Erick Manners v. United States, 947 F.3d 377

In 2011 Manners pleaded guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3)) and to using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), and received consecutive sentences.
In 2016 he filed a § 2255 motion post-Johnson arguing §924(c) could not rely on the residual clause and that his §1959(a)(3) predicate did not satisfy §924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause.
The district court denied relief; the Sixth Circuit initially affirmed but the Supreme Court remanded after Dimaya and later Davis invalidated §924(c)(3)’s residual clause.
On remand the issue became whether §1959(a)(3) categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” under §924(c)(3)(A) (the elements clause), using the categorical/modified-categorical approaches.
The statute is divisible; §1959(a)(3) requires assault, use of a dangerous weapon, and commission in furtherance of racketeering—so the question focused on whether the dangerous-weapon element elevates the assault into ‘‘violent physical force.’’
The Sixth Circuit relied on its precedents (notably Rafidi and Knight) applying the “deadly weapon rule” and affirmed denial of Manners’s motion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §1959(a)(3) is categorically a "crime of violence" under §924(c)(3)(A)	Manners: Dangerous-weapon element should not automatically satisfy elements clause; §924(c)(1)(A)’s firearm and crime-of-violence elements must remain independent	Government: Dangerous-weapon element elevates any assault into violent physical force; precedent supports treating such offenses as crimes of violence	Held: §1959(a)(3) is a crime of violence under the elements clause; conviction affirmed
Whether applying the deadly-weapon rule renders the firearm element of §924(c)(1)(A) superfluous	Manners: Allowing the predicate to satisfy both prongs makes the firearm prong meaningless	Government: The firearm element still "has work to do" (limits §924(c) to those who use/carry/possess a firearm during a qualifying offense); no surplusage problem	Held: No surplusage problem; both elements can be satisfied by the same facts in some cases without invalidating the statute

Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (invalidated a residual-vagueness clause, prompted remand)
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (held §924(c)(3)(B) residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defined “physical force” as force capable of causing pain or injury)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisible statutes and modified categorical approach)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limitation on using Shepard documents for divisible statutes)
United States v. Rafidi, 829 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2016) (held §111(b)’s deadly-weapon element makes the offense a crime of violence under §924(c)(3)(A))
Knight v. United States, 936 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2019) (applied Rafidi to hold a dangerous-weapon aggravated robbery offense is a crime of violence)
United States v. Burris, 912 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (discussed deadly-weapon rule in §924(c) context)
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) (canon against surplusage does not require rendering neighboring provision redundant)