Hagan v. Rogers

2005) (“The ciary (McKinney Law 475 upon petition the client or

court

attorney may determine enforce the (West

lien.”); Ann. N.J. Stat. 2A:13-5

2000) (“The court which the action or pending, proceeding upon peti-

other attorney law, or

tion of counsellor lien.”).

may determine and enforce the 407(a), under U.S.C.

Accordingly, Security

Handel’s Social benefits are not

subject Binder’s claim of a charging

lien, $10,000 outstanding fees

represented dischargea- debt unsecured Bankruptcy

ble Court.

V. above,

For set the reasons forth we will

affirm the order the District Court. HAGAN; Hemphill;

Lewis Ira James Esquilin; Christopher Mark;

Efraim Weiss; Papacristos;

William Christos Johnston, George Tymil Jr.;

Louis

Mason; Franklin; Claude Peter

Braun; Mason; Oliver Toboris

Wright; Young; Ronald Allan Loven-

son, Appellants ROGERS, Administrator; George

Grace

Hayman, Jersey Commissioner New Prisons;

State Hochberg, Dr. Doctor

Employed By Correctional Medical

Services; Correctional Medical Ser-

vices, Inc.; Goodwin, Bernard Asst.

Administrator.

No. 07-1412.

United States Court Appeals,

Third Circuit.

Argued Feb. 2009.

Filed: June Curiae

Defendant-Amicus State New Jersey. RENDELL, JORDAN,

Before: ROTH, Judges. Circuit THE OPINION OF COURT RENDELL, Judge. Circuit central before it is whether is clear and manifest that Congress, through Litigation the Prisoner of Reform Act intended to remove prisoners from the definition of “Persons” join permitted to claims under Federal Procedure of Civil 20. We answer negative. fourteen Appellants are state inmates of Diagnostic & Adult Treatment Center (“ADTC”). Avenel, Jersey New The prisoners jointly single complaint, filed Hagan, Hemphill, Lewis Ira James on of themselves and a purported behalf Weiss, Esquilin, William Christos Efraim class, alleging that officials associated Johnston, Jr., George Louis Papacristos, facility their violated constitutional Franklin, Mason, Claude Peter Tymil rights by failing to contain and treat a Lovenson, Braun, Allan Wright, Toboris contagious serious skin condition. Center, Diagnostic Adult & Treatment prisoners The requested pauper- Avenel, forma NJ, pro se. (“IFP”) appointment status and the Mark, SCI, Christopher Rockview Belle- been counsel. Before Defendants had fonte, PA, pro se. served, the District Court for the District Mason, Newark, NJ, pro se. Oliver Jersey thirteen of the New dismissed NJ, Young, Ledgewood, pro Ronald se. prisoners sponte, sua with leave to file complaints, after con- amended individual [Argued], McHugh, Esq. Nancy Joel prisoners cluding that were barred Winkelman, Esq., Harrison Schnader Se- permissive joinder under Federal Rule of Lewis, PA, Philadelphia, & for Amicus gal (“Rule 20”) The Civil Procedure 20 Court Appellants on behalf of Lewis Ira Counsel also under denied class certification Feder- Hagan; Hemphill; Esquilin; James Efraim (“Rule 23”). al Rule Civil Procedure 23 Mark; Weiss; Christopher Chris- William Appellants challenge ap- both decisions on Johnston, Papacristos; George tos Louis peal. Mason; Franklin; Jr.; Tymil Claude Peter

Braun; Mason; Wright; Oliver Toboris appeal presents several issues. This Allan Young; Ronald Lovenson. First, must we determine whether we Etzweiler, Esq., [Argued], jurisdiction to the District

