pleadings, attributes to the State entire power to hold and dispose, of, .by grant or lease, the lands in' question; and' her case is put upon the alleged invalidity of the title of the railroad company, arising out of the asserted unconstitutionality of 'the act of 1869, which act made the grant, by reason of certain irregularities in its passage and title, or, that- ground failing, "upon the right of the State to arbitrarily revoke, the grant, as a
The opinion of the majority, if I rightly apprehend it, likewise concedes that a State does possess the power to grant the rights of property and possession in such lands to private parties, but. the power is stated to be, in some way restricted to “small parcels, or where such parcels can.be disposed of without detriment to the public interests in the lands and waters remaining.” But it is difficult to see how thé validity of the exercise of the power, if the power exists, can depend upon the size of the parcel granted, or how, if it be'possible to imagine that the power is subject to such a limitation, the present case would be affected, as the grant in question, though doubtless a large and valuable one, is, relatively to the remaining soil and waters, if not insignificant, yet certainly, in view of the purposes to be effected, not unreasonable. It is matter of common knowledge that a great railroad system, like that of the Illinois Central Railroad Company, requires an extensive and constantly increasing territory for its terminal facilities. ■
It would seem to be plain that, if the State of Illinois has the power, by her legislature, to grant private rights and interests in parcels of soil under her navigable .waters, the extent of such a grant and its effect upon the public interests in the lands and waters remaining are matters of legislative discretion.
Assuming, then, that the State' of Illinois possesses the .power to confer by grant, upon the ’'Illinois Central Railroad Company, private rights and property in the lands df the State underlying the waters of the lake, we come to inquire whether she has exercised that power by a valid enactment, and if so, whether the grant so made has been legally revoked.
It was contended, on behalf of the State, that the act of 1869, purporting to confer upon the railroad company certain rights in the lands in question, did not really so operate,'because the record of proceedings in the senate does not show that the bill was read three times during it's passage, and because the title of the bill does not sufficiently express the purpose of the
•. It is unnecessary to discuss these objections in this opinion, because the court below held them untenable, and because the opinion of the majority in this court adopts the reasoning and conclusion of the court below in this regard.
It was further contended, on behalf of the State,' that, even if the act of 1869 were a valid exercise of legislative power, yet the grant thereby made did not vest in the railroad company rights and franchises in the nature of private property, but merely conferred upon the company certain powers for public purposes, which were taken and held by the company as an agency of the State, and which accordingly could be recalled by the State whenever, in her wisdom, she deemed it for the public interest to do so, without thereby infringing a contract existing between her and the railroad company»
■This is a question that must be decided by the terms of the grant, read in the light of the nature of the power exercised, of the character of the railroad company as a corporation created to carry out public purposes, and of the'facts and' circumstances disclosed by the record.
It must be conceded, in limine, that, in construing this grant, the State is entitled to the benefit of certain well-settled canons of construction that pertain to grants by the State to private persons or corporations, as, for instance, that if there is any ambiguity or uncertainty in the act that interpretation must be put upon it which is most favorable to the State; that the words of the grant, being attributable to the' party procuring the legislation, are to receive a strict construction as against the grantee; and that, "as the State acts for the public good, we should expect to find the grant consistent with good- morals and the general welfare of the State at large and of the particular community to be affected.
These are large concessions, and, of course, in order to defeat the grant; they ought not to be pushed beyond the bounds of reason, so as to result in a strained and improbable construction. Reasonable effect must be given to the language' employed, and the manifest' intent of the enactment must prevail.
This act of Congress .was formally accepted by the legislature of the State, February 17, 1851. Laws of 111., 1851,192, 193. Seven days before, the acceptance — February 10, 1851 — the Illinois Central Railroad Company was incorporated for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating the railroad and branches contemplated in the-act of Congress.
By the second section of its charter, the company was authorized and empowered “ to. survey, locate, construct, complete, alter, maintain and operate a railroad with one or more tracks or lines of rails, from the southern terminus of the Illinois and Michigan' Canal to a point at the city of Cairo, with a branch of the same to the city of Chicago on Lake Michigan,1 and also a branch via the city of Galena tó a point on the Mississippi River opposite the town of Dubuque in the State of Iowa.”
It w;as provided in the third section that “ the said corporation shall have the right of way upon, and may appropriate to its sole use and control for the purposes contemplated herein, land not exceeding two hundred feet in width through its entire length; may enter upon ánd take possession of and use all and
The eighth section had the following provision : “ Nothing in this act contained shall authorize said corporation to make a location of their track within any city without the consent of the common council of said city.”
By the fifteenth section, the right of way and all the lands granted to the State by the act of Congress before mentioned, and also the right of way over and through lands owned by the State, were ceded and granted to the' corporation for the “ purpose of surveying, locating, constructing, completing, altering, maintaining and operating said road and branches.” There was a requirement in this section (clause 3) that the railroad should be built into the city of Chicago.
By the. eighteenth section, the company was required, in consideration of the grants, privileges and franchises conferred, to pay into the treasury of the State, on the first Monday of December and June of each year, five per centum of the gross receipts of -the road and branches for the six months then next preceding.
■ The twenty-second section provided for the assessment of an annual tax for state purposes .upon all the property and assets of the corporation; and if this tax and the five per cent charge upon the gross receipts should not amount to seven per cent
The act of November 5,1849, referred to in the third section of the charter, provided a mode for condemning land required, for railroad uses, and contained an express provision that upon the entry of-judgment the corporation “shall become seize,(i in fee of all the lands and real estate described during the-continuance of the corporation.” 2 Laws of Illinois, 1849, 27.
