Rideout v. Riendeau

Jolin, others.” harming himself or Pike, Similarly in we found

A.2d at 1064. cause to de probable officer had

that the defendant, “acted and the officer

tain the intentionally disre

reasonably and did not he was the territorial.limits to which

gard out crime.”

subject in order to ferret

Pike, at 147. hold that a We suspicion satis

reasonable and articulable component cause probable

fies the and Pike test.

Jolin Fort Bubar did not leave

[¶ Chief Pres-

Fairfield to make an excursion into He was Isle to ferret out crime.

que

traveling jurisdiction in a different for a stop and was on

reason unrelated to

duty making while Pres- stop. Once Isle, he be-

que observing after vehicle Rideout, request- he

lieved to be driven jurisdiction

ed that an officer the correct stop, stop

make the and he made the he was to do so

when instructed

dispatcher. These facts indicate that reasonably

Chief Bubar acted and did not

intentionally disregard territorial limits his attempt

in an to ferret out crime. entry is:

Judgment affirmed. ME 198

Rose et al. RIDEOUT al.

Heaven RIENDEAU et Maine.

Supreme Judicial Court of

Argued June

Decided Nov.

narrowly tailored to serve a interest, state and thus does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. us, [¶ 2] The Rose Rideout, Chesley appeal judg- ment entered in the Superior (Saga- J.) dahoc County, Humphrey, affirming an (West Bath, order of the District Court Field, J.) dismissing for visi- grandchildren. tation with their The Dis- Court, trict Grandparents held that Act, §§ Visitation 19-A M.R.S.A. 1801- (1998), violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution be- require cause it does not a showing of harm to the child before a court can order visitation with a grandparent.1 The court concluded that the “best standing by itself is not a compelling state interest.” disagree We do not conclude, however, that conclusion. We the state does have a in- terest providing forum within which grandparents who have acted as Joseph M. (orally), Bangor, Baldacci grandchild their may seek continued con- plaintiffs. Thus, tact with that child. we vacate the Jed J. French (orally), Crary Frances judgment dismissing the Rideouts’ visita- Lindemann, French, P.A., Powers & Free- tion and remand for an application port, for defendants. hearing. Act after new WATHEN, C.J., I.

Panel: BACKGROUND and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, The underlying procedural [¶ 3] and his- SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and JJ. torical facts be summarized as fol- Chesley lows.2 Rose and Rideout wish

SAUFLEY, J. visit with grandchildren. their three upon [¶ 1] We are called here to deter- parents of the children do not currently mine whether Grandparents Maine’s want their spend Visi- children to time with the tation Act violates Rideouts. All three children live with competent parents parents, who choose not to Heaven-Marie Riendeau have their grand- Jeffrey children visit with their and Riendeau. Heaven-Marie is Act, parents. We conclude that the daughter of the Rideouts. The chil- us, applied Keiko-Marie, to the presented facts dren are years now 13 old decision, thus, originally 1. The District Court found that 19 that would alter its and §§ (Supp.1995-96) M.R.S.A. 1001-1004 was today. review the Act as it exists repealed unconstitutional. statute was This replaced by §§ and (1998). 19-A M.R.S.A. 1801-1805 judgment 2. The trial court’s contains substan- Superior Court remanded the findings parties tial of fact which do not case to the District Court for a determination dispute. Our recitation of the facts is drawn legal of analysis. whether recodification affected its findings. from those change The District Court found no Grandparents revised Visitation Act (born Roman, the children. 6, 1987); Jeffrey’s and care of February now Heaven (born 16, 1989); and, petition seeking filed a Additionally, Rose years February old (born Mariah, three Heaven and the years adopt now 7 old June Keiko. 1998). home near Jeffrey biological is the father children left Rideouts’ authorities, and Mariah and the father of Roman. time Rose contacted adoptive all contact between Heaven terminated sixteen-year-old high Heaven was a [¶ 4] after re- grandchildren student, unmarried, living school From Jeffrey. live with turning to gave home with the Rideouts when she forward, Jeffrey appear Heaven and point first During birth to Keiko. seven home life. The enjoyed to have a stable life, years years of Keiko’s four of Roman’s complaint filed the instant seek- Rideouts life, life, and several months Mariah’s pursuant ing court-ordered visitation children’s “primary Rideouts were the Act, Grandparents Visitation caregivers and custodians.” Keiko’s ground to dismiss on the parents moved early years, significant Rose’s involvement that the Act is unconstitutional. in caring upset for Keiko Heaven and caused friction between Heaven and Rose. The District Court held combined occasions, On several Heaven left Keiko in hearing on the merits and the motion custody signed the sole writ- Rose Although granted the court dismiss. powers attorney ten for Rose to act as dismiss, it motion to also undertook find legal guardian. Keiko’s Heaven moved facts, doing, and in so determined Bangor first to Massachusetts and then to statutory criteria the Rideouts had met Corрs training. After she com- Job pursu- and would be entitled to visitation pleted framing her Heaven moved Act if the Act were ant to the terms of the then-husband, Joseph her court, however, The or- constitutional. son, Henderson, and their newborn Ro- visitation, concluding that the dered urging, man. At Rose’s Keiko went to live of the violated the Due Process Clause with her mother and her stepfather. grandpar- Fourteenth Amendment.3 The Soon, however, Henderson became violent with- Superior to the Court appealed ents abusive, chil- and Heaven and her two bring appeal out success and now their dren returned to live with the Rideouts. us.4 In Jeffrey June Heaven and

[¶ 5] Approximately Riendeau married. one II. DISCUSSION later, year and about the time of Mariah’s birth, A. Troxel v. Granville Jeffrey separated, “pri- Heaven and by marily because of the tensions caused Grandpar analysis No of Maine’s [¶ 7] interference in unit.” Rose’s Act can be undertaken ents Visitation chil- point, At this Heaven and the three a review of the recent decision without again dren went to live the Rideouts. v. Court Troxel Gran U.S. Despite returning parents, to five with-her ville, Heaven’s with Rose remained L.Ed.2d 49 strained. After Heaven moved back Troxel, In the Court was called parents, contacted the De- [¶ 8] with her Rose constitutionality of the to review the regarding upon Human partmеnt of Services Superior delay argument Part of the inordinate party made an concern- Neither ing applicability comply of the Maine Constitution by failure to was occasioned Court Act, validity of the to the constitutional therefore, briefing a remand to schedule this issue on we do not address to determine wheth- permit the District Court 9,¶ Berg Bragdon, appeal. 1997 ME impacted its a recodification of the Act er (holding that an issue is P.L.1995, 694, § B-2 legal analysis. See ch. preserved waived if it is not raised or 1, 1997). (effective date October Const, I, § parties). See Me. art. 6-A. State of Washington’s nonpar- petition “[o]nce version of a visitation been Troxel, ent visitation statute. 530 U.S. at filed in court matter placed -, The Washington S.Ct. at 2057. before a judge, parent’s decision that significantly statute is broader than the would not be child’s best Maine Act. See Rev. Code Wash. Ann. interest is accorded no Id. 530 deference.” 26.10.160(3)(West 1998). Washing- at-, at (emphasis U.S. ton Supreme struck down Court its statute added). Indeed, Washington statute Constitution, on the basis of the U.S. hold- requirement “contains no that a court ac- ing that the in- unconstitutionally statute parent’s cord the presumption decision fringed right on the fundamental of par- validity any weight whatsoever.” Id. ents to rear their children. added). (emphasis Concluding -, U.S. at 2057. so permit “Due does Process Clause holding, Wаshington Supreme infringe State to on the fundamental reasoned that required the statute “no childrearing to make decisions threshold harm” showing of and that simply judge because a state believes a “ ‘any person’ allowed for forced made,” ‘better’ decision could the Court ‘any visitation of a child at time’ with the Washington declared the statute unconsti- only requirement being that the visitation tutional applied. Id. U.S. serve the best child.”5 Id. 120 S.Ct. at 2064. 120 S.Ct. at 2058-59 (citations omitted). contrast Although plurality the Troxel Act, Maine’s more tailored which applies Washington found the statute to be uncon- provides a num- stitutional “breathtakingly because it was protections parents, ber of highlight- broad,” it was careful to decide mat- ed description Justice O’Connor’s beyond ters those that were before it. Id. Washington “effectively statute as one that at-,-, 2061, 120 S.Ct. at permits any party seeking third visitation 2064. plurality The noted that “[b]ecause subject parent decision con- much adjudication ‍​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‍state-court in this con- cerning parent’s visitation of children basis, case-by-case text occurs on a we to state-court review.” Id. 530 at U.S. would be hold specific hesitant -, 120 S.Ct. at 2061.6 nonparental visitation statutes violate the per Due Process se matter.” Court, Clause as Writing plurality

