Kareem Garrett v. Wexford Health
938 F.3d 69
| 3rd Cir. | 2019Background
- Kareem Garrett, while incarcerated at SCI Houtzdale, filed a pro se § 1983 complaint (Feb 2014) alleging denial of wheelchair/walker and medications and an unwanted rectal exam; his prison grievance process was not complete when he filed.
- Garrett amended and supplemented his pleadings over time; he was released May 19, 2015, filed a Third Amended Complaint (TAC) in Feb 2016 (served as both an amendment and a supplement under Rule 15), and a shorter Fourth Amended Complaint (FAC) in Nov 2016.
- Medical Defendants moved to dismiss based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA; Corrections Defendants argued the FAC violated Rule 8’s “short and plain” requirement.
- The Magistrate Judge and District Court dismissed Medical Defendants’ claims for lack of exhaustion (relying on Ahmed) and dismissed the FAC claims against Corrections Defendants for failing Rule 8; Garrett appealed.
- The Third Circuit held the TAC (filed after Garrett’s release) operated as an amended/supplemental pleading that could relate back under Rule 15, distinguished Ahmed’s post-judgment posture, applied Jones v. Bock’s instruction to follow the Federal Rules, vacated the dismissals, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a supplemental/amended complaint filed after plaintiff's release can cure an earlier PLRA exhaustion defect | TAC filed when Garrett was a non‑prisoner; Rule 15(d) supplementation and relation back cure the initial defect | Plaintiff was a prisoner when suit began, so exhaustion must be measured at initial filing | TAC (operative pleading) may relate back; supplementation filed while non‑prisoner cures the original PLRA defect |
| Whether Ahmed v. Dragovich requires measuring exhaustion only at original filing regardless of later amendment | Ahmed is post‑judgment and inapplicable; Rule 15 governs here | Ahmed binds and prevents curing by later amendment because suit began while plaintiff was prisoner | Ahmed distinguished as post‑judgment; it does not control here |
| Whether the PLRA’s “no action shall be brought” language overrides Rule 15 and Rule 15(d) | Federal Rules (Rule 15) apply; PLRA does not displace them absent clear Congressional intent | PLRA’s language mandates measuring status at initiation and displaces Rule 15 | Jones v. Bock controls: exhaustion is an affirmative defense and PLRA does not implicitly override Rule 15; Rule 15 may apply |
| Whether dismissal of the FAC under Rule 8 was proper (short and plain statement) | FAC is concise, factual, and entitled to pro se liberal construction; some claims give fair notice | FAC is prolix, incomprehensible, fails to identify who did what when | Court found wholesale dismissal was an abuse of discretion; some FAC claims satisfy Rule 8; vacated and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2002) (post‑judgment context: post‑judgment amendment cannot cure PLRA exhaustion defect)
- T Mobile Ne. LLC v. City of Wilmington, Del., 913 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2019) (Rule 15(d) supplementation can relate back to cure initial pleading defects)
- Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (PLRA exhaustion is an affirmative defense; courts should follow Federal Rules rather than impose special pleading requirements)
- Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2009) (statutes do not alter procedural rules absent clear Congressional intent)
- Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002) (Rule 15 leave to amend remains available despite PLRA)
- Jackson v. Fong, 870 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2017) (amended complaint filed after release can obviate exhaustion defense)
- Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (contrary view treating plaintiff’s status at initial filing as dispositive)
- Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996) (district court may dismiss excessively verbose or prolix complaints)