The consent of the common council to the location of therailroadi within the city of Chicago was given by an ordinance passed June 14, 1852.
On'the 16th of April, 1869, an act was passed by the legislature of Illinois, entitled “An act in relation to a portion of the submerged lands and Lake Park grounds -lying on and adjacent tó the shore of Lake Michigan, on the eastern frontage of the city of Chicago.” The'third section of this act provided as follows:
“ Sec. 8, The right of the Illinois' Central Eailroad Com.pany, undér the grant from the Staté in its charter, which said' grant constitutes a part of the consideration for which the said-company pays to the State at least seven per cent of its gross earnings, and under and by virtue of- its appropriation, occupancy, use and control, and the riparian ownership incident to such grant, appropriation, occupancy, use and control, in and to the lands submergéd or otherwise lying east of the said line-running parallel with and four hundred feet east -of the west line" of Michigan Avenúe, in fractional sections ten (10) and fifteen (15), township and range , as aforesaid, is hereby Confirmed ; and all the right and title of the State of Illinois, in and to the submerged lands, constituting the bed of Lake Michigan, and lying east of the tracks -and breakwater of the Illinois Central Eailroad Company for the distance of ■ one-mile, and between the south line of the south pier extended eastwardly, .and a line extended eastward from the south line
By this act, the right of the railroad company to all the lands it had appropriated and occupied, lying east'of a line drawn parallel to, and four hundred feet east of, the west line of Michigan Avenue, in fractional sections ten and fifteen, was confirmed; and a further grant was made to the company of thé submerged lands lying east of its tracks and breakwater, within the. distance of one mile therefrom, between the south ■ line of the south pier.extended eastwardly and a line extended eastward from the south line of lot twenty-one.
So long as the act stands in force there seems to me to exist a contract; whereby the Illinois Central Company is to have and enjoy perpetual possession ,and control of the lands in question, with the right to improye the same and take the rents, issues and profits thereof, provided always that' the company shall not have the power to sell or alien such lands, nor shall the company be authorized to maintain obstructions to the Chicago harbor, or to impair'the'public right of navigation; nor shall the company, its lessees or assigns, be exempted from any act of the general assembly, which may' be hereafter passed, regulating the rates of wharfage and dockage to be charged in said harbor, and whereby, in_ consideration of the grant of these rights and privileges, it shall be the duty of'the company to pay, and the right of the State to receive, seven per cent of the gross receipts of the railroad company from t “ use, profits, leases or otherwise, of said land or the improvements thereon, or that may be hereafter made thereon.”
Should the railroad company attempt to disregard the re-* straint on alienating the said lands, the State can, by judicial proceeding, enjoin such an act, or can treat it as a legal ground of forfeiting the grant; or, if the railroad company fails or refuses to pay the per centum provided for, the State can enforce such payment by suit at law, and possibly by proceedings to forfeit the grant. But so long as the railroad company shall fulfil its part of the agreement, so long is the State of Illinois inhibited by the Constitution of the United States from passing any act impairing the obligation of the contract.
Doubtless there are limitations, both expressed and implied, on the title to and control over these lands by the company. As we have seen, the company is expressly forbidden to obstruct Chicago harbor, or to impair the public right of navigation. So, from the nature of the railroad corporation and of its relation to the State and the public, the improvements put upon these lands by the company, must be consistent with their duties as common carriers, and must be calculated to
To prevent misapprehension, it may be well to say that it is not pretended in this view of the case that the State can part, or has parted, by contract, with her sovereign powers. The railroad company takes and holds these lands subject at all times to the same sovereign powers in the State as obtain in the case of other owners of property. Nor can the grant in this case be regarded as in.any way hostile to the powers of the general government in the control of harbors arid navigable waters.
The able and interesting statement, in the opinion of the majority, of the rights of the public in the navigable waters, and of the limitation of the powers of the State to part with its control over them, is not dissented from. But its pertinency in. the-present discussion is not clearly seen. It will be time enough to invoke the doctrine of the inviolability of public rights when and if the railroad company shall attempt to disregard them. ‘
Should the State of Illinois see, in the great and unforeseen growth of the city of Chicago and of the lake commerce, reason to doubt the prudence of her legislature in entering into the contract created by the passage and acceptance of the act of 1869, she can take the rights and property of the railroad company in these lands by a constitutional condemnation of them. So, freed from the shackles of an undesirable contract, she can make, as she expresses in her bill the desire to do, a “ more advantageous sale or disposition to other parties,” without offence to the law of the land.
The doctrine that a State, by making a grant to'a corporation of her own creation, subjects herself to the restraints of law judicially interpreted, has been impugned by able political thinkers, who. may, perhaps, find in the decision of the court in the present case some countenance of their views. But I am unable to suppose that there is any intention , on the part of this court to depart from its doctrine so often expressed.
“ A private corporation created by the legislature may lose its franchises by a misuser or non-user of them, and they may be resumed by the government under a judicial judgment upon a quo warranto to ascertain and enforce the forfeiture. . . . But that the legislature can repeal statutes creating private corporations, or confirming to them property already acquired under the faith of previous laws, and by such repeal can vest the property of such corporations exclusively in the State, or dispose of the same to-such purposes as they-may please, without the consent or default of the corporators, we are not prepared to admit; and we think ourselves standing" upon the principles- of natural justice, upon the fundamental laws of every free government, upon the spirit and the letter of the Constitution of the United States, and upon the decisions of most respectable judicial tribunals, in resisting such a doctrine.” Terrett v. Taylor,
In Stone v. Mississippi,
The obvious conclusion from the foregoing view of the case is that the act of 1873, as an arbitrary act of revocation, not passed in the exercise of any reserved power, is void, that the