[¶ 9] for a of the (citations omitted). Moreover, Id. at 2064 Justice Washington O’Connor found the given “sweeping statute of the unconstitutional. Id. 530 U.S. at breadth” Wash- -, statute, ington plurality 2065. the Troxel was not plurality S.Ct. at The in pivotal upon found it called a strict Washington engage scrutiny stat- entirely ute of the parents eliminated the statute. Id. no level of scru- Under process, tiny Washington the decision-making noting that would the statute be Dissolution, 5. Family The best the child interests of standard has Me. B.J. of indeterminate, omitted). (1999) (citations at times been criticized leading unpredictable results. As one judge has observed: significantly In addition to a different statu- framework, tory at the facts issue in Troxel depends upon What is best for children very were those us. different from before The upon values and which norms reasonable Troxel with a Court was faced who had people differ. room for Broad debate agreed parents grandparents, to allow the unpredictable array means a broad and of husband, of her deceased to visit with her possible any custody outcomes in contest. Granville, -, children. Troxel v. prolonged encourages expen- That fact -, 120 S.Ct. litigation "strategic sive behaviors” of paternal grandpar- L.Ed.2d 49 The parents, usually of which bene- neither ents filed a "soon after the fits children. Sheldon, [by Anticipating death their son.” Id. 530 U.S. suicide] Honorable John C. of at-, Principles American Law Institute's the Law 120 S.Ct. at 2061. special weight trial must accord concepts em- courts deemed consistent objections regarding parents’ decisions in Due bodied Process Clause.7 third-party visitation. Id. requests for Thus, although the Troxel 11] at -, at 120 S.Ct. 2061-62.8 U.S. Washington unconsti- declared the statute mind, we principles these [¶ With tutional, it did so on the limited facts and analysis of the Maine Grand- turn to our it, leaving day law for another Act. Visitation analysis statutes with protections of carefully more established

parents’ rights. fundamental B. Standard Review constitutionality The of the [¶ 14] does, The opinion Troxel presents Act Visitation Grandparents however, us provide guidance with clear first Maine.9 question impression First, important points. on the Because the District Court ruled liberty at issue in this law, matter of we as a validity care, case—the interest of novo, de Estate review the court’s decision and control of their children—is custody, ¶4, Jacobs, ME 719 A.2d perhaps the oldest of the fundamental special deference to and we accord no liberty recognized interests in the Superior conducted review Court. Pepperman Rangeley, v. Town Court. ¶ 157, 3, Id. 530 at A.2d 852. Our U.S. ME familiar guided by principle to direct fundamental review to be consti upbringing presumed care and of their children statute “[a] challenging disappear person does not the face of a third tutional and party’s constitutionality the burdеn of estab request visitation with the chil- Second, infirmity.” Kenny v. Dep’t dren. interests its lishing best ¶ 7, Servs., standard, alone, is an ME standing insuf- Human (citation omitted). determining ficient Because we standard when the Legislature intervene must that the acted State in the decision mak- assume if ing competent parents. process requirements, Id. 530 with due accord reasonably interpret statute as finally, 2061. And be- can “presumption parents require cause of the that fit those constitutional satisfying children,” ments, way, act in must such a the best interests of their we read at-, at plurality opinion 7.The face.” Id. 530 U.S. 120 S.Ct. and Justices Thomas its J., (Souter, concurring). 2066 expressly recognized and Stevens that right” have to the care and a "fundamental significant that Troxel 8. think it also We Troxel, at custody of their children. 530 U.S. expansive gave particular notice to the -, -, (Thomas, 120 S.Ct. at Washington reading by Su- of the statute J., at -, concurring), at 530 U.S. Court, "Washington preme noting that J., (Stevens, dissenting). recognition In give opportunity to Court had the right,” Justice of this “fundamental Thomas reading, de- but it [the narrower statute] -, opined the statute could not survive anal 530 U.S. at clined to do so.” omitted). (citation In rec- scrutiny at 2061 ysis in with the strict accordance changing ognition families, rapidly face of Maine of the of review. Id. 530 U.S. standard proceed caution in this de- with J., (Thomas, concurring). Jus at veloping area of law refrаin recognized Kennedy tices Souter announcing sweeping statements of constitu- right protected parents have a constitutional tionality. at by the Process Clause. Id. 530 U.S. Due J., -, (Souter, S.Ct. at 2066 concur constitutionality has been Although the 9. Act's ring), S.Ct. at 2076 us, con- previously argued we declined to J., (Kennedy, dissenting). Justice Souter vot properly it was not sider that claim because Berg, ed to on the the statute 1997 ME preserved affirm basis for review. ¶ A.2d 1215. "sweeps broadly is unconstitutional too notwithstanding possible appellate other unconstitu- court must be bound two interpretations tional “one, same statute. rules: ... anticipate never a ques- Pipe Corp. Portland v. Line Envtl. Im- tion of law in constitutional advance of the Comm’n, provement A.2d it; 15-16 necessity deciding other, never (Me.1973). ... formulate a rule law required by broader than is the precise in reviewing [¶ 15] Our role Raines, facts to which it to be applied.” constitutionality of a must statute neces (citation 362 U.S. at 80 S.Ct. 519 omit- sarily be limited facts in the case ted). Hence, we address the constitution- us. not beyond We reach ality of before us context facts those to decide the constitutionality facts found the District Court. yet of matters not presented. United Raines, 17, 21-22, States C. The Act (1960); L.Ed.2d 524 State v. (Me.1982).

Gray, Grandparents We Visitation Act Brennan, agree the wisdom of Justice was enacted to a forum prоvide where writing for the unanimous Court in certain grandparents could seek access Raines, in which grandchildren.10 he concluded that an their provides The Act exist, Section relationship 1803 reads as follows in its entire- ficient does ty: sufficient effort establish one has been made. 1803. Petition Standing D.If court’s determination petition for under visitation affirmative, rights. paragraph in the grandparent A of a C is minor child may petition hearing grand- court shall hold on the rights the court for reasonable parent’s petition of visitation for rights or access if: reasonable A. At least one of the child’s visitation or access and shall or consider died; legal guardians any objections legal guard- or existing B. concerning There is a sufficient relation- ians award ship child; grandparent rights between the and the or grand- of visitation access to the parent. or for the standard award existing C. When a sufficient rights relation- reasonable of visitation or access ship grandparent provided between the in subsection 3. exist, child does not a sufficient effort to 3.Best of the child. The court establish one has made. may grant grandparent been rights reasonable following procedures 2. Procedure. The to a upon visitation or access minor child apply petitions rights finding rights of visitation or of visitation or access are access paragraph under subsection B or best interest child and would C. significantly parent- interfere with grandparent A. The must file relationship parent’s right- or with the or access ful applying over child. standard, an alleging existing affidavit a sufficient shall consider the child, following that suffi- factors: child; cient age efforts have made to been establish A. The relationship relationship with the child. When B. the The of the child with the petition accompanying and affidavit grandparents, including are child’s the court, contact; filed grandparent the previous shall amount of child, copy serve a on at preference of both least one the C. of The of the if old parents legal guardians or enough express meaningful of the prefer- child. to ence; parent legal guardian B. The or of the may response child file adequacy an affidavit to D. The and duration grandparent’s petition the accompa- living arrangements and child’s current and nying continuity; affidavit. the desirability maintaining When affidavit in re- the of court, sponse parent is the stability any proposed living filed with the E. The of child; legal guardian copy or arrangements shall deliver a to the for grandparent. the parties F. The motivation in- C. capacities The court give shall determine on the ba- volved and their to the love, petition sis of the the guidance; and affidavit wheth- child affection and er it likely adjustment is more not that than there is a G. The to the child’s child’s or, home, relationship existing present sufficient community; if a suf- and school

