Donald Larry Martin v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner
903 F.3d 1154
| 11th Cir. | 2018Background
- Donald Martin served as an Alabama Army National Guard member and as a National Guard "dual status" military technician from 1977/1982 until termination in 2004–2005.
- Dual status technicians perform civilian weekday technician jobs (federal civil service pay) and military weekend duties (military pay); they must maintain reserve membership and wear uniform but are also classified as civilian employees for many purposes.
- After discharge he received civil-service disability retirement pay (from his technician employment), military retired pay, and Social Security retirement benefits based on earlier covered work.
- The SSA applied the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) to reduce Martin’s Social Security benefits because of his civil-service disability payments, excluding only payments that are "based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service."
- Martin argued the civil-service disability payments qualified for the uniformed services exception because his dual-status work was "wholly" service as a member of a uniformed service; SSA and the district court disagreed, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether payments based on dual-status technician employment are "payment[s] based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service" and thus exempt from the WEP | Martin: Dual-status technician work is essentially military; payments are wholly based on service as a Guard member and fall within the exception | SSA: Dual-status technician employment is not performed wholly in the capacity of a uniformed-service member; exception does not extend to such civilian technician payments | Held: Payments did not qualify for the exception; role is dual (civilian + military) and not "wholly" service as a member of a uniformed service |
| Level of deference owed to SSA's interpretation of the uniformed-services exception | Martin: Did not contest Chevron applicability; relied on textual argument that statute unambiguously favors him | SSA: Its acquiescence ruling, POMS, and guidance are entitled to deference (Chevron or at least Skidmore) | Held: Court need not decide Chevron step-zero; SSA’s view is persuasive and entitled to Skidmore deference, but even on the text the exception does not cover dual-status technician payments |
| Interpretation of "as" and "wholly" in the phrase "service ... as a member of a uniformed service" | Martin: "Service" should be read broadly to cover the dual-status employment | SSA: "As" limits payments to those for work performed in the capacity/role of a uniformed-service member; "wholly" requires the payment to be exclusively for such service | Held: "As" and "wholly" limit the exception; dual-status work contains civilian elements so payments are not "wholly" for uniformed-service service |
| Whether Eighth Circuit’s Petersen decision controls | Martin: Petersen held the exception applied to dual-status technicians | SSA/District Court: Petersen differs; SSA treats it as binding only in Eighth Circuit via acquiescence ruling | Held: Eleventh Circuit declines to follow Petersen, concluding differently on statutory text and application of "wholly" |
Key Cases Cited
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (standards for persuasive weight of agency interpretations)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (Chevron step-zero and when agency interpretations warrant Chevron deference)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes)
- Petersen v. Astrue, 633 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2011) (held WEP exception applied to dual-status technicians; SSA issued limited acquiescence)
- Stroup v. Barnhart, 327 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2003) (addressing SSA regulation construing WEP and deference issues)
- Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) (factors supporting Chevron deference where agency has relevant expertise and careful, long-standing consideration)
- Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371 (2003) (limitations on deference to informal agency materials)