Eleuterio Payan Jaquez v. Jefferson Sessions III
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10199
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- Petitioner Eleuterio Payan Jaquez, a Mexican national and former conditional permanent resident, pled guilty in Virginia state court in May 2005 to possession of cocaine and was later placed on probation under Va. Code § 18.2-251 (first-offender statute); the court vacated the finding of guilt and dismissed the charge after successful completion of probation.
- DHS charged Payan Jaquez with removability for failure to remove conditions on his permanent residence and for a controlled-substance conviction; he admitted both grounds.
- Payan Jaquez applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1); DHS moved to pretermit, arguing his 2005 proceedings constituted a conviction rendering him ineligible under § 1101(a)(48)(A).
- The IJ found Payan Jaquez ineligible for cancellation because his guilty plea plus probation met the statute’s deferred-adjudication definition of “conviction”; the BIA affirmed on the same grounds but remanded for proper voluntary-departure advisals.
- Payan Jaquez petitioned for review to the Fourth Circuit, which had jurisdiction to decide the pure question of law whether his § 18.2-251 deferred adjudication qualified as a "conviction" under § 1101(a)(48)(A).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Virginia § 18.2-251 deferred adjudication qualifies as a “conviction” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) | Payan Jaquez: not a conviction because § 1101(a)(48)(A) requires both a finding of guilt and imposition of punishment, and those must co-occur; his plea was vacated such that no effective finding of guilt existed when punishment was imposed. | Government/BIA: § 1101(a)(48)(A) defines conviction to include deferred adjudication when there is a guilty plea (or other specified admission) and a judge orders punishment (probation); no temporal simultaneity requirement; probation is punishment. | Held: The Fourth Circuit denied the petition. The court held Payan Jaquez’s guilty plea satisfied the first element and his probation satisfied the second, so the deferred adjudication fits § 1101(a)(48)(A) and renders him ineligible for cancellation of removal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Crespo v. Holder, 631 F.3d 130 (4th Cir. 2011) (interpreting § 1101(a)(48)(A) and distinguishing plea vs. judge-found facts in deferred adjudication cases)
- Dung Phan v. Holder, 667 F.3d 448 (4th Cir. 2012) (probation constitutes a form of punishment or restraint for immigration-conviction purposes)
- Griffiths v. I.N.S., 243 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001) (defining elements of conviction in deferred adjudication contexts)
- Castillo v. Holder, 776 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2015) (standard of de novo review for legal questions from the BIA)
- Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981) (statutory text controls when unambiguous)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (deference framework for agency interpretations)