James Trimble v. David Bobby, 804 F.3d 767

Background

In 2005 James Earl Trimble murdered three people; he confessed and was convicted by an Ohio jury on three counts of aggravated murder with death specifications. The trial court imposed three death sentences pursuant to the jury's recommendations.
During capital voir dire, prospective Juror 139 expressed strong personal pro-death-penalty views and at times appeared to conflate the guilt and penalty phases, but repeatedly affirmed he could follow the court's instructions and consider mitigation.
The trial court declined to excuse Juror 139 for cause; defense failed to use one regular juror peremptory strike and saved its two alternate juror strikes but those were spent on other alternates, so Juror 139 became the first alternate and was later seated to replace an ill juror for the penalty phase.
On direct appeal Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the juror-bias claim for plain error (finding Juror 139 would not automatically vote for death) and rejected other claims; state courts also admitted/displayed multiple unrelated firearms at trial and permitted certain prosecutor questions in mitigation.
Trimble filed a §2254 habeas petition raising (relevant here) juror-bias, admission/display of weapons, and prosecutorial-misconduct claims; the district court granted habeas relief on the juror-bias claim but denied relief on the other two claims.
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court on the juror-bias claim (holding Juror 139 was not an automatic-death juror) and affirmed denial of habeas relief on the weapons-admission and prosecutorial-misconduct claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Trimble)	Defendant's Argument (Warden)	Held
Whether Juror 139 was an "automatic death penalty" juror so biased that seating him in the penalty phase violated due process	Juror 139 repeatedly said he thought a guilty murderer "should" get death and conflated guilt with penalty phases; he could not set aside his views and thus would automatically vote for death	Juror 139 affirmed multiple times he could follow the court's instructions, consider mitigating evidence, and the trial judge rehabilitated him; defer to trial judge; procedurally defaulted claim	Reversed district court: juror was not automatic-death juror; trial judge's rehabilitation acceptable; habeas relief wrongly granted on this claim
Whether admission, courtroom display, and sending into jury room unrelated firearms deprived Trimble of due process	The guns were highly prejudicial and could lure the jury to decide on emotion rather than proof of the charged offenses	Evidence rebutted defense theory that Positano's killing was accidental and any error was harmless given overwhelming guilt evidence; state court's ruling was reasonable under Payne and AEDPA	Affirmed district court's denial: admission/display not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent; any error harmless given overwhelming evidence
Whether prosecutor's penalty-phase questioning (military discharge, alleged domestic violence) constituted unconstitutional prosecutorial misconduct that infected sentencing	Prosecutor elicited improper, prejudicial evidence/impressions that undermined reliable sentencing and fairness	Questions elicited little or harmless testimony; state court reasonably applied Darden; any error cured by independent reweighing of aggravating and mitigating factors	Affirmed district court's denial: state court's decision not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent; any error harmless or cured by reweighing

Key Cases Cited

Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (juror may be excused for views on capital punishment that would prevent or substantially impair duties)
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (juror who would automatically vote for death must be removed)
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (prosecutorial-misconduct inquiry asks whether comments so infected trial with unfairness as to deny due process)
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (due process forbids admission of evidence so unduly prejudicial it renders trial fundamentally unfair)
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (undue prejudice definition: evidence that distracts factfinder from proof specific to charged offense)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (harmless-error standard on federal habeas is whether error had substantial and injurious effect or influence)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference standard: petitioner must show state-court decision was unreasonable)
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (specificity of governing rule matters when assessing unreasonableness under AEDPA)
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984) (trial court's juror-impartiality determinations entitled to deference; overturned only for manifest error)
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (trial-court credibility assessments based on demeanor are entitled to deference)
Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932 (6th Cir. 2004) (example where juror with pro-death views was held not automatically biased)
White v. Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2005) (example where juror found to be automatic-death juror due to clear inability to follow law)
Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2003) (similar facts where juror's initial automatic-death remarks were cured by further questioning)
Franklin v. Anderson, 434 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2006) (trial-court rehabilitation may be insufficient when juror cannot understand duties)