299 this fun standing will have to cess Clause. Id. We understand they if bring only firmly for visitation to be established.12 right damental (1) of the long demonstrate the death one of ade parent so “Accordingly, (2) (i.e., relation- parents; existing “sufficient his or children is quately cares for her (8) a ship” grandchildren; their or fit), normally there be reason will to a relationship. sufficient effort sustain inject into the private the State to itself 1803(1)(1998). 19-A M.R.S.A. the family question realm of further the make best ability parent of that 1803(1)(B) Only [¶ subsection of 17] concerning rearing of decisions us, Act is before and we have no occasion at -, parent’s children.” Id. 530 U.S. Thus, the remaining prongs.11 to consider Flores, Reno v. (citing 120 S.Ct. at 2061 constitutionality we do of not address the 304, 292, 1439, 123 1803(1)(A) 1803(1)(C); 113 S.Ct. subsections added). (1993)) (emphasis 1 L.Ed.2d determine whether subsection 1803(1)(B), existing requiring a “sufficient The liber and grandparent between the not, how ty integrity interest in child,” can in a manner applied ever, absolute, nor free from state forever

consistent with the Due Process Clause. Yoder, v. 406 interference. Wisconsin D. Ex- Constitutionality of “Sufficient 205, 1526, 233-34, 92 32 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. isting Relationship” Provision (1972); Bickford, McNicholas (Me.1992). The Due Process A.2d analysis by our begin

[¶ 18] We impenetrable wall Clause not an behind parents recognizing have a fundamen children; may their which shield liberty tal interest make con “to decisions rather, protection care, provides heightened custody, of cerning the and control at -, parents’ fun against state intervention their children.” U.S. (citations omitted). to make decisions concern right at 2060 damental care, words, custody, and control of their ing other con right direct and J.R., 442 trol a is a children. Parham v. U.S. upbringing child’s “fundamental” See 584, 603-05, liberty protected by Due Pro- 61 L.Ed.2d very capacity spent The and time with her Hi. Mariah has little parties grandparents. stipulated, grandparent cooperate learn to or to however, care; very are close and cooperate in children identically purposes assisting should be treated cooperation I. Methods Therefore, all Act. three of children resolving disputes person’s and each will- methods; they as if have the same "suffi- are treated ingness to use those grand- existing relationship” with their cient having Any other reasonable J. factor parents. bearing physical psychological well-being of child. Sisters, Modification or termination. Soc’y 12. Pierce v. U.S. any rights modify (1925) court or terminate L.Ed. 1070 granted under this section as circumstances (stating liberty includes require. upbringing Modification or termination right dren), chil to direct the Nebraska, rights with this section. must consistent Meyеr v. (1923) (hold issue Enforcement. The L.Ed. protected necessary liberty enforce issued under the Due ing orders orders that the protect under this section or to Process Clause includes parties. upbringing control the edu direct the See, children). e.g., v. 6. award Osier Costs fees. The court cation of their 1027, fees, Osier, (Me.1980) costs, (recog including attorney’s A.2d 1029 reasonable ‍​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‍410 right” nizing parents’ to the defending under "fundamental prosecuting actions children); custody” Dan chapter. of their “care and (1998). Welfare, 303 Dep’t & § v. Health 1803 State 19-A M.R.S.A. forth 794, (Me.1973) (discussing natu A.2d 797 parents to the spent rights of Although ral and fundamental Keiko and Roman both children). Rideouts, custody of their years care their sister in the of the 300

(1979). heightened custody That man in care and chil- protection ests of their scrutiny strict at issue. dren.13 dates the statute Washington Glucksberg,

See v. 521 U.S. (ii) State Compelling Interest 720-21, 702, 2258, 117 S.Ct. 188 L.Ed.2d (1997); 772 Sch. No. 1 Admin. Dist. v. Because a fundamental Comm’r, 854, Dep’t of Educ., A.2d 857 liberty is interest interfered with (Me.1995). requires Strict that scrutiny State, required is the State to demonstrate narrowly the State’s action be tailored to compelling its actions serve a state Flores, a compelling serve state interest. Court, interest. District in its 301-02, 1439; U.S. at Butler analysis necessity thoughtful regarding the Court, 987, Judicial interest, of a state compelling noted (Me.1992). provided ... Act a requirement “[i]f harm, it would compelling then advance a Therеfore, 20] fundamental [¶ because a pass state interest constitutional mus liberty unquestionably interest at stake Concluding ter.” absence of first, here, we must determine whether “harm” eliminated any compelling element that fundamental liberty interest is inter- interest, state the court held the Act to with, State, fered in the context of unconstitutional. so, Grandparents If Visitation Act. strict apply scrutiny to the portions An element of in the “harm” before us whether the determine not, however, traditional sense narrowly State has involvement tailored its compelling state interest extant when mat to serve a compelling state relating ters the welfare of are children interest. scrutiny. under For example, the State’s requiring at school (i) State Intervention a Fundamental restricting tendance or child labor does Right exclusively derive from the State’s interest conclude, “harm,” We party preventing [¶21] but instead stems challenged, that the Vis Grandparents parens patriae broader State’s Act provides itation which well-being mechanism interest in the See children. Massachusetts, 158, the State intervene in the basic exer Prince v. 321 U.S. 166-67, 438, (1944); of parents’ rights cise to determine the 88 L.Ed. Sisters, custody care and Soc’y of their children. The Pierce v. 268 U.S. (1925); Act allows the courts to determine wheth see 45 S.Ct. L.Ed. 1070 T., (Me. er will turn required also In re Sarah A.2d 1993) against (finding children over tо the compelling state interest parents’ timely wishes. power achieving permanence for abused children). Thus, adjudicate such and to disputes although the threat of enforce its own state certainly orders constitutes harm to a child is sufficient to in way clearly impli provide involvement with a compelling the State intere st,14 parents’ liberty consisting cates fundamental inter- harm of a threat physi- See, Doehr, Co., Inc., 922, 941, e.g., Connecticut v. 102 S.Ct. (1991) 73 L.Ed.2d 482 115 L.Ed.2d 1 (noting prejudgment en remedy statutes parental 14. The over State's deci- party procedures able to utilize state areas, sions is well established in certain such "overt, significant assistance state offi requirements, including as health immuniza- cials,” thereby involving substan state action needs, (1993), § tion 20-A M.R.S.A. 6354 edu- enough implicate tial Clause); the Due Process including requirements, qualified cation Ctr., Heights see also Peralta v. Med. schooling plan, 20-A M.R.S.A. 5001-A Inc., 80, 85, (1993), safety requirements, addressed (1988); Lugar L.Ed.2d v. Edmondson Oil Family the Child and Services and Child Pro- Act, (1992 §§ 22 M.R.S.A. tection 4001-4093

