Case Information
*1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA In re ANTHONY MAURICE COOK, JR., on Habeas Corpus.
S240153 Fourth Appellate District, Division Three G050907
San Bernardino County Superior Court WHCSS1400290 June 3, 2019
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, and Groban concurred.
Justice Kruger filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. S240153
In
People v. Franklin
(2016)
whether a sentenced prisoner whose conviction is final can seek the remedy of evidence preservation and, if so, by what means. We conclude that offenders with final convictions may file a motion in the trial court for that purpose, under the authority of section 1203.01. That statute provides that, postjudgment, the trial court may generate, collect, and transmit information about the defendant and the crime to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The statute specifically mentions statements prepared by the court, prosecutor, defense counsel, and investigating law enforcement agency. But the court has inherent authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 187 to authorize additional evidence preservation consistent with our holding in . Because section 1203.01 provides an adequate remedy at law to preserve evidence of youth-related factors, resort to a petition for writ of habeas corpus is unnecessary, at least in the first instance.
I. BACKGROUND In 2007, Anthony Cook, Jr., was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of premeditated attempted murder, with findings that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death. [2] Cook was 17 years old when he committed the offenses. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for the attempted murder, and five consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the murders and enhancements. The judgment was affirmed on appeal.
In 2014, Cook filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his sentence as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 ( Miller ). The Court of Appeal held that Cook’s sentence was constitutional because newly enacted sections 3051 and 4801 entitled him to a parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration. Accordingly, it denied the writ, and Cook petitioned for review.
While Cook’s petition was pending, we decided
Franklin supra
,
On remand, the Court of Appeal held that Cook was entitled to such a proceeding. ( In re Cook (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 393, 398 399, review granted Apr. 12, 2017, S240153.) The court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that habeas corpus relief was not available because ’s remand procedure was not based on an underlying illegality or unlawful restraint as would be necessary to exercise habeas jurisdiction. ( Id . at pp. 399 –400.) It reasoned: “A previously convicted defendant may obtain relief by habeas corpus when changes in case law expanding a defendant’s rights are given retroactive effect.” ( Id . at p. 399.) Accordingly, the court held that “the deprivation of the rights granted by is cognizable on habeas corpus” and that the “appropriate remedy . . . is to remand the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct a hearing at which [Cook] will have the opportunity to make such a record.” ( Id . at p. 400.)
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
II. DISCUSSION A. Scope of Franklin ’s Holding
Whether juvenile offenders with final convictions are
entitled to a
Franklin
evidence preservation proceeding turns on
the scope of
Franklin
’s holding. The Attorney General would
have us limit entitlement to defendants sentenced after
Franklin
and to cases pending on direct appeal when
Franklin
was decided. He points out that
Franklin
did not find an
illegality in the juvenile’s sentence. I nstead, the remand
procedure was based on a statutory change in the law providing
for juvenile parole hearings. The Attorney General cites the
presumption that, in the face of legislative silence, an amended
statute applies only to defendants whose judgments are not yet
final. (Citing
People v. Brown
(2012)
It is true that
Franklin
did not declare the juvenile’s
sentence unlawful. (
supra
, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 278 – 281,
284.) Rather, we concluded that “[s]ection 3051 . . . effectively
reforms the parole eligibility date of a juvenile offender’s
original sentence so that the longest possible term of
incarceration before par ole eligibility is 25 years.” (
Id
. at p. 281.)
“[T]he combined operation of section 3051, section 3046,
subdivision (c), and section 4801 means that Franklin is now
serving a life sentence that includes a meaningful opportunity
for release during his 25th year of incarceration. Such a
sentence is neither [life without parole] nor its functional
equivalent.” (
Id.
