John Doe, I v. Doug Peterson, 43 F.4th 838

Nebraska's Sex Offender Registration Act requires registration by anyone who must register in another jurisdiction (the "other-jurisdiction" provision) and also for those who committed enumerated offenses in Nebraska or offenses elsewhere that are "substantially equivalent."
Nebraska exempts juveniles adjudicated delinquent in Nebraska from registration; but Nebraska requires registration of entrants whose out-of-state registration obligation is based on a juvenile adjudication.
Four plaintiffs (John Does) committed juvenile sex offenses in other states, were required to register there, then moved to Nebraska and were told they must register under the other-jurisdiction provision.
The Does sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of the right to travel (Privileges or Immunities under the Fourteenth Amendment) and equal protection because Nebraska does not impose the same requirement on juveniles adjudicated in Nebraska.
The district court granted summary judgment for Nebraska; the Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Right to travel — does the other-jurisdiction provision violate the Privileges or Immunities right of new residents?	The provision discriminates against new entrants who must register elsewhere and thus burdens interstate travel and residency rights.	The statute does not impose a durational or fixed-point residency distinction; it triggers on an out-of-state registration obligation, not on timing of residency.	No violation; right to travel not implicated because the law is not a durational or fixed-point residency scheme.
Equal protection — does the law irrationally treat out-of-state juvenile adjudicates differently than Nebraska juveniles?	The law irrationally forces registration on juvenile adjudicates from other states while exempting Nebraska juveniles.	Nebraska has rational bases: public safety, variation in other states' juvenile/adult charging rules, administrative burdens, and federal registry policy.	Rational-basis review satisfied; statute is rationally related to legitimate public-safety and administrative interests.

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (U.S. 1999) (Privileges or Immunities/constitutional right to travel framework)
Hope v. Comm'r of Ind. Dep't of Corr., 9 F.4th 513 (7th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (similar "other-jurisdiction" registration upheld against travel claim)
Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2013) (right to travel not implicated absent durational residency discrimination)
FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1993) (explaining rational-basis standard)
Birchansky v. Clabaugh, 955 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2020) (application of rational-basis review)
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (U.S. 1975) (permissible reliance on administrative burdens)
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1970) (legislative "rough accommodations" doctrine)
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (U.S. 1955) (laws need not be perfectly logical to be constitutional)
Skaggs v. Neb. State Patrol, 804 N.W.2d 611 (Neb. 2011) (Nebraska statute can apply to lifelong residents who trigger registration by out-of-state obligations)
State v. Clemens, 915 N.W.2d 550 (Neb. 2018) (Nebraska interpretation that out-of-state juvenile-based registration obligation triggers Nebraska registration)