Corcoran v. Marie

entry is: Judgment affirmed. ME 14

Jan M. CORCORAN

Linda MARIE.

Supreme Judicial of Maine.

Argued: Sept.

Decided: Jan. Bickerman, Esq. (orally),

Peter B. Read- field, ME, for Jan Corcoran. Bell, Esq. (orally), Unity, pay by

Nаthan D. would Marie June and $2200 ME, for Linda Marie. pay that thereafter he would Marie “$160 per month or as to meet the needed deficit SAUFLEY, C.J., Panel: and of her ... basic until [her] ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, circumstances allow her to assume all of GORMAN, and JABAR. living expenses.”1 her basic The record SAUFLEY, C.J., paid reflects that Corcoran and Majority: $2200 and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, paid per has month since June $160 GORMAN, and JJ. required by judgment. 2008 as JABAR, Dissenting: J. In March Corcoran moved for relief judgment, from the divorce LEVY, J. in separately modify June moved to it. appeals Jan M. from a Corcoran J.) (Mullen, denied both mo- judgment entered in the District Court May In tions. Marie moved for con- J.) French, (Augusta, granting a motion to tempt, July and in separately moved to spousal support enforce filed former his enforce the spousal support agreement. wife, argues Linda Marie. Corcoran Both of Marie’s motions asserted that be- in amending court erred provided cause Corcoran had not her with support agreement part of its enforce- sufficient funds cover the deficit result- agree order. We and vacate the ing from the difference between in- her judgment. living expenses, come and her he was in violation of the judgment. I. BACKGROUND a hearing, [¶ 4] After court [¶ Corcoran and Marie were 2] di- J.) (French, denied Marie’s motion for con- vorced in an proceeding uncontested tempt, concluding that although Marie had August years marriage. after four rеpeatedly requested provide Corcoran to (Worth, J.) The divorce incorpo- her with additional financial assistance be- a spousal support agreement rated yond month, she had failed Corcoran and Marie had drafted without provide Corcoran with an accounting to counsel, the assistance of sepa- and also establish the added financial rately support she stated that it was awarding Thus, reasoned, needed. thе court general spousal transitional and support. Cor- (B) (2010). 951-A(2)(A), See 19-A M.R.S. coran had not contumaciously by acted The agreement provided failing any that Corcoran pay greater amounts than entirety: stated in its needed to meet the deficit her basic liv- ing expenses. provide provision This document is to a written This will remain in con- tract between Linda Marie Corcoran and effect until Linda’s circumstances allow her purposes maintaining Jаn Corcoran for living expenses. to assume of her all providing financial means to Linda to prefer We would per- that this would be a living expenses. meet her basic exchange through sonal rather than agreed We have that Jan Corcoran will setting up court. We will be an automatic up make the deficit of Linda's income to transfer between the banks involved. expenses meet aforementioned in the fol- beneficiary Linda will remain as the on lowing Jan approximate- manner. will policy Jan's life insurance and will make ly begin February on or about arrangements expenses to cover funeral completed by 2008 to be June 2008. There- precedes Jan case Linda. after, provide Jan will month or as taxes, property specified including late fees in- ment. terest. to the motion to en- regard With addition, the court amended force, the court construed the divorce the spousal support obligation prospective- establishing

judgment per $160 ly, increasing it from month to $160 amount, support as a minimum and that its week. The court also established underlying intent was for Corcoran to extra-judicial mechanism for automati- greater whatever amount was re- cally adjusting the amount of quired to enable her to meet her basic port Corcoran be required pay. would to observed, living expenses. The court “Un- Marie was ordered to provide Corcoran a fortunately, is silent re- budget written annually showing her in- garding accounting the method of for those expenses come and for preceding year, expenses procedure through or the which and pay any Corcoran was ordered to re- is to be informed of the ac- [Corcoran] sulting deficit budget indicated counting payment before the is due.” The during ensuing year by way of ‍‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍weekly necessary court that it was to concluded payments. explained: The court judgment amend divorce under necessary is to [I]t amend the Divorce 110A(b)(6)(B),2 authority of M.R. Civ. P. to Judgment to achieve purpose its stated expenses”: living define “basic of “providing financial means to [Marie] finds that basic liv- [Marie’s] to meet her living expenses.” See ing expenses mortgage include: and 110A(b)(6)(B)(“Relief M.R. P. Civ. on a costs, taxes, home insurance property may motion to enforce include amend- oil, sendee, heating electricity, telephone judgment ment of a or order such is if water, sewer, trash, clothing, groceries, necessary to purposes achieve the insurance, automobile maintenance and added)). judgment (emphasis or order.” propane, gasoline.... and The Court

