*1 AGENCY, JOHNSON RAILWAY EXPRESS
INC., ET AL. Arguеd May 19, No. 73-1543. December 1974 Decided J., opinion Court, delivered the Blackmun, of the in which J., JJ., C. and Burger, White, Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, joined, and in Parts I—III of which and Mar- Douglas, Brennan, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., opinion concurring part shall, filed an Douglas dissenting part, JJ., joined, in which Brennan, post, p. 468. Deborah M. Greenberg argued petitioner. the cause for Greenberg, With her on the briefs were Jack James M. Nabrit.III, Bailer, Morris J. Eric Schnapper, William E. Caldwell, and Louis H. Poliak.
Arthur M. Wisehart argued respondent cause for Railway Express Inc. him Agency, With briefs was Peter Highsaw, Jr., G. James L. argued the Wolfe. cause and filed respondents briefs for Brotherhood Railway Clerks et al.* Bork,
* Solicitor Attorney Pottinger, General Assistant General Keith Jones, A. Rose, Middleton, Joseph David L. Michael A. T. Eddins filed a brief for thе United curiae. States as'amicus
Mb. Justice: Blackmun delivered opinion *2 Court. presents
This case the issue whether timely filing of a charge employment discrimination Equal with the Employment Opportunity (EEOC), Commission pursu- ant §to 706 of Title of the Rights Civil Act 1964, 259, Stat. C. § tolls the 2000e-5, running of of limitation applicable to an action, based on facts, same instituted under 42 U. S. C. 1981.
I Petitioner, Johnson, Jr., Willie is Negro. He started respondent Railway Express work for Inc., Agency, by now, change name, Express, (REA), REA Inc. Memphis, Tenn., spring in the express of 1964 as May On by 31,1967, employed REA, handler. while still but now as a handler, driver rather than petitioner, as a with others, timely filed charge with the EEOC REA was discriminating against its Negro employees with respect seniority He job rules and assignments. charged respondent also Rail- unions, Brotherhood of way Railway Clerks Tri-State Local and Brotherhood Lily Valley Local, racially maintaining Clerks memberships (white segregated Negro respectively). later, peti- Three weeks on June REA terminated employment. tioner’s his Petitioner then amended charge to include an had allegation that he been dis- charged because of his race. Investigation its Report”
The EEOC issued “Final on 22, 1967. App. report generally December 14a. The supported petitioner’s It claims racial discrimination. years not however, was until more than two later, on March 31, 1970, that the Commission rendered its de- cision finding reasonable cause to believe charges. And 9% more months went before the C. 15, 1971, pursuant EEOC, January notice read, gave petitioner it then (e), as 2000e-5 VII civil action institute a his days.1 within respondents some еncountered notice, petitioner this receiving After Dis- The United States obtaining counsel. difficulty in Tennessee, on District of the Western trict Court right- to file petitioner February 12, permitted complaint, clerk as a with the court’s to-sue letter also The court 30-day requirement. satisfaction pauperis, proceed leave to petitioner granted forma him. On March represent counsel to appointed it Complaint” against “Supplemental filed a 18, counsel unions, racial discrimination alleging two and the REA *3 VII of Title defendants, violation part of unions 42 U. C. 1981. The § Act of S. of the 1964 and or, summary judgment respectively moved for REA and alternative, for dismissal of all claims. in the 1981 claims as § dismissed the The District Court one-year limitations. by Tennessee’s statute barred of 1974).2 Petitioner’s (Supp. Ann. §28-304 Tenn. Code grounds.3 other were dismissed on remaining claims 1 period of amended to allow a applicable The statute later was notice, bring days, in which to the Title 90 of the after issuance (1) (1970 (f) ed., Supp. Ill), as action. C. 2000e-5 92-261, (a), 86 amended Pub. L. Stat. §4 2 attorneys— Malpractice “28-304. Personal tort actions — Statutory libel, rights penalties. for for Civil actions — —Actions injuries