Gary Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc.
772 F.3d 1056
| 6th Cir. | 2014Background
- Gary Vander Boegh worked as landfill manager at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant under DOE contractors; after a 2006 contract transition he applied to be landfill manager for EnergySolutions and was not hired.
- Vander Boegh had engaged in protected whistleblower activity while previously employed and filed a DOL retaliation complaint in 2006 asserting claims under the ERA, FCA, and four environmental statutes (SDWA, CWA, TSCA, SWDA).
- District court initially granted summary judgment for defendants; this court previously affirmed in part and reversed as to EnergySolutions; on remand the district court granted summary judgment for EnergySolutions concluding Vander Boegh lacked statutory standing as an applicant, not an employee.
- Vander Boegh appealed the standing rulings and argued alternatively that he was an employee under a contractual right of first refusal ("grandfathered" status).
- The Sixth Circuit held (1) “employee” does not include applicants under the ERA and FCA, (2) it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the four environmental-statute claims because their review scheme limits review to the DOL and then the courts of appeals, and (3) the district court properly applied the law-of-the-case doctrine to reject the contractual right-of-first-refusal claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “employee” in the ERA covers job applicants | Vander Boegh: term is ambiguous; DOL interpretation includes applicants; Chevron deference applies | EnergySolutions: plain/common-law meaning excludes applicants; no employment relationship existed | Held: "employee" does not include applicants under ERA; no statutory standing |
| Whether “employee” in the FCA covers applicants (pre-2009 amendment) | Vander Boegh: FCA should be construed broadly to protect applicants (cites legislative purpose) | EnergySolutions: plain meaning limits protection to employment-like relationships; legislative history shows Congress amended to add contractors/agents, not applicants | Held: "employee" did not extend to non-employee applicants; no FCA standing |
| Whether district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over SDWA/CWA/TSCA/SWDA claims filed in district court | Vander Boegh: exhaustion requirement non-jurisdictional; asks for pendent appellate jurisdiction | EnergySolutions: statutory scheme provides exclusive DOL then courts-of-appeals review; district court lacks jurisdiction | Held: statutory review scheme is jurisdictional; district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction; environmental claims dismissed |
| Whether district court erred in refusing to revisit claim that Vander Boegh was an employee via contractual right of first refusal | Vander Boegh: district court should have reconsidered employee-status via contract | EnergySolutions: law-of-the-case applies; issue was previously decided against Vander Boegh | Held: law-of-the-case bars relitigation; district court did not abuse discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for agency deference)
- Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (use common-law agency meaning when statute uses "employee")
- Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (common-law master-servant test for "employee")
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (distinguish jurisdictional limits from nonjurisdictional claims-processing rules)
- Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994) (exclusive statutory review schemes imply limited jurisdiction)
- Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994) (federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction)
- Demski v. U.S. Department of Labor, 419 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005) (agency interpretation and common-law analysis regarding employee status)