Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc.

277 Opportunity Equal Employment even advantages, term long “achieve Sup- Commission, Amicus af- may be employees individual though Appellant. Sutton, porting a result. differently” fected Moore, v. Humphrey 412; also at see F.2d Commerce, of United 349-50, 84 S.Ct. Chamber of U.S. Advisory end, Employment (1964). States; Equal day’s At

L.Ed.2d Appellee. Supporting Council, and democratic Amici a deliberate reached CWA the con- consistent that was decision No. 01-1359. of a the views and with language tractual its members. majority of Appeals, of States Court United without conclusion Circuit. Fourth not reach this We do circum- unfortunate of being mindful 7, 2003. May Argued: them- find plaintiffs in which the stances that the question no can be There selves. 5, 2004. Decided: Jan. them. impacted severely decision union’s trau- endured plaintiffs Several faith- jobs years after losing their

ma of However, an- to USAir. ful service furloughs by USAir’s caused guish ultimately was occasioned relocations in bad acting unions management Septem- events faith, tragic but the airline their fallout 11 and ber courts wrong for industry. It would be events larger the blame these lay leadership, or its of the CWA the feet CWA, like evidence the face else, for reasonable searched everyone trying times. difficult amidst measures court is the district judgment hereby

AFFIRMED. HILL, Plaintiff- Louise

Ethel Appellant, LOGISTICS MARTIN LOCKHEED MANAGEMENT, INCORPORAT- Defendant-Appellee,

ED, Conrad, Ellen Bokat, S. Robin A.

Stephen Litigation Chamber National Bryant, D. Amicus D.C., for Center, Inc., Washington, Commerce; Eliza- Ann Chamber Curiae Cheung, Y.K. Reesman, Katherine beth L.L.P., Williams, & Norris Meguiness, D.C., Amicus Curiae Washington, Council. WILKINSON, WIDENER,

Before WILLIAMS, LUTTIG, NIEMEYER, KING, TRAXLER, MOTZ, MICHAEL, SHEDD, GREGORY, Judges. Circuit Judge opinion. by published Affirmed opinion majority wrote TRAXLER WILKINSON, WIDENER, Judges which WILLIAMS, LUTTIG, and NIEMEYER, wrote Judge MICHAEL joined. SHEDD Judges in which dissenting opinion joined. MOTZ, and KING GREGORY

OPINION

TRAXLER, Judge: Circuit action brought this Louise Hill Ethel Lockheed employer, her former against Inc. Management, Logistics Martin (“Lockheed”), claiming she from terminated wrongfully in and age and sex of her ment because of such dis- complaints for her retaliation Title of alleged violations Knoxville, crimination. Rayson, A. Ronald ARGUED: 1964, as Act of Rights Oxford, the Civil R. VII Susan TN, Appellant. for Rights Act by the Civil amended Opportunity Commis- Employment Equal 2000e-17 §§ 2000e see 42 U.S.C.A. D.C., Amicus Curiae sion, for Washington, Age (West and Supp.2003) Satterfield, 1994 & Neal Andreas Commission. of 1967 Employment in Act & Discrimination Baldwin, Johnson Jr., Haynsworth, §§ to 634 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.A. Greenville, SC, L.L.C., Appel- for Greaves, as state as well (West II, Supp.2003), 1999 & Burkhalter, A. David BRIEF: ON lee. under discrimination for such law claims M. TN, Nicholas Knoxville, Appellant. for Law, N.Y. Rights Human York General, B. the New Philip Inzeo, Deputy Acting en granted We § Law 290 to Exec. General, C. Lorraine Sklover, Associate district whether to decide review General, banc Equal Davis, Employ- Assistant motion Lockheed’s granted Commission, Washing- properly court Opportunity ment affirm. judgment. We summary for D.C., Commission. ton, Amicus Curiae (1) I. SOP: a reprimand by issued Ronald Souders, person the lead at Bragg Fort Ethel Hill was hired Lockheed anas Carolina, North for a violation of Rule of aircraft sheet metal mechanic in 1987. In “[ujnsatisfactory quality or SOP — capacity, this she worked as part quantity of work”—under a MWO as- contract field team assigned perform signed (2) 1997; to Hill in September military modifications to aircraft at various reprimand disciplinary suspension is- military bases the eastern United Dixon, sued Richard the lead person at States, pursuant to contracts between Fort York, Drum in New for Hill’s viola- Lockheed and the United govern- States tion of safety Lockheed’s tool control poli- ment. Thomas Prickett was Lockheed’s (3) cy 1998; in April program manager charge of the con- issued Dixon at Fort Drum for another tract field teams Archie Griffin was violation of 4Rule of the SOP under sever- supervisor East Coast senior site al assigned MWOs to Hill in April and Lockheed, they rarely but were present at May 1998. J.A. 112. military jobsites. Rather, the individual Lockheed’s SOP provides 3.4.2 Hill and the other aircraft mechanics were employee “[a]n who receives a combination directly supervised by person” a “lead reprimands two written not involving a “point of military base, contact” each suspension and one involving suspension who reported Griffin in the line of au- (not rule) necessarily on the same will be thority. person The lead was also respon- subject to discharge.” Thus, J.A. 110. enforcing sible for the standard operating after Hill’s third reprimand became war- (“SOP”) procedures of Lockheed and en- ranted, Dixon contacted Griffin to obtain suring that the military contracts were guidance on how to proceed and was told satisfactorily performed jobsite. at the to follow the SOP. Dixon then forwarded In addition to the mechanics and the disciplinary the paperwork Griffin, to who supervisor, direct Lockheed assigned a along with Prickett made the decision to safety inspector to each jobsite. military terminate Hill provisions under the Specific aircraft modifications scheduled to SOP. fifty-seven Hill was years old at the performed be military under the contracts position time. Her was ultimately filled were set forth in modification work orders a forty-seven-year-old male mechanic. (“MWOs”). safety inspector 1998, In June Hill filed a charge charged checking with the modifications to discrimination and with retaliation the ensure that they had been completed Equal Employment Opportunity Commis accordance the required specifica- with sion, charging sex age and discrimination However, tions. inspector the no had su- and retaliation. She right-to- issued a pervisory authority mechanics, over the sue letter in April Hill then 1999. filed any nor authority to discipline them. Like VII, this ADEA, action under Title the and mechanics, the safety the inspector report- the Act, New York Human Rights alleging ed to and directly worked under super- that she was terminated Lockheed “be vision person. of the lead cause of’ her sex and age and in retalia

During her eight last months of tion her complaints of discrimination.1 Lockheed, ment with Hill received three Hill acknowledges Dixon, that Souders and written reprimands under persons Lockheed’s the lead on Fort Bragg and parties agreed 1. The legal that analy- have control the claims outcome the claims al- applicable sis to the Title leged VII ADEA and Rights under the New York Human Act.

283 com- for her discrimination retaliation acted respectively, jobsites Drum Fort v. Lock- Hill against See retaliatory plaints mo- [him].” discriminatory or without Inc., 314 Mgmt., Logistics and reprimands, heed Martin issuing the three tive Cir.2003). (4th majority A she violated that 659 dispute F.3d does she in each thereafter vot- judges rules referenced circuit the active standards that dispute decision, does not and the panel also reprimand. ed to vacate to ter- subjected her reprimands banc. appeal the three court reheard en 3.4.2, nor does she under SOP mination acted Prickett with that Griffin

allege II. when retaliatory motive discriminatory or grant of court’s review the district We her. to terminate made the decision they Higgins de novo. See summary judgment dis- that she was Rather, allegation Co., 863 Nemours & E.I. de v. DuPont is age of her sex charged because Cir.1988). (4th Summary Fultz, 1167 F.2d that Ed in her claim grounded pleadings, “if the Drum, appropriate is judgment harbored at Fort safety inspector interrogatories, her, evi- answers depositions, as against discriminatory animus file, together old with the calling her “useless and admissions by his denced retired, no affidavits, a “trou- there is any, if show to be who needed lady” woman,” on fact and and a “damn as to material lady,” issue genuine old bled working they were while is entitled moving party occasions several 240-241A, According Fed. J.A. matter of law.” together. as a judgment animus, along Catrett, Hill, this 56(c); Corp. v. see Celotex R.Civ.P. against her retaliate Fultz’s desire to 317, 322, with 91 106 S.Ct. 477 U.S. his Dixon about complained (1986). she when the evi- construe We L.Ed.2d admittedly comments, report led Fultz favorable to Hill light most in the dence in her sec- infractions resulted valid inferences her all reasonable and draw which, when reprimands and third ond Liberty Lobby, Anderson favor. See Bragg reprimand, Fort combined 242, 255, Inc., S.Ct. 477 U.S. termination for her basis served (1986). L.Ed.2d 3.4.2. SOP under present Hill failed to Concluding that III. of her claims support evidence to sufficient em- “an unlawful makes it Title VII by Lock- and retaliation

