Holder v. United States, 836 F.3d 891

Background

Norris G. Holder seeks authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion invoking Johnson v. United States and Welch v. United States.
The question is whether Holder’s bank robbery conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (e) qualifies as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) (the “force” clause) or whether Johnson’s vagueness holding affects § 924(c)(3)(B)/related provisions.
The Eighth Circuit majority denied authorization, holding bank robbery under § 2113(a)/(e) is a crime of violence under the force clause, relying on United States v. Boman and circuit precedent.
Judge Melloy dissented, arguing Holder made a prima facie showing sufficient to permit a successive § 2255 filing because there is a circuit split and open questions about mens rea for the intimidation element of § 2113(a)/(e).
Melloy emphasized precedent (Pickar, Yockel) that federal bank robbery’s mens rea does not attach to the use of force or intimidation, suggesting possible non-intentional commission that might not satisfy the force clause.
The dissent urged a low threshold for authorizing successive petitions, endorsing a “cursory glance” to permit district-court exploration rather than foreclosing the argument at the appellate gate.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Holder may obtain authorization to file a successive § 2255 based on Johnson/Welch	Holder contends Johnson/Welch may render § 924(c)(3)(B)/similar provisions void or inapplicable to his conviction, warranting authorization	Government argues bank robbery under § 2113(a)/(e) is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), so Johnson/Welch do not help	Denied: appellate majority refused authorization; dissent would grant to permit district-court review
Whether § 2113(a)/(e) (bank robbery) is a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause)	Holder (via dissent) argues § 2113(a)/(e) can be committed without the requisite intentional use of force or knowing intimidation and thus may not fall within the force clause	Government and majority: § 2113(a)/(e) has an element of force or threatened force and qualifies as a crime of violence	Held: Majority says it is a crime of violence under the force clause; dissent disputes and seeks further review
Applicability of Johnson to statutes with similar language (e.g., § 924(c)(3)(B), 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), Guidelines)	Holder points to circuit decisions extending Johnson and to a circuit split; argues successive relief should be authorized	Government points to circuit decisions rejecting Johnson’s extension and to precedent treating bank robbery as violent	Held: Appellate court denied relief here; dissent notes split and favors authorization for further fact/ legal development
Role of mens rea in the intimidation element of federal bank robbery	Holder/dissent: precedents (Pickar, Yockel) show mens rea does not attach to intimidation, raising doubt whether intimidation element requires intentional force	Government/majority: characterizes § 2113 robbery elements as requiring or encompassing force/threatened force sufficient for § 924(c)(3)(A)	Held: Majority treats bank robbery as satisfying force clause; dissent says mens rea issue warrants district-court examination

Key Cases Cited

Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (prima facie standard for successive § 2255 authorization)
Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing prima facie standard)
In re Hubbard, 825 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (authorizing successive petition re: Johnson and § 16(b))
In re Pinder, 824 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2016) (authorizing successive petition re: Johnson and § 924(c)(3)(B))
In re Encinias, 821 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2016) (allowing successive petition considering Johnson’s extension to Guidelines)
United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 813 F.3d 225 (5th Cir.) (holding § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson)
Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague in immigration context)
United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding § 16(b) invalid in light of Johnson)
United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding Johnson does not apply to § 924(c)(3)(B))
In re Fields, 826 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2016) (denying successive authorization to apply Johnson to § 924(c)(3)(B))
United States v. Pickar, 616 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2010) (mens rea for bank robbery does not attach to use of force or intimidation)
United States v. Yockel, 320 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2003) (same conclusion on mens rea for intimidation)
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (interpretation of "use of physical force" implying a higher degree of intent)
United States v. Boman, 810 F.3d 534 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding federal robbery under § 2111 satisfies force-clause elements)
In re Hines, 824 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016) (armed bank robbery meets force-clause definition)
United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2016) (armed bank robbery is a crime of violence)