finds that the “deficit” between the base [¶ 8] Corcoran filed a motion for a new spousal support obligation and [Marie’s] trial and a motion for findings of fact and ability to meet her basic expenses response conclusions of law in is between month or Court’s enforcement Regarding order. per week deficit. trial, the motion for a new reject- the court ed claim that Corcoran’s he had been de- The court determined that nied due he process because had not weekly deficit in an arrearage resulted known that going modify the court was to $16,000, more than but noted Marie’s testi- support obligation his and wаs thus not mony “accept” payment that she would $12,101.63. opportunity present afforded an evi- granted The court therefore income, debts, amount, dence related to his judgment plus to Marie in that interest, post-judgment expenses, specified costs and and other factors 951-A(5) (2010). also to pay ordered Corcoran Marie’s 2008 19-A M.R.S. provides "Prehearing judge may 2. M.R. Civ. P. 110A to a who refer the motion to Involving mediation, Schedule and Procedure for may Cases or refer the action for A(b)(6)(B) Minor Children.” Section 110 prompt scheduling hearing of a before a states: judicial officer. Relief on a motion to en- may force include amendment of a judgment A motion to enforce a or order necessary ment or order if such is timely shall be addressed in a fashion and purposes manage- achieve the of the or shall not be included the case process. The motion be referred shall order. hаd amended the pared by reasoned that its order Marie. It also determined clarify divorce so as arrearage there was a substantial in spous- meaning living expenses” of “basic al based on the appli- retroactive that, by doing, so had not adjustment cation of the definition and modified judgment. by the mechanism established court’s amendment.3 response motion Corcoran’s law, findings of fact and conclusions may A judgment be clari the court revised a of the portion fied where it is demonstrated that it con pertinent in its order that appeal, ambiguity but otherwise denied the motion. tains an that is “reasonably sus ceptible interpretations.” different