imprisonment, prosecution, person, to the false malicious conversation, seduction, marriage promise, actions criminal breach of attorneys malpractice are against for whether said actions suits tort, grounded compensa- civil for or based contract or actions tory both, brought damages, or under the federal civil punitive or statutory statutes, penalties be com- rights and actions for shall (1) year after cause of within one action accrued.” menced 3 The also based its District Court dismissal ground on the alternative that he failed to claim REA had appeal In his to the United Court Appeals States Circuit, petitioner, the Sixth respect to his § argued claims, running one-year period suspended during limitation was pendency of his timely filed complaint administrative with the EEOC under VII. The Appeals Court of this rejected argument. 489 F. 2d (1973). See also Jenkins Corp., Motors Supp. General 354 F. 1040, (Del. 1973). apparent Because of an conflict between ruling, language holdings in cases from granted Circuits,4 other we certiorari restricted to the limitation issue. We invited the Solicitor General to file as exрressing brief amicus curiae views (1974). United States. 417 S. 929
II A. Title VII of the Civil Act Rights was en- “to equality employment acted assure opportunities practices by eliminating those discrimi- devices that nate on the race, color, basis of religion, sex, or national Alexander Gardner-Denver origin.” statutory rights It creates against invid- Railway Act, his remedies exhaust administrative Labor seq. App. 151 et Stat. U. S. C. 102a. Court of argument. Appeals did not the exhaustion Inasmuch as we address *4 grant of certiorari to the limitation issue, limited our 417 U. 929 S. (1974), express we have here a view whether no occasion to as to a employment subject 1981 is ever claim discrimination a re- § quirement be administrative remedies exhausted. judicata The claims the unions were dismissed on res grounds. App. Appеals The agreed 101a. Court of with that 525, (CA6 disposition. 1973). issue, 1 also, 489 F. 2d 530 n. This grant was not included in our of certiorari. 4 See, g., Rouge Contracting e. Boudreaux v. Baton Marine Freight Spector 1011, (CA5 Macklin 1971); 437 2d 1017 16 F. n. Inc., Systems, App. 69, 84-86, D. 979, C. n. 478 F. 2d 994-996, (1973). n. 30 a employment and establishes
ious discrimination rights. vindication of those comprehensive scheme for the may by employment discrimination Anyone aggrieved is Commission a with the EEOC. That lodge charge “authority to individual investigate with the vested voluntary compli- promote discrimination, charges to institute requirements VII, the of Title ance with or named in a dis- against employers civil actions unions Com- charge.” S., Thus, at 44. the crimination U. may institute civil U. C. mission itself action. S. III). the (f)(1) (1970 Supp. If, however, § 2000e-5 ed., obtaining “voluntary com- EEOC is not successful another, chooses not pliance” for one reason or and, the claimant, after behalf, sue on the claimant’s letter may right-to-sue passage days, of 180 demand wait- VII action himself without and institute the Title procedures. conciliation ing completion for the III). (f) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. See § 42 U. C. 2000e-5 S. (1971); McDonnell p. Rep. 92-238, H. R. No. Green, 411 Douglas Corp. v. U. S. is the federal district court suit,
In the claimant’s to authorize appoint him, counsel for empowered payment without of the action commencement attorney’s and even to allow an or fees, costs, security, Ill) (1970 Supp. (f)(1) ed., 2000e-5 S. C. fee. engage intentional (k). 2000e-5 Where and U. S. C. court in unlawful proved, ment discrimination “such affirmative action and order may backpay award (g) C. 2000e-5 may appropriate.” as may not III). backpay, hоwever, Supp. (1970 ed., two-year prior filing to the be for more than District Ibid. Some charge with the Commission. compensatory puni neither nor have ruled that Courts Title VII suit.5 may be damages tive awarded (Haw. Gerarge, 1974); Supp. Loo 374 F.
