Grand Trunk Western Railroad v. United States Department
875 F.3d 821
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Webster Williams, a Grand Trunk locomotive engineer with a long history of anxiety and depression, missed work in December 2011 pursuant to a physician’s treatment plan (including taking Xanax and advice not to work during severe anxiety episodes). Grand Trunk deemed six of eight days unexcused and terminated him for excessive absenteeism.
- Williams filed an OSHA retaliation complaint under the FRSA § 20109(c); OSHA dismissed it as non-protected because the illness was non-work-related. He appealed to an ALJ.
- The ALJ, relying on the Administrative Review Board’s prior Bala decision, found Williams engaged in protected activity (following a treating physician’s plan) and awarded relief; the ARB affirmed.
- The ARB interpreted 49 U.S.C. § 20109(c)(2) to protect employees who follow a treating physician’s plan even for off-duty (non-work) injuries or illnesses.
- Grand Trunk petitioned for review; the Sixth Circuit reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and considered textual structure, canons, legislative history, and agency deference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Williams/ARB) | Defendant's Argument (Grand Trunk) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 20109(c)(2) protect employees who follow a treating physician’s plan for off-duty (non-work) injuries/illnesses? | § 20109(c)(2)’s text lacks the on-duty limitation found in (c)(1), so (c)(2) independently protects following a treatment plan even for off-duty conditions. | Read (c)(1) and (c)(2) together under the section title “Prompt medical attention”; both subsections target on-duty injuries/occupational illnesses—(c)(2) implements (c)(1)’s purpose and thus is limited to work-related injuries. | Held for Grand Trunk: (c)(2) applies only to on-duty injuries; ARB’s off-duty reading rejected and case remanded with instruction to dismiss. |
| Does the Russello canon require reading (c)(2) more broadly because (c)(1) includes “during the course of employment” and (c)(2) does not? | The omission implies Congress intended (c)(2) broader scope. | Russello is a non-dispositive inference here; structural context shows (c)(2) flows from (c)(1) and the title limits scope to on-duty injuries. | Russello inapplicable; structural/contextual reading controls. |
| Can legislative history or remedial purpose expand (c)(2) to off-duty illnesses? | Purposive reading of FRSA favors broad whistleblower/medical-protection coverage. | Legislative history and amendment context show Congress intended protections for on-the-job injuries and prompt medical attention—not as an FMLA-style sick-leave provision. | Court finds legislative history supports on-duty limitation; purposive arguments do not overcome textual/structural reading. |
| Is agency deference (Chevron/Skidmore) owed to the ARB’s interpretation? | ARB’s interpretation should get deference. | Traditional tools resolve ambiguity; Chevron/Skidmore are inapplicable or unpersuasive. | Chevron deference not warranted; Skidmore deference rejected because the court finds the agency interpretation unpersuasive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 776 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2015) (held § 20109(c) applies only to treatment plans for on-duty injuries and rejected ARB’s broader reading)
- Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (canon that differing language in adjacent provisions can imply differing meanings)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (antiretaliation provisions may be interpreted broadly to effectuate statutory purpose)
- Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (courts should not infer a broad hidden delegation or expansive meaning absent clear congressional intent)
- Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012) (agency interpretations inconsistent with traditional tools of construction are not entitled to deference)