II. DISCUSSION ¶ Rothman, 39, 9, Thompson v. 2002 ME Corcoran contends that the 921, 791 (quotation A.2d 924 marks omit by effectively modifying court erred the ted); Bliss, 208, see also Bliss v. 583 A.2d judgment’s spousal support provi divorce (Me.1990). 210 In reviewing an order having sion without finding made a of a “purporting clarify a judgment,” divоrce change substantial in circumstances and (1) apply two-part we a test: whether “the without having ability considered his prior judgment ambiguous court’s was as a pay the increase from month to (2) law”; matter of whether “the per week in spousal support. See 19- prior court’s construction of its 951-A(4) (2010); ‍‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍§ A M.R.S. Pettinelli v. consistent with its read as Yost, 121, 14, 1074, 2007 ME 930 A.2d objectively whole and is supported by the 1079; Spencer Spencer, 1998 ME Greenwood, record.” Greenwood v. 2000 ¶¶ 12, 17, 720 A.2d 1162-63. Be ¶37, 10, ME (quоtation 746 A.2d 361 cause the court purport modify did not omitted); marks Thompson, see also judgment, however, the ques ¶39, 6, ME 791 A.2d 923. A court tion we must answer is whether the court not, may guise “under the of a clarification acted within the bounds of its inherent order,” make a change material that modi authority clarify ambiguous provision provisions fies the original judg judgment. divorce Bliss, ment. 583 A.2d at 210. [¶ The court held that a clarifying 11] case, there is no doubt amendment was required because “[t]he that рroperly the court treated the judg- Judgment Divorce was silent regarding being ment as ambiguous. parties’ by method which the Plaintiff and agreement that “provide Corcoran would Defendant would compute the ‘deficit’ be- per month or as needed to meet the tween the in spousal support and deficit of living expenses” [Marie’s] basic ability Defendant’s to meet her can be to mean expenses.” construed that the amount amended the by suppоrt might adjusted of the be defining “basic as need- expenses,” ed establishing frequency a means for the or that the support automatic adjustment needed, spousal might adjusted the amount of be as or both. port exclusively Further, budget based on a pre- agreement did define the expressly 3. The court "Involving cited M.R. Civ. P. Minor Children." Because there 110A(b)(6)(B) authority as the case, source of its are no minor children involved in this spousal amend award. As Rule apply. Rulе 110Adoes not states, however, applies lOA’stitle to cases deed, living expenses” “basic that would estab- judgment prepared divorce support. the basis for Marie’s need for lish signed judge expressly referred to the parties’ written as including Although ambiguous, we also “general an award of support.” that, difficulty concluding little have whole, agreement rep- when read as judgments Divorce are con attempt by laypersons resents an to de- struеd consistent with the intent of the general spousal sup- scribe an award of court, revealed the language port. General is “awarded to Greenwood, judgment.4 of the financial assistance to a provide spouse ¶37, 9, 746 A.2d at 360-61. We find no substantially with income potential less support in the language of the at than the other spouse spous- so issue here for the adopted by amendment es can maintain a reasonable standard of whole, thе court. Considered as a living after divorce.” 19-A M.R.S. judgment does not demonstrate an intent 951-A(2)(A). Here, temporally to create a unique form of open-ended spousal support of $160 (1) would be automatically adjusted payable by Corcoran was intended solely payee’s based on the self-determina pay to enable Marie to her basic tion of her need for more or less words, expenses other to maintain a —in requirement without the of a substan reasonable after the standard di- (2) circumstances, change tial in gives marriage vorce. was of income, no consideration to the payor’s subject short duration to the statuto- health, expenses, or any of the other statu ry presumption against rebuttable tory factors for determining sup spousal general support award of marriages in port § set forth 19-A M.R.S. 951- years, less than ten see 19-A M.R.S. A(5)(A)-(Q). If judgment the divorce had 951-A(2)(A)(1), § it was reasonable for intended that the spousal support would Marie, parties agree who suf- substantially deviate so approach from the fers from brain damage by caused a head contemplated by spousal support stat injury, might require long-term financial ute, would have so