In re Cook
247 Cal. Rptr. 3d 669
| Cal. | 2019Background
- In 2007 Anthony Cook Jr., who was 17 at the time of the crimes, was convicted of multiple murders and sentenced to consecutive terms resulting in very long terms; his judgment became final on direct appeal.
- Legislature enacted Penal Code §§ 3051 and 4801 creating youth offender parole hearings during the 25th year for certain juveniles sentenced as adults.
- In People v. Franklin (2016) the California Supreme Court remanded a nonfinal juvenile case to allow the trial court to preserve youth-related evidence (documents, evaluations, testimony) for the Board of Parole Hearings to consider later.
- Cook sought the same Franklin-style evidence-preservation relief after his conviction was final by petitioning for habeas corpus; the Court of Appeal granted relief and ordered a remand for a Franklin proceeding.
- The California Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) offenders with final convictions are entitled to seek a Franklin evidence-preservation proceeding and (2) the appropriate first-step remedy is a postjudgment motion in the trial court under Penal Code § 1203.01, supplemented by the court’s inherent authority under Code Civ. Proc. § 187, rather than initial resort to habeas corpus.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cook) | Defendant's Argument (AG) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a prisoner with a final conviction may obtain a Franklin-style evidence-preservation proceeding | Cook: Franklin relief is needed even with final judgment to preserve youth-related evidence for future parole and to vindicate Miller-based rights | AG: Franklin remand was for nonfinal cases; once final, no authority to reopen sentencing for that purpose | Held: Yes — offenders entitled to seek Franklin proceedings despite finality; Franklin’s purpose applies retrospectively |
| Proper procedural vehicle to obtain Franklin relief for final judgments | Cook: Habeas corpus is appropriate to secure necessary relief | AG: Habeas traditionally requires an unlawful restraint; Franklin did not show illegality, so habeas is improper | Held: Habeas unnecessary in the first instance; Penal Code § 1203.01 provides an adequate, preferable remedy (motion in superior court) |
| Scope of postjudgment procedure under § 1203.01 (written statements v. full evidentiary hearing with live testimony) | Cook: Franklin contemplates broader record-building (documents, evaluations, testimony subject to cross‑examination) — trial court can receive such evidence | AG: § 1203.01 contemplates brief written statements soon after sentencing; it doesn’t authorize the Franklin evidentiary procedures in final cases | Held: § 1203.01, together with the court’s inherent authority (Code Civ. Proc. § 187), authorizes the trial court to conduct Franklin-style evidence-preservation proceedings; courts may regulate scope and require offers of proof to ensure relevance and efficiency |
| Whether initial resort to habeas remains available after § 1203.01 remedy is exhausted | Cook: Not required to begin with § 1203.01 | AG: N/A | Held: Courts left open the possibility of later writ or mandamus if trial court refuses to perform duties, but § 1203.01 motion should be the first step |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (Cal. 2016) (remand on direct review to preserve youth-related evidence for future parole hearings)
- People v. Rodriguez, 4 Cal.5th 1123 (Cal. 2018) (defendant entitled to supplement record for youth offender parole consideration)
- In re Kirchner, 2 Cal.5th 1040 (Cal. 2017) (distinguishing remedy frameworks for Miller-related claims)
- People v. Morales, 2 Cal.5th 523 (Cal. 2017) (trial court’s inherent authority to preserve evidence to protect discovery jurisdiction)
- People v. Picklesimer, 48 Cal.4th 330 (Cal. 2010) (motion practice after final judgment is generally unavailable absent statutory authority)
- In re Gandolfo, 36 Cal.3d 889 (Cal. 1984) (statutory remedy can render habeas unnecessary)