Larry R. review Court’s so, Jr., denying joinder, order if whether Massey, Esq., Keith S. Office of Attor- Jersey, IFP from Rule 20 ney General of New Division of are barred NJ, Law, Trenton, joinder also as a matter law. We are Hughes, Richard J. juris- joinder may asked to decide whether to exercise preempted by pro- certain Litigation diction over District Court’s denial visions of the Prison Reform Act (“PLRA”). certification, so, 104-134, class whether Pub.L. 26, 1996). proper. (Apr. denial was Stat. 1321 The Court was persuaded by reasoning also of other below, For the reasons discussed we district courts that had determined that jurisdiction that we have to re- conclude general circumstances of incarceration denying view the District Court’s order joint prisoner litigation impractical. render joinder, and that IFP are not Court did not discuss whether the plain- categorically joining barred from Plaintiffs requirements satisfied basic Furthermore, Rule 20. tiffs under Rule, under the nor did it identi- against plain- be assessed fees should fy any circumstances of incarceration that join tiff under Rule 20 as rendered Plaintiffs’ impractical. though proceeding was indi- ordered a new case to be vidually. Finally, ju- elect to we exercise opened Plaintiff, for each dismissed over ques- risdiction the class certification gave 30 days to file an tion, and conclude that the District Court’s complaint amended proceed order to explanation denying for certification was individually. The Court deferred consid- inadequate. accordingly We will remand requests eration of the for IFP status and the proceedings matter further consis- appointment for the pending counsel tent opinion. with this filing of the complaints. amended Background I. order, In the sponte same sua the Dis- Appellants single pro filed a com- trict also Appellants’ se denied motion plaint 20, on October to proceed pursuant 2006 as a class action U.S. 23(b)(3). District Court for the District of New Jer- Court identified con- sey, against regarding officials associated cerns the typicality with the of the ADTC, a state named facility for the Plaintiffs’ prisoners’ detention claims and the circumstances, and disparate particular- treatment convicted sex factual offenders. The prisoners allege ly regard that the to medical and injury. Defendants needs their Eighth violated and The Court pro Fourteenth also reasoned that a se rights by failing litigant Amendment represent to address could not of a threat serious and class fellow inmates. undiagnosed disease, contagious scabies, skin possibly None of the Plaintiffs filed amended spreading through facility. Appellants complaints within the requisite days, also to certify moved a class of all persons joined but all appealing to this Court for similarly pursuant situated to Rule review of both the class and certifi- prisoners requested IFP rulings. 1, 2007, cation February On Ap- applied status appointment for the of pellants also filed a to stay motion all counsel. relating action to the District Court’s Jan- served, Before had order, Defendants been uary 25 and asserted their belief District Court sponte issued an order sua applications that the Court’s Rules 20 on January ‍​​​​​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍2007, dismissing without May were incorrect. On prejudice Plaintiffs, all except Ha- original 30-day Lewis after the period for amend- gan, upon concluding permissive join- ment had expired, the District Court der was IFP prisoner unavailable to liti- granted stay stated its order that gants. The Court suggested that Rule 20 Appellants days to file Depot, Frederico v. Home 507 F.3d completed after we complaints amended Cir.2007) (internal (3d quotation omit- appeal. of their review our ted). Appellants argue the order was amicus curiae counsel as assigned We prisoners final chose to stand because and asked counsel Appellants on behalf complaint, initial rather than on their (1) following questions: address the complaints proceed individual- amended jurisdiction to re- has this Court Whether prison- counter that the ly. Respondents denying order the District Court’s view complaint their be- ers did not stand on (2) so, if whether joinder; stay and received a they requested cause joinder as a matter from Rule 20 barred pending the District Court’s order (3) law; are not barred appeal. of this resolution court fees should joinder, how permissive prior cannot discern from our cases We among plaintiffs; be assessed determining party a clear rule for when a (4) improperly the District Court whether stand on his or her com has elected to De- Although certification. class denied Frederico, determined served, plaint. In we yet been we have not fendants plaintiff elected to stand on her com of New Jer- Attorney General invited the during pro at no time plaint where similarly respond questions to these sey to pur to correct the ceedings did she seek brief, and she has done an amicus through deficiencies, but instead ported pleading questions address each so. We complaint that her was repeatedly asserted below. presented In sufficient as filed. Id. Batoff v. Co., II. Rule 20 Joinder 977 F.2d 848 State Farm Insurance (3d Cir.1992), that we had we determined A. Jurisdiction jurisdiction plaintiff a did not amend when the Dis seek review of Appellants days complaint within the 30 his dismissed joinder and denying order trict Court’s at n. allotted the district court. Id. 851 except Hagan dismissing all claimants satisfied that certain 5. We were also leave to and with prejudice, without Devoe, F.2d in Tiernan v. 923 plaintiffs basis for this only arguable amend. (3d Cir.1991), elected to stand on 1024 is 28 U.S.C. to review the decision Court they re claims after their dismissed 1291, juris appellate § authorizes which nounced, filed with this by letter briefs final of the district over orders diction Court, proceed any intention to reinstitute Folsom, 666, F.2d v. 925 courts. Welch at the Id. ings against defendants issue. Cir.1991). (3d “A final order is one 667 1031. and litigation on the merits that ‘ends the no that none of the There is do but for the court nothing leaves complaints their within prisoners amended ” (quot at 668 judgment.’ the Id. execute by the days the ordered District Court. 30 Livesay, Lybrand v. 437 ing Coopers & ap- joined All Plaintiffs the instant of the 467, 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 98 S.Ct. U.S. that and there is no evidence peal, (1978)). 351 argument wavered from their ever join under they be a com should dismissing an order While indicate normally Rule 20. These circumstances prejudice without is plaint on their initial Appellants stand “a dis the meaning of final within the in plaintiffs the Frederi- complaint, as had be treated leave to amend will missal with distinguishing A Batojf. potentially has elected co plaintiff final if the as a order Appellants is that the aspect of this case original complaint.” upon the to stand quate, subsequent a sought, granted, pleading and the District Court individual stay by Appellants January apparent- effectively of its 25 order that would have con- ly rights of ceded the issue. This preserve Appellants the should as proceed individually they type juris- viewed situation where lost on the diction Although exists under because there 20 issue here. none of the nothing can plaintiff do to cure Appellants complaints filed amended with- defect in a order, complaint. dismissed in Deutsch days they joined of the all (3d States, United F.3d requesting stay of that order on Febru- Cir.1995). District ruling Court’s ary 2007. joint action, foreclosed further Plain- Yet the did not grant District Court nothing tiffs could do to cure purport- this stay 4, 2007, May long until after the 30 ed defect. days expired. afforded to the Plaintiffs had reasons, For these we conclude that we expiration From the of the dismissal order jurisdiction under granting grant leave to amend until the stay, the Plaintiffs were in the same B. Litigants Rule 20 and IFP Prisoner position plaintiff as the they If Batoff. Appellants argue the District Court were not staking intent on their claims on concluding erred in were the fate of appeal, they would have categorically joining barred from plain- been expected complaints to file amended tiffs under Rule 20. Amicus Respon- neared, as the deadline in the absence of a dents contends that the District in- ruling on requested stay. After the 30 terpreted correctly, light days expired, subsequent issuance of provisions certain stay—which right included further unique consideration circumstancеs amend-—wasa fortuitous development out- of incarceration. We conclude that noth- side of their persuaded control. We are ing in the PLRA demonstrates that Con- that the sufficiently Plaintiffs have demon- gress alter plain language intended to strated their intent to stand on origi- their 20, of Rule and that conditions of incarcer- nal complaint. ation should not be considered in disre- Moreover, by requesting the stay, Ap garding unambiguous the language the of pellants squarely stating were their oppo prisoner Rule. Accordingly, litigants may sition to District interpretation Court’s of not categorically precluded be joining from 20, Rule and their proceed joint desire to plaintiffs as Rule under ly. The Court’s invitation to the to amend proceed individually and directly A severing district court’s order position contradicted their appeal. parties on for satisfy joinder failure to the This situation is different from typical requirements of Rule 20 is for reviewed dismissal with leave to amend where the abuse of Coughlin discretion. v. Rogers, (9th amendment a particular plead Cir.1997). could cure 130 F.3d A 1351 ing flaw or This is failure. also differеnt district court its abuses discretion when typical joinder from a situation in upon which a “its decision a clearly rests erroneous court might grant deny finding fact, or a motion to of an errant law conclusion of amend a complaint in order to plain add or an improper application of law to fact.” Co., tiffs. See Michelson v. Citicorp Nat’l Danvers Inc. Motor v. Ford Motor Servs., Inc., (3d Co., (3d Cir.2008) (inter 512 F.3d Cir. F.3d 1998). Here, omitted). the Court effectively quotation District nal marks The Dis ruled the complaint legally joinder inade- trict denying Court’s order was currenees,” “any par- or whether there was any findings regarding the on based fact parame- the of law or common to all in the case or plaintiffs ticular 20(a)(1).1 Instead, In- plaintiffs.” Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 20 itself. ters of stead, relied arguments the Court on were barred concluded suggesting raised other courts statutory joinder in of certain light from categorically prisoners are excluded circumstances of general provisions arguments Rule 20. fall into two Thus, These operative ques- incarceration. (1) general categories: With the enact- District Court based its tion is whether the effectively ment of Rule 20 has conclusion of law. on an erroneous order to liti- prisoner been modified exclude Rule 20 that is language of (2) gants; prison characteristics of plain is and unam matter pertinent populations prison litigants render ill-suit- biguous: joinder. ed Rule 20 We address these may join plain- in one action Persons as arguments turn. if: tiffs (A) they any right joint- assert to relief 1. Rule 20 and the PLRA severally, or in the alternative ly, with of PLRA that provisions two arising or out of respect the same other courts in context troubled transaction, occurrence, or of series joinder of claims are codified occurrences; or transactions 1915(b) §§ and 1915(g). U.S.C. Section (B) fact any question of law or common 1915(b) “if a provides brings all arise in the action. plaintiffs will a civil action or files an in forma appeal 20(a)(1). courts applying For Fed.R.Civ.P. pauperis, required shall be rules, 20 and “the impulse related filing the full amount fee.” possible the broadest entertaining toward 1915(b)(1). § Payment full fee scope of action consistent with fairness to spread monthly pay- a number over claims, parties; parties argue ments. Respondents encouraged.” is strongly remedies United collecting multiple joint full fees from Gibbs, Am. v. Mine Workers 388 U.S. litigants comply 715, 724, 86 S.Ct. 16 L.Ed.2d 218 1915(b)(3), provides, conflict with which (1966). “the of a permits “In no event shall the collected fee who has some interest an action person exceed the amount fees ..., even when that interest is not so statute for the of a civil commencement joinder” strong require as to his under a appeal action or an of civil action or AG, Volkswagenwerk Rule 19. Field v. § criminal judgment.” Cir.1980). (3d Nothing F.2d 626 299 1915(g) availability Section limits the Rule plain language in the indicates IFP prisoners through status to a “three prisoners “persons” as that are excluded rule, provides: strike” which join plaintiffs. to permitted In apply prisoner bring The District did not Rule no shall a a civil Court event judgment Appellants’ appeal whether action in a civil determining or transaction, action proceeding claims arise from “the same or under this section occurrence, has, prisoner the on 3 prior or series of transactions or oc- or more fact, joinder. appear it that the dаtes 1. In would claims for normally good here be candi- asserted would occasions, while incarcerated or detained considered the same two that concerns brought here—namely, an or any facility, ap- action District considered joinder that in the peal in a court of the United claims context States prisoner litigation presents unique grounds was on the that it is chal- dismissed malicious, frivolous, lenges, and that could undermine or state a fails to § if prisoners split granted, claim were to upon which relief at fees or avoid strikes. Id. 854. Howev- prisoner unless the is under imminent er, court stated: danger physical injury. of serious § not It does follow that 1915 has super- § 1915(g). obligated A court district Rule 20. The PLRA not seded does it, sponte finding dismiss a upon case sua joint litigation. mention Rule 20 or Re- alia, malicious, inter or or that it frivolous by implication peal only occurs when the fails claim. state 28 U.S.C. newer rule is logically incompatible with 1915(e)(2): § older one. And there is no irrecon- expressly The District Court did not cilable conflict between Rule 20 and the decide that there was a conflict between PLRA: litigаtion Joint does not relieve 1915(b) § and Rule but referred to any duties under more provisions tensions between identified recent statute. by other Appeals courts. Court of for (internal omitted). Id. citations the Eleventh Circuit has held that, 1915(b)(1) The court § concluded while the preempted Rule 20 as to IFP PLRA preempt joinder, did not prison litigants in Haley, Hubbard v. 1915(b)(1) § (11th did Cir.2001). affect collection of fees F.3d 1194 The court rea- prisoner for IFP such litigants that each soned plainly requiring each IFP prisoner pay must individual fee. fee, prisoner filing the full Id. at 855-56. The also court determined repealed as to that, reading the PLRA and Rule to- IFP litigants. Id. at 1198. The gether, 1915(g) require joint liti- court persuaded by was Congress’s desire gants be held' for against liable strikes suits, to deter recognition frivolous and the co-plaintiffs their claims. The court artic- by other courts that excessive ulated no concern 1915(g) conflicts litigation presented problem. Id. joinder. Rather, with Rule 20 “[w]hen However, from decisions the Courts of are enough claims related to be handled Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits together, they enough are related pur- at odds with Hubbаrd. In a sua §of poses 1915(g).” Id. sponte administrative order addressing the effects Chief The Seventh reasoning Circuit’s the Sixth Circuit ordered that fees in Boriboune is compelling. The PLRA are to be among prisoner litigants divided did not alter the text or make suits, choosing join indicating thus any reference to Lacking the Rule. such were barred doing reference, express only way to con Act., In re Litigation so. Prison that clude the PLRA 20 altered Rule Reform (6th 1131, Cir.1997). 105 F.3d 1137-38 be to that the determine later stat The Court of Appeals for the repealed by Seventh Cir- implication ute the Rule to as engaged cuit in analysis a more thorough prisoner litigants. requires This more it a when district reversed court’s inter- applying than mere in tension the later pretation of 20 in Berge, Rule Boriboune v. provisions to earlier. “[R]epeals law’s (7th Cir.2004). 391 F.3d 852 The court by implication are not favored and will not

