19 F.4th 437
4th Cir.2021Background
- Jean Francois Pugin, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in Virginia (2014) to being an accessory after the fact to a felony and received a sentence of 12 months (9 suspended).
- DHS charged Pugin as removable for committing an "aggravated felony" defined as an offense "relating to . . . obstruction of justice," 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S).
- The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals applied the Board’s generic definition (In re Valenzuela Gallardo II): an affirmative, intentional attempt motivated by specific intent to interfere with an ongoing, pending, or reasonably foreseeable investigation or proceeding (or another’s punishment from a completed proceeding), and concluded Virginia’s accessory-after-the-fact statute matched that definition.
- Pugin argued (1) Chevron deference is inappropriate (or the statute is unambiguous), (2) the phrase requires a nexus to an ongoing proceeding (not just a foreseeable one), (3) the rule of lenity controls, and (4) Virginia’s offense lacks the Board’s specific-intent element and therefore does not categorically match.
- The Fourth Circuit majority held Chevron deference applies to the BIA’s interpretation, found the phrase ambiguous, concluded the BIA’s definition is reasonable, and determined Virginia accessory-after-the-fact requires specific intent (per Wren and Virginia jury instructions), producing a categorical match — removal affirmed.
- Chief Judge Gregory dissented: he would find the statutory phrase unambiguous (requiring a nexus to an ongoing proceeding), that the BIA’s broadened interpretation is unreasonable and vague, and that Virginia law may be broader than the federal definition.
Issues
| Issue | Pugin's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of Chevron to the BIA’s definition of "relating to obstruction of justice" | Chevron inappropriate because the INA has criminal consequences and lenity should apply; or statute unambiguous | Chevron applies: INA is civil, BIA has delegated authority, collateral criminal effects are too attenuated to displace Chevron | Chevron applies; Step Zero satisfied (deference appropriate) |
| Meaning of "relating to obstruction of justice": does it require an ongoing proceeding? | Phrase is a term of art requiring a nexus to an ongoing/pending proceeding | Phrase is ambiguous; may cover interference with ongoing or reasonably foreseeable proceedings; BIA’s foreseeable-proceeding test is reasonable | Phrase is ambiguous; BIA’s definition (ongoing or reasonably foreseeable proceeding) is reasonable and entitled to deference |
| Rule of lenity | Lenity governs because interpretation implicates criminal penalties | Lenity does not apply: provision is civil; potential criminal effects are indirect/attenuated | Lenity does not displace Chevron in this context |
| Categorical match: does Virginia accessory-after-the-fact contain the specific-intent element required by the generic BIA definition? | Virginia offense is only knowledge-based and may reach conduct outside the generic definition | Virginia common-law offense (and jury instructions/case law) requires acting with the view/intent of enabling the principal to elude punishment — a specific-intent element — so it categorically matches | Virginia accessory-after-the-fact requires specific intent to hinder apprehension/punishment and thus categorically matches the BIA’s generic definition; removal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations)
- I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (deference especially appropriate in immigration/foreign-relations context)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (rule of lenity applies when interpreting criminal statutes referenced in immigration law)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (§1512 requires a nexus to a foreseeable official proceeding)
- Aguilar v. United States, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (nexus requirement in obstruction context)
- Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015) (applied Chevron in INA context to define statutory term)
- Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) (Supreme Court discussion of categorical approach and Board deference limits)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (categorical-approach framework for matching state elements to federal generic offenses)
- United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2019) (interpreting §1512: obstructive conduct must be connected to a proceeding that was pending or reasonably foreseeable)
- United States v. White, 771 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2014) (sustaining §3 accessory-after-the-fact conviction where acts foreseeably impeded detection/apprehension)