459 Despite range as a design compre- Title VII’s and its problem hensive solution of invidious discrimina- tion in employment, clearly individual is aggrieved deprived not of other he possesses remedies and is not limited Title VII in his search for relief. “[T]he legislative history Title VII congressional manifests a intent allow pursue independently individual his rights under both Title VII applicable and other state statutes.” Alexander Gardner- v. Co., Denver 415 U. In S., particular, Congress noted "that the remedies available to the individual under Title are co-extensive with the dual’s indiv[i] provisions to sue under the Rights the Civil 1866, Act of 42 1981, U. S. C. § and that pro- the two augment cedures each other are mutually not exclu- sive.” H. R. Rep. p. No. 92-238, (1971). 19 See also Rep. S. No. 92-415, p. (1971). 24 Later, considering Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, rejected Senate an amendment that would deprived have of any right claimant to sue under Cong. § 1981. 118 Rec. 3371-3373
B.
42
U. S.
1981,
present
being
C.
codifica
century-old
of 16 of the
tion
Civil Rights
1870,
Act of
144,
Stat.
on
hand,
the other
on its face
pri
relates
marily to racial
discrimination
en
making and
Although
forcement of contracts.
spe
this Court has not
it
cifically so
held,
among
well settled
the Federal
Appeals6
Courts of
join
we now
them —that
—and
Lockheed-Georgia
Co.,
Howard v.
(ND
Supp.
372 F.
854, 855-856
1974); Van
Corp.,
Hoomissen v.
Xerox
Ga.
F. Supp.
835-
Humphrey
(ND
1973).
Portland
Cal.
Southwestern
Cf.
v.
Co.,
Cеment
Supp.
(WD
369 F.
1973),
Tex.
rev’d
grounds,
(CA5 1974).
other
2d
488 F.
6 Young
Co.,
v. International Tel.
Tel.
&
(CA3
Section 1981 not inapplicable Title VII. The latter to certain made (b) (1970 Supp. III). 42 employers. ed., § U. S. C. 2000e Also, investigation, concili- VII offers assistance attorneys’ ation, counsel, costs, fees, waiver of court specific items are unavailable least under of § terms 1981.
Ill
curiae,
as amicus
Petitioner,
and the United
States
they must,
independence
as
of the avenues
concede,
respectively
of relief
available under Title
and the
Co.,
Mayer
Jones v.
H.
older
392
See
Alfred
(1968).
U.
n. 20
it
been
409, 416-417,
Further,
S.
has
filing
charge
noted that
of a Title VII
and resort
machinery
Title VIPs administrative
prerequi
are not
Long
v. Ford
sites for the
institution
a 1981 action.
Co.,
Motor
Caldwell
(CA6
F.
1974);
496
2d
Co.,
Brewing
v. National
2d 1044,
(CA5
443 F.
1046
(1972); Young
In-
1971),
denied,
cert.
916
S.
v.
(CA5
denied,
2d 1044
Brewing
1971),
443 F.
cert.
Co.,
tional
Long
(1972);
(CA6
v. Ford Motor
496 F.
Co.,
U. S. 916
2d 500
1974);
Works,
(CA7),
Waters v. Wisconsin
We satisfied, are also, Congress not expect did that a court usually would be resorted only upon completion Title VII and the procedures voluntary Commission’s compliance. efforts to obtain Conciliation persuasion through the administrative *7 process, sure, to be often approach constitute a desirable to settlement disputes based sensitive and emotional charges of employment invidious discrimination. We recognize, too, filing that of a lawsuit might tend deter efforts at conciliation, that in the lack success legal action could weaken the Commission’s efforts voluntary compliance, privately induce that suit is narrow, oriented and than in brоad, rather application, as successful conciliation tends to be. But these are the natural Congress effects of has choice made available by the claimant its conferring upon independent him judicial Administrative and remedies. The choice is a valuable one. Under some circumstances, the admin- may highly istrative route preferred over the litiga- tory; others, under the reverse may be true. We are disinclined, congressional the face of upon emphasis independence existence and of the two remedies, to any positive preference infer for one other, over the expression without a more the legislation definite Con- gress as, for enacted, example, has proscription of а an EEOC claim pending. § 1981 action while generally conclude, therefore, We the remedies available under Title VII under 1981, although although directed most of related, and the same ends, distinct, independent. are separate, With this base established, we turn to the limitation issue.