at pp. 279 280.) Accordingly, Franklin was
“not subject to a sentence that presumes his incorrigibility; by
operation of law, he is entitled to a parole hearing and possible
release after 25 years of incarceration.” (
Id
. at p. 281.) Under
our interpretation of the statutes, “Franklin’s two consecutive
25-year-to-life sentences
remain valid
, even though section
3051, subdivision (b)(3) has altered his parole eligibility date by
operation of law . . . .” (
Id
. at p. 284, italics added.) “By simply
transforming the affected sentences to life with parole terms,
[section 3051] avoid[s] the
Miller
issues associated with the
earlier sentences.” (
In re Kirchner
(2017)
The Attorney General understates the significance of
Franklin
’s evidence preservation function in the statutory
scheme. The Legislature’s intent in enacting sections 3051 and
4801 was “ ‘to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that
provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she
committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release’ ” upon
a showing of maturation and rehabilitation. (
Franklin
,
supra
,
We recently explained the role a proceeding plays in the youth offender parole process. In People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123 ( Rodriguez ), the Court of Appeal declined to remand the case to the trial court, reasoning that the defendant had a “ ‘ “sufficient opportunity” ’ ” at the original sentencing hearing to make a record. ( Id . at p. 1131.) We disagreed and held that Rodriguez was “entitled to remand for an opportunity to supplement the record with information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing. Although a defendant sentenced before the enactment of Senate Bill No. 260 [(2013 2014 Reg. Sess.)] could have introduced such evidence through existing sentencing procedures, he or she would not have had reason to know that the subsequently enacted legislation would make such evidence particularly relevant in the parole process. Without such notice, any opportunity to introduce evidence of youth-related factors is not adequate in light of the purpose of Senate Bill No. 260.” ( Ibid .) at the proceeding’s conclusion. Parole determination are left to the Board.
Nothing about the remands in Franklin and Rodriguez was dependent on the nonfinal status of the juvenile offender’s conviction. On the contrary, “[t]he statutory text ma kes clear that the Legislature intended youth offender parole hearings to apply retrospectively, that is, to all eligible youth offenders regardless of the date of conviction .” ( Franklin , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 278, italics added.) By a parity of reasoning, an evidence preservation process should apply to all youthful offenders now eligible for such a parole hearing. As Franklin emphasized, the possibility that relevant evidence will be lost may increase as years go by. ( Id . at pp. 283 – 284.) This reality is no less true for offenders whose convictions are final on direct appeal.
Nor were the remands in
Franklin
and
Rodriguez
dependent on this court’s authority under section 1260 to
resolve a factual issue affecting the validity of the judgment.
(See
People v. Braxton
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 818 819 [citing
cases].) Rather, a proceeding is unrelated to the
validity of the defendant’s sentence. Neither the entitlement to
a youth offender parole hearing, nor the evidence preservation
pro cess “disturb[s] the
finality of state convictions.”
(
Montgomery supra
,
Accordingly, we hold that an offender entitled to a hearing under sections 3051 and 4801 may seek the remedy of a proceeding even though the offender’s sentence is otherwise final.
B. Section 1203.01 Provides an Adequate Remedy at Law in
the First Instance To Conduct a Postjudgment Evidence
Preservation Proceeding in the Trial Court
A question remains. How does a juvenile offender with a
final conviction gain access to the trial court for an evidence
preservation proceeding? We have explained that “ ‘[t]here is no
statutory authority for a trial court to entertain a postjudgment
motion that is unrelated to any proceeding then pending before
the court. [Citation.] Indeed, a motion is not an independent
remedy. It is ancillary to an on- going action and “ ‘implies the
pendency of a suit between the parties and is confined to
incidental matters in the progress of the cause. As the rule is
sometimes expressed, a motion relates to some question
collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with,
and dependent on, the principal remedy.’ ” [Citation.] In most
cases, after the judgment has become final, there is nothing
pending to which a motion may attach.’ ” (
People v. Picklesimer
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337 (
Picklesimer
), quoting
Lewis v.
Superior Court
(2008)
Cook sought a writ of habeas corpus and the parties vigorously debate the propriety of that remedy. The Attorney General argues that the remand procedure contemplated in was not necessary to cure an underlying illegality in the juvenile’s sentenc e. Rather, he urges, it is an evidence- gathering procedure designed to implement the new parole provisions in section 3051 by reopening youthful offenders’ sentencing hearings, allowing them to build a more robust record of their characteristics and circumstances related to the offense for later use at a parole hearing. Here, the Attorney General reasons that, “absent any underlying unlawful restraint or illegal sentence, habeas corpus would not historically lie to reopen a sentencing hearing in a long final case in order to supplement a record.”
Cook counters that depriving him of an opportunity to make a record in the trial court amounts to an unlawful custodial restraint cognizable on habeas corpus. According to Cook, a proceeding is necessary to effectively cure the unconstitutionality of his sentence under Miller , and to carry out the statutory mandate of section 4801, subdivision (c) that the Board “shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.” He argues that the writ of habeas corpus is a proper vehicle to oversee the operation of the parole system.