155 1915(b)(1) value,” require- “§ at face intention of unless the presumed be a full fee is prisoner pay to manifest.” ment for each clear and repeal to is legislature pay prisoner that a must simply price v. De- one Home Builders Ass’n National 644, under the PLRA. Bori- 127 S.Ct. for IFP status Wildlife, 551 U.S. fenders (inter- (2007) boune, at 856.2 2532, 467 391 F.3d 168 L.Ed.2d omitted). marks аnd brackets quotation nal interpretation an can also be Such found only be repeal will implied “An 1915(b)(3), § which harmony read in with in are in two statutes provisions where filing event shall the that no provides “[i]n conflict, where the latter or irreconcilable the amount of fees collected exceed fee of the subject area the whole covers act by statute for the commence as a clearly intended and is earlier one appeal. a civil action or ment” of Smith, 538 U.S. Branch substitute.” 1915(b)(3). 1915(b)(3) § Section U.S.C. 155 L.Ed.2d 123 S.Ct. 1915(b) § in the context of as must be read (internal (2003) quotation citations and 1915(b)(1) provides that a whole. Section omitted). marks ultimately filing collect a full a court must not even the PLRA does Since and, possible, a where prisoner, fee from ¿ov much less joinder, permissive address portion up initial of the fee must collect an area, we cannot con subject er the whole 1915(b)(2) pro establishes front. Section repealed the later statute clude that make prisoner which a shall cedures are in irrecon provisions unless the two monthly payments against the balance later interpreting the conflict. In cilable sense sequence, fee. Read in common statutory a statute, not infer will “[w]e 1915(b)(3)merely § ensures indicates is ... such a construction unless repeal fees, paid by when prisoner’s that an IFP in order necessary absolutely installment, not exceed the standard will shall of the later statute words Nothing in full. filing paid fee individual Home at all.” National Ass’n meaning 1915(b) § mentions or indicates in (internal Builders, quota at 2532 S.Ct. 1915(b)(3) § to Congress intended omitted). marks, brackets, ellipses tion multiple a bar to the collection serve as 1915(b)(1) plaintiffs from individual individual fees § language of plain as Reading the PLRA joint litigation.3 a harmony with complete can be read litigant IFP to a joined joined prisoner requiring by requiring each installment, and filing fee full individual full individual fee. As pay to more, PLRA with Rule reasoned, harmonizes the taking no Circuit Seventh juris- differing panel judges ing views of Judge a court Although Roth would have here. diction is not relevant plaintiffs, single joined a fee between divide reading plain Judge agrees "that a Jordan subsection, provision of 3. The final 1915(b)(1) pay a requires each § 1915(b)(3) 1915(b)(4), provid- § parallels § Thus, majority panel filing fee.” that, ing event shall a "In no point. Judge Jordan and I do agrees on bringing or” prohibited a civil action suggestion that agree Judge Roth's not filing appeal for failure to have sufficient view as to this issue does Jordan’s U.S.C. pay an initial fee. assets while because he believes count 1915(b)(3) together, § Read generally, District Court was is available (4) protect prison- an IFP are intended deny joinder in this within its discretion suggests Con- rights. er’s This further us, clearly before fee issue to be gress case. did not intend per- agreement denying prisoner’s as to its access to I and he and vehicle regard- joinder. missive that case law We believe resolution. internally that, harmonizes the various hold reading the PLRA and Rule 20 1915(b). provisions §of together, plaintiff is accountable for the co-plaintiffs dismissal of a claims. merely upon We are called in this case to determine how two operate laws should Thus, we conclude that the PLRA together. The two laws at issue accom- repeal did not joinder as to IFP plish independent complementary pur- prisoner litigants. Nothing in the PLRA can and рoses, which should coexist. As the speaks clarity with sufficient or creates an noted, “[j]oint Seventh Circuit litigation conflict, irreconcilable and the statute can does not relieve any duties not be deemed to exclude IFP prisoner under the more recent statute.” Bori- litigants from Rule 20 as a matter boune, 391 F.3d at 854. application of law. repeal by implication would undermine Moreover, congressional goals. it would 2. Rule 20 and Conditions Incarcer- expand by repeal implication into an ev- ation eryday principle, Congress since routinely legislation provisions enacts with that do In addition to the purported conflicts neatly not existing coexist with statutes. between Rule 20 and the the Dis- (3) Sections hardly convey trict Court also general relied on condi- “clear and manifest” by Congress intent by tions faced inmate populations to con- repeal Rule and constructing the clude that was unavailable. The PLRA nullify so as to Rule 20 is not Court noted several difficulties in multiple- “absolutely necessary.” prisoner litigations that were by identified other district courts in think Wasko v. Allen

