Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13

Background

Charmaine Hamer sued Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago and Fannie Mae for employment discrimination; the district court granted summary judgment and entered final judgment on September 14, 2015.
Hamer’s counsel filed motions on October 8, 2015 to withdraw and for a two‑month extension of the Rule 4(a)(1)(A) appeal deadline; the district court granted both and extended the appeal deadline to December 14, 2015.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) limits any extension to "no more than 30 days after the prescribed time or 14 days after the order granting the motion, whichever is later." 28 U.S.C. §2107(c) prescribes statutory extension periods only for certain lack‑of‑notice situations (14 days reopening or other limits), but does not set a general 30‑day limit.
Respondents did not object in district court to the two‑month extension; on appeal they first asserted the notice was untimely, invoking Rule 4(a)(5)(C)’s 30‑day limit.
The Seventh Circuit sua sponte questioned timeliness and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, treating Rule 4(a)(5)(C)’s 30‑day cap as jurisdictional.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated, holding that Rule 4(a)(5)(C)’s time limit is a court‑promulgated claim‑processing rule, not a statutory jurisdictional prescription, so the Seventh Circuit erred in dismissing for want of jurisdiction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 4(a)(5)(C)’s 30‑day limit on extensions is jurisdictional	Hamer: The limit is contained only in the Rule, not in statute, so it is a claim‑processing rule and not jurisdictional; dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was improper	Respondents: The Rule implements statutory §2107(c) and should be treated as having statutory (jurisdictional) force; late appeal must be dismissed	Held: Not jurisdictional. Time limits set by statute are jurisdictional; time limits appearing only in court rules are mandatory claim‑processing rules and may be forfeited or waived.
Whether Bowles controls and mandates jurisdictional treatment here	Hamer: Bowles applied to statutory time limits; it does not make rule‑based limits jurisdictional	Respondents: Bowles language saying appeal within prescribed time is "mandatory and jurisdictional" supports treating Rule limit as jurisdictional	Held: Bowles concerned a statutory limit; its language is qualified and cannot be extended to purely rule‑based time prescriptions.
Whether the 1991 amendment to §2107 restored or implied a statutory 30‑day limit	Hamer: The statutory text after amendment does not include a general 30‑day limit; one should not speculate Congress inadvertently omitted it	Respondents: Congress likely intended conformity with Rule 4 and the earlier 30‑day limit, so Rule 4(a)(5)(C) retains statutory force	Held: The Court will not infer inadvertent legislative error; statutory text governs—no general statutory 30‑day extension exists.
Appropriate consequence for district court’s overlong extension	Hamer: Respondents forfeited objection by not objecting in district court; remedy should be further proceedings	Respondents: Court of Appeals can raise jurisdictional defect sua sponte and dismiss	Held: Because the Rule limit is nonjurisdictional, dismissal for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction was incorrect; the Supreme Court remanded for further consideration (including forfeiture and other equitable issues).

Key Cases Cited

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (statutory appeal‑deadline set by Congress is jurisdictional)
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004) (only Congress can attach jurisdictional consequences; court rules are not a source of subject‑matter jurisdiction)
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (courts have sometimes mischaracterized claim‑processing rules as jurisdictional)
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011) (mandatory claim‑processing rules promote orderly litigation but are not necessarily jurisdictional)
Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (distinguishing when procedural rules must be observed if properly invoked)
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (clear‑statement rule for determining whether a limitation is jurisdictional)
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012) (clarifies when statutory limitations are jurisdictional and application of clear‑statement rule)