Our state Constitution guarantees the right to habeas
corpus. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 11;
In re Reno
(2012) 55 Cal.4th
428, 449.) The availability of the writ is implemented by section
1473, subdivision (a), which provides: “A person unlawfully
imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any
pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into
the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint.” (See also
People v. Villa
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1068.) “ ‘[I]t is well
settled that the writ of
habeas corpus
does not afford an all-
inclusive remedy available at all times as a matter of right. It
is generally regarded as a special proceeding. “Where one
restrained pursuant to legal proceedings seeks release upon
habeas corpus
, the function of the writ is merely to determine
the legality of the detention by an inquiry into the question of
jurisdiction and the validity of the process upon its face, and
whether anything has transpired since the process was issued
to render it invalid.” ’ ” (
Villa
, at pp. 1068 – 1069, quoting
In re
Fortenbury
(1940)
We need not decide if the writ of habeas corpus is
expansive enough to afford Cook the relief he seeks. Cook has a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law that makes resort to
habeas corpus unnecessary, at least in the first instance. (
In re
Gandolfo
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 889, 899 – 900; see generally,
Kirchner supra
,
Under section 1203.01, the trial court may create a
postjudgment record for the benefit of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. Specifically, subdivision (a)
provides: “Immediately after judgment has been pronounced,
the judge and the district attorney, respectively, may cause to
be filed with the clerk of the court a brief statement of their
views respecting the person convicted or sentenced and the
crime committed, together with any reports the probation officer
may have filed relative to the prisoner. The judge and district
attorney shall cause those statements to be filed if no probation
officer’s report has been filed. The attorney for the defendant
and the law enforcement agency that investigated the case may
likewise file with the clerk of the court statements of their views
respecting the defendant and the crime of which he or she was
convicted.” (§ 1203.01, subd. (a).) Thereafter, the clerk of the
court must mail copies of the statements and reports to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (
ibid
.), providing
information to assist effective administration of the law (see
In
re Minnis
(1972)
The purpose of section 1203.01 parallels that of a
Franklin
proceeding. As we explained in
Franklin
, the statutes
“contemplate that information regarding the juvenile offender’s
characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense will
be available at a youth offender parole hearing to facilitate the
Board’s consideration.” (
supra
,
Section 1203.01, subdivision (a) does specify that any
statements by the judge and prosecutor should be filed
“[i]mmediately after judgment has been pronounced.” As
California Rules of Court, rule 4.480 explains, a section 1203.01
statement “should be submitted no later than two weeks after
sentencing so that it may be included in the official Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Adult Operations
case summary that is prepared during the time the offender is
being processed at the Reception-Guidance Center of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . .” There is no
indication, however, that the statut e’s requirement deprives the
court of authority to act at a later time. (See
People v. Duran
(1969)
Section 1203.01, subdivision (a) also uses permissive language: If a probation report is filed, the judge, the district attorney, defense counsel, and the investigative law enforcement agency “may” cause statements about the offender and the offense to be filed with the clerk. But it would be improper for the court to preclude a juvenile offender’s chance to supplement the record with information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing. We recently emphasized that point in Rodriguez supra , 4 Cal.5th 1123. There, the Court of Appeal rejected the juvenile offender’s request to remand the case under Franklin , reasoning that “ ‘[i]nformation from the probation reports prepared for both defendants, the juvenile fitness hearing reports, their pretrial statements to officers, as well as what was provided at the sentencing hearings, would all be available for consideration at the youth offender parole hearing.’ ” ( Id. , at p. 1131.) We concluded that, without prior notice of Senate Bill No. 260 (2013 2014 Reg. Sess.) and the Franklin process, “any opportunity to introduce evidence of youth-related factors is not ade quate in light of the purpose of Senate Bill No. 260.” ( Rodriguez , at p. 1131.) Accordingly, we held that the juvenile offender was “entitled to remand for an opportunity to supplement the record with information relevant to his eventual youth offender p arole hearing.” ( Ibid .)