discrimination ... employer for an practice ployment decision-makers, terminated who heed’s to discrimi- ... or otherwise discharge motiva- improper any such Hill without respect with any individual against nate Lock- granted tions, court the district conditions, terms, or compensation, to his judgment. On summary motion for heed’s such because employment, of privileges of re- this court panel of a divided appeal, 42 U.S.C.A. ... sex.” individual’s grant of sum- court’s the district versed added). 2000e-2(a)(l) The (emphasis § “Hill holding ha[d] that judgment, mary ... “an similarly forbids ADEA age of sex and direct evidence proffered or otherwise any discharge individual [Fultz], statements discrimination individual against discriminate substantially company’s influenced who terms, condi- compensation, respect to his ha[d] that “Hill to fire her” decision be- employment, tions, privileges or a to create sufficient evidence proffered age.” 29 individual’s such cause fact about wheth- issue material genuine added). 623(a)(1) (emphasis § in U.S.C.A. issued ... were reports er [Fultz’s] A. national origin motivating awas factor any employment action.” 42 U.S.C.A. Generally speaking, plaintiff may avert 2000e-2(m) added). § (emphasis The ef- summary judgment and establish claim fect of the amendment was to eliminate the age for intentional sex or discrimination employer’s ability escape liability in Ti- through proof. two avenues of tle VII by proving mixed-motive cases that First, plaintiff may establish a it would have made the same decision in claim demonstrating of discrimination the absence of the motiva- through direct or circumstantial evidence Rather, tion. through proof, such the em- age sex or discrimination motivated ployer only can now limit the remedies employer’s employment adverse deci available to the employee for the violation. however, sion. employee, need not § See U.S.C.A. 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). “On prohibited demonstrate that the character claim in which an proves individual a viola- istic was motivating the sole factor pre 2000e-2(m)” tion under section and the vail, so long motivating as it was a factor. employer “demonstrates [it] would cases, In such historically referred to as have taken the same action the absence cases, “mixed-motive” it is sufficient for impermissible factor, motivating the individual to demonstrate that the em court ... may grant relief, declaratory ployer was motivated to take the adverse injunctive relief, attorney’s fees and permissible action both costs directly demonstrated be attribut- and forbidden reasons. See U.S.C.A. able pursuit to the of a claim under 2000e-2(m); § Price Hop Waterhouse v. 2000e-2(m),” section but “shall not award kins, 228, 241, 490 U.S. 109 S.Ct. 104 damages or issue an order requiring any (1989). L.Ed.2d 268 admission, reinstatement, hiring, pro- motion, payment.” Id. Prior to enactment of Rights the Civil Act of Supreme recog Court had Since 2000e-2(m), enactment of section nized adverse decisions our cases have nonetheless adhered to could be legitimate motivated both and Price requirement Waterhouse’s that Ti- discriminatory reasons. See Price Water tle plaintiff present VII direct evidence to house, 490 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. 1775. To establish a mixed-motive discrimination proceed under theory, this mixed-motive case. Taylor See v. Virginia Union however, plaintiff required to offer Univ., (4th Cir.1999) (en 193 F.3d direct evidence of If discrimination. banc) (noting “plaintiff qualifies that a plaintiff successful, the burden then advantageous more standard of liabili- employer, shifted to the who escape could ty applicable in if mixed-motive cases liability by proving that it would have plaintiff presents direct evidence that deci- made the same decision in the absence of placed sionmakers substantial negative re- the discriminatory motivation. See id. at liance illegitimate on an criterion” in 276, (O’Connor, J., 109 S.Ct. 1775 concur (internal reaching their decision quotation ring). omitted)); marks Brinkley v. Harbour Re- response Waterhouse, Club, (4th to Price Con- 598, creation 180 F.3d 606-07 2000e-2(m) gress Cir.1999) (same). § added to Title VII in held, proof, Such we 1991, the Rights Civil Act of providing that production commanded the of “evidence of “an employment practice unlawful is estab- conduct or statements that both reflect lished when complaining party the directly demon- alleged discriminatory the attitude race, color, sex, strates that religion, or and that directly bear on the contested

285 at a (3) job her duties performing she was Phipps, v. Fuller decision.” employment legitimate Cir.1995). employer’s (4th that met level 1137, 1142 F.3d 67 of adverse at the time the expectations however, Supreme the Recently, (4) action; position and the employment direct evidence whether considered Court similarly filled open or remained a obtain plaintiff for a required is protected the applicants outside qualified § under 2000e- instruction mixed-motive If a at 607. Brinkley, 180 F.3d class. See “height such that no 2(m); held the Court burden presented, is the facie case prima is evidence” through direct showing ened legiti a to articulate employer the shifts to Costa, 539 Inc. v. Palace Desert required. the ad mate, nondiscriminatory reason for 2148, 2153, 156 -, 90, 123 S.Ct. U.S. the Assuming action. employment verse (2003). plain the Relying upon 84 L.Ed.2d production, of burden employer meets this that a statute, held the Court text Douglas framework —with “the McDonnell only demons- “need plaintiff Title VII disap presumptions its burdens — a forbidden used trative] remaining issue [is] sole and the pears], respect consideration v. Sand vel Reeves non.” discrimination obtain an “In order to Id. practice.” ment 133, Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. Plumbing erson 2000e-2(m), plaintiff a § under instruction 2097, 105 147 L.Ed.2d 142-42, 120 S.Ct. evidence,” di- only present sufficient need omitted); (internal (2000) marks quotation circumstantial, a reasonable “for or rect Hicks, v. Mary’s Center also St. Honor see of conclude, by a preponderance jury to 2742, 507-08, 125 502, 113 S.Ct. 509 U.S. sex, color, race, religion, evidence, that the words, (1993). the In other L.Ed.2d 407 motivating factor origin was or national prove plaintiff shifts back to burden at 2155 Id. practice.” any employment for of the evidence by a preponderance omitted).2 (internal quotation marks “were not reasons employer’s stated averting of second method reasons, pretext were but its true under proceed judgment is summary 143, Reeves, at 530 U.S. discrimination.” framework, the em which under “pretext” point, the burden At this 120 2097. S.Ct. facie establishing prima after ployee, with the “merges pretext to demonstrate discrimination, demonstrates of case court persuading burden ultimate rea permissible proffered employer’s the victim has been plaintiff] that [the ac taking an adverse son Burdine, 450 discrimination.” intentional for discrimination. actually pretext tion is Thus, 256, 1089. at S.Ct. U.S. v. Bur Dep’t Comm. Texas See Affairs framework “serves Douglas McDonnell 248, 252-53, dine, 101 S.Ct. 450 U.S. expedi the court bring litigants (1981); Doug McDonnell 67 L.Ed.2d ques ultimate fairly to this tiously and Green, 411 U.S. Corp. las 253, 101 S.Ct. tion.” Id. (1973). To L.Ed.2d 668 S.Ct. case sex prima facie demonstrate B. pretext under age discrimination age dis- (1) her sex and pursued Hill has framework, show that plaintiff must mixed- (2) under both the class; claims crimination protected of a is a member she Specifi- frameworks. action; pretext motive adverse suffered she continue Waterhouse requirements of Price “mixed mo- been assumed that It has however, decision, Our apply to such claims. Rights Act of 1991 provision of Civil tive" method, upon the and, therefore, upon but hinge not does to the ADEA apply does proof either framework. sufficiency of under burden-shifting direct evidence cally, presented Hill she asserts that suffi- (direct, her discrimination claim circum stantial, cient direct and evidence circumstantial or pretext), evidence of or wheth that, even if performance- demonstrate her proceeds er she under a mixed-motive or problems related accompanying repri- single-motive theory, “[t]he ultimate ques mands were a motivating factor in Lock- every tion in employment discrimination heed’s decision to terminate her under the case involving disparate a claim of treat SOP, discriminatory Fultz’s motivations ment plaintiff is whether the was the vic her by rendered termination Lockheed the tim of Reeves, intentional discrimination.” product of mixed-motives on Lockheed’s 153, (2000); 530 U.S. at S.Ct. 2097 see addition, part. Hill asserts that she has Burdine, 256, 450 U.S. at 101 S.Ct. 1089. a prima established facie case of sex and To demonstrate such an intent to discrimi that, age discrimination and because Fultz part nate on the employer, an indi was involved in leading the events up to alleging vidual disparate treatment based decision, the termination legiti- Lockheed’s upon protected trait produce must suffi mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the upon cient evidence one which could find reprimands termination —her and the protected “the trait ... actually moti SOP—can pretext be considered a for dis- vated employer’s Reeves, decision.” crimination. (internal 530 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. 2097 omitted). quotation marks protected

The district court concluded that Fultz’s trait “must actually played have a role in remarks did not constitute direct evidence the employer’s decisionmaking process and age sex or by discrimination Lockheed had a determinative influence on the out because Fultz did not make the (internal come.” Id. quotation marks and ment decision to terminate her. In addi- omitted); alterations Price tion, Water the district court concluded that the cf. house, 490 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. 1775 plaintiff failed to establish a claim of dis- (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that crimination pretext under the framework “statements nondecisionmakers, or because was not meeting Lockheed’s statements decisionmakers unrelated to legitimate expectations regarding job the decisional process itself [do not] suffice performance when terminated, she was to satisfy plaintiff’s burden” of proving valid, Lockheed had articulated a nondis- discrimination); Koski v. Standex Int’l criminatory reason for terminating Hill un- (7th Corp., Cir.2002) 307 F.3d SOP, der its and Hill failed to establish (noting that pertinent inquiry is wheth that Lockheed’s articulated reason was a decisionmaker, er the as opposed to other pretext for an unlawful mo- managers subordinates, evaluated the tive based upon Fultz’s involvement in the aggrieved employee upon based discrimi leading events up to the termination’ deci- criteria). natory sion. Although the Supreme Court IV. any heightened

eliminated requirement of direct evidence to establish a mixed-motive In embarking upon a determi sex VII, discrimination claim under Title nation of who ais “decisionmaker” for — Palace, see at -, Desert U.S. purposes of discrimination brought actions S.Ct. at the fundamental basis for under ADEA, Title VII and the begin we the district court’s decision has not been with the language of the statutes. Title affected. Regardless of type of evi VII and the ADEA provide that shall “[i]t dence plaintiff offered support for be an unlawful practice for an

