Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 589 U.S. 178

Sulyma worked at Intel from 2010–2012 and participated in two Intel retirement plans whose underlying funds increased allocations to alternative assets (hedge funds, private equity, commodities) with relatively high fees.
Intel provided multiple written disclosures (QDIA notices, summary plan descriptions, fund fact sheets, annual disclosures) hosted on an employee website (NetBenefits); Intel’s records show Sulyma accessed the site repeatedly.
Sulyma testified he did not remember reviewing the disclosures and declared he was unaware during employment that his plan money was invested in hedge funds or private equity; he recalled only mailed account statements that did not identify specific alternatives.
Sulyma sued in October 2015 alleging imprudent fiduciary investment decisions; defendants moved for summary judgment under ERISA §1113(2) (three‑year limitation measured from plaintiff’s “actual knowledge”).
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the plaintiff’s testimony created a genuine issue whether he actually knew the disclosed information.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether receiving but not reading (or not recalling reading) disclosures can establish “actual knowledge” under §1113(2).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a plaintiff has “actual knowledge” under 29 U.S.C. §1113(2) of information contained in disclosures he received but did not read or does not recall reading	Sulyma: He lacked actual knowledge because he was not in fact aware of the disclosed facts; his testimony creates a genuine dispute	Intel: Receipt of disclosures (and access to them) means he “had” the knowledge; constructive or imputed knowledge from disclosures should satisfy §1113(2)	The Court held actual knowledge requires that the plaintiff in fact became aware of the information; mere receipt of disclosures without awareness does not establish §1113(2) actual knowledge
How actual knowledge may be proven at summary judgment	Sulyma: denial of awareness can preclude summary judgment if genuine dispute exists	Intel: electronic records of access and disclosure suffice to show knowledge and justify summary judgment	The Court confirmed usual proof methods remain: direct testimony, circumstantial inferences (including electronic access and actions taken in response), and evidence of willful blindness; but blatant record contradiction of a plaintiff’s denial can defeat his version at summary judgment

Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242 (2010) (statutory language in ERISA must be enforced according to its terms)
Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010) (distinguishing actual knowledge from what a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (knowledge may be proven by direct testimony or inference from circumstantial evidence)
Global‑Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011) (discussing willful blindness as a basis for imputing knowledge)
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (at summary judgment courts need not accept a party’s version if blatantly contradicted by the record)
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence)
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 U.S. 531 (1994) (presumption that Congress acts intentionally in choosing statutory language)