James Coleman v. Elaine C. Duke
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15179
| D.C. Cir. | 2017Background
- James Coleman, an African-American DHS employee, applied for a Supervisory Production Specialist position twice in 2010; he was interviewed and deemed qualified but was not selected in October 2010. One selected candidate declined, leaving the position unfilled.
- Coleman contacted DHS EEO on December 11, 2010, alleging race and age discrimination; after that contact, his supervisor issued a Letter of Counseling (Dec. 30, 2010) and later a Letter of Reprimand (Jan. 28, 2011).
- On January 16, 2011 DHS laterally transferred Kara Millhench (a white woman under 40 who had not applied) into the open supervisory role; Coleman added retaliation to his administrative complaint and filed a formal EEO complaint on Feb. 17, 2011.
- The DHS EEO acceptance letter listed claims of race, age, harassment and reprisal, and enumerated several ‘‘examples’’ of incidents supporting the claims but did not explicitly list the Millhench transfer among those examples; it asked counsel to notify the office within seven days if the accepted claims were incorrect; Coleman did not respond.
- Coleman sued after withdrawing his administrative complaint when DHS did not resolve it; the district court dismissed Coleman’s retaliation claim related to the Millhench transfer for failure to exhaust and rejected retaliation claims based on the counseling/reprimand letters.
- The D.C. Circuit majority reverses the exhaustion dismissal and remands Coleman’s retaliation claims (including those based on the disciplinary letters) for further proceedings; Judge Henderson dissents, arguing Coleman failed to exhaust the Millhench-transfer claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Coleman exhausted administratively a retaliation claim based on Millhench’s January 2011 transfer | Coleman contends his formal EEO complaint (and its attachments and sworn declaration) put DHS on notice of the Millhench transfer as a retaliatory act and covered the relevant timeframe | DHS argues the EEO acceptance letter’s list of "examples" did not include the Millhench transfer and Coleman failed to correct or amend the acceptance letter, so the transfer claim was unexhausted | Reversed: Coleman exhausted the Millhench-transfer retaliation claim; the complaint, attachments, and acceptance letter provided sufficient notice to DHS to investigate |
| Whether the district court properly treated the counseling and reprimand letters as non-actionable for retaliation | Coleman argues the letters could be materially adverse in a retaliation context (could dissuade a reasonable worker) and should be judged under the retaliation standard, not the narrower discrimination/adverse-employment-action test | DHS (and district court) treated the letters as non-material job-related criticisms not rising to retaliation | Reversed on this point: district court used incorrect/overly narrow standard; remand for application of the proper retaliation standard |
| Whether DHS’s proffered legitimate reasons for transferring Millhench defeat the retaliation claim on summary judgment | Coleman contends record gaps, comparative-qualification disputes, and suspicious timing (transfer soon after EEO contact) make the reasons plausibly pretextual and warrant discovery | DHS claims transfer was for efficiency and because Millhench had relevant briefing experience; argues reasons unrebutted | Remanded: record is factually disputed or silent on key qualification and process issues; discovery required before summary judgment |
| Proper effect of EEO acceptance letter when it lists "examples" but not every event in complaint | Coleman says the acceptance letter acknowledged reprisal generally and the complaint attachments specified Millhench transfer as an event to be investigated; agency cannot implicitly narrow claims without clear notice | DHS says acceptance letter and counsel’s failure to respond show the agency defined scope and Coleman failed to preserve or correct it | Court favors Coleman: acceptance letter did not clearly narrow claims and the formal complaint attachments control; agency must follow regulatory notice/partial-dismissal rules to limit claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Niskey v. Kelly, 859 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (administrative exhaustion requirement for federal employees)
- Artis v. Bernanke, 630 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir.) (EEO complaint must give sufficient information to enable agency investigation)
- Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344 (D.C. Cir.) (failure to include a claim in the formal complaint and not responding to an acceptance letter can mean no exhaustion)
- National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (U.S.) (discrete acts are separately actionable; timeliness rules)
- Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir.) (failure to competitively advertise or lateral actions can support discrimination/retaliation claims)
- Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211 (D.C. Cir.) (retaliation standard: whether challenged action might dissuade a reasonable worker)
- Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir.) (letters of counseling/reprimand generally not materially adverse absent abusive language or tangible consequences)
- Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir.) (agency misinformation and exhaustion/limitations principles)