301 spent many years. Keiko so danger not a for safety cal or imminent sine a qua compelling years being par- non for the existence of much her first seven of We with the trial agree state interest. that she called by her grandparents ented however, court, than something more referred “Mom and Dad” and the Rideouts the of the child must be best interest “her aunt.” to her mother as own compelling to a stake order establish a contact with The cessation of state interest.15 a child views as whom the grandparent upon not called here [¶ We are dramatic, a and even may have parent to all where a define instances traumatic, upon the child’s well-be- effect the interest could demonstrated therefore, State, an urgent, ing. only need look to the facts State. We providing a fo- interest compelling, us determine whether that level to having such a grandparents rum those for exists, of that determina existing relationship” with their “sufficient guided by language: tion we are our own Here the have grandchildren. Rideouts right parent natural a to the care “The of grandchildren, acted for their as and control of child should be limited may and therefore seek continued access most Mer urgent for the reasons.” Bussell, 118, 816, springs 27 chant v. 189 Me. A.2d to those children. This interest (1942) added). (emphasis of any right common law not from child, to visitation grandparent “urgent We rea- [¶25] conclude need to be significant but from child’s exist, where, here, as a grandparent sons” not assured that he or she will unnecessar- who parent has functioned as a to the child ily grandparent contact who lose seeks continued contact with that child. The Rideouts acted as Keiko and has been a to child.16 See Roman’s See, Supp.1999). rights” v. e.g., & Massa of constitutional cannot include Jacobson chusetts, 11, 29-30, separate U.S. grandparents of holders such (1905) (upholding compel L.Ed. 643 ling state’s rights. Grandparents simply do not have laws). compulsory interest in vaccination general right of common law or constitutional Indeed, grandchildren. it was access to their fact, concept that the State securing any legal the lack of family of merely intervene in life on basis obtaining visits between court's assistance a best interest determination is so well estab grandparents grandchildren their that led explicitly that we trial lished directed Legislature very statute be enact prong reach courts the best interest today. general ... con fore us "As matter parental rights cases termination until acknowledge temporary decisions state-court showing parental State has made a unfit legal ‘(Historically, grandparents had no statutory based on one four bases for ness ” Troxel, at -, of visitation.’ A., Ashley termination. See In re 679 A.2d dissenting) (Kennedy, at 2077 J. 1996). (Me. the court has found the Unless at -, omitted). (citation Id. 530 U.S. factors, presence of one those "harm” R., 2061; Conservatorship Justin S.Ct. at not even consider best interests 1995) (Me. (affirming a 662 A.2d 234-35 T., re child. See In Leona 609 A.2d guardianship peti grandparent’s denial of (Me. 1992); Org. also v. see Smith unfitness); parental tion in absence of Families, 97 J., Foster Stanley Penley, 142 Me. (1977) (Stewart, S.Ct. concurring) 53 L.Ed.2d (1946) (declining custody award ("If attempt State were to fa when children maternal breakup family, natural over the force of a present). ther was fit and children, objections and their showing of unfitness and for without some Rather, rights, any, grandparents’ stem if thought to be in sole reason that do so was "recognition ... derivatively interest, best I have little the children’s should opportunity to bene- should have the children im- that the State would have intruded doubt permissibly statutorily speci- relationships with fit from private 'the life realm grandpar- example, ” persons fied —for (citation enter.’ omit which ted)). state cannot ents.” added). grandpar- (emphasis "Because duties of ents other relatives undertake col- Contrary to the assertions of our Concurrence, many States parental nature in leagues “confluence households. 302

