Jeremiah Davis v. United States
900 F.3d 733
6th Cir.2018Background
- Jeremiah Davis was sentenced under the ACCA in 2001 based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions; two of those convictions were from 1991–1992 (pre-1993 statute revision).
- Davis later filed a §2255 habeas petition after Johnson v. United States, arguing his prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions were not ACCA predicates because they allowed reckless mental states and the residual clause had been invalidated.
- The district court granted relief relying on this circuit’s earlier decision (McMurray) that reckless aggravated assault was not a violent felony and concluding Voisine did not overrule that precedent.
- On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that after the Supreme Court’s Voisine decision and this circuit’s subsequent cases (Verwiebe and Harper), recklessness can satisfy the ACCA use-of-force clause and Tennessee aggravated assault under §39-13-101(a)(1) is a crime of violence.
- The government produced juvenile charging petitions (Shepard documents) showing Davis was charged under subsection (a)(1) (serious bodily injury or use of a deadly weapon) for both pre-1993 convictions; the court deemed those documents adequate to identify the statutory variant of conviction.
- The court rejected Davis’s attempts to displace the charging documents (argument analogizing Bernal-Aveja/Day) because the only plausible lesser-included offense was the (a)(1) variant, which is a qualifying ACCA predicate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tennessee aggravated assault (including reckless variants) is a violent felony under the ACCA use-of-force clause | Davis: Reckless variants are not ACCA predicates (relying on McMurray) | Government: Voisine and later Sixth Circuit decisions make recklessness sufficient | Held: Recklessness suffices; Tenn. §39-13-101(a)(1) is a crime of violence under the use-of-force clause |
| Whether Davis’s pre-1993 convictions were for the (a)(1) variant (serious injury/deadly weapon) | Davis: Government failed to prove which statutory variant he was convicted of | Government: Shepard documents (charging petitions) show convictions under (a)(1) | Held: Charging documents conclusively show (a)(1); thus convictions are qualifying predicates |
| Whether charging documents (Shepard materials) can be used when conviction followed bench trial | Davis: Post-bench-trial sentencing should rely only on judge’s formal findings, not charging papers | Government: Shepard/Descamps/Mathis permit examination of charging documents to identify the offense | Held: Shepard documents are admissible to determine the statutory variant regardless of bench trial |
| Whether an original charge of attempted murder (later convicted of aggravated assault) prevents using the charging document to identify the convicted variant | Davis: Analogizes to cases where plea to lesser offense changed elements (Bernal-Aveja/Day) | Government: Tennessee law allowed conviction only on crimes raised by indictment; attempted murder did not permit (a)(2) or (a)(3) theories | Held: Those cases are distinguishable; only (a)(1) could be a lesser-included verdict here, so charging document controls |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (reckless conduct can satisfy the use-of-force element)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (permissible Shepard materials for determining the offense of conviction)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (limits on comparing statutory elements; sentencing-court use of limited materials)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (reaffirming limited-document approach for determining offense elements)
- United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2011) (prior Sixth Circuit holding that reckless aggravated assault was not a crime of violence)
- United States v. Verwiebe, 874 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding recklessness sufficient under use-of-force clause post-Voisine)
- United States v. Harper, 875 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2017) (applying Verwiebe to Tennessee aggravated assault)
- Braden v. United States, 817 F.3d 926 (6th Cir. 2016) (standards for §2255 habeas review)