287 actions fall Tangible employment ... or other- discharge ... to employer special province super- of the within the against individual towise discriminate empow- supervisor has been sex or visor. such individual’s The of’ ... because 2000e-2(a)(l); company as a distinct class by § 29 ered the 42 U.S.C.A. age. 623(a)(1). the decisions af- agent Both acts define of make economic § to U.S.C.A. his person engaged fecting employees “a other under or “employer” as term ... and affecting commerce industry control. an 42 See person.” a

any agent of such the employment actions are Tangible 630(b). 2000e(b); § 28 U.S.C.A. § U.S.C.A. supervisor brings the means which enterprise of to power the official the an liability of evaluating the In tangible A em on bear subordinates. acts, we are guided under the employer requires an act ployment official decision Indus., Burlington See agency principles. act. The enterprise, company the a of 754, Ellerth, 742, 118 S.Ct. 524 U.S. Inc. v. most cases is documented decision in (1998) (holding, 2257, 633 141 L.Ed.2d records, may be company official case a sexual harassment of the context by higher super level subject to review VII, express that “[i]n under Title brought Co., Upjohn 913 E.g., Shager v. visors. terms, federal courts Congress directed (7th Cir.1990) 398, (noting that F.2d 405 agency princi Title based interpret VII plaintiff; fire did not supervisor statutes, how The ples”). discrimination did, rather, Path Committee the Career ever, vicariously employers make do not was still liable because employer but the and moti discriminatory acts for the liable supervi functioned as the the committee even everyone employ, in their vations supervisor often paw”). sor’s “cat’s to or motivations lead acts or when such imprimatur of the enter must obtain the action. employment tangible influence processes. its internal See prise and use employer to contrary, by defining theOn Appliance & Kotcher v. Rosa Sullivan Con employer, of the “any agent” include (2d Inc., Center, 957 F.2d 62 Cir. some place an intent gress “evince[d] 1992) (“From em perspective for which employees limits on the acts employer supervisor and ployee, the responsible.” ... are to be held employers single entity”). merge into a Vinson, Bank, FSB v. Savings Meritor reasons, tangible For these 57, 72, L.Ed.2d 106 S.Ct. 91 477 U.S. supervisor be- taken ment action (1986); City Faragher see also 790-792, purposes Title VII act Raton, comes for 524 U.S. Boca con- (1998). the exact Whatever employer. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. agency in the relation of the aided tours Fllerth, the limits In the Court defined always standard, will requirements its employer agency encompassing as of such tangi- supervisor takes met when a be hold- employees of its liability for the acts against a action subor- employment ble power to or other actual ing supervisory instance, it would be dinate. Id. tangible make decisions. agency princi- interpret implausible (holding that “[a]s at 118 S.Ct. escape lia- ples to allow supervisor, proposition, general bility. authority of acting person other 762-763, Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 524 U.S. tangible can undertake a company,” action). order to accommodate Thus, “[i]n our in- 2257. Pertinent liability of vicarious agency reasoning principles explained its quiry, the Court supervisory by misuse of for harm caused follows: 288

authority,” the Court held that em “[a]n cisionmakers for the employer harbored a ployer subject motivation, liability discriminatory is to vicarious to a the Court held that employee victimized for an the employer judg- actionable hos was not entitled to ment as a by tile matter of law supervisor environment created under the McDon- (or Douglas nell framework successively “peti- with immediate because the higher) 764-65,tioner [had] introduced additional evidence authority employee.” over the Id. at Chesnut,” one of petitioner’s superiors S.Ct. in the chain authority, “was motivated Co., Shager In v. Upjohn 913 F.2d 398 by age-based animus and principally was (7th Cir.1990), Court, by cited the Ellerth responsible petitioner’s firing.” similarly the Seventh Circuit applied agen- Reeves, 151, at U.S. 120 S.Ct. 2097 cy principles employer to hold that an added). (emphasis Specifically, “Chesnut would be discriminatory liable for the em- [petitioner] had told that he ‘was so old he ployment by supervisor. actions taken ” must have Mayflower’ come over on the court, however, developed That a “cat’s and “that he ‘was too damn old to do his paw” or “rubber-stamp” theory impos- ” (internal job.’ omitted). Id. alterations ing liability upon an for the dis- A coworker had confirmed that there was criminatory supervisor, motivations of a an “obvious difference” in way petition- the though even supervisor the did not formal- Chestnut, er was treated and there was ly take the adverse action. evidence that Chesnut had supervised an having After presented been evidence efficiency study only petitioner’s line plaintiffs the supervisor was motivated placed only petitioner the proba- discrimination, age the court was confront- tion. Id. The Reeves Court also noted that ed with problem plaintiff that the plaintiff had “introduced evidence that technically fired a “Career Path Com- Chesnut was the actual decisionmaker be- mittee” which was unaware of supervi- hind his firing.” Id. at 120 S.Ct. 2097 prejudice. sor’s Id. at 405. The court added). (emphasis Although Chesnut had held that if the committee “acted as the petitioner’s recommended the termi- supervisor’s] prejudice conduit of [the —his nation to decisionmaker, the formal paw cat’s innocence of its members —the formal decisionmaker company was the spare would not company from liabili- president and spouse, Chesnut’s and there ty.” However, Id. if the committee “was testimony supervisor from a in the not a stamp, mere rubber but made an company that company “employees independent decision to Shager,” fire there Chesnut, feared and that Chesnut had ex- would finding be no basis for ercised ‘absolute power’ within compa- employer violated the ADEA. Id. at 406. ” ny for long ‘as as he remember.’ [could] Similarly, Sanderson, in Reeves v. (internal Id. at 120 S.Ct. 2097 altera- Supreme Court evaluated an employer’s omitted); tion see also id. at 120 S.Ct. liability for the motivations 2097 (noting that Chestnut was “described of a supervisory employee in the context of wielding power’ ‘absolute within the Reeves, a disparate treatment claim. See sum, company”). Reeves informs us U.S. 120 S.Ct. 2097. Reeves person that the allegedly acting pursuant brought against action his former em- to a discriminatory animus need not be the ployer, alleging that he was terminated “formal impose liability decisionmaker” to age because of his in violation of the upon an employer for an adverse Although ADEA. there was no direct action, or ment long plaintiff so as the pres- circumstantial evidence that the formal de- ents sufficient evidence to establish that “principally they they the one cision that make or for which the subordinate for, principal responsibility. hold “actual decision- or the responsible” 151-52, behind, the action. Id. maker” Second, that, we note in the of wake 120 S.Ct. Shager, ap our sister circuits have often plied paw” a “cat’s stamp” “rubber the Hill asserts that Reeves does appeal,

