Joseph Arpaio v. Barack Obama
418 U.S. App. D.C. 163
| D.C. Cir. | 2015Background
- DHS implemented and expanded deferred-action programs: DACA (2012) and DAPA (2014), deferring removal and authorizing work for certain non‑dangerous undocumented immigrants already present in the U.S. for renewable periods.
- The programs apply only to persons already in the United States who meet eligibility criteria (e.g., arrival before Jan 1, 2010 for DACA/DAPA, passing background checks) and exclude dangerous criminals and recent entrants.
- Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph Arpaio sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging DACA/DAPA violate the Take Care Clause, the APA (failure to follow notice-and-comment), and are arbitrary and capricious; he asserted financial and operational harms to his sheriff’s office from increased crime and jail costs.
- The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing (Sheriff’s alleged harms were generalized and speculative); Arpaio appealed.
- The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding Arpaio failed to plead an injury fairly traceable to the challenged policies and redressable by enjoining them, because his theories relied on speculative chains of third‑party conduct and misread the policies’ prioritization purpose.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing — injury, causation, redressability | Arpaio: deferred action will (1) act as a "magnet" drawing more unlawful entrants and (2) reduce removals so more noncitizens remain and commit crimes, increasing local policing/jail costs. | Government: programs apply only to persons already in U.S.; causal chain from policies to new entries and crime is attenuated and speculative; programs prioritize removal of criminals and thus are unlikely to increase crime. | Held: No standing. Arpaio’s alleged harms are speculative, rest on multiple intervening third‑party actions, and are not fairly traceable or redressable by enjoining DACA/DAPA. |
| Third‑party causation (magnet theory) | Arpaio: foreigners will learn of or infer similar future relief and unlawfully enter U.S., settle in Maricopa, commit crimes, and impose costs. | Govt: majority of steps are independent third‑party choices; such attenuated chains require substantial evidence and are ordinarily insufficient for standing. | Held: Third‑party behavior predictions are too speculative; standing based on anticipated third‑party conduct is substantially harder and not met here. |
| Reductions in removals / effect of prioritization | Arpaio: DACA/DAPA will decrease total removals, leaving more offenders in county. | Govt: Policies reprioritize enforcement toward dangerous criminals; they do not promise fewer removals overall and, if effective, should reduce crime by focusing on dangerous individuals. | Held: Arpaio’s reduced‑removals theory misreads the policies and cannot plausibly show they would increase crime; plausible alternative (fewer crimes) defeats his claim. |
| APA / procedural claims (notice-and-comment) | Arpaio: DACA/DAPA function as rules/regulations requiring notice-and-comment; failure to comply renders them invalid. | Govt: enforcement discretion and deferred action are longstanding and discretionary; court need not reach merits absent standing. | Held: Court did not reach merits of APA claims because Arpaio lacks Article III standing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (agencies generally have enforcement discretion not to act)
- Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (recognition of deferred action as executive discretion)
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (Secretary charged with administration and enforcement of immigration laws; broad immigration enforcement discretion)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury, causation, redressability)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (heightened requirement for imminent injury in cases seeking prospective relief)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (complaint must plead factual matter to be plausible)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (state standing and "special solicitude" discussion)
- Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. FAA, 795 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (standing denied where injury rests on speculative chain of third‑party actions)
- O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (standing denied where prediction of future prosecutions is speculative)
- Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Dep't of Educ., 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (requirement of substantial evidence linking government policy and third‑party conduct for standing)
- Renal Physicians Ass'n v. HHS, 489 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (procedural‑injury plaintiffs still must show redressable injury)
- United Transp. Union v. ICC, 891 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting speculative predictions of third‑party action for standing)