provided. it assistance from to maintain a Corcoran Thus, the court’s amendment of reasonable living. general standard of As judgment exceeded its clarification au- support, subjeсt the award is to modifica- thority because the amendment was not termination, tion and see 19-A M.R.S. required give effect general 951-A(4), § which is consistent with the spousal support by established the divorce agreement’s characterization that the sup- and it judgment, materially altered the port paid would be “as needed.” substance of the award. Thus, although [¶ Corcoran and 15] Our conclusion employ [¶ Marie did not does not mean language 18] of the necessarily that Marie is a obligation, remedy statute to describe without Corcoran’s month, if they together with her other employ stating did — income, sources of monthly pay- that Corcoran would make is not sufficient for her ‍‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍ments of to Marie to help pay her her maintain a reasonable standard of liv- long ing. it Because judgment as was the divorce did general support. needed —describes In- the spousal support bar from being Rothman, ¶39, 8, Accordingly, particularly Thompson 4. we are deferential 2002 ME judge origi- where "the same who issued the A.2d judgment nal also made the clarification.” modification, suggested future see 19-A We have that whether a subject 951-A(4), may judg- with the seek an clarification is consistent M.R.S. if monthly spousal support supported by ment as a whole and increase review, subject a record is also to de novo she is able to demonstrate substantial circumstances, case, at least when the сourt has not in which consid- change After capacity need and ered extrinsic evidence. reconsid- both Marie’s Corcoran’s issue, however, ering the we conclude would have to be considered. See ¶ Pettinelli, 121, 14, ME at that de novo review of the resolution of 930 A.2d ambiguity inappropriate. is De novo necessarily implies review there is entry is: answer; only correct one but when a Judgment vacated. remanded to Case provision judgment ambiguous, in a is entry the District Court for of an order possible interpre- that more than one denying the motion to enforce. may tation be both consistent with supported as whole and JABAR, J., dissenting. circumstances, record. such def- erence to the trial appropriate. court is fully agree I with the Court’s We will therefore review court’s clari- finding ambiguity ambiguity fication of an in a provision. I ment’s re- for abuse of discretion. dissent, however, spectfully I because be- Rothman, 39, 7, Thompson v. supports lieve record the District (citations omitted). 791 A.2d 923-24 interpretation that ambiguous Court’s provision. “Review an for abuse of discre- tion involves resolution of questions.” three support provision’s Given the ac- ¶ Yost, 121, 11, Pettinelli v. 2007 ME 930 knowledged I ambiguity, my analysis focus 1074, Thus, A.2d 1077. to determine on the prong applicable second of the test whether the court abused its discretion reviewing when clarifying order a di- construing the divorce judgment, we must judgment: vоrce whether “the court’s con- following: consider the prior judgment struction its of is consis- (1) are findings, any, sup- factual if language tent with its read a whole as and the ported by according record objectively supported by is the record.”5 (2) standard; clear error did the court Greenwood, 37, Greenwood v. 2000 ME applicable understand the law to its ex- ¶ 10, 358, (quotation 746 A.2d 361 marks (3) discretion; given ercise of and all the omitted). answering In question, this we law, applying appropriate facts and the attempt do not ourselves to the resolve weighing was the court’s of applica- rather, ambiguity; we review the court’s ble facts and within the choices bounds construction for an abuse of discretion. of reasonableness. ¶ Forbis, 110, 7, See State v. 2004 ME 856 ¶ 621, 11, long ago, explained 1077-78; A.2d 623. Not we Id. 930 A.2d at see also ¶ Rideout, 69, 13, 1 applying the rationale for this level of def- v. Smith 2010 ME A.3d 441, any erence: “In resolving ambiguity in a reviewing purporting prior judgment 5. When an "order with its is consistent its lan- clarify judgment," apply guage objectively a divorce we two- read as a whole and is (1) part prior judg- ported by test: whether "the court's record.” Greenwood v. Green- law"; wood, 37, 10, ¶ 358, ambiguous ment was as matter of 2000 ME 746 A.2d 361 (2) omitted). (quotation whether "the court’s construction of marks

