Harris v. Warrick County Sheriff's Department, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 729

Harris was hired by the Warrick County Sheriff's Department in 2003 and progressed to deputy sheriff during a one-year probationary period.
During probation Harris violated SOPs (unread SOPs, nonstandard patch, nonissue lights) and disobeyed direct orders, raising concerns about motivation and adherence to rules.
After a meeting in October 2007, the Sheriff warned Harris and offered a dispatcher return, but Harris remained committed to deputy duties.
Harris again violated rules (patrol car misuse, failure to make vehicle available for transporting a prisoner) resulting in a one-month revocation of take-home vehicle privileges.
In January 2008 Harris was terminated for insubordination, disobedience, and lack of commitment; several white deputies with misconduct were retained during probation but not characterized as similarly situated.
Harris alleged racial discrimination (Title VII and §1981) citing racially charged nicknames and exposure to Blazing Saddles, but the district court granted summary judgment for the Department and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Harris established circumstantial proof of race discrimination	Harris argues direct circumstantial evidence shows a discriminatory mosaic.	No evidence the decisionmakers engaged in racially biased conduct; evidence does not connect to termination.	No genuine issue; no proof of discriminatory motive.
Whether white deputies' better treatment shows a valid comparator	Some white deputies were retained despite probationary misconduct.	Those deputies were not similarly situated to Harris due to distinct failings.	Not similarly situated; no valid comparator.
Whether the cat's paw theory is viable in this direct proof case	Non-decisionmakers' biased acts may causally affect termination.	Argument was waived and unsupported by linking conduct to termination.	Waived; no Staub-style causation shown.
Whether the same-actor inference affects the outcome	Same-actor inference could support non-dispositive bias.	Same-actor inference is not dispositive in most cases.	Not dispositive; still supports affirmance.

Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (Supreme Court, 2011) (cat's-paw liability for discriminatory animus)
Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2003) (direct evidence required; subordinate statements rarely probative)
Long v. Teachers' Retirement Sys. of Ill., 585 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2009) (circumstantial evidence must point to discriminatory reason)
Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2006) (similarly situated comparator requirement)
Haywood v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 323 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2003) (notions of comparators must share a comparable set of failings)
Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing misconduct to assess similarly situated)
Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2006) (court does not act as super-personnel department)
Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2003) (circumstantial evidence must point to discriminatory reason)
Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1999) (same-actor inference considerations)
Martino v. MCI Commc'ns Servs., Inc., 574 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 2009) (same-actor inference and discrimination analysis)
Winsley v. Cook Cnty., 563 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2009) (standard for direct vs. indirect proof)
Darchak v. City of Chi. Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2009) (cat's-paw theory description in Seventh Circuit)