At oral argument, the Attorney General agreed section 1203.01 authorizes the court to receive postjudgment submissions for transmission to the Board and opined the statute was “the most elegant way to cut the Gordian knot in this case.” But he has also emphasized the limited scope of the remedy, observing that “the ‘brief statement’ provisions of section 1203.01 bear little resemblance to the adversarial proceedings articulated in .” To be sure, section 1203.01, enacted in 1947, did not anticipate our 2016 decision. Nonetheless, “[c]ourts have inherent power, as well as power under section 187 [ [4] ] of the Code of Civil Procedure, to adopt any suitable method of practice, both in ordinary actions and special proceedings, if the procedure is not specified by statute or by rules adopted by the Judicial Council. It is not only proper but at times may be necessary for a court to follow provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which are harmonious with the objects and purposes of the proceeding although those provisions are not specifically made applicable by the statute which creates the proceeding.” ( Tide Water supra , 43 Cal.2d at p. 825, fn. omitted.) While section 1203.01 does not mention a proceeding to preserve evidence, neither does it prohibit one.
People v. Superior Court
(
Morales
) (2017)
condemned inmate is prevented from filing a postconviction discovery motion because he lacks counsel. ( Morales , at p. 532.) Accordingly, we concluded that trial courts, which have jurisdiction to grant a condemned inmate’s motion for postconviction discovery, “have the inherent power to protect that jurisdiction by entertaining motions for the preservation of evidence that will ultimately be subject to discovery under that statute when the movant is appointed habeas corpus counsel.” ( Id . at p. 533.)
People v. Hyde
(1975)
Although the circumstances of
Morales
and
Hyde
differ in
some respects from the case before us, their logic is persuasive.
Section 1203.01, augmented by the court’s inherent autho rity to
craft necessary procedures under Code of Civil Procedure
section 187, authorizes it to preserve evidence as promptly as
possible for future use by the Board. Transmission of that
record to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, in
turn, enables the Board to “discharge its obligation to ‘give great
weight to’ youth -related factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in
determining whether the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ . . . .”
( ,
supra
,
Our recent decision in Kirchner , supra , 2 Cal.5th 1040, does not compel a different result. There, a juvenile offender filed a habeas corpus petition requesting resentencing because the court did not give due consideration to the factors laid out in Miller supra , 567 U.S. 460. ( Kirchner , at pp. 1042 – 1043.) Unlike this case, the petitioner in Kirchner did not qualify for a later youth offender parole hearing. ( Id . at p. 1049, fn. 4.) Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal denied habeas relief, reasoning that the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law under section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) (hereafter section 1170(d)(2)), which authorized recall of the sentence and resentencing. ( Kirchner , at p. 1043.)
We disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, observing, “Section 1170( d)(2) was not designed to address Miller error, and its recall of sentence and resentencing procedure is not well suited to remedy the constitutional error of which petitioner complains.” ( Kirchner supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 1043.) Under the express terms of the statute, some juveniles were categorically excluded from its reach without regard to whether their sentences comported with Miller . ( Id. at pp. 1049, 1053.) Eligible juveniles were required to submit a petition describing their remorse, relating their efforts at rehabilitation, and stating that at least one of four qualifying circumstances applies. ( Id . at pp. 1049 & fn. 6, 1053.) The sentencing court was required to find at least one of these circumstances true by a preponderance of the evidence before resentencing the minor. ( Id . at pp. 1050, 1053.) Finally, in considering the propriety of resentencing, the court “ ‘may consider’ a set of enumerated factors, which only partially overlap with those identified in Miller .” ( Id . at p. 1054.) Reviewing these criteria, we concluded that section 1170(d)(2) did not provide an adequate remedy at law for Miller error: “as a process designed to revisit lawful sentences of life without parole, section 1170(d)(2) limits the availability of resentencing under its terms, and the resentencing inquiry it prescribes does not necessarily account for the full array of Miller factors in the manner that a proper resentencing under Miller would.” ( Kirchner , at p. 1043.)
Kirchner is distinguishable. Cook is not seeking a resentencing, but instead a chance to create a record relevant to a parole hearing. Further, in Kirchner , both the express language and legislative intent behind section 1170(d)(2) were so specific as to preclude an effective Miller resentencing. ( Kirchner , supra , 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1043, 1055.) No similar hurdle blocks access to a proceeding under the authority of section 1203.01, augmented as necessary by Code of Civil Procedure section 187. In fact, section 1203.01’s framework provides a more flexible, efficient, and suitable means of collecting information for the benefit of the Board than the rigid requirements of habeas corpus.