On ory to employer liability determine for the may contours of who not the outer define discriminatory acts and of su motivations pur- considered a decisionmaker be pervisory employees who do not exercise an imposing liability upon em- poses of decisionmaking authority. formal e.g., See Instead, urges adopt us to ployer. she (5th 342, Principi, v. 289 F.3d Gee 345-47 inquiry ap- influence” as the “substantial .2002); Stores, Cir Christian v. Wal-Mart theory, propriate standard. Under Inc., 862, (6th Cir.2001); 252 F.3d 876-78 fairly employee a subordinate would be Bergene Project Agric. v. River Salt Im of the em- viewed an actual decisionmaker Dist., provement 1136, & Power 272 F.3d substantially in- if the subordinate ployer (9th Cir.2001); 1141 Abramson v. William employment an decision made fluences Paterson Coll. New Jersey, 260 F.3d of formal The EEOC decision-maker. (3d 265, Cir.2001); City 285-86 Wascura v. view, although ap- supports also such Miami, (11th 1238, South 257 F.3d 1247 of further, pears go to ask that we even Cir.2001); v. City Rose New York Bd. of to hold that a subordinate em- urging us Educ., 156, (2nd Cir.2001); 257 F.3d 162 substantially an ployee influences (5th Rossotti, 375, Rios v. 252 F.3d 381-82 influence ment decision whenever the is Cir.2001); v. English Dep’t Colorado of sufficient to be considered a cause of the Corr., (10th 1002, Cir.2001); 248 F.3d 1011 action, if employment even the formal de- Venture, McKinney Hosp. Russell v. 235 simply rubber-stamp cisionmaker did not (5th 219, Cir.2000); F.3d Kendrick 226-28 recommendation. the biased subordinate’s Servs., Inc., Transp. v. Penske 220 F.3d of decline to endorse either view the We (10th 1220, Cir.2000); Stimpson 1231 v. employer liability un- permissible limits of Tuscaloosa, 1328, City 186 F.3d 1331 ADEA. der Title VII and the (11th Cir.1999); Llampallas v. Mini-Cir First, gov- we the statutes and believe Lab, Inc., 1236, cuits 163 F.3d 1249-50 erning precedents provide do not for such (11th Cir.1998); Washington v. Griffin expansive employer’s view of an liabili- Center, 1308, 142 Convention F.3d 1310-11 did not ty. Although Reeves the Court (D.C.Cir.1998); Ercegovich Goodyear v. upon an reexamination embark exhaustive Co., Tire & Rubber 154 F.3d 354-55 agency principles applicable to discrimi- (6th Cir.1998); Trinity Hosp., Eiland v. cases, nation the Court’s clear emphasis (7th Cir.1998); v. 150 F.3d Willis upon decisionmaking” who holds “actual Office, County Marion Auditor’s 118 F.3d power authority “principal (7th or who has Cir.1997); 542, 547 v. Geor Walden (3d responsibility” employment for an decision 506, 514-15 gia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d Coll., is consistent with the limitations set forth Cir.1997); Long v. 88 F.3d Eastfield individuals, (5th although per- Cir.1996); in Ellerth. Such Stacks South decisionmakers, Inc., haps acting not as formal Pages, 27 F.3d western Bell Yellow (8th Cir.1994). supervisory nonetheless act in a or mana- support gerial capacity agents ap as the of the em- we should positions their as how issue, pointed It have ployer. proach parties is these individuals who must possess requisite discriminatory moti- us to various lines different cases pa- of their view of the being supportive vation behind the adverse de- decision, However, stamps report, our re- or recommenda theory. rameters subordinate, actually leads us to the conclusion tion made it is view of the cases that, courts often utilize the say while the inconsistent the subor employed by terminology as same the actual decisionmaker or the dinate is court, always have not de- they Shager responsible for the contest principally one ways, theory consistent scribed the decision, long so as he ed after a discussion rarely they done so have parameters otherwise falls within the from which the principles agency of the the discrimination statute’s definition of an applica- that limit its theory emerged and employer agent employer. or of the See tion. Chicago, Rogers City v. 320 F.3d (7th Cir.2003) (The is 754 “decisionmaker ultimately conclude the more We person responsible the for the contested upon is to focus the appropriate course decision,” competent but there [is] “[i]f the discrimination statutes and language of precedents decisionmaker] do not evidence that the Supreme [formal Court —which Accordingly, we de speak paw1 in such terms. acted as ‘cat’s [the subordinate’s] parse recommendation, to further the opportunity rubber-stamped cline the his we applications paw of the cat’s or varying would consider be the [the subordinate] theory employed by our stamp rubber regarding” challenged decisionmaker Rather, simply we note sister circuits. action.); Inc., Caterpillar, Schreiner v. 250 theory premise behind is Cir.2001) (“[A] (7th F.3d 1100 deci the statutes and Su inconsistent with paw’ sion-maker cannot act as the ‘cat’s for precedent least insofar preme Court discriminatory another who harbors a ani —at conceived and theory originally as the prej mus” or “be the ‘conduit’ of another’s the more literal employing courts used Rather, a claim can udice.” “such survive holding in meanings of those terms. The factual in when there is a basis itself, example, quite limit Shager record for the assertion that the biased agency principles, Employing ed. prejudice individual’s was the motivation allow an court declined to actions.”); for the decision-maker’s but see itself from discrimination on the insulate Inc., (5th Laxton v. 333 F.3d 584 Gap, supervisor of a and dominant deci part Cir.2003) (holding that relevant in “[t]he through the use of a formal sion-maker quiry supervisor harboring is whether” the merely who rubber- decisionmaker a animus “had influence or stamped paw or acted as cat’s leverage decisionmaking of those over” Shager, 913 supervisor’s decision. See “principally responsible for the adverse 405-06; Mateu-Anderegg F.2d at see also (internal quotation action” Bay, 304 Dist. F.3d Sch. of Whitefish omitted)). marks (7th Cir.2002); Kramer v. 623-24 Lo conclude, To Title and the ADEA do VII R-1, gan County Dist. No. 157 F.3d Sch. inquiry not limit the discrimination to the (8th Wascura, Cir.1998); 620, 624-25 actions or statements of formal decision- Shager 1247. The cites in F.3d at Court employer. for the a con- makers Such Faragher seeming both Ellerth and struction of those discrimination statutes and, although the terms are not approval Reeves, very purposes would thwart the of the acts Supreme Court used by allowing employers to insulate them- analysis Reeves would seem Court’s liability by hiding simply selves from be- place quite comfortably within that ter non-biased, approvals, albeit a formal decisionmaker hind the blind minology. When Reeves, for or of formal decisionmakers. See merely paw acts as a cat’s rubber- However, 151-52, cisión or the actual decisionmaker for the 120 S.Ct. 2097. at U.S. employer. to endorse construction we decline allow a statutes that would