Troxel, (iii) at -, 530 U.S. Narrowly S.Ct. Tailored State Action (“There (Stevens, J., dissenting) is at a Next, [¶ 29] we must determine individual, minimum a third whose inter narrowly whether the State’s action is tai implicated every ests are case which lored to compelling serve identified child.”). applies the statute —the Glucksberg, state interest. See 521 U.S. at a grandparent 721, [¶ 27] When has (citing Flores, S.Ct. been the “primary caregiver 1439). and custodi 302, aspects S.Ct. Several for significant period an” a child over a First, the Act analysis. to our are.central time, relationship between the child grandparent a standing must establish be grandparent application warrants litigation may a petition. commence on fore parens patriae authority of the court’s 1803(2)(A)- 1803(1), §§ 19-A M.R.S.A. behalf of the child and provides compel a 1803(2)(C). Second, the court must con ling basis the State’s intervention into any objection sider concern an intact parents. with fit Recent ing an award visitation or ly, this compelling recog interest has been grandparents. access 19-A contexts, nized in other upon several based 1803(2)(D). Third, § M.R.S.A. the court a reasoning parent’s fundamental may grant if so doing would liberty interest must against be balanced a significantly parent- interfere with any in continuing “[child’s] interest to have relationship parent’s with the access to only adult who has acted aas rightful over the child. 19-A parent [the v. child].” Youmans Ra 1803(3). § M.R.S.A. mos, 774, 165, 429 Mass. 711 N.E.2d (1999); see also V.C. v. 163 N.J. requirements Each pro- of these (2000) A.2d 548-49 (holding safeguards against vides unwarranted in- that the grant State intervene to visi family’s trusions into an intact life. The objections tation parent over the of a requirement, first grandparents where the child’s psychological parent “has standing they may demonstrate liti- stepped in to legal assume the role of the claim, gate provides protection their parent who has unwilling been unable or stress, against the expense, pain the obligations parenthood”); undertake litigation, and until grandpar- unless Institute, American Law Principles ents have convinced the court that they (Tenta § Law Family Dissolution 2.03 among are grandparents those who may 2000).17 tive Draft No. pursue visits under the Act. 19-A M.R.S.A. 1803(1), 1803(2)(A)-1803(2)(C). §§ Trial Thus, the State has demonstrated vigilant must application courts that it a compelling in provid- requirement of this ing a order to effectuate grandparent, forum which a who issue, Legislature’s narrowly has acted as a to the efforts tailor child at continuing seek contact with the child. the Act to the compelling serve interest of sought to ensure the the chil Because address facts before welfare of us, by protecting relationships dren therein we do not determine whether State parties.” those children form with third compelling such would have a interest in circum- Thus, added). (emphasis although Id. stances where a assert dif- grandparent positive type relationship.” can and should ferent of "sufficient 19-A life, 1803(1)(B). biological Ordinarily, influence in a child’s rela M.R.S.A. tionship provide parents' alone does basis State's interest in childcare decisions legally merely provide enforceable interest in child whose "de minimis” and does not fit, present Sterling are see In re bаsis for state intervention. See N., Quilloin Walcott, (Me.1996), 1314-15 v. (1978); whose grandparent Stanley 54 L.Ed.2d 511 nature,” Illinois, 645, 657-58, "parental not of a see U.S. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 2059. 31 L.Ed.2d 551 the rela- parents’ affect visitation would plurality the in Troxel the Both State. If the court tionship stressed that child. Id. Kennedy’s dissent with Justice factor, of with a stating grandparent “the burden that visits that determines proceeding parent- the litigating a domestic relations with significantly will interfere the disruptive parent- pre- can be of relationship, itself ‘so that determination child the constitutional the par- intrusion into further cludes a custodial to make certain of See id. ent’s decision. for welfare basic determinations the child’s ” Troxel, at implicated.’ becomes 530 U.S. E. Conclusion -, (quoting 120 S.Ct. at 2065 Justice at Kennedy’s dissenting 530 U.S. opinion We conclude therefore that 33] [¶ 2079).18 at -, at S.Ct. acted the as grandparents where the periods of significant for children’s of protective aspect The [¶ second 31] time, Act Visitation Grandparents the Act, requirement the the the trial in ad state interest compelling serves a to the give parent’s court consideration relationship with dressing the children’s visitation, is objection equally important. them as 1803(2)(D). who have cared for people the provi § 19-A M.R.S.A. This narrowly Act tai Because the parents. the presumption sion life to the gives interest, lored serve that aсting are the best interests this case without violat at -, applied their child. See 530 U.S. parents. Parham, the of the ing (citing at 2061 2493). at court not The the Accordingly, 34] must vacate [¶ simply consider the best interests of the District Court. We note judgment of child, give sig but must also consider effort to approval the District Court’s weight parents’ position, nificant to the in this find- further matter delays avoid intervening thus from preventing court entering visitation or- ing facts making in a fit on parent’s simply decision that could be effectuated event der id. best interests basis. See analysis our constitutional differed at 2062. conclusion from that of court. Our protection provides The third sim- constitu- applied that the statute can authority, preclud- ilar limits on the court’s tionally before us is deter- on the facts ing awarding ac- visits or minative, however, the appropriateness on finds cess unless the court need itself. Given the of visitation “significantly those would not visits the restrictions of the application careful parent-child interfere” with the relation- passage of time since Act and the ship parent’s rightful entry judgment, we remand the court’s 1803(3). over child. 19-A M.R.S.A. court for further trial the matter attention, Again, the court must focus its hearing. best solely on the determination child, entry on The is: of the but also how interests sufficiently protect the chaos and conflict children from judiciary Maine hаs been custody by feuding parents litiga- the detrimental effects created cases."). concerned about Indeed, the Maine Commission that a Com- tion has on families turmoil Gender, Justice, and the Courts concluded to li- on was to seek alternatives mission tigated formed Bernstein, "[rjesolution custody report, in a recent See Sumner resolutions. is, through process disputes adversarial Report, Forum Nonadversarial Administrative psycho- (1996); among things, damaging to the E. also Dana other 11 Me. B.J. 366 see parents.” Prescott, well-being logical children and Appoint- Parental Conflict Cases, Custody Report Council, ment Child Performance Judicial Branch of Referees (2000) ("One daunting Implementation of the Me. B.J. Recommendations on challenges facing legal system the end Justice, Gender, Commission Maine ways the Courts of millennium is to find effective Judgment vacated. recognizing passage Remanded to the that the in Maine and similar Superior every statutes in one Court with instructions to re- forty-nine pro- the other states reflect mand District Court further changes found in the structure of the proceedings opinion consistent with the family. American herein. demographic changes past difficult century make it to speak of an WATHEN, C.J., RUDMAN, with whom family. American average composi- J., joins, concurring. tion of families varies from greatly many household to household. While I [¶ 35] concur in the result reached children have two married the Court but write separately distance and grandparents who visit regularly, myself from curiously ambiguous and many single- other children are raised in restricted conclusion “that state does In households. children have compelling a interest providing in living with one parent accounted forum within which who percent all age of children under grandchild have acted as to their in Dept, the United States. U.S. may seek continued with contact Commerce, Census, Bureau of Current child.” The District Court held that the Population Reports, 1997 Population Grandparents Visitation Act violates the (1998). Profile of United States 27 Fourteenth Amendment to the United Understandably, in single-parent these States Constitution on its face because it households, persons outside nuclear requires showing of harm to the child increasing are called upon a court can order visitation with a frequency everyday assist in the tasks grandparent. cases, court rearing. grand- also concluded many child In parents play an important that the “best role. For is standard in example, mil- approximately state interest itself.” With percent lion children —or 5.6 chil- all advantage Troxel, in teaching I age dren under 18—lived the house- reject the notion that the Act is invalid on hold of their grandparents. Dept, U.S. its face and that application the best Commerce, Census, Bureau Cur- interests of the always is standard rent Population Reports, Marital Status unconstitutional in the of grand- context Living Arrangements: March 1998 n parent visitation.19 (1998). (Update), p. i In my judgment, the issue before The nationwide nonpa- enactment of us is whether applied the Act can rental assuredly ever visitation statutes due, part, recogni- some to the States’ constitutionally. Although the United tion of these changing realities Supreme States stopped Court short of family. grandpar- American Because issue, on ruling precise opinion ents other relatives undertake Troxel is persuades instructive and me a parental many duties of nature in the Act survives a challenge. facial households, States have to en- sought I begin my analysis, [¶ did 37] as sure welfare of the children therein Troxel, Court, United States protecting relationships those effect, present 19. The District in the case took alone is never In sufficient. evidence, hypothetically, applied addressed merits found that the Act never could purported constitutionally challenge, to find the Act unconstitutional fails facial fact, Morales, applied. City Chicago In the court see concluded v. showing (1999); of harm to the children essential S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Salerno, justify any parental interferenсe with United States rights, and that the best standard interests S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 697 its the statute unconstitutional declare parties. children form with such third Rather, they stat- found unconstitution nonparental The States’ visitation face. so, recogni- supported by empha utes are further doing they In applied. al as State, tion, which varies State elaborating need for care sized the opportuni- that children should process scope parental due precise ty relationships benefit from ob context and statutorily specified persons exam- “[bjecause much state-court served —for ple, grandparents. case-by-case ba adjudication occurs on a Granville, 57, -, sis, Troxel v. hesitant to hold we would be (2000) 2054, 2059, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 vio nonparental visitation statutes specific (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). per se Due Process Clause as late the Troxel, 530 U.S. at matter.” Su- United States (O’Connor, J., opin plurality at 2064 presented Court was with the State preme ion). dissenting justices, Two of Jus the Washington’s nonparent version concluded, Kennedy, tices and statute Stevens Washington visitation statute. The reasons, facial Maine that the significantly broader than the each for different fail and challenge Act. See Wash. to the statute should Rev. Ann. Code 26.10.160, (1998) (allowing §§ that persuasively 26.09 .240 Kennedy opined Justice any third at party to for visitation does not have constitutiоnal time, subject only to the best interests in cases not right prevent to visitation all child). of the Our Act confined at -, 530 involving harm. See id. U.S. in this grandparents requires and case (Stevens, J., dissenting); 120 at S.Ct. existing relationship” “sufficient between -, at 2075 id. 530 U.S. at S.Ct. child, grandparent see 19-A. M.R.S.A. and J., ac (Kennedy, dissenting). Taking into 1803(1)(B); § interference significant no separate the view of Scalia count Justice parent-child relationship, see that, a judge, as he is without 1803(3); § in to a that finding addition upon infringe to laws that deny legal effect is in best of the the interests in the Con rights that are not enumerated 1803(3). Washington child. See stitution, at -, 120 S.Ct. see id. 530 U.S. Supreme Court struck down its statute on J., (Scalia, I can come dissenting), at 2074 and the basis of the Federal Constitution the basis only one conclusion—on ‍​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‍in- unconstitutionally held that the statute Maine’s Grand existing precedent, federal fringed right par- on the fundamental facially vio Act does not parent Visitation Troxel, 530 ents to rear their children. the Due Process Clause.20 late -, at That 120 S.Ct. U.S. however, not does inquiry, [¶39] ruling rested the fact the statute chal- escapes Act a facial end here. The of harm and requires showing threshold “ solely not because the lenge, by allowing ‘any person’ peti- also as de may in case facto ‘any for forced visitation of a child at tion Rather, the upon by the Court. relied only requirement being time’ with invalidity operates escapes facial because visitation serve the best interest constitu- confluence of the within rich broadly. too See sweeps child” the statute chil- parents, Smith, tional interests of (citing Custody In id. re dren, state, (1998)). grandparents, 969 P.2d 28-30 Wash.2d deriva- these interests are family, whether opinion, four members of plurality context, complex In this to tive or otherwise. Supreme States Court declined United could on the basis that statute the basis affirm 20. Justice Souter voted affirm on analysis the strict in accordance with "sweeps broadly and is survive too statute U.S. scrutiny review. See id. 530 standard of face.” 530 U.S. unconstitutional on its Id. J., (Thomas, J., (Souter, con- concurring at 2068 120 S.Ct. at 2066 curring judgment). judgment). voted to Justice Thomas categorical serving statement and pronouncements recognition.... of constitutional concerning invalidity yield rearing, facial must to careful Decisions balancing [Wisconsin which Yoder U.S. competing v.] [406 (1972)], Meyer], S.Ct. interests of all. To strict focus with scruti- 1042], 390, 43 S.Ct. Court, L.Ed. ny, as does the on the state, parents, vis-a-vis the Piercel L.Ed. cases recog other ignore is to what case particular nized protec as entitled to constitutional equally be the compelling interests of the tion, long grand have been shared with children, family, grandparents. other parents or relatives occupy who The District apply Court must the Act the samе household—indeed who great sensitivity order balance major take on responsibility for the protect parties of all rearing of the children. not run afoul Although of the constitution. 1932; 504-05, Id. at see also id. at Supreme United States (Brennan, J., concur yet definitively catalogued the factual (discussing ring) increasing number of considerations or decisional frameworks nontraditional families the United constitutionally required are or appro- pro States and their to constitutional priate, developing guidance. caselaw offers Illinois, tection); Stanley v. As the United States 651-52, 1208, 92 31 551 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d grappled changes Court with Ameri- (1972) (recognizing rights of a parental can society that in the and started 1960s biological father who married his continue to the present day, Court has mother). child’s biological The United consistently expanded the definition of Supreme States Court has also reaffirmed recognized and oth- that individuals regulate that State the behavior er than biological adoptive parents may adults, including of parents, attempt child-rearing authority. exercise This protect the constitutional of chil understanding parent-child broader Baird, 132, dren. See Bellotti v. 428 U.S. relationship acknowledge led the Court to 147, 2857, (1976); 96 S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d 844 the rights nonparents part of to be a of a York, 629, Ginsberg v. New 390 U.S. 637- life. City child’s See Moore v. East (1968). 41, 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 Cleveland, 494, 1932, 431 U.S. is constitutiоnally significant It that (1977). Moore, In L.Ed.2d an ordi- requires existing Maine Act a “sufficient attempted nance to restrict children relationship.” my judgment Although families, living specifi- extended controlling, significant it is also cally with their at grandparents. See id. case, present in the grandparents may 499-506, 97 S.Ct. 1932. The Court held caregivers significant have acted as over a “family sort this choice” is a consti- period developed of time and have tutionally-protected area under the Due close Some children. Clause parents Process even when are not courts, statutory authority, without In particular, involved. See id. the Court the common presumption modified law and ruled that a grandmother had the to opened the door visitation adults who grandchildren. live with her See at id. parent have become the de facto of child. 504, 97 S.Ct. 1932. Custody of H.S.H.-K, In See re 198 Wis.2d Ours is no means a tradition limited 649, 419, (1995); see S.F. N.W.2d respect uniting M.D., bonds Md.App. A.2d family. (2000); M.J.B., members the nuclear V.C. v. 163 N.J. uncles, aunts, cousins, (2000); tradition and A.2d E.N.O. v. 551-54 L.M.M., especially sharing house- 429 Mass. 711 N.E.2d — denied, along parents hold and children has cert. equally equally roots venerable and de- 145 L.Ed.2d Addi- (ALI) Act. 19-A forth in the See interests set tionally, American Law Institute (I). 1803(3)(H), § M.R.S.A. suggested being a de facto grant lawful court- may create a basis a note Finally, Troxel introduces Principles See ordered visitation. interpretations sweeping cаution about Analysis Family Law of Dissolution: nonparental applications 2.03(l)(c) (Tentative Recommendations important with an The Act deals statutes. 2000). the Act By confining Draft No. as follows right described case, the present de in the facto Court: unnecessarily strips the Act of this issue in liberty beyond limited results that significance care, in the case—the interest could be achieved common law. custody, control of their children —is the oldest of fundamental perhaps of the primary [¶ 41] One constitutional recognized by liberty interests in the of the Wash application deficiencies Court. fact that ington statute Troxel was the weight to gave special the trial court daugh parent’s determination of her custody, “It is with us cardinal so, doing the court

