Case Information
*1 VANASKIE, Circuit Judges .
(Filed: January 24, 2013) Samuel J. Cordes [Argued]
Christine T. Elzer
Samuel J. Cordes & Associates
245 Fort Pitt Boulevard
Pittsburgh, PA 15222-0000
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant *2 William C. Andrews
Anthony G. Sanchez [Argued]
Amie A. Thompson
Andrews & Price
1500 Ardmore Boulevard
Suite 506
Pittsburgh, PA 15221-0000
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee ____________ OPINION OF THE COURT ____________ HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge .
Thе question presented by this appeal is whether a Pennsylvania public school district violates the Constitution when it sets teacher salaries based, in part, on prior in-state teaching experience. We hold it does not.
I
In September 2006, the Steel Valley School District hired Patrick Connelly as a sixth grade teacher. Steel Valley pays its teachers pursuant to а salary scale based on their education and years of experience. At the time he was hired, Connelly had nine years of teaching experience—all in Maryland. Because Connelly acquired his teaching experience outside Pennsylvania, however, Steel Valley credited him with only one year. Other new teachers with like experience acquired within Pennsylvania (but not at Steel *3 Valley) received at least partial credit for each year they had taught.
Because Steel Valley gave Connelly only one year of credit, his initial annual salary was $38,023, which was substantially less than the $49,476 Connelly alleged he would have received had Steel Valley given him full credit for his experience. As time passed, Connelly‘s initial salary determination continued to adversely affect his pay. During the 2010–11 academic year, Connelly‘s salary was approximately $22,000 less than it would have been had he received full credit in 2006.
In June 2011, Connelly filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania asserting two Fourteenth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Connelly argued that Steel Valley‘s fаilure to fully credit his out-of-state teaching experience violated his right to interstate travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and denied him equal protection of the law. The District Court granted Steel Valley‘s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that Connelly ―does not state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim because the сlassification alleged is based on location of teaching experience, not residency.‖ Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist. , No. 11-851, 2011 WL 5024415, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2011). The Court dismissed Connelly‘s complaint with prejudice, holding that any amendment would be futile. at *8. This appeal followed.
II
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We exercise plenary review over the grant of a motion
to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside
, 578 F.3d 203, 206
(3d Cir. 2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
must provide ―more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.‖
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (citation omitted). The plaintiff must allege ―enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‖ at 570. This standard requires the plaintiff to shоw ―more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.‖
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing
Twombly
,
Twombly and Iqbal require us to take the following three steps to determine the sufficiency of a complaint:
First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc. , 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp. , 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
III
Connelly claims Steel Valley‘s salary scale impaired
his right to travel interstate in violation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clausе of Article IV (as incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment) and the Equal Protection Clause.
We review both of Connelly‘s claims under the same standard
because ―the right to interstate travel finds its ‗most forceful
expression in the context of equal protection analysis.‘‖
Schumacher v. Nix
, 965 F.2d 1262, 1266 (3d Cir. 1992)
(quoting
Zobel v. Williams
,
A
We begin by considering which equal protection standard governs our review of Steel Valley‘s pаy scale. The parties vigorously dispute this point because the standard of review ( i.e. , rational basis review or strict scrutiny) is often outcome determinative. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §16-30, at 1089 (1st ed. 1978) (noting strict scrutiny is a ―virtual death-blow‖); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §16-2, at 1442–43 (2d ed. 1988) (―The traditional deference both to legislative purpose and to legislative selections among means continues . . . to make the rationality requirement largely equivalent to a strong presumption of constitutionality.‖). As Connelly correctly notes, Steel Valley set his salary based on a classification that paid those with in-state teaching experience more than those with out-of-state experience. He argues that because this classification ―serves to pеnalize the exercise of his right to migrate,‖ it should be subject to strict scrutiny. Steel Valley counters that rational basis review applies.
The state‘s creation of a classification is not ―per se
unconstitutional or automatically subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny.‖
Maldonado v. Houstoun
, 157 F.3d 179,
184 (3d Cir. 1998). If a ―classification ‗neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold
it so long аs it bears a rational relation to some legitimate
end.‘‖ (quoting
Vacco v. Quill
,
Connelly does not argue
that Steel Valley‘s
classification affects a suspect class, so strict scrutiny will
apply only if it burdens a fundamental right. The right to
interstate travel has been recognized as fundamental by the
Supreme Court.
