In re Cook
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Corrigan, Cantil-Sakauye, Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, Groban, Kruger
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
In People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), the defendant committed a murder at age 16, was tried as an adult and given a sentence of 50 years to life. He challenged the sentence as a violation of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. While his appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted
evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at [Franklin‘s] eventual youth offender parole hearing.” (Ibid.)
Franklin involved a direct appeal. The question here is whether a sentenced prisoner whose conviction is final can seek the remedy of evidence
I. BACKGROUND
In 2007, Anthony Cook, Jr., was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of premeditated attempted murder, with findings that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death.2 Cook was 17 years old when he committed the offenses. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for the attempted2
murder, and five consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the murders and enhancements. The judgment was affirmed on appeal.
In 2014, Cook filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his sentence as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller). The Court of Appeal held that Cook‘s sentence was constitutional because newly enacted sections 3051 and 4801 entitled him to a parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration. Accordingly, it denied the writ, and Cook petitioned for review.
While Cook‘s petition was pending, we decided Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261. Thereafter, we granted Cook‘s petition for review and transferred the case to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its decision and consider whether, in light of Franklin, Cook was “entitled to make a record before the superior court of ‘mitigating evidence tied to his youth.’ ” (In re Cook, S234512, Supreme Ct. Mins., July 13, 2016.)
On remand, the Court of Appeal held that Cook was entitled to such a proceeding. (In re Cook (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 393, 398–399, review granted Apr. 12, 2017, S240153.) The court rejected the Attorney General‘s argument that habeas corpus relief was not available because Franklin‘s remand procedure was not based
We granted the Attorney General‘s petition for review, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Scope of Franklin‘s Holding
Whether juvenile offenders with final convictions are entitled to a Franklin evidence preservation proceeding turns on the scope of Franklin‘s holding. The Attorney General would have us limit entitlement to defendants sentenced after Franklin and to cases pending on direct appeal when Franklin was decided. He points out that Franklin did not find an illegality in the juvenile‘s sentence. Instead, the remand procedure was based on a statutory change in the law providing for juvenile parole hearings. The Attorney General cites the presumption that, in the face of legislative silence, an amended statute applies only to defendants whose judgments are not yet final. (Citing People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323; In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744–748.) He urges the authority for the remand in Franklin logically derived from (1) the procedural mechanisms available to the trial court to compile a relevant record at the sentencing stage of an open criminal action (
It is true that Franklin did not declare the juvenile‘s sentence unlawful. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 278–281, 284.) Rather, we
The Attorney General understates the significance of Franklin‘s evidence preservation function in the statutory scheme. The Legislature‘s intent in enacting sections 3051 and 4801 was ” ‘to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release’ ” upon a showing of maturation and rehabilitation. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277, quoting Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.) Franklin authorized postjudgment proceedings to effectuate that intent. A Franklin proceeding gives “an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender‘s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight to’ youth-related factors (
court may
We recently explained the role a Franklin proceeding plays in the youth offender parole process. In People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123 (Rodriguez), the Court of Appeal declined to remand the case to the trial court, reasoning that the defendant had a ” ’ “sufficient opportunity” ’ ” at the original sentencing hearing to make a record. (Id. at p. 1131.) We disagreed and held that Rodriguez was “entitled to remand for an opportunity to supplement the record with information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing. Although a defendant sentenced before the enactment of Senate Bill No. 260 [(2013–2014 Reg. Sess.)] could have introduced such evidence through existing sentencing procedures, he or she would not have had reason to know that the subsequently enacted legislation would make such evidence particularly relevant in the parole process. Without such notice, any opportunity to introduce evidence of youth-related factors is not adequate in light of the purpose of Senate Bill No. 260.” (Ibid.)
Nothing about the remands in Franklin and Rodriguez was dependent on the nonfinal status of the juvenile offender‘s conviction. On the contrary, “[t]he statutory text makes clear that the Legislature intended youth offender parole hearings to apply retrospectively, that is, to all eligible youth offenders regardless of the date of conviction.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278, italics added.) By a parity of reasoning, an evidence preservation process should apply to all youthful offenders now eligible for such a parole hearing. As Franklin emphasized, the possibility that relevant evidence will be lost may increase as years go by. (Id. at pp. 283–284.) This reality is no less true for offenders whose convictions are final on direct appeal.