In exercising habeas jurisdiction, the courts “ ‘must abide
by the procedures set forth in . . . section s 1473 through 1508.’ ”
(
People v. Romero
(1994)
As noted, Cook is not seeking release. Nor does he challenge the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the proceedings that led to his now final judgment and sentence. The relief he seeks is entirely consistent with section 1203.01, which has nothing to do with the validity of a trial court’s judgment. The section does not define procedures that will culminate in a new judgment and does not contemplate modification of the original judgment. By its terms, the statute addresses the filing of statements with the court “after judgment has been pronounced.” (§ 1203.01, subd. (a).) Further, the motion we recognize under section 1203.01 does not impose the rigorous pleading and proof requirements for habeas corpus. (See discussion, post , at pp. 20 ‒ 21.) Nor does it require the court to act as a factfinder. Rather, it simply entails the receipt of evidence for the benefit of the Board. ( , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) For these reasons, resort to the writ of habeas corpus in the first instance would be unnecessarily cumbersome. Not only is initial resort to section 1203.01, supplemented as necessary by Code of Civil Procedure section 187, an adequate remedy, it is superior in its efficiency and purpose to reliance on the great writ. [6]
Having recognized the opportunity for offenders with final
judgments to preserve evidence in the trial court, we need not
address arguments made by amicus curiae the Post-Conviction
Justice Project and the Pacific Juvenile Defender Center that
the procedures and resources available to inmates through the
parole process are inadequate to implement the statutory
mandates of sections 3051 and 4801. (See
Rodriguez
,
supra
, 4
Cal.5th at p. 1132;
Franklin
,
supra
,
C. Proceedings for Cases with Final Judgments For inmates like Cook who seek to preserve evidence following a final judgment, the proper avenue is to file a motion in superior court under the original caption and case number, Picklesimer supra , 48 Cal.4th at pp. 339 – 340; In re Gandolfo , supra , 36 Cal.3d at pp. 899 900.) We express no opinion on the propriety of a writ in that context.
[7] We now have such a case before us. ( In re Palmer , review granted Jan. 16, 2019, S252145.)
citing the authority of section 1203.01 and today’s decision. The
motion should establish the inmate’s entitlement to a youth
offender parole hearing and indicate when such hearing is
anticipated to take place, or if one or more hearings have already
occurred. The structure for the proceeding is outlined in
Franklin
,
supra
,
Although Franklin mandates an opportunity for evidence preservation, the trial court may “exercise its discretion to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, sta tutes, and regulations.” ( Rodriguez supra , 4 Cal.5th at p. 1132.) The court may, for example, require an offer of proof regarding the evidence the offender seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such evidence is relevant to youth-related factors and meaningfully adds to the already available record. It may also determine whether testimony is “appropriate” ( , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 284), or if other types of evidentiary submissions will suffice. Finally, emphasized that the purpose of the proceeding was to allow the offender to assemble evidence “at or near the time of the juvenile’s offense rather than decades later when memories have faded, records may have been lost or destroyed, or family or community members may have relocated or passed away.” ( Id . at pp. 283 – 284.) Some offenders who file these postjudgment motions in the trial court may have spent a decade or more in prison. Some may have even come before the Board for a youth offender parole hearing. The court may consider whether a Franklin proceeding is likely to produce fruitful evidence considering such factors as the passage of time and whether the offender has already benefitted from the factfinding procedures set forth in section 3051, subdivision (f)(1) and (2) with the assistance of appointed counsel (§ 3041.7; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2256, subd. (c)). Additionally, some offenders may choose not to present certain forms of evidence, such as live testimony, or to forgo a Franklin proceeding altogether. Delving into the past is not always beneficial to a defendant. The opportunity for a Franklin hearing is just that: an opportunity.
It bears emphasis that the proceeding we outlined in
derives from the statutory provisions of sections 3051
and 4801. (
Franklin, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 283 284; see
Rodriguez
,
supra
,
III. DISPOSITION The judgment of the Court of Appeal granting Cook’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions to deny the petition. The denial order shall be with out prejudice to Cook’s filing a motion in the trial court for a proceeding under the authority of section 1203.01 and today’s decision.
CORRIGAN, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CHIN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
GROBAN, J.
S240153 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kruger I agree with much of what the majority says: Although the youth offender parole statutes provide no mechanism for individuals serving final sentences to return to court to create records for use at their later parole hearings, Penal Code section 1203.01 (section 1203.01) fills that gap. That provision, which was enacted for the very purpose of preserving information for later use in parole determinations, permits both sides in a criminal case to submit to the court postjudgment written statements about the offender and his or her crime. As the Attorney General acknowledged at oral argument, the provision applies even in the case of final judgments. It thus supplies Cook and others similarly situated with the record-preservation mechanism that the youth offender parole statutes lack.