discrimination V. supervisory who has no biased subordinate authority and who does not disciplinary or mind, principles these With we formal deci- make the final or question turn to the now whether simply to become decisionmaker sion presented has sufficient evidence to dem he had a substantial influence because onstrate that she has been “the victim of or because he has the ultimate decision intentional discrimination” Lockheed one, role, significant in the even played Reeves, upon based Fultz’s actions. employment decision. adverse 153, 120 U.S. S.Ct. precedential prac- corporate employ- no As is often the case in We can discern depart settings, decisionmaking process to from the ment the upon tical basis which by the at Lockheed involved several of su- inquiry applied as articulated and Hill’s Court in Reeves n —and expand pervisory to Supreme employees. Specifically, Hill’s Dixon, by embracing supervisor, made in the contours of the decisions con- acts— Griffin, discriminatory superior, sultation with his impute test that would the issue employees reprimands hav- the second and third to Hill motivations subordinate decisionmaking authority to the for her violations of Lockheed’s rules and ing no Griffin, agents policies. approval, for employer, pur- and make them Prickett’s acts, simply then the decision to terminate Hill poses of the be- made performance under the for work defi- they cause have influence or even sub- SOP challenged repri- ciencies in the three effecting stantial influence in documented undisputed It Regarding decision. adverse mands she received. is Dixon, Griffin, actions, not an will be liable not for and Prickett were moti- any way by age vated in or sex discrimina- improperly person the motivated who decision, merely Accordingly, influences the but for the tion to make their decisions. reality summary judgment in person who in makes the decision. order to survive framework, may proof either Hill must encompasses This individuals who be under for deemed actual decisionmakers even be able to hold Lockheed liable the they alleged discriminatory are not formal decisionmak- animus harbored though Reeves, ers, safety inspector present where the husband Fultz —the such as jobsite Drum no formal of the formal decisionmaker wielded abso- Fort who held disciplinary supervisory authority and in or over power company, lute within Hill, reports reporting but who was involved in Shager, supervisor’s where the to Dixon that led to her second merely and recommendation were rubber- violations and, ultimately, her stamped by decisionmaking reprimands the formal and third sum, summary In termination Griffin and Prickett under committee. survive judgment, aggrieved employee derogatory who the SOP. The comments and discriminatory of Fultz allegedly rests a discrimination claim under Title motives ADEA if he can be deemed a upon VII or the are relevant for, of, employee agent or Lockheed motivations of a subordinate decisionmaker discrimination statutes. purposes must come forward with sufficient evi- for determination, we must ex- employee pos- dence that the subordinate To make detail, light most authority amine in more sessed such be viewed as Hill, undisputed facts that the one for the de- favorable to principally responsible site, for violation of Lockheed’s tool underlying her three Hill’s the events surround policy. control ultimate termination. reprimands and her policy requires Lockheed’s tool control (Fort accurately ac- Bragg) the aircraft mechanics to Reprimand A. The First their tools at all times and to count for challenge Although Hill does promptly report missing lost or tools signifi- it is validity reprimand,3 of her first supervisors. impor- immediate their it to her third cant because is similar both As policy dispute. tance of the is not and because also serves as Hill, acknowledged by policy ensures ultimate termination predicate for Hill’s working that “all of the mechanics that are reprimand was is- under SOP 3.4.2. The ... track of their keep around the aircraft during assignment to Fort sued they get left in the aircraft.” tools so don’t Carolina, in September North Bragg, 76. All tools are marked for identifi- J.A. “ work,” [unsatisfactory quality cation the mechanic’s initials or social of Rule # 4 of the SOP. J.A. 124. violation number, security the mechanic’s tool- in- Specifically, reprimanded Hill was outlined, “shadowed,” box is so prop- too stalling rivets that were small missing immediately apparent are tools Wig- an antenna mount. Donald erly hold opened. is when the toolbox safety Bragg, at Fort gins, inspector military at Fort April, employees violation, up the and Ronald Soud- wrote pair Drum found a of blue-handled cutters ers, person Bragg, the lead at Fort issued bearing gave Hill’s identification mark and repri- Hill it to Hill. has admitted this Fultz, assigned them to who had to been Wig- and that properly mand was issued Fultz, safety inspector. the site as the in unfairly not act or in gins and Souders did turn, gave to Dixon. After the cutters manner towards her. Griffin, Hill consulting with and Dixon is- following reprimand written and sued (Fort Drum) Reprimand B. The Second three-day suspension, accordance with Lockheed’s SOP: Hill January assigned was to my April brought at Fort Drum in New York. Prior to On 14 98 it was to work Drum, 4” assignment your Diagonal to Fort Griffin attention that Cutters found on a spoke complaints Grips with her about he had with Blue Handle were concerning job performance. bring her maintenance stand. You faded to received my Inspector’s Griffin told Hill that her work had not to attention or the that, up par you misplaced been to because the lead attention that lost or this persons ultimately responsible my were tool. These cutters were held quality possession you they “the work on the road” and until discovered [her] on,” up missing. During Inventory “she had to the lead were Tool be followed (COB) to at on 14 persons expressed had some resistance Check close business jobsites. you as to the being assigned April questioned her to their J.A. were In- reprimand 188. Hill’s second written was whereabouts of these cutters spector. issued four months later Your answer: “I told Richard approximately Dixon, person at I taken the tool home.” Your tool- Richard the lead had SOP, Actually, prior repri- they under SOP Hill had received two were not considered Bragg job-site reprimand at mands on a Lockheed in 1995. Be- 3.4.2. The issued Fort reprimand reprimands had been removed was considered to be the first cause these pursuant purposes of the decision. from Hill's record to Lockheed’s termination reprimand, military per- on 15 98 in the as were the again April checked box was sonnel who found Hill’s cutters and turned morning again at close busi- in to Fultz. But your if all them Hill’s eleventh-hour you asked had ness. When claim that she Fultz tools, did not have a “yes.” your answer about the prior discussion lost cutters 98, after a morning April of 16 On her reprimand creates no material issue of Safety Brief on F.O.D. very in-depth fact disputed because such evidence is Control, your toolbox was and Tool plainly support insufficient a conclusion Diagonal 4” pair checked and a like that Fultz was the actual decisionmaker or toolbox, I your were in when Cutters principally responsible the one for Lock- your original pair my posses- held still reprimand. heed’s decision to issue the sion. action, purposes disciplinary For of this you approximately I confronted at When they we look at appeared must the facts as April you denied 0900 hours on 16 Dixon, who met with Hill and made the 4” with the Blue Diagonal Cutters disciplinary decision that action was war- your markings tool Grips, Handle Kendrick, 220 ranted. See F.3d them, yours. engraved in were (noting evaluating that in whether an em- reprimand At the time the J.A. 125-126. ployee disciplined has or terminated been issued, only partial- Hill’s toolbox was trait, protected “because of’ a we must “shadowed,” deficiency ly she corrected they appear “look at the facts as to the during three-day suspension. making the person discipline); decision” Hill that the dispute does not McKnight Kimberly Corp., Clark plainly three-day suspension and the were (10th Cir.1998) (holding F.3d disciplinary authorized Lockheed’s plaintiff pretext failed establish Indeed, acknowledged that she rules. plaintiff where was terminated after the immediately could have been terminated investigation conducted an into a under the SOP for this violation. Never- allegations of misconduct on subordinate’s theless, repri- Hill that valid claims this part plaintiff the and believed the discriminatory by mand was rendered true, though allegations plaintiff to be even Spe- in the incident. Fultz’s involvement in the that the presented evidence lawsuit cifically, Hill that ever now denies she false). may have been allegations missing cutters with Fultz or discussed reprimand completed by Dixon written Fultz, “I Richard I had [Dixon] told told forth the information he had plainly set home,” taken the tool as reflected tool, including Hill’s lost regarding that reprimand. J.A. 125. She claims Fultz conversation between now-disputed conversation, Fultz lied to Dixon about this Hill, signed by and was Hill. Faced repri- Dixon to issue the which caused supervisor, her immediate one-on-one mand. agrees acting Hill freely man that was personal discriminatory motiva- Viewing light the evidence most without Hill, tion, opportunity dispute to can assume that Dix- Hill had the to favorable we reprimand any to information which formed the basis of on would not have issued the Yet, missing reprimand. to there reported Hill had Fultz not Hill’s Dixon’s decision evidence, claim, no that she did respect, tool to him. In this Fultz was is no Hill Dixon informed of the facts clearly leading up in the events to so.4 Once involved Nor, matter, appears any of the conversation with Fultz for that is there indication denial affidavit, deposition. of an during did her for the first time in the form that she so ber, only Hill acknowl- Dixon testified that of his determina formed the basis which warranted, edged was that it “could be hers.” J.A. reprimand tion that a any added). dispute that, her to upon incumbent (emphasis was Hill also admits if at that time she reprimand basis for make upon at the time Dixon was called English, later. complain intended to reprimand, she a decision about Cf. (“A claim plaintiff cannot 248 F.3d at 1011 my acknowledged that the cutters “had authority uncritically relied firing that a them,” all I number on and “that’s said.” prejudiced recom upon a subordinate’s Hill during deposition, 78. Even her J.A. op had an plaintiff where the mendation that the cutters only acknowledge would to and the evi portunity respond rebut And, likely” “most hers. J.A. 81. were recommendation.”); supporting dence deposition in her di- when she was asked Willis, (holding that 118 F.3d at 547-48 had, fact, pair lost a rectly whether she appli not paw” the “cat’s line cases was cutters, diagonal again Hill refused investigat where the decisionmaker cable that, “I had so up, testifying own instead by meeting motives ed a subordinate’s many, actually I could not answer that.” acting on the sub plaintiff with the before J.A. 78.5 recommendation). ordinate’s adverse short, Hill, he In when Dixon met with addition, support the record fails given no reason to view the facts principally that Fultz was re- the claim differently they related to than had been sponsible for the issuance of Hill’s second him, testify at no Dixon time did Dixon his deci- reprimand because based being Hill he based his belief that upon Hill his belief that sion to the tool candid on Fultz’s statement about to Fultz. After Fultz told had lied being contrary, taken home. Dixon On Hill, his encounter with Dixon Dixon about acknowledged testified that if Hill had By with Hill about the incident. met he missing she was a tool when showed time, replaced missing Hill had cutter her identification bearing her the cutters had all of in her toolbox and told Dixon she mark, not have re probably she would presented her tools. with the tool When His concern possession reprimand.6 in Dixon’s that bore her num- ceived written day response right. completed one A: That's before Q: dishonest, Well, summary judgment you if she hadn’t been Lockheed’s motion for deposition and four months after her had would have treated her in a different way, you? taken. been wouldn't acknowledged, "yes, A: ... If she'd I'm tool,” nothing Later, missing a ever only wouldn't had 5. Hill admitted that she said. pairs been owned three of cutters before Dixon Q: Okay. pair, only She wouldn't have been written gave disputed and that she her the all, But, pairs up at would she? had three afterwards. even then pair Probably up at that of A: wouldn't’ve been wrote Hill would admit she lost cutters, cutters, pair and she raised all. not Q: Okay. you possibility person When did ... first talk to the that another could have pair on the of cutters that Hill about etched her number Mrs. it? course, possession. morning, was Of even if I in Dixon’s A: I talked to her next true, missing pair that were would still be And box at that time believe. in her there, safety existed. and a concern would have still it ... was a tool. She said was she had her tools. Q: Q: course, And, Okay. you relied on Mr. Fultz her, talking But time I had A: I—at the to be honest because that’s a serious accusa- my employee being the tool in desk. tion when an is dishonest? however, investigated every discrepancy him thatshe Hill’s refusal to admit to And, given and, tool. misplaced report before it was had corrected with very purpose poli of the tool one, fact that the exception determined that all misplaced that tools are not cy is to ensure accurate and legitimate write-ups. were hav they in an aircraft where could wreak discrep- He also met with Hill about each perhaps tragedy, hardly one won oc and ancy, who admitted that four of the five why important Dixon felt his ders remaining discrepancy reports factu- were con aircraft mechanics be candid when correct, ally and has never contested Dix- by missing him about tools. fronted authority reprimand on’s to issue a on that sum, basis alone. support record does not finding that Fultz was the actual decision- before, As Hill does not contend that principally responsible maker or the one discriminatory Dixon acted with a animus Hill her for Lockheed’s decision issue when he made the decision that the third reprimand for the violation of the second reprimand pre- was warranted. Hill has Rather, control Dixon obvious- policy. tool sented no evidence and has made no claim ly independent, made an non-biased deci- similarly employees situated were not important Hill violated an sion that had discrepancy reports issued for the same or safety policy, that Hill had not Lockheed perform- similar deficiencies in their work forthright acknowledgment in her been ance, they or that were not issued written carelessness, that a reprimand reprimands discrepancy reports once such was warranted. by person. were verified the lead On the (Fort Drum) Reprimand The Third Hill contrary,

C. testified that Fultz had writ- “many discrepancy]” reports ten completed After Hill her three- faulty work other mechanics completed day suspension, she returned to work at Drum during at the Fort worksite their days, Drum. the next few Fultz Fort Over there, at of which assignment least one discrepancy reports six installation issued suspension in the of a male em- resulted signed to Hill for that Hill had off MWOs ployee, supervisor J.A. and Hill’s completed, on as but which Fultz deter Bragg reprimand her first Fort had issued unsatisfactory. Although mined to be single discrepancy upon report based Hill discipline authorized to or Rather, safety inspector there. mechanics, charged other Fultz discrepancy reports issued asserts that checking modifications to ensure that with Fultz, accurate, although “nitpicky were they completed had been in accordance trivial,” that, they J.A. because required specifications. contract period time during were issued same reported discrepancies on Lock He those uttering that Fultz was “Discrepancy heed’s standard installation Record,” complained that she had about job in accordance with his duties statements Dixon, Dixon, jury could find that she re- safety inspector. J.A. 128-31. So if she hadn’t’ve lied to Mr. Fultz and el: Q: acknowledge they it that told that she had did that and [him] Did she later ultimately were? then she come in and had hers, acknowledged were