462
IV
otherwise
or
stated
specifically
no
there is
A. Since
cause
for a
limitations
statute
relevant
ordi
would
controlling period
1981, the
by state
provided
one
appropriate
the most
narily be
Felix,
(1914)
U. S.
O’Sullivan
v.
law.
See
Hoosier
Auto Workers v.
1871);
Act of
(Civil Rights
Manage
(Labor
(1966)
Corp., 696, 701-704
Anderson,
U.
S.
Act); Cope
v.
ment Relations
Chattanooga Foundry Act);
(National Bank
(1947)
Act); Campbell
Atlanta,
(Sherman
(1906)
U.
S.
Haverhill,
Act).
(Patent
For
(1895)
one-year
period in
case,
of this
purposes
1974) clearly and
(Suрp.
Tenn. Code Ann.
Warren v. Norman
application.7
has
See
specifically
Realty
(CA8 1975). The cause of ac
Any period limitation, including only in the fully specified by 28-304, is understood it from suspend context circumstances that various Although of action. running against particular cause necessarily arbitrary, any statute of limitations n in- instituting suit length of allowed concerning point evitably judgment reflects a value Nondiversity generally Hill, Federal Procedural Law in See State Litigation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. just proposition argument such a petitioner advanced At oral saving statute, respect applicability Tennessee’s Tenn. *9 Arg. of 14. See also Pet. Oral Code Tr. Ann. §28-106 for Cert. n. 27. claims valid protecting in of the interests favor
at which prose- the in outweighed by prohibiting the interests are limita- virtually of all statutes In cution of stale ones. is period of chronologiсal length the the tions revival, tolling, provisions regarding interrelated period borrowing In a state application. questions of action, of to a federal cause application of limitation for setting in the wisdom relying court is State’s of a thereto, prosecution on the limit, exceptions closely analogous claim. or novel about this. State nothing
There is anomalous variety cases that raised been followed in a of law has appli of questions concerning the overtones and details the federal cause cation the state limitation S., Corp., Auto Hoosier at action. Workers v. Cope v. (characterization action); the cause of Anderson, S., (place U. where cause of arose); Barney Oelrichs, (1891) action S. 529 (absence tolling circumstance). from Nor is State as a anything peculiar rights to a federal civil there special in justify applying that would state reluctance express the terms 42 U. S. C. 198810 Indeed, law. contrary the true. suggest that is provides: U. S. C. jurisdiction “The in civil and criminal matters conferred on by provisions chapter district courts and Title for this persons protection in in civil of all the United States their rights, in vindication, shall be exercised and enforced their conformity States, so such laws with the laws of the United far as carry effect; where into but all cases are suitable same object, provisions they adapted or are are not to the deficient punish necessary offenses to furnish suitable remedies and law, changed law, as modified and the constitution the common having jurisdiction the court State wherein and statutes held, is so far as same not in- civil or criminal cause such States, of the United shall with the Constitution laws consistent disposi- govern said courts the trial and to and be extended *10 C. Although law in this primary guide state is our area, not, it sure, guide. be our exclusive As the Court noted in Auto Corp., S., Workers v. Hoosier 706-707, may displaced considerations state law be application their where would be inconsistent policy underlying federal cause action under consideration. n argues Petitioner that a to toll the limitation failure period in this case will seriously conflict with the broad purposes remedial humane Specifi- of Title VII. he cally, urges that Title VII a embodies strong in support of conciliation and voluntary compli- ance as a means of achieving statutory mandate equal employment opportunity. He suggests that failure toll statute on a 1981 claim during pendency complaint administrative force EEOC would plaintiff premature a into expensive litigation that destroy would all chances for administrative conciliation voluntary compliance. We have possibility noted this indeed, above it and, is conceivable, perhaps almost expected, to toll will have failure the effect of a civil pressing complainant who his § values 1981 claim into rights court before the has completed EEOC its administrative proceeding.11 One answer to this, although perhaps not satisfactory one, plaintiff highly is that his may stay § 1981 suit ask the court to until proceedings the administrative efforts at voluntary conciliation and compliance completed. have been But the fundamental answer to argument pre lies the fact — cause, and, nature, t-ion if it is a criminal in the