Shapiro v. Thompson
, 394 U.S. 618, 630,
638 (1969),
overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v.
Jordan
,
In this regard, we have recognized that strict scrutiny
apрlies only when the state creates ―‗distinctions between
newcomers and longer term residents.‘‖
Schumacher
, 965
F.2d at 1267 (quoting
Zobel
, 457 U.S. at 60 n.6);
see also
Maldonado
, 157 F.3d at 181–82, 190 (finding Pennsylvania
law limiting amount of welfare benefits a family could
receive during its first twelve months in the state triggered
strict scrutiny). In other words, strict scrutiny applies when
the state conditions the receipt of certain government benefits
on the duration of the recipient‘s residence in thе state.
See
, 965 F.2d at 1267 (analyzing the history of the
Supreme Court‘s treatment of residency-based distinctions).
As the District Court correctly noted, in a line of cases
implicating the fundamental right to travel from
Shapiro v.
Thompson
, to
Saenz v. Roe
, the Supreme Court has applied
strict scrutiny only to durational residency requirements.
See
Saenz
,
When the receipt of a government benefit is
conditioned on factors other than duration of residency, we
apply rational basis review to detеrmine whether the right to
*8
travel has been unconstitutionally burdened. In ,
we considered a Pennsylvania bar admission rule that
prevented graduates of unaccredited law schools from sitting
for the Pennsylvania bar exam unless: they were members of
the bar of a state with a reciprocal bar admission policy, were
in good standing with that bar, and had practiced law in the
state for more than five years.
As the District Court correctly noted, Steel Valley‘s classification is based on the location of teaching experience, not duration of residency. Thus, Connelly is being treated no differently than lifelong residents of Pennsylvania. He does not allege that residents of Pennsylvania who tаught out of state for nine years prior to working at Steel Valley are given more credit than was he for their comparable out-of-state teaching experience. Nor does Connelly sufficiently rebut Steel Valley‘s argument that a teacher who resides in Pennsylvania but teaches in a neighboring state would be subject to the same classification as Connelly, should that teacher later decide to seek employment with Steel Valley.
A simple example illustrates the problem with Connelly‘s argument. Consider a teacher who, for his whole life, has lived in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, but spent the first decade of his teaching career working at a public school in *9 Frederick, Maryland. If that teacher were to leave the Frederick school аnd take a position with Steel Valley, he presumably would receive the same credit for his Maryland teaching experience that Connelly received. Thus, only the teacher‘s lack of Pennsylvania teaching experience—not his residency—would adversely affect his starting pay. For that reason, Steel Valley‘s classification creates no substantial burden оn the right to travel.
This is not to deny that Steel Valley‘s classification creates some incidental burden on interstate travel. Teachers who reside outside of Pennsylvania and who have years of teaching experience in their home states may elect not to move to Pennsylvania because they might not receive full credit for their teaching experience. As we noted in , however, a mere ―impediment to plaintiffs‘ freedom of movement‖ which has ―some deterrent effect on nonresident[s] . . . who wish to migrate to Pennsylvania‖ is not enough to give rise to strict scrutiny. 965 F.2d at 1267; see also id. (―[T]he Constitution does not guarantee that citizens of State A may move to State B and enjoy the same privileges they did as citizens of State A, only that citizens of State A mаy move to State B and be treated on similar terms as the citizens of State B.‖). Because Steel Valley‘s salary classification treats citizens differently based only on their teaching experience irrespective of their residency, strict scrutiny does not apply. [1]
*10 Finally, Connelly urges us to follow Erisman v. Chartiers Valley School District , Civ. No. 00-1102 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2001), which supports his argument that we should apply strict scrutiny to Steel Valley‘s experience-based salary classification. The facts of Erisman and this case are remarkably similar. There, a teacher with twenty-two years of experience in Maryland was hired by a Pennsylvania school district that denied her nine steps of salary scale credit. Erisman , slip op. at 1. The magistrate judge reasoned that the classification was subject to strict scrutiny because ―[t]he рolicy would clearly cause greater injury to those who reside out of state and who intend to make Pennsylvania their new place of residence.‖ Id. at 8. Therefore, he found that ―the practical effect of the district‘s policy is to impose a substantial burden on interstate migration.‖ We decline Connelly‘s invitation to follow Erisman because we are convinced that it was wrongly decided.
