Jacqueline Hurst v. District of Columbia, 681 F. App'x 186

Jacqueline Hurst, a white Youth Development Representative for DC’s DYRS, was placed on leave and later terminated after a 2009 bad-check prosecution that resulted in probation before judgment in Maryland.
DCHR’s background-review process can trigger proposed adverse action when an employee’s background raises concerns about suitability to work with youth; DCHR issues final termination decisions after administrative review.
A DYRS hearing officer recommended retaining Hurst, finding probation before judgment did not equal a conviction, but DCHR’s deciding official (Camille Stillwell) reversed and fired Hurst for lack of judgment, honesty, and fitness as a role model.
Hurst sued under Title VII and Maryland law alleging race discrimination, claiming several African‑American DYRS employees with criminal histories were treated more leniently.
At summary judgment, the District showed (and the district court found) that Hurst’s proffered comparators differed materially from her (different offenses/outcomes, temporal remoteness, different decisionmakers, or lack of record on outcomes).
The district court granted summary judgment for the District; the Fourth Circuit affirmed because Hurst failed to identify valid, similarly situated comparators to establish disparate treatment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hurst established a prima facie Title VII disparate‑treatment claim by identifying similarly situated non‑white comparators	Hurst: several African‑American DYRS employees with criminal issues were not terminated for similar or worse offenses	District: the proffered comparators are not similarly situated—differences in offense seriousness/outcome, timing, decisionmakers, or no record of discipline	Held: Hurst failed to show similarly situated comparators; prima facie case not established; summary judgment affirmed
Whether the district court should consider a comparator (T.G.) raised for the first time on appeal	Hurst: T.G. is a valid comparator (raised on appeal)	District: issue waived because not raised below; no exceptional circumstances to consider it	Held: Court declined to consider T.G.; argument waived absent exceptional circumstances
Whether Hurst preserved a hostile‑work‑environment claim or direct evidence of discrimination	Hurst: appellate briefing raised hostile‑work‑environment and direct‑evidence arguments	District: no such claim was pled or pursued below; direct evidence presented does not link decisionmaker’s state of mind	Held: Hostile‑environment theory waived; proffered direct evidence did not show decisionmaker bias relevant to the termination

Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Libertarian Party v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2013) (definition of genuine dispute and material fact)
Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1993) (prima facie elements for disparate discipline claims)
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (U.S. 1981) (burden‑shifting framework in discrimination cases)
Lightner v. City of Wilmington, 545 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2008) (requirement that similarity and seriousness be clearly established)
Radue v. Kimberly‑Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2000) (proper comparator deals with same supervisor, standards, and similar conduct)
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1992) (comparators must lack differentiating or mitigating circumstances)
Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100 (4th Cir. 1985) (nature of offenses and punishments are key in disciplinary comparisons)
Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 2007) (insufficient common features defeat comparator argument)
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (U.S. 2002) (distinguishing discrete acts from hostile‑work‑environment claims)
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004) (statements by non‑decisionmakers or unrelated decisionmakers are insufficient as direct evidence)