We that the Sеventh Circuit was Jail, (N.D.Ind. County 2006 WL correct when it observed the “three 2006) April and Swenson v. provision strikes” Mac- 1915(g) is not nec- Donald, (D.Mont. Jan.30, WL essarily in conflict If 2006). The plaintiff difficulties join desires to identified prison- with other those (1) ers, courts he could were prospect face the “the need for each being plaintiff responsible sign pleadings, for the strikes others. and the consequent We disagree with possibilities the District Court may documents be instant changes (2) action that the they circulated”; issue would as neces- “pris- sarily is, resolved the oners way—that may other seek compel prison authori- joint that a litigant necessarily will ties to permit avoid a them gather ‍​​​​​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍to discuss strike under 1915(g) (3) joint because a litigation”; “jail populations would not be charged for the dismissal of are notably transitory, joint making litiga- his or her claim long (4) as the difficult”; entire case tion possibility was not dismissed. The pre- may coercion affect the relations between cisely how strikes should be assessed in a the inmates. (App.12.) The District Court joint prisoner litigation was not before the concluded that these considerations made District Court and is not “joint before us. How- litigation exceptionally difficult.” ever, when (Id.) combined with a full filing fee The Court did not any address con- requirement, § 1915(g) may actually dis- specific siderations to the Plaintiffs in this suade litigation since a court could action.4 fact,

4. A review suggests of the record instance, in the current matter. For there is impracticalities some of the asserted no evidence that the had diffi- District apply to the culty securing Plaintiffs required signatures all of the discretion, Essentially, provide re the District the District Court Court must analysis should arguments comports on a reasoned with the lied to “persons” permitted Rule, considered requirements not be of the and that agree. Rule 20. do not under We join specific present- on the pattern based fact Supreme Court and this Court “The plaintiffs ed and claims before the Rules of held that the Federal repeatedly It rely court. is insufficient for a court to statute, Procedure, like any other Civil general assumptions regarding on the cir- given plain meaning.” their should be cumstances incarceration. Colkitt, Group, Berckeley Inv. Ltd. (3d Cir.2001). 135, 142 n. 7 F.3d III. Class Cеrtification “inquiry is if we find complete Court’s Appellants argue also that the District unambigu Rule to be clear

text erred in denying Court their motion for (internal quotation omit Id. marks ous.” class certification under Rule In ted). “persons” Rule 20’s use of the term complaint, Appellants their claimed that unambiguous. Nothing in the is clear and subject inmates of the ADTC were either Rule itself raises hint that infections, subject to actual skin or to were broad not be included within the should injury the threat of future due to deliber- joining persons capable definition on the part prison ate indifference offi- Thus, the pursuant claim to the Rule. their failing to contagion. cials contain the on these extrinsic District Court’s reliance The District Court denied class certifica- rather lan plain considerations than the tion for failure of named Plaintiffs to Rule 20 was guage of error.5 23(a). requirements meet certain of Rule The District based its deci Court This Court has the discretion to deny joinder inter to on an erroneous sion jurisdiction interlocutory exercise over an of Rule and we therefore pretation appeal denying class certification. Fed. that the Court abused its discre conclude 23(f); Lynch, R.Civ.P. Newton v. Merrill denying joinder Appellants.6 tion to Pierce, Smith, Inc., law, Fenner & 259 F.3d correcting Aside from this error (3d Cir.2001). however, have identified our decision does not limit the We authority principles guide re nonexclusive our discre District Court’s broad with is, tion, counseling jurisdiction under Rule which us exercise gard all, discretionary. exercising In its after when denial certification would effec- pleadings filings related to this Court on 6. The District determined that Rule Also, appeal. relatively the ADTC is a small Appellants, was unavailable to inmates, sug- facility approximately Hagan pursuant dismissed all but to Rule 21. litigation gesting inmates of the argument, Respondents an alternative seek As manageable. facility may be inquiry to frame our as a review of the Dis- discretionary power trict Court's to dismiss Although 5. the District Court made no men- rather under than a review of specific facing in- tion of the conditions However, interpretation Court's of Rule 20. prisoners, believes that stant Jordan only the Court dismissed the after Plaintiffs generalized litigation difficulties of concluding they рrecluded were grounds provided sufficient District Thus, joining under Rule the Court's deny joinder. judge While interpretation incorrect of Rule 20 was dis- identify why joint litiga- well credible reasons positive, separately we need not address generally might suits be a tion of authority Rule 21. the Court's under idea, opinions good such cannot be used congressional by disregarding defeat intent language plain Rule 20. 158 (Id.) Furthermore,

