Garcia v. Garland, 64 F.4th 62

Background

Antonio Luna Garcia, placed in removal proceedings for unlawful entry, had an approved I-130 from his U.S. citizen wife but could not adjust status in the U.S. because he entered without inspection.
To return to Mexico and obtain an immigrant visa without triggering a 10-year bar, Garcia needed an I-212 and a provisional unlawful presence waiver (I-601A); DHS regulations made waiver eligibility contingent on removal proceedings being administratively closed.
Garcia asked the IJ for a continuance or administrative closure so he could pursue the provisional waiver; the IJ denied both and cited Matter of Castro‑Tum, which (at the time) held IJs and the BIA generally lacked authority to administratively close cases.
The BIA affirmed the IJ, noting DHS had amended waiver rules to allow some avenues without administrative closure and that administrative closure was not available generally under Castro‑Tum.
After the BIA decision, the Attorney General overruled Castro‑Tum in Matter of Cruz‑Valdez and restored the Avetisyan/W‑Y‑U‑ standard permitting broader administrative closure discretion; this appeal asks whether reliance on Castro‑Tum was an abuse of discretion and whether Castro‑Tum was correct or applied correctly here.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Garcia)	Defendant's Argument (Government/BIA)	Held
1) Did the agency abuse its discretion by relying on Castro‑Tum when it later was overruled?	Reliance on a now‑overruled interpretation renders the denial an abuse of discretion.	Agencies may rely on the controlling interpretation at the time of decision; later agency reinterpretation does not retroactively make prior reliance arbitrary.	No abuse: agency may rely on a then‑controlling, reasonable interpretation.
2) Was Castro‑Tum a lawful interpretation of the regulations?	Castro‑Tum conflicted with the plain regulatory text that authorizes IJs/BIA to take "any action" appropriate and necessary.	The regulations are ambiguous; Castro‑Tum reasonably read the limits ("for the disposition of" cases) to preclude general administrative closure.	Regulations ambiguous; Castro‑Tum was a reasonable interpretation and entitled to deference.
3) Did Castro‑Tum nevertheless permit administrative closure in Garcia’s circumstances (to enable a provisional waiver)?	DHS’s waiver regulation contemplates administrative closure for I‑601A eligibility, so closure should have been available here.	DHS regulations cannot expand the authority of IJs/BIA; only the Attorney General can confer such authority, so Castro‑Tum controls.	Castro‑Tum did not authorize administrative closure in Garcia’s case; DHS regs do not independently create IJ/BIA authority.
4) Was Garcia unfairly surprised by Castro‑Tum’s timing?	Castro‑Tum was issued shortly before the hearing, causing unfair surprise.	Administrative closure was always discretionary; no settled expectation existed.	No unfair surprise; denial did not violate due process or create unfair retroactive liability.

Key Cases Cited

Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (reaffirmed limits and conditions for deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations)
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agencies may fill statutory ambiguities when authorized by Congress)
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations)
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (agencies may resolve statutory ambiguity and that resolution can govern judicial interpretation)
De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015) (agency adjudicative reinterpretations presumptively applied prospectively)
Hernandez‑Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2020) (administrative closure is typically not a "disposition" and thus not plainly authorized by §1003.10)
Arcos Sanchez v. Attorney General, 997 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2021) (held regulatory text unambiguously authorizes administrative closure)
Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019) (same: plain‑text reading grants IJs/BIA broad discretion to administratively close cases)
Gonzalez‑Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting administrative closure is not expressly described in statutes or regulations)
Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2006) (standard for abuse of discretion review)