infliction punishment party guilty.” (cid:127)of on the found significant delays are not We unmindful at have g., Chrom proceedings See, tended administrative in the EEOC. e. Corp. EEOC, I. v. E. (CA5 1972); EEOC 2d F. craft duPont deNemours & (Del. 1974). Supp. 1321, 373 F. civil claimant —that sumably happy rights one for the remedy against 1981 as a clearly has retained Congress from and separate discrimination private employment time-consuming the more elaborate and independent of freely concedes that Title VII. Petitioner procedures of any time after his 1981 action аt he could have filed *11 in him we understand accrued; his cause of action fact, very so to do. in a Thus, claim unfettered to The slept has on his 1981 sense, petitioner rights. real may by been induced faith his slumber have fact that remedy is in of his Title of little adequacy rele truly independ as the two remedies are vance inasmuch petitioner’s Moreover, since Title VII court action ent. appears pecu now also to time barred because of the history this procedural case, effect, liar of in petitioner, would have us extend the 1981 cause of well beyond the life of even his Title VII of cause action. policy find no reason that excuses We failure steps necessary to the minimal to preserve take each independently. claim
V Pipe American & Construction Co. cites Petitioner Utah, and Burnett v. New York (1974), U. S. 538 Central R. (1965), support of his position. helpful. is respective periods Neither case The of in those directly cases were derived from federal statutes rather to than reference law. state Moreover, in body each case there was substantial procedural relevant federal law to guide the decision to period, significant toll the limitation and underlying fed eral policy would have conflicted with a decision suspend running to of the In not statute.12 12 Burnett, prior In filing the Court considered the effect of a Employers’ Liability an action under the Federal Act in state court three-year applicable on the FELA of limitation. The action proce bоdy of federal case is no present there relevant decision, conflict is no there guide dural our law perhaps Finally, protect.13 federal ing timely given to the effect tolling most importantly, depended in Burnett Pipe prior American filings exactly involved heavily filings those the fact This subsequently cause of action asserted. same con more than a or theoretical factor was mere abstract necessarily because each case prior filing sideration statute avoid the evil which the operated protect.14 was designed limitations Appeals judgment Court affirmed.
It ordered. is so improper. law had been dismissed because under state venue was express policy liberally allowing In transfer view cases, (a), thе de- improper-venue C. see sirability claims, the uniformity FELA in the enforcement of *12 filing prior tolled In Ameri- Court concluded that the the statute. Pipe timely we a civil antitrust can considered the effect that filed four-year purported applicable class have on the should period The District the suit federal of limitation. Court found history light In inappropriate one for status. of the class action the efficiency purposes litigatory and the of Fed. Rule Proc. 23 of Civ. filing had a actions, prior that class we concluded the served tolling effect. really expressly here. are not note is at stake We We how little respondents can question with the- whether concerned broad these nationally compelled practices mandated to the to conform their employment opportunity. respondents, or equal If the of engaged conduct, them, actually there any presently in such are of to position are in a now either necessarily will who be claimants question charge to sue under file under Title VII or The a § petitioner only particular so has waited in case is whether this this in claim long to assert his that he has forfeited his § court.' argues timely filing charge with the of a that the Petitioner charged employer placing on notice that has the effect the EEOC of argues, being Thus, petitioner asserted. claim of discrimination is a Mr. Justice with whom Marshall, Mr. Justice Douglas concurring in join, Brennan Mr. Justice and dissenting part. in part and supply ag-
In intended to that recognizing Congress avenues but related independent grieved employees :with of 1964 Act Rights under-' VII of Civil the relief C. Rights 1870, Act of of the Civil full a importance Court the emphasizes the dis- weapons employment to unlawful arsenal of combat sector. public in well as the private crimination the as that recognizing firm majority ground The stands on victims, discriminatory both remedies are available I I-III the practices. Accordingly, concur Parts opinion. Court’s analysis of the relation the Court .stumbles its
But,
question.
