*1 BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
v. WALTON No. 00-1937. March Argued January 2002—Decided *2 With A. Lamken argued the cause petitioner. Jeffrey Olson, General Assistant were Solicitor him on briefs General McCallum, Solicitor General Deputy Attorney Kneedler, C. Mark S. Davies. and John Hoyle, L. cause for With Kathryn respondent. Pryor argued * her on the brief was James W.Speer. Breyer of the Court. delivered opinion Justice Act authorizes disability The Social payment Security Income in- insurance benefits Supplemental Security *3 amended, with as dividuals disabilities. Stat. (1994 V) (Title II §401 et ed. and U. S. C. seq. Supp. disability (Title et §1381 benefits); insurance XVI supplemental seq. income). Act For both of benefits the defines security types as an term key “disability” “inability to substantial activity engage any gainful reason determinable or by any physical medically mental to which can result expected or can be last which has lasted in death or expected a not less than 12 continuous months.” period for 423(d)(1)(A) (1994 ed.) II) (Title added); § ac- (emphasis (1994 1382c(a)(3)(A) V) (Title XVI). cord, ed., Supp. This case two about the Social presents Security questions Administration’s of this definition. (which
First, we Social Administration shall Security call the the term reads as “12 Agency) “inability” including (to view, month” In its requirement. “inability” engage last, substantial must or must be ex- any activity) gainful Schuster, Robert Bobroff, * Rochelle Michael E. Rains filed and a brief amici curiae al. as AARP et affirmance. urging for at last, least 12 months. pected Second, the Agency reads term to last” as “expected when applicable only has not “inability” lasted In months. the case of yet a later determination —where the did “inability” last 12 months —the will assume that automatically the claimant failed to meet duration requirement. will not back to look whether, decide hypothetically despite the claimant’s actual return to work before months ex- pired, “inability” nonetheless have been might to last that long.
The Court of for the Appeals Fourth Circuit held both these of the statute unlawful. interpretations hold, We both fall within the contrary, lawful inter- See Chevron A. pretive authority. U. S. Inc. Natural Re- sources Council, Inc., 467 S.U. Conse- Defense we reverse. quently,
I In 1996 Walton, Cleveland for both respondent, applied Title II insurance benefits and Title XVI disability Supple- mental (1) Income. The found that Security Oc- by 31,1994, tober Walton hаd a serious mental illness developed both and involving associated schizophrenia depression; (2) the illness caused him then to lose his as a full-time job (3) teacher; mid-1995 he work by time began again part (4) a cashier; as December 1995 he was by as working cashier full time.
The that illness concluded Walton’s mental had him from in prevented e., i. work, engaging any significant from in substantial 11 for “engaging] any gainful activity,” (when 31, months —from October 1994 he lost his teaching (when until thе end job) he earned income September sufficient rise to to the level of “substantial gainful activity”). (2001). §§404.1574, See CFR 416.974 And because the statute demanded an “inability any substantial engage 12, gainful activity” months, not Walton was not lasting entitled to benefits. affirmed The District Court
Walton court review. sought the decision, but Court Appeals Fourth Circuit reversed. Walton Apfel, F. 3d 12-month The court said that statute’s modifies the word duration “impairment,” requirement stat- Id., It added that the word at 189. “inability.” similar leaves no doubt” that there is no ute’s ... “language (to “duration related to an “inability” requirement” engage Ibid. be- that, It concluded substantial gainful activity). the statute’s “unam- cause clearly” language “speaks Walton to receive benefits was entitled despite biguous,” those benefits to unable agency restricting Ibid. work for a 12-month period. that, event, Walton
The court went on to decide any work, one because, to Waltоn’s return prior qualified Id., his last 12 months. would have “expected” “inability” at 189-190. It that the had made Walton’s conceded actual return to work determinative on this point. 1592(d)(2) (2001). §§ CFR 404.1520(b), But it found unlawful benefit Agency regulations gave with the stat- conflicted hindsight ground they —on ute’s clear 3d, command. 235 F. at 190.
For either reason, concluded, the Fourth Circuit Walton became II “entitled” to Title benefits no later than April 1995, five after months onset of his illness. See 423(a)(l)(D)(ii) §§423(a)(l)(D)(i), for a U.S.C. (providing 5-month before a claimant is “entitled” to “waiting period” (1994 423(c)(2)(A) ed.). benefits), It added that Walton’s later work as a cashier beside the That was legally point. work counted as of a 9-month “trial work simply part pe- riod,” which the II statute to those “entitled” to Title grants benefits, and which it them to without loss permits perform 422(c). of benefits.
The Government out that certiorari. sought pointed the Fourth of other Circuit’s first conflicts with those holding with Titus v. Sulli Circuits, 189-190, 3d, 235 F. compare
217 (CA8 van, аnd Alexander Rich 590, 4 3d v. 1993), F. 594-595 ardson, 451 F. 2d (CA10 1971). 1185 added that Fourth were Circuit’s views to well-settled law and contrary would create additional Social costs billion Security $80 over 10 We We writ. now reverse. years. granted
II The definition of has two statutory “disability” parts. First, it kind of certain an “in- “inability,” requires namely, substantial Sec- ability engage any gainful activity.” ond, an it or requires namely, men- “impairment,” “physical tal which “reason” provides impairment,” “inability.” The adds that statute must be one that “impairment” “has lasted or can be to last . . . not than 12 less expected But what about the months.” Must it also last “inability”? (or last) for the same amount of time?