The relevant distinction when evaluating a claim
asserting a violation of the fundamental right to travel is
between long-term and short-term residents, not current
residents and
prospective
residents.
See Schumacher
, 965
F.2d at 1267. Indeed, the court in
Erisman
recognized that
new Pennsylvania residents were treated the same as longer
term residents under the school‘s policy.
See Erisman
, slip
―right to travel embraces the citizen‘s right to be treated
equally in her new State of residence.‖
op. at 8–9 (noting that longer term Pennsylvania teachers‘ right to interstate travel ―is just as surely impaired by this policy as is the citizen of another State selecting to come to Pennsylvania fоr the first time‖). The right to travel simply is not implicated when there is no discrimination based on the duration of one‘s residency. [2]
In sum, because Connelly‘s allegations cannot support an inference that Steel Valley penalized him for exercising his right to interstate travel, its salary classification does not implicate a fundamental right. See Soto-Lopez , 476 U.S. at 903. Therefore, Steel Valley‘s decisiоn to provide Connelly with less than full credit for out-of-state teaching experience is subject to rational basis review.
B
*12 As we shall explain, Steel Valley‘s experience-based salary classification is sufficiently tied to the legitimate state purpose of promoting an efficient and effective public school system to pass the rational basis test. Acсordingly, we hold that Steel Valley did not violate Connelly‘s right to travel.
―State laws that neither employ a suspect classification
nor impinge a fundamental right are ‗entitled to a
presumption of validity against attack under the Equal
Protection Clause.‘‖ ,
The District Court cited two justifications for offering greater compensation to those with in-state teaching experience: valuing familiarity with the Pennsylvania Department of Education‘s (DOE) policies, procedures, and regulations; and promoting efficiency in the education system. Connelly , 2011 WL 5024415, at *7. The DOE has established ―rigorous academic standards and assessments to facilitate the improvement of student achievement and to provide parents and communities a measure by which school performance can be determined.‖ 22 Pa. Code § 4.2. The DOE‘s academic and assessment standards set forth guidelines for teachers in areas including: curriculum and instruction tailored to different grade levels and subjects; *13 grading and scheduling; standardized testing; and special education. See id. § 4.1 et seq .
It is reasonable to assume that teachers who have more experience working within Pennsylvania schools have greater familiarity with these regulations and the goals they are expected to accomplish. Beyond familiarity with the regulations, it is also reasonable to assume that teachers with more experience working within the system would have a better grasp on what methods are most successful in achieving the goals the DOE has established. Therefore, a school district may rationally place a premium on teachers who have more experience working within the Pennsylvania school system in order to achieve the legitimate goal of an efficient and effective public education system.
Given the deferential standard we employ when considering а state policy under rational basis review, see , 965 F.2d at 1269, these reasons suffice to uphold Steel Valley‘s policy. Therefore, the District Court did not err when it dismissed Connelly‘s complaint.
IV
Finally, Connelly argues that the District Court erred
when it dismissed his complaint with prejudice without
giving him the opportunity to amend. ―We review a district
court decision refusing leave to amend . . . for abuse of
discretiоn.‖
Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox
Rothschild LLP
, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP
,
Here,
the District Court dismissed Connelly‘s
complaint with prejudice because it determined that any
amendment would be futile.
Connelly
,
V For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court‘s order granting Steel Valley‘s motion to dismiss.
Notes
[1] Connelly also argues that strict scrutiny applies because he has a fundamental right not to be subject to a classification that discriminates between teaching experience in Maryland versus Pennsylvania. This is an incorrect statеment of the law. In Saenz , the Court explained that the
[2] Connelly also relies on Hammond v. Illinois State Board of Education , 624 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. Ill. 1986). Hammond is inapplicable here because the court limited its analysis of an in-state teaching requirement for school superintendent candidates to whether the policy was rationally related to a legitimate state interest and avoided a discussion of the plaintiff‘s right to travel argument. See id. at 1155. Moreover, the court indicated in dicta that the teaсhing requirement did not implicate the plaintiff‘s right to travel because it ―treats both Illinois and non-Illinois residents equal; both must have prior Illinois teaching experience.‖ Thus, Hammond actually supports our holding that an experience-based classification that treats both new and old residents equally does not run afoul of the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.