tolling
between the two statutes
the
majority
charge
that
of Title
filing
concludes
the
Opportunity
Equal Employment
with the
Commission
(EEOC)
applicable
does
toll the
of limita-
not
statute
exclusively
period
relies
for the
tions.
It
on state law
importance
and effect of the
dis90unts
federal-рolicies
and avoidance
conciliation
protect
employer,
has
itself
the loss-of
opportunity
fading-
witnesses,
evidence',
-disappearance
memories
surprise
could
revival of a claim
result from sudden
unfair
Telegraphers
long
Rail
has-been
slumber. See
allowed'to
way Express
Agency,
U. S. 348-349
ignore
span
if
Even we were
substantial
of time that could
tacking
frequently
1981 limitation
result from.
consideration)
protracted period
we
all
of EEOC
not at
certain
are
*13
charge
charged
protection
party
that a Title VII
affords the
the
suggests.
-See,
g., Tipler
petitioner
that
e.
E. I. duPont deNe
(CA6 1971). Only'where
Co., 443
mours &
F. 2d
there
identity
sug
protections
complete
is
the
action will the
of
causes of
courts,
gested by
necessarily
petitioner
exist
will the
have an
policy
opportunity
repose
the influence of the
of
inherent
to assess
period.
generally
in
the Law—
Developments
a
See
(1950).
.1177,
Limitation, 63
L. Rev.
Statutes of
Harv.
unnecessary litigation
majority
this area. The
recog-
policies
nizes
but concludes
the statute
tolling
these
that
of
for a
limitations
during
pendency
§ 1981 suit
the
of
Title VII
is
proceedings
appropriate
not an
of
means
I
furthering them.
disagree.
congressional pur-
pose
premature
of discouraging
judicial
intervention
any
the
of
absence
real risk
reviving
stale claims sug-
gest
propriety
the
I
On
view
tolling
balance,
here.
apply
the failure to
the tolling principle as undermining
the
of Title VII
frustrating
foundation
congres-
sional
I
alternative remedies.
must,
providing
from
therefore, dissent
IV
V of
opinion.
Parts
The Court
out
sets
the circumstances
suspend
a statute of limitations without close examination of the
equitable
statute’s
underpinnings.
to the
According
ma
jority,
deprived
court
of authority to toll
the state statute
it
both
because
borrows
“the State’s
in setting
wisdom
a
well
limit,
exceptions thereto,”
[as
as]
ante, at 464, and
no special
offers
reason for reluctance to
apply
period
“overtones”
rights
federal civil
practice,
action. As a general
where Congress has created
a federal
prescribing
without
for enforce
ment,
uniformly
the federal courts
borrow the
anal
most
ogous state statute
limitations. The applicable period
is derived from
which
limitations
thе State would
if
apply
had
been
brought
a state court.
g.,
e. Auto Workers v. Hoosier
See,
Corp.,
470 to include a built-in limitations failure
Congress’
imprimatur
"an
automatically
warrant
§ 1981 does not
borrowing
of both the
on state law”
sanction the
Auto
from
law.
effect as well as the duration
state
J.,
dis
Corp., supra,
v. Hoosier
at
Workers
(White,
394-395;
Holmberg
supra, at
senting);
Armbrecht,
v.
States,
(1939).
Board
v.
Comm’rs United
“When
leaves to the federal courts the
hardly expect
formulation of remedial
can
details, it
equity
principles
to break with historic
them
federally-created equitable
in the enforcement of
Holmberg
supra,
v.
at 395.
rights.”
Armbrecht,
Moviecolor,
Co.,
Eastman Kodak
See also
Ltd. v.
