James-Robert G. Curtis v. Florania Da Silva Medeiros
152 A.3d 605
| Me. | 2016Background
- Medeiros (dual U.S./Brazilian citizen) and Curtis divorced in 2011; they share parental rights and Medeiros was awarded the child’s primary residence.
- The 2011 judgment addressed Medeiros’s request to take the child on annual 10–14 day August trips to Brazil and stated she may take the child “as of August 2013, or such earlier time as: (a) the parties agree in writing; or (b) either party completes the process of registering this Divorce Judgment in Brazil.”
- Medeiros sought to modify and to enforce the judgment in 2014, asking specifically for paperwork and permission to travel in 2014; the court delayed hearing the motions until September 2015.
- The court concluded the 2011 judgment authorized only a single trip in August 2013 (not annual trips), denied enforcement, then sua sponte modified the order to allow trips to Brazil only every other year and awarded one weekend per month contact to the paternal grandparents under 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(B).
- The grandparents were not parties, did not move to intervene, and offered no affidavit or testimony proving prima facie standing.
- Medeiros appealed, arguing (1) the divorce judgment unambiguously allowed annual trips and (2) the grandparents’ court-ordered contact violated her fundamental right to parent because minimal procedural/standing safeguards were not followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Medeiros) | Defendant's Argument (Curtis) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2011 judgment authorized annual trips to Brazil beginning in 2013 | Judgment unambiguously contemplates plural "trips" and annual August visits; references to August 2013 only set timing for the first trip | Court below read the judgment as authorizing only a single August 2013 trip | Held for Medeiros: judgment unambiguously allows annual trips; denial of enforcement and modification to biennial trips vacated |
| Whether the court could modify the travel provision absent ambiguity | Medeiros: court exceeded clarification power by materially altering an unambiguous provision | Curtis: modification was permissible (implicit) | Held for Medeiros: court exceeded authority by materially changing an unambiguous provision |
| Whether a court may award third-party (grandparent) contact under 19-A M.R.S. §1653(2)(B) without the third party being a party or establishing prima facie standing | Medeiros: third-party contact implicates fundamental parental right and requires strict scrutiny and procedural safeguards (motion to intervene + affidavit showing prima facie standing) | Curtis: the order functioned as a scheduling mechanism tied to father’s rights (or that grandparents could have shown standing) | Held for Medeiros: third-party petitioners must move to intervene and file a motion for contact with an affidavit demonstrating prima facie standing; award vacated because grandparents never sought relief nor satisfied minimal standing procedures |
| Whether the court’s procedural handling satisfied strict-scrutiny safeguards for parental rights | Medeiros: procedural safeguards absent; grandparents never established standing | Curtis: argued grandparents could have established standing or order was not under §1653(2)(B) | Held for Medeiros: procedural requirements were unmet; award to grandparents violated the required preconditions and was vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Ramsdell v. Worden, 17 A.3d 1224 (Me. 2011) (judgment interpretation and enforcement principles)
- Burnell v. Burnell, 40 A.3d 390 (Me. 2012) (court may not materially alter an unambiguous divorce judgment under guise of clarification)
- Davis v. Anderson, 953 A.2d 1166 (Me. 2008) (third-party intervention/contact must meet prima facie standing similar to Grandparents Visitation Act)
- Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169 (Me. 2014) (compelling state interest for third-party intrusion exists only in exceptional circumstances)
- Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000) (parents have a fundamental right to care, custody, and control of children; strict scrutiny applies)
- Conlogue v. Conlogue, 890 A.2d 691 (Me. 2006) (finality in custody decrees and limits on judicial modification)
- Corcoran v. Marie, 12 A.3d 71 (Me. 2011) (court cannot amend a judgment in a way that materially alters the original award)