Dougherty, J., Aplt. v. Heller, K.
138 A.3d 611
| Pa. | 2016Background
- Dougherty (plaintiff), a public figure, sued Heller (defendant), a newspaper columnist, for defamation over a 2009 column; Heller later conceded error and apologized but the material remained accessible online.
- Heller noticed a videotape deposition of Dougherty; at the deposition Dougherty’s counsel demanded assurances the video would not be disseminated outside litigation; Heller’s lawyer refused an on-the-spot blanket assurance and the deposition was aborted.
- Heller moved to compel the videotaped deposition under Pa.R.C.P. 4017.1; Dougherty cross-moved for a protective order under Pa.R.C.P. 4012(a) to prevent public dissemination of the videotape pretrial.
- The trial court granted the motion to compel and denied the protective order for lack of “good cause”; Dougherty appealed claiming the order was a collateral order immediately appealable.
- The Superior Court (en banc) held the trial court’s order was a collateral order but affirmed on the merits (majority): Dougherty failed to show a cognizable privacy right of constitutional dimension and failed to present sufficient particularized evidence of likely misuse to satisfy “good cause.”
- The Supreme Court addressed (1) validity of temporary judicial assignments to assemble a quorum, (2) whether the trial court’s order was a collateral order, and (3) the merits of the protective-order refusal; it held temporary assignments under Rule 701(C) valid, quashed the interlocutory appeal (no collateral-order jurisdiction), and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court’s denial of a protective order barring pretrial public dissemination of a videotaped deposition is a collateral order appealable as of right | Dougherty: denial implicates a privacy right in pretrial discovery that is separable, too important to deny review, and will be irreparably lost if not immediately reviewable | Heller: collateral-order doctrine is narrow; the dispute is fact-specific and intertwined with merits so interlocutory review is premature | Court: Generalized privacy claim here insufficient for collateral-order jurisdiction; appeal quashed (no as-of-right review) |
| Whether Dougherty demonstrated "good cause" under Pa.R.C.P. 4012(a) to obtain a protective order preventing dissemination of videotape | Dougherty: public-figure status, history of acrimony with media, Heller’s refusal to promise non-dissemination, and risk of selective editing create a concrete risk of irreparable harm | Heller: speculative embarrassment from possible dissemination of unknown content is insufficient; trial court has broad discretion and rules favor discovery use | Superior Court majority / Supreme Court (on remand posture): trial court did not abuse discretion; Dougherty failed to present particularized, concrete evidence of likely misuse to meet good-cause standard |
| Whether the Supreme Court could validly use temporarily assigned judges under Pa.R.J.A. 701(C) to reach quorum and decide the matter | N/A (issue raised by challenge to assignments) | Heller / Court Administrator: Rule 701(C) authorizes Chief Justice to assign retired/former judges to any court, including Supreme Court, to serve interests of justice | Court: Rule 701(C), the Judicial Code, and precedent (Wetton) permit temporary assignments to the Supreme Court; application for relief denying assignments was denied |
| Whether two Justices could dismiss an appeal as improvidently granted (quorum question) | Dougherty: quorum requires a majority of the Court’s full authorized complement (four of seven); two-Justice dismissal was ultra vires and void | Others (cited authority): prior practice suggests remaining non-recused justices may act; some precedent supports single-justice action in rare circumstances | Court: quorum should be measured against full authorized complement; a quorum is four Justices; two-Justice dismissal was erroneous and treated as nullity (discussion led to reargument and assignment) |
Key Cases Cited
- Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (U.S. 1984) (trial courts have broad discretion to regulate discovery and to issue protective orders balancing privacy and public-access interests)
- Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (U.S. 1977) (recognition of individual interest in avoiding disclosure of certain personal matters)
- Ben v. Schwartz, 556 Pa. 475 (Pa. 1999) (scope of collateral-order importance prong requires rights rooted in public policy beyond a single case)
- Wetton, Commonwealth v., 538 Pa. 319 (Pa. 1994) (Supreme Court authority to assign temporary judges under Rule 701 to sit on the Court is valid)
- Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral Dirs. Ass'n, 602 Pa. 65 (Pa. 2009) (collateral order doctrine is narrow; importance prong must be met)
- Cooper v. Schoffstall, 588 Pa. 505 (Pa. 2006) (examples of discovery orders implicating important privacy rights that may warrant interlocutory review)
- Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of E. Pa., 592 Pa. 66 (Pa. 2007) (discussing malice standard and burdens in defamation cases)