My disagreement with the majority concerns the scope of the procedures authorized under section 1203.01. That provision authorizes the submission of documentary evidence only; it does not authorize a full-blown evidentiary hearing, including the taking of live testimony, subject to cross- examination. Unlike the majority, I do not believe courts have the inherent authority to expand section 1203.01 to provide for such hearings when the Legislature has not chosen to do so. The procedures prescribed in section 1203.01 were not casually selected; they represent the Legislature’s considered judgment abou t how to balance the offender’s interest in preserving information with the state’s interest in limiting the costs and
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting burdens of additional postjudgment proceedings. Unless and until the Legislature reconsiders, it seems to me we are bound by its choice.
It is true the procedures prescribed by section 1203.01 are
not as expansive as the procedures we ordered in
People v.
(2016)
This brings me to a final observation. For many youthful offenders serving final sentences, it is likely already too late to capture all the information about the particular youthful characteristics that might have been available closer to the time of their offenses. (See maj. opn., ante , at p. 22.) Given this practical reality, we should be careful not to overstate the importance of any particular set of record-preservation procedures to the proper functioning of the youth offender parole system.
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting
By statute, the charge of the Board of Parole Hearings is
to give each youthful offender “a meaningful opportunity to
obtain release” (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (e)), according “great
weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared to
adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent
growth and increased maturity” (
id.
, § 4801, subd. (c)). A robust
record of an
individual’s youthful characteristics will
undoubtedly be helpful to the Board in undertaking this inquiry.
But the majority opinion does not hold, and it should not be read
to suggest, that in the absence of such a record the Board
necessarily will be unable to give such youthful offenders the
meaningful consideration to which they are entitled. Even
without such information, the Board can and must carry out its
duty to give “great weight” to the mitigating nature of youth.
Immaturity, impetuosity, and the like are “hallmark features”
of youth (
Miller v. Alabama
(2012)
* * * * * Again, as noted, I agree with much of what the majority says today. Under section 1203.01, Cook may submit to the superior court written statements respecting his youthful characteristics. Consistent with Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (f)(2), this submission may include relevant evaluations, as well as statements from “[f]amily members, friends, school personnel, faith leaders, and representatives
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting from community-based organizations with knowledge about the individual before the crime or his or her growth and maturity since the time of the crime.” In my view, however, whether to order additional record-preservation procedures in final cases is a matter for the Legislature to decide.
KRUGER, J. *29 See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion In re Cook
__________________________________________________________________________________ Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S240153
Date Filed: June 3, 2019
__________________________________________________________________________________ Court: Superior
County: San Bernardino
Judge: Katrina West
__________________________________________________________________________________ Counsel:
Anthony Maurice Cook, Jr., in pro. per.; and Michael Satris, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Anthony Maurice Cook, Jr.
Heidi L. Rummel, Ian C. Graves and Richard L. Braucher for the Post-Conviction Justice Project and Pacific Juvenile Defender Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Anthony Maurice Cook, Jr. Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland and Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorneys General, Michael R. Johnsen, Deputy State Solicitor General, A. Natasha Cortina, Theodore Cropley, Parag Agrawal and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent the People. *30 Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): Michael Satris
Law Office of Michael Satris
P.O. Box 337
Bolinas, CA 94924
(415) 868-9209
Jeffrey M. Laurence
Assistant Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
(415) 703-5897
Notes
[1] All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
[2] Sections 187, subdivision (a), 664, 12022.53, subdivision (d).
[3]
processes are more properly called “proceedings”
rather than “hearings.” A hearing generally involves definitive
issues of law or fact to be determined with a decision rendered
based on that determination. (
People v. Pennington
(1967) 66
Cal.2d 508, 521; see generally
Lewis v. Superior Court
(1999) 19
Cal.4th 1232, 1247; Black’s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 836, col.
1.) A proceeding is a broader term describing the form or
manner of conducting judicial business before a court. (See
generally
The Recorder v. Commission on Judicial Performance
(1999)
[4] Code of Civil Procedure section 187 provides: “When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other
[5]
Section 2900.5 was subsequently amended to require the
trial court to calculate presentence custody credits. (See
People
v. Mendoza
(1986)
[6] Nothing we say here forecloses an offender, after exhausting the procedures outlined in this opinion, from filing a petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus to compel the trial court to perform its duties under . (See generally