Frederick Woods v. Elvin Valenzuela, 734 F. App'x 394

Frederick Newhall Woods, a state prisoner, challenged his 2012 parole denial, alleging a parole commissioner had a conflict of interest (pending job application with the district attorney’s office that opposed parole).
Woods sought relief via a federal habeas petition: an evidentiary hearing and a new parole hearing before an unbiased panel.
After the 2012 denial, Woods received another parole hearing in 2015 and was again denied parole; he remains incarcerated.
The district court denied habeas relief; Woods appealed to the Ninth Circuit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.
The Ninth Circuit majority held the claim was not moot and that the claim falls outside the core habeas remedy, vacating the district court’s merits decision and remanding with leave to amend under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Judge Kleinfeld dissented: he agreed the claim is not cognizable as habeas under Nettles but would dismiss the appeal as moot because Woods received a subsequent unbiased hearing in 2015.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Mootness of claim	Woods: 2012 denial caused continuing injury; he remains incarcerated so controversy live	State: subsequent 2015 hearing cured the alleged injury; no redress possible	Majority: not moot — ongoing injury from 2012 denial continues; Dissent: would find moot because 2015 hearing provided relief
Appropriate remedy (habeas vs § 1983)	Woods: sought habeas relief (new parole hearing) after due process violation	State: implied that habeas may be improper if relief won't necessarily shorten confinement	Held: claim not in core habeas because success would not necessarily shorten confinement; claim must proceed, if at all, under § 1983
Sufficiency of alleged conflict to state due process claim	Woods: commissioner’s job application created disqualifying conflict violating due process	State: disputed or implicitly argued bias does not necessarily entitle to habeas relief	Held: if proven, conflict would state a minimal-due-process violation under Swarthout; plaintiff may amend to assert § 1983 claim
Relief and redressability	Woods: seeks evidentiary hearing and new unbiased parole hearing	State: federal courts cannot order parole release; remedy limited to new hearing	Held: federal court cannot directly shorten sentence; remand for § 1983 amendment and further proceedings (not immediate release)

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (mootness requires a continuing concrete injury)
Super Tire Eng’g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115 (1974) (continued governmental action affecting present interest can prevent mootness)
Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981) (conditional release does not always moot procedural claims when restrictions continue)
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (complete release can moot procedural challenges to parole process)
Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (distinguishes habeas from § 1983; non-core claims belong in § 1983)
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (habeas appropriate only when success would necessarily shorten confinement)
Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011) (procedural due process at parole hearings requires minimal protections)
Haggard v. Curry, 631 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2011) (only state parole board can set end date for indeterminate sentence)
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (standing requires a reasonable likelihood of future injury)
Iron Arrow Honor Soc. v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67 (1983) (discussion of redressability and mootness principles)