In re Lampart
306 Mich. App. 226
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Juvenile Robby Lampart pleaded to arson in 2007; restitution of $28,210 was ordered and the mother, Diana Alexandroni, was ordered to pay $250/month (wage withholding ordered).
- Alexandroni later suffered a heart attack (2009), became unemployed, and reported sole income of SSDI (approx. $730/month); wage withholding ceased and unpaid restitution remained (~$22,960).
- Trial court (2011) treated Alexandroni’s SSDI as "income" for setting a reduced monthly payment ($150/month) and indicated contempt enforcement could be used after funds were in her possession.
- Alexandroni moved (2012) to modify or cancel restitution, arguing 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (Social Security anti‑attachment) bars using SSDI to satisfy restitution; trial court denied the motion and the denial is appealed.
- Court of Appeals held that (1) a contempt order that would effectively require payment from SSDI/its proceeds would constitute “other legal process” under § 407(a) and thus be prohibited, but (2) the restitution judgment remains valid and may be enforced from non‑SSDI assets or future non‑SSDI income; remanded for further factual inquiry into assets/income.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) bars enforcing restitution against Alexandroni’s SSDI benefits | Alexandroni: § 407(a) prohibits any legal process (including contempt) that reaches SSDI or its proceeds | State/trial court: § 407(a) should be read narrowly; court may treat SSDI as income and use contempt to enforce once funds are in possession | Held: § 407(a) bars use of "other legal process" to compel payment from SSDI or its proceeds; contempt that would force satisfaction from SSDI violates § 407(a) |
| Whether court may consider SSDI as “income” when setting payment obligations | Alexandroni: consideration OK, but orders must not be enforceable against SSDI itself | State: treating SSDI as income is proper and fairness warrants enforcement against SSDI recipients | Held: Court may consider SSDI in assessing ability to pay, but may not issue an order that can only be satisfied from SSDI (must avoid compelling invasion of protected benefits) |
| Whether restitution order should be vacated or canceled because SSDI is sole income | Alexandroni: cancel restitution because only source is exempt SSDI | State: restitution judgment remains valid; future non‑SSDI assets/income may satisfy it | Held: Restitution judgment remains; cancellation denied because other assets or future income might exist; enforcement limited by § 407(a) |
| Whether mere threat/specter of contempt alone constitutes “other legal process” under § 407(a) | Alexandroni: even threat of contempt effectively coerces and should be barred | State: specter of contempt can be legitimate to discover assets; not automatically prohibited | Held: Mere prospect of contempt is not per se § 407(a) "other legal process"; but using contempt to reach SSDI/its proceeds is prohibited; remand for asset/income inquiry recommended |
Key Cases Cited
- Washington State Dep’t of Social & Health Servs v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371 (2003) (interprets “other legal process” in § 407(a) narrowly as processes like garnishment that transfer control over funds via judicial/quasi‑judicial means)
- Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973) (Social Security benefits remain protected from legal process even after payment and deposit unless converted to another asset)
- Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 (1988) (state law conflicting with federal protection for Social Security benefits cannot stand)
- Whitwood, Inc. v. South Blvd. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 265 Mich. App. 651 (2005) (Michigan appellate recognition that Social Security proceeds remain protected after deposit)
- In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich. 367 (2013) (substance over labels: courts cannot evade statutory limits by relabeling a process)
- In re McEvoy, 267 Mich. App. 55 (2005) (juvenile‑code restitution framework and parental reimbursement authority)