A: Could be hers. that these Q: up? Acknowledged you written Could be hers. that it wouldn’t have I There wouldn't’ve been had her number of it? A: wouldn’t. nothing A: Yeah. Had her number.... said. J.A. 251A-253. an em- or terminate discipline could never of’ her sex “because reprimand

ceived com- violation of ployee undisputed for an age. and rules, egregious including such acts pany infer- proffered accept if we Even (or stealing endangering the fighting by motivated discrimi- Fultz was that ence carelessly aircraft fly who lives of those retaliatory animus towards Hill natory and mechanic), long so as the by attended reports, this fact discrepancy to issue that she was could demonstrate employee actual Fultz into the transform not does by employee in” subordinate “turned principally re- or the one decisionmaker discriminatory motivation. “because of’ to issue the decision for Dixon’s sponsible Rather, undisputed it is reprimand. third D. The Termination investigated and personally Dixon that discrepancy accuracy of the verified the brings us to Lockheed’s deci This independent, non- an and made reports, Hill because she had to terminate sion decision, in consultation with again biased predicate repri the three accumulated Griffin, were sufficient- the infractions for under SOP 3.4.2. mands termination a written ly to warrant serious formally with Tom rested The decision reprimand third reprimand, but Prickett, manager in program Lockheed’s Hill’s termination. trigger would teams, of the field charge contract Griffin, supervisor the senior site Archie actu- Fultz was the argument that Hill’s jobsites, East Coast both of for Lockheed’s allegedly Dixon al because decisionmaker away sites from were whom located power no override Hill that he had told follow, reasons that Fort Drum. For the is also una- under SOP actions Fultz’s they also the are were we satisfied alleged Dixon’s state- Accepting vailing. actual decisionmakers. viewing it in the ment to as true her, only pro- most light favorable rep- that a third After Dixon determined not author- that Dixon was vides evidence for Hill’s unsatis- rimand was warranted legitimate arbitrarily override ized to he sent Hill factory performance, work report issued discrepancy and accurate her status. Dixon home to await word on charging an safety inspector a Lockheed guidance on how then contacted Griffin improper comple- aircraft mechanic with and, upon being told Griffin proceed order. work tion of an aircraft modification SOP, forwarded the to follow Lockheed’s ability to evalu- alter Dixon’s It does not to him. At paperwork disciplinary reject, discrepancy ate, verify or and to time, him had Hill’s first Griffin before deciding disciplin- whether when reports of Rule 4 of for her violation reprimand under Lockheed’s ary action is warranted unsatisfactory quality of work— the SOP — SOP. Bragg at Fort by Ronald Souders issued 1997; reprimand second September to withhold appropriate would it be

Nor tool violation of Lockheed’s control for her from an who summary judgment at Fort Drum in issued Dixon policy for rules vio- employee has terminated 1998; third and Hill’s any April lations, wholly in the absence of Rule part on the of her second violation discriminatory motivation of work—is- unsatisfactory quality decisionmakers, the vi- simply because SOP — But May by Dixon known in the sued not have been might olations lim- was not Griffin possessed information absence of a subordinate’s performance to these admitted work infractions to ited brought animus that personally was also Griffin Otherwise, problems. unbiased light. sum, although position Hill had en- Fultz was in a of the dissatisfaction aware report safety Drum. to and work jobsites prior quality to Fort gendered on Dixon, that, ultimately violations to and to Grif- although Griffin testified Specifically, fin, put together by the shards of evidence person, Hill people of the liked as most regarding Hill Fultz’s involvement her to be of his lead men wanted none are support termination insufficient to assigned quality to them because of the finding that Fultz was the actual decision- and she had to have her work because maker, or the one principally responsible personally He had guidance. continuous for Lockheed’s decision to terminate her. sending to her to spoken prior with Hill By bringing Hill’s shortcomings light, complaints Drum about these and Fort merely decisionmaking Fultz initiated the up that her work was not advised her process that led to the final repri- two Moreover, already had par. Griffin had by mands issued Dixon and the termi- conversations with Dixon concern- several By nation decision. Hill’s own account of ing problems Hill’s work at Fort Drum. termination, leading the events up to her Nevertheless, was notified after Griffin Dixon, it person was the lead and Hill’s warranting of the events third supervisor, direct who principally was re- SOP, and termination under the he con- sponsible reprimands for the final two af- with both Dixon and Fultz concern- sulted independent, ter he made de- non-biased ing Hill’s termination and confirmed that they appropriate terminations that were Hill Dixon had talked to about her situa- And, procedures. under Lockheed’s it Although tion at Fort Drum. Dixon de- Griffin, Priekett, approval was specifically recommend to Griffin clined independent, who made the non-biased de- Hill that from her be terminated having cision to Hill after terminate been ment, that Dixon testified he “felt like performance problems advised of Hill’s job anymore” couldn’t and do prior going [Hill] to her to Fort Drum and re- boss, I “that’s what told the and he said ceiving repri- documentation of the three in.” put paperwork supervi- J.A. 150. Dixon mands and word from her on-site job today quality problems Hill do sor that Hill’s work had testified that “could one continued there. The mere fact it up, normal. Tomorrow she would mess opinion by Fultz’s solicited Griffin you’d ... tell her she messed this during decisionmaking the course it.... This up and then she’d correct change the undis- process is insufficient may may airplane be fine. next one puted fact that reached an inde- Griffin words, be off.” J.A. 146. In other Dixon pendent, non-biased decision to terminate testified, he needed another sheet metal Hill. job. mechanic on Fultz criti- his was also

cal of performance Hill’s work reasons, foregoing affirm the For the we asked to work with Dixon to Griffin summary judg- grant district court’s prepare report documenting a written “all age Lockheed to Hill’s sex and ment to happened.” the details of what J.A. 255. brought discrimination claims under Title report gave ADEA, Fultz wrote the to VII, the and the New York Human Dixon, ultimately forwarded it to Grif- who Rights Act. has failed to demonstrate Priekett, fin. program manager, testi- by legally sufficient direct or circumstan- fied that his decision to terminate Hill age tial evidence that her sex or was “a pursuant motivating to Lockheed’s SOP was based factor” for her termination Lockheed, 2000e-2(m), see § him provided the information Griffin U.S.C.A. and Dixon. because she has failed to demonstrate an practice employment at Lockheed made unlawful decisionmaker any relevant subchapter. practice this discriminatory motivation. a harbored such supervisory or disci- Fultz no possessed 2000e-3(a). § To establish a U.S.C.A. Hill and the record authority over plinary retaliation, prima facie case of that Fultz support (1) a conclusion does engaged that she in a ee must show (2) or was other- was the actual decisionmaker activity; employer that her protected for termi- responsible principally employment against wise took an adverse action (3) her; con- nation that there was causal decision. activity protected nection between the Hill likewise has failed to es employment King action. the adverse See claim under the tablish her termination (4th Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 150-51 of Burdine and burden-shifting framework Cir.2003). prem an initial Douglas. As McDonnell case, “protected Hill’s asserted this ise, prima Hill has failed to establish activity” comprised complaints age discrimination facie case of sex allegedly discrimination that she made to because, admissions of the by her own Dixon, Fultz’s dis- supervisor, her about rules infractions performance and

work criminatory comments towards her. How- termination, that to her she has failed led ever, prima Hill has failed to establish performing that she was to demonstrate cannot facie case of retaliation because she at a that met Lock job her duties level demonstrate Lockheed’s decision expectations at the time legitimate heed’s her caused the com- terminate action. How of the adverse to Dixon. plaints she made ever, prima if it said that a even could be First, even if we assume that Hill com- stated, Hill been could not facie case had plained age to Dixon about Fultz’s and sex prevail Lockheed articulated le because comments,7 Hill does not claim that Dixon nondiscriminatory reason for the gitimate, issued her the second or third decision, Hill has come termination against complaints retaliation for her to demonstrate forward with no evidence Fultz. Nor does Hill claim that Griffin or proffered by Lockheed was that the reason Prickett made their decision terminate part for discrimination on the pretext Rather, retaliatory as is reasons. its relevant decisionmakers. claims, the case with her discrimination may prevail on her asserts she because, claim retaliation after she re-

VI. suspension imposed upon turned from the reasons, Hill’s For similar reprimand, Fultz retali- her for her second terminated Lock claim that she was against complaining ated her for to Dixon complaints for her heed retaliation by issuing discrepancy records for un- six discriminatory re Dixon about Fultz’s satisfactory signed that had been MWOs 704(a) of Title marks also fails. Section by Hill completed. This evidence is that: provides VII similarly insufficient to establish a retalia- an unlawful disciplin- be tion claim Fultz no [i]t shall because held ary authority to discriminate practice and was neither an actual employees principally of his ... be- decisionmaker nor otherwise against any responsible has for Dixon’s decision to issue employee] opposed cause [the only complained complained testified that Hill testified that she Dixon While Hill comments, yelling picking on her and at her. age and Fultz was Dixon about Fultz’s sex triggered thority often the third which influence these decisions. previously, majority decision. As noted Yet the holds that when a termination biased every alleged subordinate with no au- personally decisionmaking Dixon reviewed thority exercises deficiency by Fultz and verified substantial influence over reported decision, relying upon it as a basis the subordinate’s each one before decision, cannot super- imputed Hill’s immediate bias be to the formal deci- for his site, to sionmaker who acts for the person employer. visor and the lead on the See puts claim ante at 291. at reprimand. There is no This us with issue odds circuit, virtually every any reprimand puts Dixon in retali- other and it us issued statutes, language and no claim odds with the of the complaints, ation for Hill’s impose liability in which when an that Griffin or Prickett acted retaliation. adverse There is no claim that similar infractions decision is taken “because of’ discrimination, age sex or by were overlooked Dixon when it came to see U.S.C. 2(a)(1); 623(a)(1). or, matter, § § employees other for that 29 U.S.C. 2000e— circuit, by today After in this an employer similar infractions were overlooked is off the hook for a discriminatory employ- Fultz when committed Hill’s co-work- Indeed, ment evidence is to the decision that is motivated ers. the bias And, contrary. Hill that she of a subordinate who lacks decisionmaking admitted authority. wrong. all con- That is As committed but one errors for the case, in discrepancy reports majority tained in the and ac- facts this fails state them in knowledged light her belief that she would have most favorable to the (Lou) Hill, plaintiff, Ethel terminated even if she had not com- who was the been summary nonmovant in plained Accordingly, judgment pro- to Dixon.8 we also ceedings; especially affirm the district court’s determination fails to draw all justifiable in summary was entitled to inferences Hill’s favor. As a Lockheed result, judgment majority affirming claim of retaliation. errs Hill’s Lockheed, summary judgment

award employer. VII. reasons, foregoing For the the decision I. summary court granting