Nor were the remands in Franklin and Rodriguez dependent on this court‘s authority under
Accordingly, we hold that an offender entitled to a hearing under sections 3051 and 4801 may seek the remedy of a Franklin proceeding even though the offender‘s sentence is otherwise final.
B. Section 1203.01 Provides an Adequate Remedy at Law in the First Instance To Conduct a Postjudgment Evidence Preservation Proceeding in the Trial Court
A question remains. How does a juvenile offender with a final conviction gain access to the trial court for an evidence preservation proceeding? We have explained that ” ‘[t]here is no statutory authority for a trial court to entertain a postjudgment motion that is unrelated to any proceeding then pending before the court. [Citation.] Indeed, a motion is not an independent remedy. It is ancillary to an on-going action and ” ‘implies the pendency of a suit between the parties and is confined to incidental matters in the progress of the cause. As the rule is sometimes expressed, a motion relates to some question collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with, and dependent on, the principal remedy.’ ” [Citation.] In most cases, after the judgment has become final, there is nothing pending to which a motion may attach.’ ” (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337 (Picklesimer), quoting Lewis v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 70, 76–77.)
Cook sought a writ of habeas corpus and the parties vigorously debate the propriety of that remedy. The Attorney General argues that the remand procedure contemplated in Franklin was not necessary to cure an underlying illegality in the juvenile‘s sentence. Rather, he urges, it is an evidence-gathering procedure designed to implement the new parole provisions in
Our state Constitution guarantees the right to habeas corpus. (
We need not decide if the writ of habeas corpus is expansive enough to afford Cook the relief he seeks. Cook has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law that makes resort to habeas corpus unnecessary, at least in the first instance. (In re Gandolfo (1984) 36 Cal.3d 889, 899–900; see generally, Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1052, and cases cited; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Writs, § 25, pp. 630–631.) In cases with final judgments,
Under
The purpose of
At oral argument, the Attorney General agreed
adopt any suitable method of practice, both in ordinary actions and special proceedings, if the procedure is not specified by statute or by rules adopted by the Judicial Council. It is not only proper but at times may be necessary for a court to follow provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which are harmonious with the objects and purposes of the proceeding although those provisions are not specifically made applicable by the statute which creates the proceeding.” (Tide Water, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 825, fn. omitted.) While
People v. Superior Court (Morales) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 523 is instructive. That case considered whether the superior court had jurisdiction to grant a motion to preserve evidence in anticipation of a future hearing for postconviction discovery under
People v. Hyde (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 97 is similar. After his conviction became final, Hyde filed a motion in the trial court for an award of presentence custody credits, relying on recent case authority entitling him to such credit. (Id. at pp. 99–100.) The trial court denied the motion in a manner suggesting that it lacked jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 99, fn. 2.) The Court of Appeal reversed. It noted that the defendant was not seeking to amend a final judgment; rather he was requesting that the court “supplement its judgment and advise the Adult Authority of a simple fact (how much presentence time in custody he has been subjected to) in an official and authentic manner so that the Adult Authority can take that action which the statutory law (and the constitutional principles applicable thereto) obligates it to take.” (Id. at p. 100.) Nonetheless, “[n]o precise statutory remedy” was available to solve the problem. (Id. at p. 101.) The court concluded that, although the Adult Authority ultimately had responsibility for the custody credit calculations, “[t]here must be a judicial process by which disputed facts may be resolved when the defendant and the Adult Authority are unable to agree on the correct answer.” (Ibid.)5 Relying on
Although the circumstances of Morales and Hyde differ in some respects from the case before us, their logic is persuasive.
1170(d)(2)), which authorized recall of the sentence and resentencing. (Kirchner, at p. 1043.)
