37 F.4th 238
5th Cir.2022Background
- Plaintiffs (Easom, Howard, Nau) were fracking crew members laid off effective March 18, 2020; termination letters cited a sharp drop in oil prices and the "unexpected adverse impact" of the Coronavirus.
- US Well Services moved for summary judgment asserting the WARN Act’s natural-disaster exception (29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(B)) applied because COVID-19 caused the layoffs; plaintiffs moved for summary judgment arguing COVID-19 is not a "natural disaster" and was not the direct cause.
- The district court concluded COVID-19 qualified as a natural disaster and read the statute to require but-for causation, but denied summary judgment because factual causation remained disputed and certified two legal questions for interlocutory appeal.
- The Fifth Circuit reviewed only the certified legal questions de novo and examined statutory text, context, canons of construction, and the Department of Labor regulation interpreting the exception.
- The Fifth Circuit held (1) COVID-19 is not a "natural disaster" under the WARN Act (the statutory examples—flood, earthquake, drought—limit the term) and (2) the natural-disaster exception requires proximate ("direct result") causation as reflected in the DOL regulation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether COVID-19 qualifies as a "natural disaster" under the WARN Act | COVID-19 is not the kind of event Congress meant to cover; pandemic/disease excluded by context and purpose | COVID-19 is a natural, calamitous event that caused the layoffs and fits the term "natural disaster" | COVID-19 is not a "natural disaster" under the WARN Act; the text and examples (flood, earthquake, drought) limit the term |
| Whether the WARN Act's natural-disaster exception requires but-for or proximate causation | "Due to" requires proximate (direct) causation; otherwise the exception would swallow the statute | "Due to" means because of (but-for); multiple causal links should still qualify | The exception incorporates proximate causation; DOL regulation requiring a "direct result" is entitled to Chevron deference |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agency interpretation owed deference when statute ambiguous and regulation reasonable)
- Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) (proximate cause inquiry requires a sufficient connection between conduct and result)
- Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (use of noscitur a sociis to construe terms in a list)
- Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003) (expressio unius canon supports excluding unlisted items from a statutory series)
- Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (interpret statutory words by their ordinary meaning at enactment)
- In re TWL Corp., 712 F.3d 886 (5th Cir. 2013) (elements of a WARN Act claim)
- Tanks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 417 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2005) (appellate jurisdiction under §1292(b) limits review to legal questions)
- Dixie Pine Prods. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 133 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1943) ("direct cause" ordinarily synonymous with proximate cause)
- Stanfield v. Neubaum, 494 S.W.3d 90 (Tex. 2016) (analysis of intervening/superseding causes and foreseeability)