ter’s best interests. first of the child reside care and nurture presumption violated primary function parents, whose fit act in the best interests of “that for ob- preparation and freedom include at-, Id. their children.” supply state can neither ligations the Troxel, at 2061. As noted nor hinder.” special Maine Act affords measure 120 S.Ct. at 2060 making by protection parental decision omitted). (citation pri- must afford Courts requiring grandpar the court to find to the interests and views macy weight inter significantly ent visitation would not to parent fit and are not free resolve of a or any parent-child relationship fere by splitting the difference difficult call parent’s over rightful trial did in Troxel. Washington court the at -, the id. child. See the case illustrates present The [¶44] at 2062 19-A (citing M.R.S.A. is that exacting more decisional framework 1803(3)). Act, impor § In applying the it is Here, hy- determined required. appreciate tant trial courts to that requirements pothetically that spe decisions fit are entitled to if the had met and indicated that Act been weight is em principle cial and this constitutional, visi- were it would order Act Act required by bedded in the and is note, to without court went on tation. The Constitution. to be if were the children explanation, Troxel, under accomplished exchanged, it would be 42] In the United States Su- [¶ guard- supervision party of a third or also the failure of preme Court criticized and grandpar- to ad litem and the Washington trial court credit ian delivery present be at the were not to parent voluntarily provid- fact that had ents Although time. such never at the same grandparents, point to ed visitation in a visitation, appropriate only ready solution sought deny and resisted resolving a conflict setting for grandparents divorce expanded visitation the not, of grandpar- the context parental rights, The as do demanded. Maine does analy- visitation, it also states, implicates many ent express- the statutes in other capacity The interests. sis of best ly condition an award of visitation cooperate grandparents and denial of parent’s denial or unreasonable explicit part is an disputes resolve con- and grandparent. visitation to Such required by analysis siderations, however, with- the best interests comfortably fit visitation whether determining of best Act comprehensive formulation should be ordered. 19-A See M.R.S.A. The governing Court states the (I). 1803(3)(H), principle of “if interpretation that we can reasonably interpret a statute as satisfying 45] One court usefully [¶ observed requirements, ... constitutional must a general proposition, “[a]s visitation ¶ Ante, (Court’s way.” read it in such a awarded to is gratifica- adults opinion). To apply principle this inter- enjoyment, tion or but to fulfill the needs pretation, must there be some words to McCarter, of the child.” Fairbanks However, interpret. the Court cites Md. As the words in the interpret- statute noted, United States Court has application ed to limit its substi- statutory “[t]he extension of parents’ rights tutes’ or “de facto” to sue. to persons area other a child’s par- than Rather, the Grandparents Visitation Act is ents, however, with an comes obvious an invitation to and all can comers who cost,” “place could a substantial bur- call themselves to bring suit parent-child den on the traditional rela- disrupt unit. This is tionship.” tailoring narrow de- Act, scrutiny strict 2059. Under the it is the mands of a statute that invades a funda- court’s function to order only interest, mental mixing under limited Court’s circumstances when it child, then, concepts in- application will law and only benefit the if that terpretation can benefit be realized of law cannot make it significant- without so. ly burdening interfering the par- approach analogous [¶ Court’s 49] ent-child relationship.21 holding stop that a statute authorizing Because, 46] in my judgment, [¶ the Act and seizure of motorists without reason unconstitutional, facially join is not I if, in two in- out three vacating the dismissal of the action and stances, the probable authorities had cause remanding for further proceedings. stop tailoring seize. The narrow is not by trusting mandate satisfied those ALEXANDER, J., dissenting. given authority broadly under unconstitu- I 47] respectfully [¶ dissent. tional apply statutes to those statutes opinion Court’s thoroughly correctly narrowly and constitutionally. legal reviews the governing principles parent’s A up- to direct which we apply must to determine the bringing control of their of children is constitutionality Grandparents Visi- not a right lightly to be aside tation Act. In cast whenev- analysis the Court’s of that law, er I or only disagree they its State the courts think conclusion that a better idea about how children be partially application of should justifies a law raised. As the Troxel interpretation plurality opinion an that law of totally unsupported majority that is and the of this wording recognize, of parental rights the statute itself. direct Separately, the facts to their children’s case, court, of by upbringing found trial re- control are “fundamen- quire judgment parents. for the liberty tal” protected by interest the Due potential grandparents’ 21. The Act seeks to minimize the affidavit with a motion to parents by requiring burden on pro- the court to The leapfrogged dismiss. court over the petition summarily requirements first consider a on affida- cedural of the and went ordering evidentiary hearing. vits an directly to the merits and the constitutional addition, Only if the challenge. court determines on the basis of the Act authorizes “costs, including and the affidavits that "it is more court to award reasonable fees, likely than that is a attorney’s defending prosecuting there sufficient exist- or 1803(6). ing relationship ....”§ or ... effort a.sufficient actions of Because constitu- made,” practical establish one has been should the tional sensitivities consider- ations, proceed hearing. to a scrupulous 19-A M.R.S.A. be courts should in follow- Here, 1803(2)(C). ing parents responded procedures specified in the Act.