77 matters,” judgment, divorce is intent of Clearwater Artesian Well v.Co. ¶ court, LaGrandeur, language 11, 8, as revealed in the 2007 ME 912 A.2d judgment, that controls.” Green- 1252, 1255, this case illustrates the crucial ¶ wood, 37, 9, ME 746 A.2d at 361. 2000 role of the in approving any divorce court Notwithstanding par- award. portion The relevant of the am- agreement, court, ties’ “it is the not the support agreement states biguous spousal that parties, responsibility has the ultimate “will provide that Corcoran fashioning entering any judgment.” month or as needed to meet the deficit of ¶ Yoder, 27, 10, living expenses.” The Dis- Yoder v. 2007 ME A.2d basic [Marie’s] Court, hearing testimony practice trict after 230. Better dictates careful parties, interpreted and, this scrutiny agreements, my of such mean Corcoran’s obli- opinion, agreement should never have In gation was “two-fold.” addition to es- Dimoulas, approved. been See Lowd ‍‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍¶ tablishing a minimum level of at 866 A.2d month, the court construed the (“[T]here question no that the divorce agreement requiring pro- as Corcoran “to authority court has the to determine vide additional funds ‘as needed to meet reject whether a divorce settlement the deficit ex- [of Marie’s] omitted)). agreement.” (quotation marks ” penses.’ Second, given agreement’s reviewing on [¶23] ambiguity, we must remain mindful that appeal, the the support agree- Court reads “more than one interpretation may be both differently. Contrary to the District consistent with as a whole interpretation, Court’s the Court describes supported by the record.” Thompson, agreement’s language “stating as 39, ¶ 7, ME 791 A.2d at 924. The monthly payments would make Corcoran preferred Court’s interpretation gener —a help her her basic al spousal support award of long as it was needed.” may well plausible reading be a month — Supra the Court concedes agreement. reviewing the In the District ambiguous support agreement that the however, interpretation, Court’s the rele could “be construed to mean that the question vant is not whether we would amount of the support might adjusted be have come to the if deciding same decision needed,” supra appears as to inter- Instead, the issue in the first instance. we pret judgment the providing as deciding are limited to whether the court’s spousal support Marie with of $160 interpretation to an amounted abuse of more, month—no no less. discretion. I cannot conclude that it did. conflicting interpretations These [¶ 24] reiterate, support agree- To thе First, underscore important points. two ment states that support agreement, provide the Corcoran “will drafted without counsel, per month legal the benefit of or as needed to meet the contains con- living uncertainty regarding pre- expenses.” siderable the basic [Marie’s] deficit of added.) type (Emphasis cise and amount of ordered.6 In contrast to the singular repeatedly we have cautioned Court’s focus on “$160 month,” the “self-represented litigants primacy given providing are afford- special procedural living expenses” high- ed no consideration in Marie’s “basic checking findings regarding 6. Other than the boxes marked court made no the nature "Transitional,” obligation. ''General” and of Corcoran's gest lighted by the three references to that does short, merely monthly payment call for fixed four-paragraph agree- term interpreta- The District Court’s characterizing $160. In ment. аddition agreement obligated tion—that Cor- purpose “maintaining as agreement’s coran to a minimum of financial means to providing [Marie] greater unless a amount was “needed to living expenses,” par- meet her basic living meet the deficit of [Marie’s] agreed up ties that Corcoran would “make expenses” agree- consistent with the income to meet deficit [Marie’s] —is objectively sup- ment’s and is ex- expenses,” aforementioned [thе] concluding the record. ported sought arrangement their plicitly keep contrary, I believe the fails to ac- place in “until circumstances al- [Marie’s] appropriate cord the District Court an low her to assume all of her basic measure of deference. expenses,” reasonably After construing Along reviewing agree- with agreement, properly the District Court language, ment’s the court heard testimo- amended the to reflect its inter- that, ny parties contempla- from both in pretation. findings regarding The court’s divorce, tion of their Corcoran and Marie living expenses” Marie’s “basic are not jointly prepared a budget outlining Ma- erroneous; are, fact, clearly they in living expenses.7 part, rie’s For her ported by testimony parties. budget designed testified that the was largely relied on the parties’ arrangement maintain the financial budget, which Corcoran himself acknоwl- during their place marriage, which Cor- edged drafting, and which he agreed rep- paid coran in- difference between her nearly resented a accounting accurate living expenses. Similarly, come and Cor- Further, living expenses. Marie’s himself, coran during questioning by the court acted well within its discretion in court, implicitly acknowledged signifi- adopting designed mechanism to auto- cance of providing for Marie’s basic matically adjust the amount оf Corcoran’s expenses: spousal support obligation. agree- Okay. you COURT: And so saw issue, provided guidance no on the word, “or as meet needed to the deficit and the court’s amendments were neces- living expenses,” you of her basic sary to the support effectuate award. it, typed right? Lastly, I no find error in the WITNESS: Yes. Mmhmm. requiring court’s Corcoran to So, Okay. COURT: what did that $12,101.63 pay arrearage. mean? correctly found that Corcoran “made nо well, WITNESS: That would mean— attempt duty to fulfill his sufficient I don’t know what basic ensure that basic liv- [Marie]’s are, food, shelter, but I mean—to me its met,” ing expenses have been and “avoided clothing. That would—that’s what we [Marie], discontinued payments, re- [and] need to determine ‍‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍I guess what —as turned bills she had forwarded to him.” It are. those is within a court’s discretion to assess a together, Taken agreement’s arrears, see 19-A party 952(4), (2010), parties’ testimony sug- §§ and the M.R.S. and the 7. determining is the intеnt of the divorce court vant in the court’s intent. Green- wood, controlling, parties' that is intent rele- 9 n. 746 A.2d at 361. enforce, affir- court, motion to has no on a to ensure that statutory obligation

mative payment can make an immediate party arrearage.8 reasons, I For these would af- of the District Court.

firm the ME 15 HANDRAHAN

Lori

Igor MALENKO.

Supreme Judicial of Maine. July on Briefs:

Submitted

Decided: Jan. governs parties’ Corcoran relies on 19-A M.R.S. this section initial award 951-A(5) (2010) proposition spousal support, regarding for the that a not motions its party’s ability pay, court must consider enforcement.

Case Details

Case Name: Corcoran v. Marie

Court Name: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Date Published: Jan 20, 2011

Citation: 12 A.3d 71

Docket Number: Docket: Ken-10-6

Court Abbreviation: Me.