of the district facts, A detailed account of the stated hereby judgment Lockheed is affirmed. favor, appears panel opinion, in the AFFIRMED Logistics v. Lockheed Martin Man- MICHAEL, Judge, dissenting: Circuit (4th Inc., agement, 314 F.3d 660-62 Cir.2003), order, respectfully major I A dissent. vacated en banc Feb- purpose ruary ADEA A of Title VII and the is to outlaw 2003. somewhat abbreviated Hill, discriminatory employment facts follows. Lou decisions that version those age. experienced are made because of sex or Biased who is an sheet metal me- chanic, years au- decisionmaking fifty-eight subordinates without was almost old Q: Q: you you you you 8. Was mad at Do would been [Fultz] because had think have complained you terminated if had complained to Mr. Dixon? to Mr. Dixon? That, my A: I don't know. That was as- Oh, yeah. A: sumption on that. Q: you you have been Do think would Q: you But don’t have evidence to way? terminated either support that? A: Yeah. A: No. J.A. 106. Fultz told Dix- to Dixon. gave then them By her sacked

when Lockheed Hill’s toolbox at he had checked trade in the on that her Hill had that time worked twenty-five and asked her where nearly the end of Hill’s shift industry for aircraft At According Lockheed. extra cutters were. last eleven years, the assigned Fultz, to field teams “I Richard Lockheed, replied, [Dixon] told Hill was Hill to do military bases in- 145. Hill that went to U.S. I home.” J.A. [them] took military airplanes. on work discussion modification that did not have sists she job at on a Lockheed working Hill was that cutters and with Fultz about her York, fired Drum, when she was Indeed, Fort New Hill not Dixon. did Fultz lied to into trouble on this Hill ran May 1998. pair a of her cutters were even that know safety her Fultz became job after Edward to claim had no occasion missing, so she Fultz did February 1998. inspector in missing talked to Dixon about that she had him, working under to have women like surprised Hill was therefore cutters. (and the woman Hill was and a cutters pair her when Dixon showed eight-person crew. her employee) oldest on they Believing hers. if and asked were immediately, and dur- Hill targeted Fultz for, were accounted that all of her cutters Fultz in 1998 when three months ing the had her that the cutters simply replied Hill many derog- he made inspector, Hill’s was answer did not them. This number on age. and On her sex atory remarks about mistakenly he be- satisfy Dixon because to her as Fultz referred occasions several report false lieved—based on Fultz’s —-that 240A. One time lady.” J.A. a “useless old that cutters already knew sure her Hill lady a old Hill useless he that was said that also believed missing. were Dixon An- home and retire. go who needed by telling him Hill had lied to Fultz that Hill was “use- Fultz said other time missing about her had talked to Dixon she to retire her.” J.A. they need[ed] less and (Dixon not tell Hill about cutters. did woman,” her a “damn 240B. He also called him, oppor- Hill had no report Fultz’s so lady,” J.A. 241A, “a troubled old J.A. lying.) out Fultz was tunity point times to her complained several 245. Hill report led Dixon to Fultz’s false Because Dixon, Fultz’s about supervisor, Richard lied, gave Hill had Dixon conclude that harassment, nothing stop did but Dixon three-day a sus- written act on his bias thus free to it. Fultz was pension. orchestrating disciplinary against Hill eligible that made her against three-day actions Hill returned from her After job for termination. Once April she suspension at the end decisionmakers Lockheed jeopardy, formal that Fultz was again to Dixon complained negative assess- on fired her based Fultz’s Dixon men- discriminating against her. ment of her work. registered Fultz that Hill had tioned to with noticea- complaint, and Fultz reacted manipulate was to

Fultz’s first move immediately Hill. Fultz anger towards ble violating Hill for reprimanding Dixon into (re- discrepancy reports began to write this policy. Under Lockheed’s tool control error) Hill, on documenting ports worker keep track of her employee an must policy next three work- reports in the writing six to her su- missing tools report tools and of the errors as days. Fultz marked each pairs identical Hill had three pervisor. “minor,” they “nitpicky were and Hill said cutters, Army employee four-inch Fultz, safety and trivial.” J.A. mainte- 83. cutters on a pair of Hill’s found on whether Army inspector, had discretion The April nance stand on Dixon, as mistakes. Fultz, up not to write minor who took the cutters employee ultimately replaced by over whether a she was a man had no control who supervisor, report forty-seven. was written. Dixon discrepancy however, could, report for accura- check he refused to endorse one cy, and II. Hill. Dix- against that Fultz

reports issued majority renders Title and the VII minor work errors dur- said that Hill’s essentially ADEA toothless when comes Drum never her tenure at Ft. were ing to protecting employees against unlawful enough engage for him to formal serious employment decisions are motivated counseling with her. majority biased subordinates. The Nevertheless, Hill was handed another “employee holds that an who rests dis- 4, 1998, May on as a written crimination claim under Title VII or the discrepancy reports flurry result of the ADEA upon discriminatory the motiva- against during Fultz had issued the employee tions of subordinate must come workdays April at end of and the three the [proof] forward with that the subordinate beginning May repri- 1998. This last employee possessed such authority as to in was Hill’s third twelve months mand be viewed the one principally responsi- as (one job), from another had carried over for ble the decision or the actual [adverse] subject discharge. and she was now to employer.” decision-maker for the Ante days she was fired. The formal Within added). (emphasis proof at 291 This to fire Hill was made two decision liable, employer majority makes the the officials, Archie Griffin and Lockheed says, because such subordinate in “act[s] Prickett, Thomas neither of whom was lo- supervisory managerial or capacity Griffin, According cated at Fort Drum. agent[ employer.” of the at ] Ante entirely the decision to fire Hill was based ],” majori- “It 289. is [this] individual by Fultz Dix- provided on information and ty emphasizes, possess req- “who must on, especially Fultz. Griffin talked with uisite motivation behind prior Fultz about several times to the employment adverse decision that [he] decision, provided and Fultz termination or for which principal make[s] [he] hold[s] Griffin with a written statement of his responsibility.” holding Ante at 289. This perform- about Hill’s work observations unduly It authorizes is narrow. discrimi- nor ance. Neither Griffin Prickett talked natory employment decisions that are mo- being Hill while with she was considered tivated biased subordinates who do not termination, for and official neither had in supervisory managerial capaci- act any knowledge of her work at firsthand ty. majority goes astray, respectful- I The (It Fort Drum. a violation of Lockheed ly suggest, holding because it bases its on policy give opportunity not to Hill the principles agency get law that do not story present her side of the before she case, in it fired.) the real issue this overlooks Dixon, supervisor, did causation, is, statutory focus on any not make recommendation to Griffin action whether adverse or Prickett about whether Hill should be protected of’ a trait hand, was taken “because fired. On the other Griffin and Moreover, majori- age. as sex or such sign Prickett relied on Fultz to write and statement, ty’s approach determining restrictive Hill’s termination a document whether subordinate’s discrimination explaining that Hill was fired because unsatisfactory. step Fultz found her work to should be counted is out be circuits, fired, support initially After Hill was her work was law other lacks man, assigned thirty-one-year-old to a Supreme and from the Court. sion, may imputed be formal Burlington In- his bias argues that majority

The Ellerth, employer. acts for the dustries, 524 U.S. who decisionmaker Inc. (1998), dic- can 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 I hold that it be. would S.Ct. cannot employer that an principle tates the imputing the influential The basis vicariously for an liable held be discriminatory motive to the subordinate’s by a biased subor- decision motivated ment formal is rooted in decisionmaker in a “act[s] the subordinate dinate unless and the ADEA. The words of Title VII as the managerial capacity supervisory or “for an make it unlawful statutes employer.” Ante agent[] ... ... or otherwise to dis- discharge dictate such rule. Ellerth does not ... any individual be- against criminate the unremarkable is bottomed on Ellerth age. individual’s” sex or cause of such other institu- corporations fact 2000e-2(a)(l) (outlawing § sex dis- U.S.C. through agents. act employers tional employment); crimination U.S.C. recognizes agency that the rela- decision 623(a)(1) (outlawing age § discrimination liability for the tionship triggers vicarious hinge The statutes em- employment). supervisor, or some oth- employer when its is, causation, liability ployer wheth- authority, takes a acting with person er action was tak- er the adverse (discharge, for tangible employment action sex- age. en of’ sex or When the “because Ellerth, example) against employee. an of the subordinate has age-based or bias 760-62, 2257. The 524 118 S.Ct. U.S. on a substantial or determinative influence relationship liability extends to the agency adverse formal decisionmaker’s or oth- supervisor even when the employer (or action, liability) the causation re- ment action tangible employment takes agent er employer is quirement is satisfied. The discriminatory Judge reasons. Id. As discriminatory action because liable for the Co., Shager Upjohn it in v. puts Posner imputed is to bias subordinate’s Cir.1990): (7th super- “a F.2d 405 913 for the who acted formal decisionmaker