309 Granville, 530 v. 530 interests of their children.’ Process Clause. Troxel 57, -, 2054, 2060, (citing 147 120 S.Ct. 120 S.Ct. at 2062 U.S. U.S. ¶ (Court’s (2000); Ante, J.R., 584, 602, 49 18 L.Ed.2d v. 442 U.S. 99 S.Ct. Parham context, (1979)). 2493, Fifth opinion).22 In another 61 101 L.Ed.2d “most recently observed that thе Circuit test, re- scrutiny The strict of aspect priva essential basic familial invasion parental that an quirement to remain cy [is]— by narrowly justified be tailored and rights together without the coercive interference interest, pre- and the compelling state Mor power of the awesome state.” in the best that fit act sumption (5th Dearbome, 657, v. 181 F.3d 667 ris children all cannot Cir.1999) (quoting Ray, v. 844 Hodorowski generalized avoided statement (5th Cir.1988)). 1210, 1216 F.2d presumed is to be constitution- “[a] statute liberty When inter 51] a fundamental [¶ person challenging the constitu- al stake, here, any it is state est is establishing its tionality has the burden subject invasion of that interest must be ¶ (Court’s Ante, opinion). 14 infirmity.” ¶ (Court’s Ante, scrutiny. 19 opin strict regu- the State undertakes intrusive When ion); Washington v. U.S. Glucksberg, 521 judicial “the family, lation of the usual 2258, 702, 117 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 138 legislature inappropri- deference is (1997); 1 v. 772 Sell. Admin. Dist. No. Cleveland, E. City Moore ate.” v. Comm’r, Educ., 854, Dep’t 659 A.2d 494, 499, 1932, L.Ed.2d (Me.1995). invasive scrutiny, Under strict strict scruti- Application if it is only state action can be saved ac- justification test demands of state ny narrowly compelling tailored to serve a narrowly by demonstrating tion it is ¶ (Court’s Ante, opin state interest. inter- tailored to serve state Flores, ion); also see Reno v. 507 U.S. est, rigorous analysis not abdication of (1993); L.Ed.2d a presumption. resort to City v. Heights, Collins of Harker L.Ed.2d Grandparents At blush the 54] first [¶ (1992); Court, Supreme Butler v. Judicial images of Norman Visitation Act evokes (Mе.1992). what believe Rockwell’s America: some better, gov- simpler family times. challenge justifying were reality application fit this law par- ernment invasion of harsh Except particularly ents than Rockwell. great because the Unit- closer Orwell23 par- disappeared ed States observed in cases of Court has deceased ent, government only by grand- law a “de minim- will invoked their own making relationship with is” interest in child care decision whose Illinois, badly they must parent. Stanley a fit See children has failed so 645, 657-58, to visit the 31 resort lawsuits (1972). the next this “de with their children on problems L.Ed.2d Reflective of interest, pre- parent-grandparent a Where generation. minimis” state “there is relationships lifestyle and in ‍​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‍the best choices differ sumption that fit act chil- upbringing and repeatedly We have held the rect the education 22. that both recognize Wilder, 32, 20, ¶ "a Maine and Federal Constitutions 748 A.2d at 2000 ME dren.” important” right of fundamental and Sisters, Soc’y (quoting Pierce C., their In re Heather to raise children. 510, 534-35, 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 ¶ 99, 23, 448, 454; A.2d State v. ME Nebraska, (1925)). Meyerv. See also 449; Wilder, ¶20, 444, 748 A.2d ME 399-400, 67 L.Ed. ¶¶ C., ME In re Christmas D., 631-32; A.2d In re Alexander ¶ 226-27. 1998 ME George 23. (Harcourt liberty parents to fundamental interest of Brace This Orwell, 1983) (1949). di- their includes "to raise children strained, If presents prospect tingent parent are the law fee. required were competent parents being caught against to they may defend such suit withering many crossfirе lawsuits as have to make sacrifices that are detri- four grandparents demanding sets of mental to the child. For in- example, grandchildrens’ involvement in the lives.24 being buy stead of able to the child by judges These suits will be jacket resolved parent winter may have to virtually applying provides law which an pay up-front fee to the attorney. Ab- guidance stan- except “best interest” showing sent of harm to delegates judges dard. That standard to grandparent petitions when the apply personal and own hearing parent court for a should essentially lifestyle prefer- unreviewable not be forced to make these sacrifices. resolving ences to each dispute. See Trox- injury, 56] To add insult [¶ el, 530 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. at 2064. presents prospect resist- resolution, Each such successful for the ing grandparents’ usurp parental efforts to will grandparents, usurp parents’ au- authority may pay be forced grand- thority over the in- unavoidably child and parents’ attorney costs and fees. 19-A See sert the of litigation, dispute, stress and 1803(6) (1998).25 M.R.S.A. prospect This uncertainty the grandchildren’s into fives. can greatly pressures add to the 55] As trial [¶ court observed in its litigation, soberly stress of must opinion: validity considered as the constitutional law this is examined.

The reason these type suits are brought hostility are because between Proper 57] re- analysis [¶ parent grandparent exist ask quires following questions: that we these, dysfunctional the most of cases. compelling 1. Does the State have a The consequences economic of the action authorizing interest lawsuits and, parent could be disastrous to the grandparents who in re- have failed written, derivatively, the child. As lationships their own children there is no real to prevent barrier gain chil- order access to their grandparent, who has more time and children; dren’s money than the parents, child’s so, If selected, is the means petitioning the court for visitation rights. Act, Grandparents Visitation suffi- A who does up-front not have the ciently narrowly to serve .tailored out-of-pocket expense defend against that interest? the grandparent’s may have to pressure par- bow under the even if point, On the first has honestly not in ent believes it best in- apparently “compelling” found a state awarding interest of the child. The terest which the United States attorney post-hearing pro- fees does not Court has called “de minimis.”26 For pur- a parent out-of-pocket vide ex- poses opinion only, this some penses required any petition legislating protect de state filed or any hearing begun. parents as Such facto addressed Court’s suits cannot taken ethically opinion on a con- will be assumed and not addressed four occur defending prosecuting number would if each actions under grandparent chapter. divorced and remarried. where, here, greater 1803(6) (1998). number could be the § 19-A M.R.S.A. target litigation that is the includes Illinois, several children different fathers. Stanley 26.See 657- (1972) 31 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 1803(6) § 25. 19-A M.R.S.A. states: (stating government that has “de the a 6. Cost and fees. The court award interest in child-care decision mak- minimis" costs, fees, including attorney's ing by parent). a reasonable fit the deter- However, weight being given parents’ to to further. the means selected Troxel, 530 deny to access. See state in- mination that assumed achieve at-,120 at 2062. not requirement terest do meet they serve that narrowly tailored to by Maine findings required The [¶ 61] particular interest. significantly “would law not relationship parent-child interfere The law that: provides [¶ 59] authority parent’s rightful over or with the