We disagreed with the Court of Appeal‘s conclusion, observing, ”
Kirchner is distinguishable. Cook is not seeking a resentencing, but instead a chance to create a record relevant to a parole hearing. Further, in Kirchner, both the express language and legislative intent behind
As noted, Cook is not seeking release. Nor does he challenge the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the proceedings that led to his now final judgment and sentence. The relief he seeks is entirely consistent with
Having recognized the opportunity for offenders with final judgments to preserve evidence in the trial court, we need not address arguments made by amicus curiae the Post-Conviction Justice Project and the Pacific Juvenile Defender Center that the procedures and resources available to inmates through the parole process are inadequate to implement the statutory mandates of sections 3051 and 4801. (See Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1132; Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 286.) “[I]n the absence of any concrete controversy in this case concerning suitability criteria or their application by the Board or the Governor, it would be premature for this court to opine on whether and, if so, how existing suitability criteria, parole hearing procedures, or other practices must be revised to conform to the dictates of applicable statutory and constitutional law.” (Franklin, at p. 286.)7 We offer no opinion here whether the federal Constitution compels the Board to consider individualized evidence bearing on youth-related factors, or whether the unavailability of such information might undermine the Board‘s decision. Finally, as we have before, we express no view on whether a Franklin proceeding is constitutionally required. (Rodriguez, at p. 1132.)
C. Franklin Proceedings for Cases with Final Judgments
For inmates like Cook who seek to preserve evidence following a final judgment, the proper avenue is to file a motion in superior court under the original caption and case number,7
citing the authority of
Although Franklin mandates an opportunity for evidence preservation, the trial court may “exercise its discretion to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.” (Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1132.) The court may, for example, require an offer of proof regarding the evidence the offender seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such evidence is relevant to youth-related factors and meaningfully adds to the already available record. It may also determine whether testimony is “appropriate” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284), or if other types of evidentiary submissions will suffice. Finally, Franklin emphasized that the purpose of the proceeding was to allow the offender to assemble evidence “at or near the time of the juvenile‘s offense rather than decades later when memories have faded, records may have been lost or destroyed, or family or community members may have relocated or passed away.” (Id. at pp. 283–284.) Some offenders who file these postjudgment motions in the trial court may have spent a decade or more in prison. Some may have even come before the Board for a youth offender parole hearing. The court may consider whether a Franklin proceeding is likely to produce fruitful evidence considering such factors as the passage of time and whether the offender has already benefitted from the factfinding procedures set forth in
It bears emphasis that the proceeding we outlined in Franklin derives from the statutory provisions of sections 3051 and 4801. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 283–284; see Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1132 [“We expressed no view in Franklin, and we need not express any view here, on whether such a remand is constitutionally required“].) While we unquestionably have the power to interpret these laws, the Legislature is in a superior position to consider and implement rules of procedure in the first instance. The Legislature remains free to amend the pertinent statutes to specify what evidence-gathering procedures should be afforded to youth offenders, taking into account the objectives of the youth offender parole hearing and the burden placed on our trial courts to conduct Franklin proceedings for the many thousands of offenders who will be eligible for them under today‘s decision.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal granting Cook‘s petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions to deny the petition. The denial order shall be without prejudice to Cook‘s filing a motion in the trial court for a Franklin proceeding under the authority of
CORRIGAN, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CHIN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
GROBAN, J.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kruger
I agree with much of what the majority says: Although the youth offender parole statutes provide no mechanism for individuals serving final sentences to return to court to create records for use at their later parole hearings,
My disagreement with the majority concerns the scope of the procedures authorized under
It is true the procedures prescribed by
This brings me to a final observation. For many youthful offenders serving final sentences, it is likely already too late to capture all the information about the particular youthful characteristics that might have been available closer to the time of their offenses. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.) Given this practical reality, we should be careful not to overstate the importance of any particular set of record-preservation procedures to the proper functioning of the youth offender parole system. By statute, the charge of the Board of Parole Hearings is to give each youthful offender “a meaningful opportunity to obtain release” (
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Again, as noted, I agree with much of what the majority says today. Under
KRUGER, J.