tively litigation, terminate a create exces- undesirable. the settle, or reach a pressure to novel or stated that a se prisoner proceeding pro sive law. Id. at 164. In unsettled adequately represent could not a class of light this matter of the fact that will be inmates. remanded for resolution of the is- reasoning proble- The District Court’s is sue, appropriate we find it to exercise our Jeffes, In v. matic. Hassine 846 F.2d 169

jurisdiction class certification over the is- (3d Cir.1988), this Court dis- ruled that a also. sue failing trict court certify erred to a class a district court’s denial We review alleged they that that all were class for certification abuse discre injured constitutionally by the conditions Inc., In Holding tion. re 242 at their The facility. Court reasoned LifeUSA (3d Cir.2001). F.3d 143 A district regard commonality, typicality to and court abuses its discretion when “its deci require Rule repre- 23 does not that the clearly upon finding rests erroneous sion plaintiff sentative precise- endured fact, an errant conclusion of law or an ly injuries that same have been sus- improper application of law to fact.” Dan members, only tained the class that Co., Inc., (in vers Motor 543 F.3d at 147 harm complained of be to common omitted). quotation ternal marks class, the named plaintiff 23(a) provides members of a personal demonstrate or interest may only class sue on behalf of a class ... injury “threat of [that] is ‘real (1) the class is so numerous that immediate,’ ‘conjectural’ ‘hypo- not or ” (2) impractical; ques- there are common thetical.’ (3) fact; tions law or the claims of the Littleton, (quoting Id. at 177 O’Shea v. representative parties typical are 488, 494, U.S. 94 S.Ct. 38 L.Ed.2d (4) class; representative parties “the (1974)). fairly protect and adequately will the inter- On the limited basis of the Dis 23(a). ests of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. Al- trict opinion, Court’s brief we fail see to though рrecise the District Court’s how the Plaintiffs in this case to failed grounds denying certification are not satisfy requirements Ap of Hassine. clear, entirely appears it the Court pellants alleged that all at the determined that the Plaintiffs failed to sat- facility, including plaintiffs, named isfy the commonality, typicality, and ade- subject were injury. threat of an 23(a). quacy requirements of complaint squarely alleges that prison The Court “the stated that claims of the Eighth officials violated Amendment representative party typical not be by being “deliberately indifferent to the the claims of the pur- class” because the exposure serious, of inmates to a communi class ported would include inmates that disease,” cable and that the amendment life-threatening injuries, suffered and in- protects “also in against future harms physical mates that injuries. suffered no mates.” (App.27.) The District Court (App.13) The Court also reasoned that the why, failed early stage, articulate this treatment received different members alleged of injury threat is insufficient vary. of the class “In light could of ly typical or common to Apрellants’ allow disparate factual circumstances of class action proceed as class. members, especially the difference re- gard Moreover, medical and injury,” needs not question we do the Dis- Court determined that a class action was trict Court’s liti- pro conclusion se JORDAN, Judge, Concurring Circuit appropriate generally gants See Oxendine representatives. class part Dissenting part. (4th

