Hertz v. Bennett, 294 Ga. 62

Hertz, age 18 at the Florida offenses, pled nolo contendere in Escambia County to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, shooting from a vehicle, and possession of a short barrel weapon; he received probation and community control.
In 2012 Hertz applied for a Georgia weapons carry license in Quitman County and disclosed a felony-related plea; a background check confirmed the Florida plea.
The probate judge denied the license based on OCGA § 16-11-129, which disqualifies felons from obtaining a license, and Hertz sought mandamus in superior court.
The Florida court’s withholding of adjudication was treated as not necessarily a Georgia conviction; Georgia law, however, defines conviction to include a plea of nolo contendere.
The superior court upheld the denial, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Hertz was disqualified under OCGA § 16-11-129 and that the statute, as applied, did not violate constitutional rights.
The court held Hertz’s nolo contendere Florida plea and subsequent criminal history justified ineligibility, and that the license denial survived intermediate scrutiny under the Georgia Constitution and Second Amendment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hertz’s Florida nolo contendere plea renders him ineligible	Hertz argues Florida withholding adjudication mirrors Georgia first offender treatment and should not disqualify.	The statute defines conviction to include nolo contendere, and Florida adjudication withholding does not negate eligibility.	Ineligible under OCGA § 16-11-129
Whether the denial violated the Second Amendment as applied	Hertz is a law-abiding citizen with no conviction, so denying a license infringes the Second Amendment.	Regulation of carrying in public is permissible; intermediate scrutiny applies and upholds the statute.	No violation; statute upheld under intermediate scrutiny
Whether the denial violates the Georgia Constitution	State constitutional right to keep and bear arms should protect Hertz from licensing denial.	State may regulate to protect public safety; license denial is constitutional as applied.	Constitutionality sustained; statute applied to Hertz is valid

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognized core right to bear arms but not unlimited)
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment applies to states via Fourteenth Amendment)
Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846) (historic state view on bearing arms; licensing regulation permitted)
Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 1 (1911) (upheld state licensing regulation as compatible with state constitution)
Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 501 (1983) (felon in possession bans upheld; licensing context allowed)
Spencer v. State, 286 Ga. 483 (2010) (license conditions and probation-related restrictions do not violate rights)
Heller v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011) (intermediate scrutiny framework for bearing arms regulations outside home)
Marzzarella v. Mas-tr, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (intermediate scrutiny for possession restrictions)
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2011) (defining level of scrutiny for Second Amendment challenges)
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (recognizes heightened scrutiny for certain Second Amendment contexts)
Ferguson v. Perry, 292 Ga. 666 (2013) (criminal history and rights restoration considerations in weapons licensing)