(1961).
F. 2d 80
cert.
(CA2),
denied,
I express now both Em- against discriminatory employment practices. porium WACO, Capwell 50, (1975); Co. v. U. S. Co., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 36, 415 U. S. (1974); Green, Douglas MсDonnell Corp. S. (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power recently As we have observed, “legislative long enactments this area have evinced a general intent parallel accord or overlapping remedies against discrimination.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver *15 Co., supra, at 47. It is this general legislative intent that must guide inus determining whether congressional purpose with respect to a particular statute is effectuated by tolling the statute of limitations.
A full exposition of the statutory origins
§of
with respect
to prohibition against private acts of dis-
crimination is set out in Jones v.
H. Mayer Co.,
Alfred
The legislative history of Title VII and its amendments demonstrates that Congress intended pro- vide a coordinated but comprehensive set of remedies against employment discrimination. The short statute of limitations and the procedural prerequisites to Title VII actions emphasized the need preserve the remedy of a suit under the 1870 legislation, which did not suffer from the same procedural restrictions as the latter enact- ment. See H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 19 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 24 (1971). See also 118 Cong. Rec. 3370 (1972). Congressional sentiment was that “[b]y strengthening the administrative remedy [it] should not also eliminate preexisting rights which the Constitution Congress [the had] accorded to aggrieved individ- private Id., encouragement While at uals.” unnecessary litigation to avoid settlement ac- independent § preservation VII and are themes the two odds, somewhat may appear tion purpose: joint of their remedial context in the reconciled equal to guarantee of remedies network a flexible devising Man- Guerra v. g., e. See, opportunities. employment 1974); (CA5 641, F. 2d Corp., 498 Terminal chester Contracting Co., 437 Rouge Marine Baton Boudreaux v. Freight Spector 1971); Macklin (CA5 1011, F. 2d 30, n. Inc., App. 84-86, D. C. Systems, Culpepper also (1973). See n. 994-996, F. 2d (CA5 1970). Co., 421 2d 888 Reynolds Metals F. Gardner-Denvеr, supra, we examined *16 In Alexander v. arbitration and liti compulsory relationship between the relationship analogous to that VII, a under Title gation process and conciliation factfinding EEOC between the both ave and accommodated litigation to that result is reasoning leading nues of redress. compliance with a short here. Forced equally compelling pendency of a be during charge of limitations the statute recourse discourage would frustrate fore the EEOC and/or conciliation, of to favored congressionally the S., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 415 U. at voluntary compliance or possibility of settlement “[t]he reduced, and the result of VII claims would thus be Id., 59. Cf. litigation, more not less.” could well be Utah, Pipe American & Constr. at 555- S., Co. effort, with the Congressional amendments, by remedy increasing strengthen the administrative ability complaints by is frustrated to conciliate EEOC’s employee the majority’s requirement the file prior 1981 action conclusion of Title VII in order to avoid conciliation efforts the bar avoid, pains statute limitations.1 un Legislative costly by the informal necessary litigation making conciliatory readily offices of investigatory EEOC available to cannot victims unlawful discrimination be squared with the mechanistic requirement formal early filing purpose the technical a limita tolling tions statute. In sum, policies weigh strongly in favor of tolling.
II purposes Examination served statute limitations they indicates that would not be frustrated by adoption of the rule. tolling Statutes of limitations are designed to insure prevent- fairness defendants by ing the revival of stale claims which the defense hampered by lost faded memories, evidence, and dis- appearing and to witnesses, avoid unfair surprise. None of these factors exists here.