Williams, F.2d Cir. are, first, appeal in this issues 1975) (“[I]t permit error to plain [an] is prisoners seeking proceed whether in is unassisted litigant who imprisoned pauperis Litiga- under the Prison in inmates represent his fellow forma counsel to (“PLRA” “Act”), tion Act or the action.”) Reform However, the District a class seq., may joined §§ 1915 un- consider- U.S.C. et. expressly deferred Court had ap- for of the Plaintiffs’ motion ation der Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil counsel, that finding such pointment Procedure, second, so, join- if whether the premature would be since decision My der should be in this case. yet been served. had not Defendants in colleagues answer the first the the premature find it We likewise affirmative, and, thоugh I have reserva- to conclude that Plaintiffs’ District Court interpretation tions about their of the in- of the class would be representation agree I with them on that. They the decided adequate before Court are, however, agree unable to with each appoint counsel. For these whether collecting other on the method for the reasons, that the District we conclude necessary filing any fees associated with denying discretion in abused its Court jointly appeal.7 filed civil action or On this class certification. point, agree Judge I with Rendell that 1915(b)(1) requires collection of the IV. Conclusion filing prisoner. fee from each Never- join- denying order The District Court’s theless, end, in I part company with based on an Appellants to the was der my both of on the decision to colleagues conclusion of law and will be erroneous join- reverse District Court’s denial also The District Court REVERSED. I the District der because believe concluding in that its discretion abused correctly determined that characteristics class, proceed as a Appellants could prison setting generally will make certification denying and the order class impracticable under Rule will REMAND will be We VACATED. general that rule. I this case fits for further consideration con- the matter respectfully dissent.8 Opinion. with this therefore sistent single agreeing majority with the initiated as a In addition to 7. Because this action was claim, appropriate there is no irreconcilable conflict be- issue of the fee arose parties jointly and Rule I also concur tween the PLRA for the first time when reasoning regarding pauper- Majority's our sought pursue appeal forma granted, jurisdiction appeal. initially to consider this In addi- While that motion was is. tion, agree Majority's I with the conclusion the Clerk later vacated the order on basis record, premature filing on this it was to rule that "the issue of how to assess fees open question in that a class could not be certified in this case. multi-plaintiff cases is an 158-59.) 143.) agree (Maj. Op. at I therefore (App. at We then direct- this circuit.” parties manner in the District Court should not have denied ed the to address the which involving stage, I appeal class certification at this and concur fees are to be assessed for extent, though judgment to that limited multiple prisoner-appellants. The effect of fees, however, imply that class certification any holding that does not on the issue say anything applies granted, it appeal but also must be nor does not limited to fees on who, multi-prison- anyone, properly could serve as of a about to the fees due on initiation only representative. It that the class means civil action. er Although agree Majority I with the approach runs afoul of the emphatic man- 1915(b)(3) §in PLRA date that “in repeal does not no event” the fee in prisoner collected implication, separately I case exceed write on this issue any that collected in other civil action or explain why logical I the more view appeal. it, As Rendell sees 1915(b)(3) common reading being inconsis- suggests sense that the ultimate concern joinder.9 PLRA tent with arose out §of is that each prisoner not concern that restrictions the in pay more than the full filing fee for pauperis adequate- statute failed to forma action, rather than that the total fee col- ly deter frivolous law- lected in a given case not exceed that suits. Law Clinic at Para-Professional in any collected other agree case. While I Beard, 301, v. 334 F.3d SCI-Graterford 1915(b)(3) § that can be read as she pro- (3d Cir.2003) (“Congress enacted the poses, I remain logic convinced that PLRA in an apparent effort ... to dis- and language of the PLRA in large courage prisoners filing frivolous law- measure inconsistent with under judiciary’s suits which strain the scarce Rule 20. resources.”). 1915, § Under “a pris- when guide best to Congressional intent brings oner a civil action or appeal files is the Act itself. See Disabled in Action in forma pauperis, prisoner shall be Pennsylvania v. Pennsylva- Southeastern required pay the full amount of a filing Auth., ‍​​​​​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍(3d nia Transp. 539 F.3d 1915(b)(1). § fee.” 28 U.S.C. The statute Cir.2008) (“We assume Congress ex- also states that filing fee in collected a presses its intent through ordinary prisoner may action not “exceed the meaning of language its and therefore be- amount of permitted by fees statute for gin with an examination of plain lan- the commencеment of a civil action or an statute.”) (internal guage of the quotation appeal of a civil action or criminal judg- omitted). marks and citation Congress’s § ment.” Id. construction, use of the passive “the fee Rendell, Judge adopting the position of collected,” 1915(b)(3) § indicates that is not the Seventh Circuit in Berge, Boriboune v. solely to be viewed on a prisoner-by-pris- (7th Cir.2004), 391 F.3d 852 concludes that oner basis but that the fee for the case 1915(b)(1) § and Rule 20 be read in itself, total, in ought not exceed the stan- harmony by requiring joined each prisoner dard fee in similar action. “Our task pay a filing full (Maj. Op. fee. at 154- give is to effect to the will of Congress, 56.) agree I plain that a reading of and where its will has been expressed in 1915(b)(1) requires prisoner each pay reasonably terms, plain language filing a full fee. I find it much harder to must ordinarily be regarded as conclu- agree multiple joined can be Samuels, sive.” Negonsott 507 U.S. under Rule 20 in single a suit and each 113 S.Ct. 122 L.Ed.2d 457 compelled pay the full filing (1993); fee. That McKelvie, accord Abduh-Akbar v. given insufficient, PLRA, reasons for denial are litigant no would be assessed a explained by Majority. strike unless an action was dismissed in its entirety, thereby allowing a stack of frivolous My colleagues express also the view single claims to be balanced on a meritorious However, there is no conflict between Rule 20 and claim. the issue of strike allocation § 1915(g), the so-called provi- "three strikes” was not before the District Court and is not sion. I that conclusion because it before us. We therefore need not address it likely seems more language juncture. under the at this Cir.2001) (en banc). fee, (3d any filing portion amount of not a of it. 307, 313 239 F.3d Indeed, reasonably says Roth her PLRA is when solu- language 1915(b)(1) satisfy says, qual- tion would “because regard. It without plain this pay filing a full fee” ification, prisoner fee must be each filing that a full (Concur. and, 164; original emphasis), prisoner Op. litigating from a collected over the “full.” the fee col- reader must stumble word no event shall again, that “in “full” nothing paying There is about the amount of fees lected exceed civil fee. partial of a by statute for the commencement of a civil action.” appeal action or an language choice of Cоngress’s added). (3) 1915(b)(1), Hav- (emphasis (b)(3) §§ sense when makes suit, single in a multiple prisoners ing responsibility we recall that the individual that we a full fee creates an “event” paying way or her of each his own should in no event be creat- are instructed central to the litigation purpose case, collecting example, ed. For Abdul-Akbar, PLRA. See 239 F.3d at 312 from each appeal fee on (“In enacting Congress con- approximately result in a total fee of will large that the number of meritless cluded $6300, far in excess of the fee collect- $450 prisoner by claims was caused the fact that filing appeal. in other civil ed the easily pau- obtained [in forma out, points that result “is Judge As Roth subject not peris] status and hence were to statutory with the relevant incongruous the economic to filing same disincentives ¶ 1.) (Concurring Op., scheme....”10 meritless cases that face other civil liti- however, am, agree gants.”). monetary outlay” to with The “modest I unable filing conun- of the full fee is intended to “force Roth’s resolution of the fees Judge think appears incompatible it with to twice about the cаse and drum because just reflexively. of the PLRA. The Act not file Prisoners will plain language the “if that singular: prisoner in the a have to make the same decision law- phrased is must make: Is the appeal, abiding civil action or files a civil Americans law- brings a required pay price?” Cong. the suit worth the See Rec. the shall be 1995) (Statement 1915(b)(1) 25, 7, 498-01, (May fee.” S filing amount of added). Kyi). Reading way the PLRA in a Judge Roth of Sen. (emphasis While 1915(b)(1) prisoner-plaintiffs individual permits with stress on the “a” of that reads Knebl, fee,” required monetary filing Talley-Bey “a 168 to circumvent the out- see (6th 884, Cir.1999), is, seem, lay betrayal a read- it would of the F.3d such only can ing purpose, dismisses the rest of the same sen- statute’s undermine tence, Congress’s effort to stem the tide of obligates filing party, which frivo- litigation.11 the full lous filing parties, a collective of (4) noteworthy statutory Viewing §§ 11. It is con- as directed problems posed by applying struction prisoner's ability initiate to an individual 1915(b) §§ in the face of the strictures of action, Judge suggested Rendell's (g) do not arise in the context of consolidation supports opinion, the conclusion that under Federal Rule of Civil Proсedure of suits protect prisoners PLRA was meant to 42(a). joinder difference between under fees, nothing punitive filing implies but it 42(a) Rule Rule 20 and consolidation under by prison- an intention to foster actions a difference. Under not a distinction without Hence, in the face of Roth's accu- ers. rule, latter there is a consolidation before incongruity rate about the observation are, definition, actions, separate there here, Judge appeal Rendell's to com- paid result fee is and each of each of which entirely persuasive. stand on its own merit. See which must mon sense is not Despite my regarding colleagues views the better in holding under 1915(b), reading agree my I col- PLRA, Rule 20 is not inconsistent with the leagues for us to decide that Rule 20 statutory at least not as a matter of inter- eases, apply does not we must pretation. repealed first conclude that the PLRA course, are, Of there as the District implication, least to the limited here, Court found a number of reasons extent that the two cannot both be proper- why allowing prison jointly inmates to liti- ly applied prisoner litiga- the context of gate may generally Beyond be unwise. out, Majority tion. points repeal by As the parsing both the language the PLRA implication requires that the “intention of thoughts and abstract about the Federal legislature repeal clear and man- [is] Procedure, Rules of Civil there remains a ifest.” Hawaii v. Hawaiian Office of Af- — world of practical difficulty in dealing with U.S.-,

