Jane Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4004
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Doe, an R2 diagnostic radiology resident at Mercy Catholic Medical Center (a private, Medicare-participating teaching hospital affiliated with Drexel University), alleges sexual harassment and retaliation by the residency director (Dr. Roe), culminating in her suspension and termination in April 2013 and preventing her licensure.
- Doe complained to Mercy HR and met with administrators and a psychiatrist; Mercy required a corrective plan and later terminated her after an appeal process in which Dr. Roe advocated for dismissal.
- Doe filed suit on April 20, 2015, asserting Title IX claims (retaliation, quid pro quo, hostile environment) and state-law claims (contract-based sex discrimination, wrongful termination, breach of covenant). She did not file an EEOC charge under Title VII.
- The district court dismissed all Title IX claims, holding Mercy’s residency program was not an “education program or activity” under Title IX and that Title VII’s administrative scheme foreclosed parallel Title IX private claims; it also found the hostile-environment claim time-barred and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
- The Third Circuit considered (1) whether Title IX covers Mercy’s residency program, (2) whether private Title IX causes of action are cognizable given Title VII overlap, and (3) remand of state claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Title IX cover Mercy’s residency program (i.e., is it an “education program or activity”)? | Mercy’s residency is a structured, accredited training program (ACGME), educational in mission and affiliated with Drexel, so Title IX applies. | Residency programs are healthcare employment, not education; Title IX’s modifier “education” limits coverage to schooling institutions. | Title IX can reach nontraditional programs whose mission is at least partly educational; Doe plausibly alleged Mercy’s residency (and its Drexel affiliation) is covered. |
| Can an employee bring private Title IX claims (retaliation, quid pro quo) despite overlapping Title VII remedies? | Cannon implies private causes of action under Title IX; employees may pursue Title IX claims alongside Title VII. | Title VII’s comprehensive administrative scheme is the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination by employees. | Private Title IX claims for retaliation and quid pro quo are cognizable even if Title VII also applies; Jackson and related precedent permit parallel remedies. |
| Is Doe’s hostile-environment Title IX claim timely? | The hostile conduct was ongoing and can be aggregated under the continuing-violation doctrine into the limitations period. | Most hostile acts occurred outside the two-year limitations period; discrete timely acts cannot revive a stale hostile-environment claim. | Hostile-environment claim is time-barred; the only timely acts were discrete (dismissal and appeal) and cannot support the continuing-violation theory here. |
| What happens to Doe’s state-law claims after resolution of Title IX claims? | If federal claims survive, the district court should retain supplemental jurisdiction and decide state claims. | District court declined supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing federal claims. | Because Title IX retaliation and quid pro quo claims survive, state-law claims are remanded for further proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (implied private cause of action under Title IX)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (Title IX retaliation claim by employee is actionable)
- North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (Title IX’s broad "person" language includes employees; agencies may enforce employment discrimination rules)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (Spending Clause notice and requirement that an official with authority have actual knowledge for damages claims)
- Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009) (clarifies interplay of Title IX and other remedies)
- Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (employees may seek remedies under multiple statutes; Title VII does not preclude other federal remedies in private sector)
- Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (distinct treatment where Congress creates an exclusive remedial scheme for federal employment)
- Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (money damages available under private Title IX actions)
- Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (factors to determine ‘‘employee’’ status)
- Morgan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (discrete acts vs. continuing violation in employment discrimination statutes)
- Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (Title IX applied to medical residency program)
- O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997) (defining educational character for nontraditional programs; program considered educational if mission is at least partly educational)