visory fires a is employee who subordinate approach support has had employer. This thing that he is author- doing the kind long for a time. the circuits do, [doing wrongful it with] ized approach for this is leading The case carry ... does not his behavior so intent (7th Co., 913 F.2d Shager Upjohn v. 398 responsibilities beyond far the orbit his Cir.1990) J.). (Posner, Shager The plain- employer.” Supreme as to excuse the The salesman, tiff, fifty-year-old seed claimed in about the up in Ellerth sums it Court of the ADEA that he fired violation way: supervisor makes a same “When was hostile to older supervisor because his employment deci- tangible [and adverse] supervisor personal- did not workers. sion, injury is assurance there committee, rather, a ly plaintiff; fire the could not have absent the been inflicted supervisor’s unaware of the unbiased and Ellerth, U.S. agency relation.” plaintiff fired the recom- prejudice, 2257, 141 Ellerth 118 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 633. analyzing supervisor. mendation simply supervisor us that when a or tells be supervisor’s motives could whether the an employee decisionmaker fires other the court imputed employer, looked reason, automatically we have an whatever to whether “the committee’s decision agent personnel imputed whose action is su- plaintiff] [the was tainted [the fire to- employer. That does not answer Id. at 405. The prejudice.” pervisor’s] day’s question: subordinate when biased supervisor that the “not record authority sub- established decisionmaking who lacks by assign- to fail plaintiff] set stantially up [the an deci- influences territory unpromising plaintiffs supervisor, him an ments of ing [sales] who did delibera- but influenced committee’s not have formal firing authority but who plaintiffs] per- portraying [the tions “had enormous influence in the decision- committee in the worst formance to the making process,” constitute direct evi possible light.” Id. at 405. Because the discrimination); dence of Abramson v. as the conduit of [the committee “acted William Paterson Jersey, Coll. New supervisor’s] prejudice,” prejudice his (3d Cir.2001) (internal 260 F.3d imputed could be to the for lia- omitted) (“Under quotations citation bility purposes. Id. A later Cir- Seventh law, our case is sufficient it if those ex case, Pneumatics, cuit Wallace v. SMC hibiting discriminatory animus influenced (7th Cir.1997) Inc., (Posner, 103 F.3d 1394 participated in the decision to termi J.), happens likewise discussed what in a nate ... evaluation at [because] discriminatory “the Title VII case when level, discrimination, if [may] based on in employee], motive of subordinate [a the decisionmaking process fluence[] judgment the autonomous of the non-dis- thus allow[] discrimination to infect the decisionmaker, criminating is the real decision.”); ultimate McKinney Russell v. cause of the adverse action.” (5th Venture, Hosp. added). 235 F.3d at 1400 (emphasis Id. The answer Cir.2000) (“If [plaintiff] can demon prejudices is clear: “the subor- [the imputed employee are to the who dinate] strate others had influence or lever authority plaintiffs has formal over the age over official ... decisionmaker job.” Shager opin- Id. The and Wallace proper impute is their point ions were nevertheless careful to out decisionmaker.”); attitudes to the formal that the subordinate’s bias will not be im- Ercegovich Goodyear Tire & Rubber puted to a formal decisionmaker who acts (6th Co., 344, Cir.1998) 154 F.3d 354 for reasons that are untainted discrimi- (“[R]emarks by those who did not inde 405; Shager, nation. F.2d See 913 at Wal- pendently authority have the ... to fire lace, at 103 F.3d plaintiff, played the but who nevertheless circuits, Most other in either mixed- in meaningful a role the decision to ter cases, pretext motive or have held that relevant.”); minate plaintiff, the [are] discriminatory when the a bias of subor- v. Stacks Southwestern Bell Yellow decision, employment dinate influences an (8th Inc., 1316, Pages, 27 F.3d 1323 Cir. employer the will be charged with the (internal 1994) omitted) quotation marks See, e.g., subordinate’s bias. v. Griffin (discriminatory manager, remarks of a Ctr., Washington 142 Convention F.3d plaintiffs supervisor who was the fired (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[E]vidence 1308, 1312 “closely employ and who was involved in a subordinate’s bias is relevant where the decisions,” ment constitute direct evi ultimate decision maker is not insulated discrimination); dence of v. Bergene Salt influence.”); from the subordinate’s San- Project Agric. River Improvement & tiago-Ramos v. P.R. Centennial Wireless (9th Dist., 1136, Power 272 F.3d 1141 (1st Cir.2000) 46, Corp., 217 F.3d 55 Cir.2001) (manager’s comment was direct (“One proving pretext] method is to [of of retaliation if “[e]ven evidence because discriminatory show that comments were manager was not the ultimate deci- [the] ... position made those in a to influ- denying plaintiff pro sionmaker the [in decisionmaker.”); ence the Rose New motion], Educ., retaliatory motive manager’s City York Bd. 257 F.3d (2d Cir.2001) (discriminatory may 162 com- be to the if imputed company standard, jority’s discrimination in the ... deci- unlawful involved manager was many in where sion”). go cases will unaddressed discriminatory bias taints subordinate’s Plumbing Prod- v. Sanderson Reeves prevent To this employment decision. Inc., ucts, S.Ct. 530 U.S. circuit should hold happening, from our (2000), pretext an ADEA 147 L.Ed.2d subordinate has sub- that when biased majority, supports the by the case cited employment an deci- stantial influence on imputing approach sion, imput- bias will be the subordinate’s who sub- of a subordinate motives biased This, of ed to the formal decisionmaker. employment deci- an stantially influences course, means that the subordinate’s bias in Reeves be- Court Supreme The sion. if formal deci- imputed not be should importance focusing gins by independent an inves- sionmaker conducts discrimination in causation judg- independent and exercises tigation on whether the “liability depends cases: ment that is free of discrimination. (under ADEA, age) trait protected in role actually playeda [the ... III. decisionmaking] process and had a er’s record, summary judgment taken in on the The [adverse determinative influence Hill, light most favorable to establishes 120 S.Ct. 530 U.S. decision].” Fultz, safety following. Lockheed’s and citations omit- marks (quotation Drum, regularly at Ft. made dis- ted; inspector Reeves original). alteration first criminatory job on the about formal comments that the thus assumes age, calling in au- Hill’s sex and “useless by someone decision will be made is, lady” company “need[ed] whom the employer. old thority, agent 240A, 240B. Fultz’s discrimi- liability purposes is retire.” J.A. matters What reflected ac- natory trait— attitude was also against protected whether bias that Fultz took or orchestrated tions including from a subordinate —had a bias against Hill. Fultz’s animus on the decision. “determinative influence” may imputed to Griffin towards be See id. Prickett, formal decisionmak- the two majority explaining is frank (or Fultz company agents), because ers class of dis- holding its removes entire influence on the decision had a substantial protection cases crimination from Hill. to fire rejects It and the Title VII ADEA. with, Fultz, safety inspector, begin To a number of other circuits approach of say in the evaluation of a test that had considerable refusing to would “embrac[e] inspected all of discriminatory performance. motivations of Hill’s Fultz impute the work, alone had the au- having no decision- Hill’s and Fultz employees subordinate reports thority discrepancy ... to issue authority making to posi- Using documented worker error. his they have influence or simply because tion, steps Fultz took a series of that set effecting in influence even substantial First, manipu- Fultz By up Hill to be fired. Ante at 290-91. challenged decision.” Dixon, into believ- supervisor, motiva- lated Hill’s counting the missing that Hill had about her supervi- ing in a lied “act[s] who tion of someone the sec- capacity as cutters. This led Dixon issue sory managerial or (with three-day suspen- ond employer,” ante at agent[ ] sion) Second, Hill returned to to Hill. when scope narrows the majority improperly complained suspension, from her she the ma- work Title and the ADEA. Under VII discriminating nation to company. part Dixon that Fultz was See II.A.2.C quite angry Fultz became against her. of the vacated panel opinion, Hill v. Lock- heed, complaint, he learned of Hill’s and he Inc., when Logistics Management, Martin taking no time in it out on her. wasted I press 314 F.3d at 671-73. do not this re- quickly discrepancy Fultz issued six however.) today, point Hill, against all for minor or trivial ports discrepancy reports led mistakes. These IV. reprimand, to Hill’s third and the three II.B, The panel opinion (parts vacated eligible made Hill for dis-

reprimands III) II.C, and considers each of Hill’s Third, discharge once was under charge. claims under Title VII and the ADEA— consideration, Fultz provided Griffin with that she was fired because of her sex and a written statement that detailed Fultz’s age and that she was also fired because of work perform- observations about Hill’s complaints her of discrimination. For the portrayed performance ance. Fultz panel reasons stated in the opinion, Lock- possible light, in the worst and Hill was heed’s motion summary judgment fired due course. these claims should be denied. See Hill v. Prickett, and the formal Griffin decision- Logistics Management, Lockheed Martin Lockheed, in- makers for did exercise Inc., 314 F.3d at 673-80. Hill’s evidence dependent judgment making the termi- trial, to a ought give entitles her and we Prickett, nation decision. Griffin and who her one. Drum, were not located at Ft. did not work, they give nor did observe Hill’s MOTZ, KING, Judge Judge Judge against the chance to state her case dis- join GREGORY in this dissent.

charge. They entirely relied on informa- Dixon, by Fultz provided tion but es- pecially simply Fultz. Dixon submitted

Hill’s file without a recommendation. pri-

Griffin talked with Fultz several times decision, the termination end, Griffin and Prickett relied on Fultz to sign write and Hill’s termination state- America, UNITED STATES ment. The termination statement ex- Plaintiff-Appellee, plained being that Hill was fired because Fultz performance found her be unsatis- factory. mainly Fultz relied on the McCourtney HODGE, Dale Dedan a/k/a grounds reprimands for the that he had Wilson, Jackson, Kimathi Keith a/k/a against summary Hill. orchestrated Defendant-Appellant. judgment record allows the inference that reprimands Fultz orchestrated those be- No. 02-4430. cause of his animus towards Hill. Because Appeals, Court of United States Griffin and Prickett relied on tainted infor- Fourth Circuit. reaching

mation from Fultz in the decision Hill, to fire Fultz’s animus Argued: Oct. 2003. (The may imputed be to them. record also Decided: Jan. ample Fultz provides grounds labeling decisionmaker, an actual which is imputing alternative basis for his discrimi-

Case Details

Case Name: Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc.

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Date Published: Jan 5, 2004

Citation: 354 F.3d 277

Docket Number: 01-1359

Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.