— a Any grandparent can file lawsuit 1803(3), child,” § do not 19-A M.R.S.A. to haul the into court to save the provide qualification sufficient to parental prerogative defend their Any by grandparents lawsuit statute. to party third access control seeking court intervention against parents children. a grandchildren is to access to force — died,27 Except parent a where parent- significant interference with filing need grandparents suits dem- relationship parent’s rightful child relationship particular onstrate no can the child. Trial courts authority over grandparent between the significant interference” make the “no to expressed child. An desire es- sophistry in a finding only by engaging a all is relationship tablish is im- insignificant that such lawsuits open needed courthouse to pact. door.28 Kennedy’s As Justice dissent [¶ 62] — Grandparent access are to decisions notes, authorizing a lawsuit Troxel an act adjudicated on the amor- based parent- intervene in the parties third to phous “best interest of the child” is, itself, a in- relationship “state standard, to according and decided disruptive par- that is so tervention preponderance of the evidence constitution- relationship ent-child of proof. burden to make al of a custodial the child’s determinations for Troxel indicates that such an certain basic implicated.” Id. 530 U.S. law- welfare becomes open-ended grandparent invitation J., (Kennedy, at 2079 process suits is too due broad meet Thus, law, a a dissenting). as matter requirements. plurality The Troxel holds Grandparents Visita- invoking too lawsuit such to be broad because Act, a its through implications, tion with all gives government, acting courts, virtually parent-child interference significant unfettered discretion Further, fit parent a relationship. where supersede parental decisions as what is against grandparent access any special has decided best for their children without law, had and because she parent provision of the with the other children deceased 1803(1)(A)(1998), is not at relationship 19-A M.R.S.A. some here, opinion and this does address issue seven three months of her life—now the first provision. constitutionality certainly years ago. relationship is This relationship” existing under sub- "sufficient provisions Grandparents Visita- the definition of paragraph B unless strain implicated are in this case section tion Act fact, point. beyond breaking that term 1803(1)(B), authorizing by grandpar- lawsuits existing considering complete of an lack allege they have "a sufficient exist- ents who ing relationship” found, relationship which the trial grandchild, and sec- all 1803(1)(C) been that has non-existent authorizing lawsuits where tion relationship, existing subparagraph but C is there is grandparents the children since allege they an effort have made only proper press the claim basis relationship. 19 M.R.S.A. to establish § past three children. A force access to all 1803(1)(B), (1)(C). Subparagraph B as- existing relationship is not a "sufficient failed apply Sub- to Keiko and Roman. serted to subpara- relationship,” this term in unless Mariah, apply to who the paragraph C must given meaning the com- graph B is outside relationship only found to have trial court understanding of the term. mon relationships “derivatively” because which, law, reasons as a of history, parents’ matter are With this the de- [¶ interest, in presumed to be the child's best cision limit association their children at-, see id. 530 U.S. 120 S.Ct. at hardly the grandparents with is surprising. 2061-62, a order imposing court an associ- Rather, it appears legitimate expression ation that the opposes unavoid- family self-respect and As integrity. ably parent’s severe insult to rightful the trial “If the court found: this question authority over the child. posed the in were court the con- inescapable clusion would be that visitation plurality opinion 63] The in Troxel [¶ inject would Rose too de- closely into the directs that rather the disregarding than unit, family fendants’ ef- determination, catastrophic parents’ own the court finding give essentially finding fect.” This must it Id. special weight. there no rela- existing If was “sufficient a trial court tionship” and gives parent’s grandparents own between the determination re- garding year the children in was special access to children the suit weight required, making then It sig- application the “no filed. makes section 1803(1)(B) findings nificant interference” conceptually cited difficult. Court to save the is a legal statute29 66] The remainder of the trial court’s logical impossibility. opinion appears to look the visitation history [¶ 64] The of this case demon- prospects point from the of viеw of the importance strates the fit respecting grandparents and the children to deter- parents’ associational choices and recogniz- might appro- mine some visitation ing promoted by mischief Act’s priate, except prob- the constitutional authorizing lawsuits to interfere with those analysis ignores This lem. the direction choices. The have Riendeaus now been special, Troxel that a elevated level years. married for eight There is dis- given parents’ consideration be to the that, pute they this record presently, views these issues. The trial court fit are for the trial children. The thought necessary it order include its findings court’s note the difficulties a specific prohibition on the had, marriage primarily as a result making derogatory comments about the attempted grandpar- interference parents. This confirms that the court was since ents 1992: fully not confident of its determination that They separated during summer of the visitation not significantly order would 1993, primarily because tensions parent-child relationship interfere with the grandmother’s] created Rose’s [the parents’ rightful over interference in their unit .... As children. finally the communications broke down Thus, beyond constitutionality Heaven,

between Rose Rose resort- not problem, legitimately the Court could reporting Jeffrey police, ed light order of its re- findings resulting being a search warrant exe- (i) garding: be- relationship horrible addition, cuted on their house. she grandparents; tween the filed a report Department (ii) Services, grandparents’ continued efforts Human ne- alleging abuse and chil- interfere and their glect, against and filed two suits (iii) lives; appropriateness dren’s defendant: an action Probate Keiko, grandparent-child of the severance adopt Court to and the instant suit case. All well before was filed. communications have since off, plaintiffs ap- are With the in Troxel getting properly broken directive plied visitation or communication with the which the trial did directive —a three children. when rendered its decision— Ante, ¶ (Court's opinion). adju- hope or lawsuit and have their claim made trial court itself findings by the interest” according to the “best dicated if the reasons for demonstrate indi- standard, which Troxel parents’ given special decision are and ele- a standard consideration, enough is to save constitutionali- an award cates vated from sup- distinguishable cannot be grandparents ty. This case 1803(B). require- ported under Where the the Maine Act’s section Troxel reasons, signifi- “no legitimate subsidiary findings had found ment of court, except access to made terminating grand- for that cannot be impact” cant view four-year facially who had in a engaged incredible taking significant impact on disrupt effort to interfere with and such lawsuits Proper parent-child relationships of Riendeau children. target parents significant test scrutiny it is evident that a no the strict family, application of made more. finding interference cannot be process protections requires due present record. I affirm the Accordingly, would [¶ 70] statute, a possible posit It is judgment. drawn, narrowly more that could much challenge survive a constitutional and meet a requirements compelling state any properly

interest defined rem- narrowly inter-

edy tailored to serve that a include a prereq-

est. Such statute could finding of

uisite harm to the

parent’s denial of some association with filing As

grandparent. prerequisite 2000 ME 203 suit, require, the statute also as the might S. PRATT Robert opinion suggests, Court’s some demonstra- prior parent-like of a relationship tion child, just aspirational hope an created, relationship might an alle- et al. John OTTUM relationship, gation of some minimal which present requires. all 19-A law See Maine. Court of Supreme Judicial (1)(C) (1998). 1803(1)(B),

M.R.S.A. 14, 2000. Sept. on Briefs Submitted heightened also bur- might require law provision other proof den of some Nov. Decided of Troxel that a fit respect direction parent’s given special, decisions be some

heightened weight. Except for the deceased here, implicated which is not

prerequisite Act, Grandparents ‍​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‍pres- Visitation drafted,

ently prereq- includes none (i) prop- which would be essential

uisites State interest to

erly define with the fundamental

support interference to control their

liberty (ii)

children; narrowly tailor

remedy pres- to serve that interest. The presents open an invitation

ent act hope to claim a who claim or grandchild with a to file

Case Details

Case Name: Rideout v. Riendeau

Court Name: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Date Published: Nov 13, 2000

Citation: 761 A.2d 291

Court Abbreviation: Me.