fairs, 129 S.Ct. legal pressed by Thus, claims prisoners. (U.S. 2009) (cita- 173 L.Ed.2d 333 Mar. though joinder even omitted). under Rule 20 is not possible, tion Where statutes prohibited by the I am unable to appear to conflict should be read to agree give Majority’s with the effect to both. See conclusion Ruckelshaus v. Co., 986, 1018, Monsanto 467 U.S. District Court wrong deny was (“Where (1984) S.Ct. 81 L.Ed.2d 815 motion for in this case. capable co-existence, two statutes are it The District Court’s opin- well-reasoned duty courts, is the a clearly absent ion identifies several issues that deserve expressed congressional intention to the greater respect given than we have them. effective.”) (in- contrary, regard each as If of freely permitted, omitted). quotations ternal and сitations there will be inevitable demands to allow Although wholly I cannot embrace Judge meetings and other communications about reading Rendell’s of the it is at litigation strategy. Trying to coordinate plausible reading least a of the statute. prisoner schedules and monitor such inter- 1915(b)(3) may Section legitimately be actions, while with dealing virtually read so that “in no event” language is certain insistence that prisoner discussions suit, limited to a single-plaintiff thereby privileged of matters must not be moni- ensuring nothing more than when a tored, will place obvious and onerous de- filing fee is collected from an in forma prison administrators, mands on pauperis plaintiff installments, the sum mention making simple safety of the fee collected disci- plaintiff from that is no plinary enforce, more measures more than that difficult to collected in other civil every action. since layer legalism Because that added of reading give would adds full effect to both 20,1 the PLRA friction to the process. and Rule administrative So- am unable to ciety accepts conclude that there a degree is an certаin of such fric- tion, irreconcilable conflict that would warrant a because efficiency is not the sole or repeal by implication. I join therefore my the primary goal of penal system. our But Co., Ry.

Johnson v. lawsuits, Manhattan 289 U.S. prisoner to related as district courts 496-97, (1933); 53 S.Ct. 77 L.Ed. 1331 basis, may, case-by-case on a deem fit. See Community In re Bank Virginia, Northern Young City Augusta, 59 F.3d 1168— (3d Cir.2005) (affirm- 418 F.3d 298 n. 12 (11th Cir.1995) (when the "core issue of ing Johnson as the “authoritative” statement cases!,]” liability" was “the same in both con- consolidation) (citation on the law of omit- involving solidation of prison actions deliber- ted). 42(a) independent stands as an warranted). ate indifference claims would be and solid bringing foundation for efficiencies administra- hunting plaintiffs imposes for extremely cautious about be we should inefficiency, particularly burdens. See Docket tive adding to 12/24/08 susceptible impose we letters from the Clerk of the the rules when 1/09/2009 lawyers. savvy jail-house by (seeking to the ADTC for- to abuse Third Circuit released and de- warding information for operation, with prison The realities purposes inmates for of notification ceased familiar judgеs become court which district argument). of oral many pro se cases through the are discounted the Ma- year, filed concern is the addi- Perhaps greatest “joint litigation by suggestion jority’s subject intimidation and tion of a new for Diagnostic and the [Adult inmates of setting. Even prison coercion within the manageable” may be Center] Treatment ‍​​​​​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍a prisons present dangerous well-run can relatively is “a small the ADTC because environment, in which freedom choice is in- facility approximately just by official In- constrained not means. 4.) Even at (Maj. Op. 156-57 n. mates. ...” threats, through may compelled mates facility, permitting small comparatively a force, physical or more subtle forms of moni- having to congregate inmates they join duress to lawsuits in which them, all between passed materials tor Climbing have no interest. on- otherwise safety of other in- maintaining the while complaint prison about conditions board personnel, would be no prison mates and like an excellent idea when the seem course, And, says noth- small feat. by a presented alternative is fellow inmate decision will have on imрact our ing for with record assault. institutions. not-so-small The concerns behind the District Court’s nature of the transitory parade are not a fanciful of horri- decision is another factor identified population They judge’s bles. reflect seasoned view mul- problematic the District Court predictable outcomes and an under- Repeated case administration. ti-prisoner standing treating incarcerated crimi- standing and mootness questions about they nothing gain by nals as had ever-changing from an list of will arise systemical- gaming litigation system is be ordinary logistics will plaintiffs, ly prisons. bad both for the courts and the case, in with a Even troublesome. Thus, inclined, is, Majority I am not as plaintiffs, shifting number of moderate say general opposi- that a statement of to proven challenge. has prison population prisoner cases tion to us, By argued the time the case was More- constitutes abuse of discretion. plaintiffs only five of the fourteen were over, fully the District Court did not while Treatment Diagnostic in the Adult still application general of that rule explain its Center, longer others were no eight while case, to the facts of this its denial of system at Jersey in the New correctional sufficiently present was tied to the on outside keeping all. While tabs those particulars recognize that we should in this prison system be easier fairly disposing as of the case on decision formerly plain- incarcerated case because announcing simply its facts and not required register are as sex offend- tiffs the cir- ers, “general assumptions regarding guarantee that released there is no (Maj. Op. of incarceration.”12 other cir- cumstances will be locatable under plaintiffs 157.) reflects, docket cumstances. As our own screening.... adequacy say, ized of the claim did "Plaintiffs here

