Keith William Erickson v. First Advantage Background Services Corp.
981 F.3d 1246
11th Cir.2020Background
- Keith Erickson applied to be a Little League assistant coach and authorized a background check that included a search of sex-offender registries.
- Little League contracted with consumer reporting agency First Advantage, which uses an internal database (including data from Experian Public Records) to run searches; in some jurisdictions the database only contains names and birth years, so the contract called for name-only searches where full DOBs were unavailable.
- First Advantage’s search returned a Pennsylvania sex-offender registry match for “Keith Dodgson” (Erickson’s birth name), a match produced by a name-only search.
- First Advantage’s report to Little League expressly stated the match was by first- and last-name only, warned the record “may not belong to your subject,” and instructed the requester to review the State Sex Offender Website before attributing the record. First Advantage also mailed Erickson a notification letter explaining the shared-name match and confidentiality.
- Erickson suffered humiliation, changed his family name, and sued First Advantage under the Fair Credit Reporting Act § 1681e(b), alleging failure to follow reasonable procedures to assure the “maximum possible accuracy.”
- The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for First Advantage, finding Erickson failed to prove the report was inaccurate or that it caused compensable harm; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of “maximum possible accuracy” under § 1681e(b) | Requires protection against misleading impressions beyond mere technical truth | Requires reports to be factually correct and not misleading to intended users | The Court: standard requires both factual correctness and freedom from being objectively likely to mislead; apply objectively to intended users |
| Whether First Advantage’s report violated § 1681e(b) | Report was “patently inaccurate”: it included a sex-offender record about an applicant who is not a sex offender | Report was technically correct (matched a name) and explicitly cautioned it was a name-only match requiring further review, so not misleading | Held: Report was factually correct and not objectively misleading to Little League; no § 1681e(b) violation |
| Evidentiary exclusions and damages/willfulness (punitive damages) | Exclusion of evidence about First Advantage’s finances and Erickson’s name change prevented proof of reputational harm and willfulness | Even if excluded, these issues are moot if no § 1681e(b) violation is shown | Held: Court did not reach these issues because Erickson failed on the accuracy/§ 1681e(b) element; JMOL affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000) (standard of review for judgment as a matter of law)
- Bogle v. Orange Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 162 F.3d 653 (11th Cir. 1998) (JMOL standard: only when reasonable people could not disagree)
- Eghnayem v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 873 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2017) (viewing evidence and inferences for nonmoving party)
- Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1991) (FCRA § 1681e(b) requires inaccuracy plus damages; interpretive guidance)
- Pedro v. Equifax, Inc., 868 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2017) (discussion that reports should be accurate and not misleading)
- Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (interpreting § 1681e(b) to require truthful and nonmisleading reports)
- Dalton v. Cap. Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2001) (supporting view that reports must be nonmisleading)
- Sepulvado v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 158 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 1998) (same)
- Twumasi-Ankrah v. Checkr, Inc., 954 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2020) (same)
- Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (same)
- United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004) (standard for reviewing evidentiary rulings)
- Chi. Trib. Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2001) (abuse-of-discretion framework for evidentiary decisions)