Respondents were informed griev ances through complaint with filed the Commission and conciliation negotiations. The charge filed EEOC and the 1981 claim arise out of the same factual circumstances. The petitioner in this case diligently pursued the informal procedures before the Commission and adhered to the congressional preference for concilia tion prior to litigation. when Now, Johnson asserts his *17 proceed to with litigation under § 1981 after his albeit good-faith, compliance unnecessary, with Title VII procedures, the majority interposes the bar of Ten the nessee statute of limitations which clearly was not de signed to include such cases.2 1 Loss of the 1981 cause of deprive § would aggrieved the employee opportunity of the to punitive recover damages and more ample backpay. 2Under no-tolling the Court’s principle petitioner’s discharge on 20, 1967, June activated the statute which subsequently ran on- of position antitolling the following judgment, my In inequi- produces conclusion logical its to Court the into be forced will employees Aggrieved result. table actions premature simultaneously prosecuting ex- first who litigant the essence, In courts. federal the a file must litigation to to resort prior conciliation рlores the which court district in the claim duplicative pro- VII Title the until no action take either will court the of in frustration proceed or are concluded ceedings con- federal No conciliate. attempts EEOC dero- time judicial of this waste warrant siderations process. conciliation of the gation protects however, principle, tolling of the Adoption remedies multiple preserving in both interest the func- proper in the discrimination employment conse- normal As a statute. limitations of the tion aof operation the suspend works tolling quence of an event pendency during the limitations of statute Co. Construction &Pipe American See or condition. York- v. New Burnett 561; at 560 Utah, S., American In Central R. right-to-sue receiрt of the his years prior 20, 1968—two June were tolled the statute even if suggests majority The letter! court initial charge the EEOC during consideration be- barred may time Title VII action proceedings, case, requiring history procedural unusual cause arising Title out of beyond that claim his extend Court consideration forecloses of certiorari grant our limited But VII. claim. the timeliness rule from normal departure no reflects any case this In event tolling en- understanding that the common tolling. Consistent limitations, aof an extension than rather suspension tails applicable remains time whatever allowed petitioner Under saving statute. any state well benefit statute, as as preju- dismissed without (1955) an action Ann. Tenn. Code filing here year of dismissal. within may be reinstituted dice time frame. well within falls *18 Pipe timely we the of a class action held initiation period tolled limitation as indi- running class, vidual members of the them enabling to institute separate actions Court found after District class action inappropriate mechanism for the In similar litigation. the Burnett court viewed' the manner of a initiation timely Employers’ Liability Federal in state Act suit court tolling as the statute of for limitations the later filing a federal action following dismissal of the state for proceeding improper analysis venue. The Court’s both cases rested on conclusion plaintiff that each by prior had his given timely defendant notice in a manner policies that “fulfilled the of repose and cer- tainty -in provisions inherent the limitation and tolled the running of the periоd.” American Construc- Pipe & tion Utah, Co. supra,
Although the length of the these cases by was fixed federal statute, the tolling rationale is equally adaptable protect subsequent litigation when duration established state statute. The in favor of continuing availability of mul tiple remedies persons subject to employment dis crimination is inconsistent with the majority’s decision not to suspend the operation of the statute. As as long the claim arising under 1981 is essentially limited Title VII claim, staleness and unfair surprise dis appear justification as for applying the statute.3 Addi tionally, the difference in statutory origin for asserted under the EEOC charge and the subsequent § 1981 suit is of no consequence since the claims are 3 Where there are differences between the 1981 claim and thé complaint, Title VII the district easily could tolling courts limit the portions to those 1981 claim overlapped the Title VII allegations. Cf. EEOC v. Louisville & N. R. 505 F. 2d (CA5 1974); Sanchez v. Brands, Standard 2dF. (CA5 1970). *19 Alexander Cf. in substance. essentially equivalent charge gives the EEOC Qardner-Denver, supra. Since grievance has a petitioner also notice that Burnett litigation initial like the filing, under policies equitable Pipe, satisfied the American Con American &Pipe provision. lying Utah, supra, at 558. struction Co. history Acts nor of these legislative
Neither good- of limitations foreclose of statutes purposes avowed procedures resort to the administrative faith tolling theory avoids Adoption EEOC. or losing the benefits conciliation choice of Draconian independent yet preserves the up sue, giving I Accordingly, would re- 1981 action. nature of point. on this the court below verse