12. The District Court dependent upon alleged by require individual- each Plaintiff is asserted claims that have produced The District a thought- “parties filing appeal notice of and, least, ful the district court thoroughly persua- required pay only to me at are added). (emphasis Thus, one Id. opinion regard. sive in this It’s ruling was fee.” Judge contrast to the holding, not an Rendell’s Consequently, abuse of discretion. joined “each prisoner” “pay cannot noted, except to the I extent dissent. (Rendell, J., II.B.l.) Op. individual fee.” ROTH, Judge, Concurring Circuit us, In the pris- case before the fourteen Part and In Dissenting Part: pay oners cannot each (yielding a $450

Judge correctly intake) Rendell holds that we “parties filing joint because $6300 jurisdiction over this case and that appeal notice of ... required pay prisoners may join cases under Federal only one fee.” See Judicial [$450] Confer- Rule of disagree, Civil Procedure 20. I Fees, ence Schedule of Court Appeals however, ¶ with her holding pris- that each Miscellaneous Fee Schedule oner in a joint-prisoner action must indi- Judge holding Rendell’s violates vidually pay the entire appellate-docketing 1915(b)(3) § because she misconstrues fee. Because that holding incongruous 1915(b)(1). § She believes that the “plain statutory scheme, the relevant I re- 1915(b)(1)” § language of requires each spectfully portion dissent from that of her “pay the full individual fee.” opinion. I require prison- that each (See Rendell, J., II.B.l.) Op. But er an apportioned amount of a single 1915(b)(1) § impel does not that result. appellate-docketing fee. It, instead, requires party—or each prisoner—“to pay the full amount of a holding Rendell’s is incorrect be- 1915(b)(1) § fee.” 1915(b)(3) 28 U.S.C. (empha- § cause it violates 28 U.S.C. added). sis difference, This subtle 1915(b)(1). § misconstrues 28 Con- U.S.C. gress’s “the,” use of “a” instead of holding 1915(b)(3), § illus- violates which states trates that requirement fee varies $450 that “[i]n no event shall” a court collect a depending on single whether a party—or a filing fee that “exceed[s] the amount of single prisoner—or multiple parties—or fees by statute for ... an appeal multiple prisoners'—bring suit. When one of a § civil action.” 28 U.S.C. suit, brings he 1915(b)(3) satisfies § Section adopts thus a sister 1915(b)(1) § $450; paying when multi- statute’s cap fees; on appellate-docketing ple prisoners bring suit under Federal 28 U.S.C. 1913 is that statute. In Rule of Civil Procedure they satisfy Congress provides that fees “[t]he by paying the apportioned and costs to charged and collected in amount of situation, In either $450. each court appeals of shall prescribed full amount of filing a fee is paid. Each ... by the Judicial Conference of the Unit- prisoner herе pay thus should a one-four- § ed States.” Id. 1913. The Judicial Con- teenth share of $450. ference, turn, prescribes a fee “for $450 docketing case on appeal.” Judicial Con- The holding in the Judge case that Ren- Fees, ference Schedule of Ap- 1915(b)(3) § dell relies on also violated of ¶ peals Miscellaneous Fee 1915(b)(1). Schedule 1. Im- § misconstrued The Seventh portantly, the Fee Schedule notes that Circuit Appeals Court of has held that

his individual medical need and the behavior litigation in the abstract but prison respect officials with to that individ- problems rather with it foresaw in the cir- 12.) (App. ual Plaintiff.” at The Court thus presented by cumstances this case. appears to have merely been concerned not

165 jointly they satis- proceed can prisoners Berge, Boriboune v. 391 RICHMOND MEDICAL CENTER FOR

fy Rule 20. See (7th Cir.2004). But when it WOMEN; 855 F.3d Fitzhugh, M.D., William G. issue, the the fee-assessment turned to themselves, staffs, their on behalf concluded Circuit Seventh patients, Plaintiffs-Appel- and their re- prisoner’s § makes it “each lees, pay full fee.” See id. at sponsibility added). Cir- (emphasis The Seventh cuit, however, analyze did not HERRING, N. Michael his official See id. 855-56. Attorney capacity as Commonwealth Appeals, Circuit Court of Sixth City Richmond; for Wade A. contrast, supports assessing appor- Kizer, capacity in his official as Com- joint-prison- filing tioned amount of fees Attorney County monwealth for the The Sixth Circuit addressed er actions. Henrico, Defendants-Appellants. and costs in the issue of how to assess fees Talley-Bey v. two-prisoner suit. See Foundation, Incorpo- R. Horatio Storer (6th Cir.1999). Knebl, F.3d It rated; Marshall, Virginia Robert G. affirmed a district court’s division costs Delegate; Kathy Byron, Virginia J. prisoners. two Id. at and fees between Delegate; Cox, Virginia M. Kirkland “any fees and costs that 887. It noted Delegate; Gear, Virginia D. Thomas may impose a district court or that we Delegate; Howell, Virginia William J. among all the equally must be divided Timothy Delegate; Hugo, Virginia D. (emphasis prisoners.” Id. participating Delegate; Lingamfelter, added). L. Scott Vir- ginia Delegate; Nixon, Jr., A. Samuel apportioned I would assess an fee Virginia Delegate; Pogge, Brenda L. satisfy among the fourteen Virginia Delegate; Ware, Jr., R. Lee appellate-docketing fee. This the $450 Virginia Delegate; Holtzman Jill Vo- 1915(b)(1), satisfy because would both Senator; gel, Virginia Coburn, Tom A. fee, filing full pay would Senator; The American U.S. Center 1915(b)(3), to- because Justice, Support- for Law Amici I gether pay only one fee. $450 ing Appellants, part dissent from that therefore pris- that holds that each opinion Rendell’s fee.13 Physicians

oner must $450 Reproductive Choice Health; Cullins, E. Vanessa Affairs,

Vice President for Medical Planned Parenthood Federation America; Forty-Two Phy- Individual Moreover, judg- by prisoners. I is no action See In re Market submit there Inn, Inc., (3d only Square F.2d Cir. ment the Court on this issue because 1992) require (stating only eligible judge voted the two members of one has appellate jurisdiction prisoner-plaintiff panel "the who held that in a action to noted, panel on the of the district fee. As the motions existed voted merits decision). requires eligible issue the resolu- court’s Because the two resolution of fee (See disagree, ‍​​​​​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍judgment permitting joinder judges the Court has no or tion of in this case. 152.) holding Jordan would not on the issue of how to assess fees. J.A. Because case, sepa Any by Judge permit joinder he should not be statements Jordan in his in this merely required opinion concerning dicta. on the fee in a Rule 20 rate fees are able to vote

Case Details

Case Name: Hagan v. Rogers

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Date Published: Jun 19, 2009

Citation: 570 F.3d 146

Docket Number: 07-1412

Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.