The has answered this the affirmative. question Acting pursuant statutory rulemaking authority, 405(a) (Title 1383(d)(1) (Title II), §§ U. XVI), S. C. it has pro formal that state that a claimant is not mulgated regulations disabled medical if is condition,” he “regardless [his] doing § 404.1520(b) “substantial 20 CFR gainful activity.” And the has this to mean that interpreted regulation the claimant is not disabled if “within 12 months after the an onset of ... impairment no pre longer vents substantial 65 Fed. gainful activity.” Reg. (2000). Courts an of its own grant agency’s interpretation Robbins, Auer considerable v. legal leeway. Tallman, Udall U. 461 (1997); U. S. (1965). And no one here denies that has prop its own erly interpreted regulation. before us
Consequently, question is whether legal of the statute lawful. This Agency’s interpretation Court has that, said if the statute “to the previously speaks clearly issuе,” we “must the un- precise effect to question give Chevron, intent of ambiguously expressed Congress.” *6 or “is silent am- however, the statute If, 842-843. S.,U. must sustain we issue,” to the with specific respect biguous a on if it is “based permissible the Agency’s must de- Hence we Id., at 843. of the Act. construction” the forbids (1) statute whether the cide unambiguously (2) the and, not, if whether interpre- interpretation, the the exceeds bounds reasons, permissi- tation, for other 533 U. S. Mead Ibid.; also Corр., see United States ble. 218, 227 forbid regu- not
First, the statute does unambiguously the contrary primarily The Fourth Circuit believed lation. that, out linguistically reason. for a pointed linguistic modifies only “12-month” the statute’s phrase speaking, And to that word “inability.” word “impairment,” in statute, all, phrasing, we After parallel extent agree. result in death.” to can be uses the words “which in refer- makes sense And that phrase structurally parallel no sense reference ence to but makes an “impairment,” the “inability.” It shows
Nonetheless, is insufficient. this linguistic point that says nothing explic- statutory particular provision silence, after duration. But such about the “inability’s” itly resolve it. It does not all, creates normally ambiguity. that an Moreover, a statute says nearby provision to be under disability “individual shall determined if of such his . . . severity [is] only impairment... work but he is not his unable do previous only kind of substantial cannot... other gain- engage any ful work which in the national exists economy.” II); 423(d)(2)(A) (Title 1382c(a)(3)(B) § accord, U.S.C. (Title XVI).
In two words, statute, other in the provisions, specifies also be se- must last 12 months and “impairment” in virtu- vere from the claimant engaging enough prevent we con- statute, work.” The “substantial ally gainful any explicitly cede, says nowhere “impairment” that the must be (i e., enough prevent that severe severe gain- “substantial work”) ful for 12 months. But that is a fair inference from language. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae (conceding that an “disabling must remain of months). severity” very for At the least the statute is ambiguous respect. in that equally And, so, if then it is an “inability” fair inference that the must last 12months. That (i. is because the e., latter statement that the claimant must “engage any gainful be unable to activity” substantial year) equivalent is the virtual of the former statement *7 (i. “impairment” e., that the enough must remain severe to prevent the engaging claimant from gainful “substantial yeаr). work” simply rephrases point the same in a slightly \yay. different Agency’s “permissible.”
Second, the construction is The interpretation makes considerable sense in terms of the stat- objectives. ute’s basic The statute demands some duration requirement. No one claims permit that the statute would say, high an individual with a pres- chronic blood illness— qualify sure—to for benefits if lasting illness, that while itself year, permit for a were to a claimant to return to wоrk after only a perhaps week, or day, away job. even a from the The Agency’s interpretation supplies requirement, a duration doing which the statute way demands, while so in a that consistently statutory “impairment” reconciles the and “in- ability” language. Agency’s regulations addition,
In reflect the longstanding interpretation. own Security See Social Rul- (cum. 1982) (“In ing p. 82-52, considering ed. ‘duration,’ inability [substantial it is the engage activity] to gainful required periоd”); must last the Disability 12-month §316 1965), Insurance (Sept. State Manual 9, Government (“Duration §316 Lodging, C, Tab of refers to period of time during which an individual is continu- ously engage unable to gainful activity in substantial because Letter No. 39 Insurance
of” an OASI Disability impairment); (Jan. (duration refers id., A, Tab 22, 1957), requirement p. at a duration of the medical impairment” to the “expected “level of sufficient to substantial gainful preclude” severity And this will accord Court activity”). particular normally du- deference an “longstanding” agency Bell, ration. North Bd. Ed. 512, 522, Haven 456 U. S. 12n. has amended or reenacted
Finally, Congress frequently E. the relevant without Social Secu- g., provisions change. 366; also 1965, 303(a)(1), Amendments of see Stat. rity (1965) Sess., I, S. No. 89th 1st Rep. Cong., pt. pp. (“[T]he committee’s . . . bill for the provide[s] payment an benefits for insured worker who has been or can disability disabled to be continuous totally expected throughout id., of 12 calendar months” at 98 аdded)); period (emphasis effort benefits to those with “short- (rejecting provide term, disabilities],” work defined as temporary inability (1971) (“No months); for six 92-231, H. R. ben- No. Rep. p. efit is however, unless disability payable, (or lasted) last has at least 12 consecutive months” (emphasis (1967) added)); Sess., No. 90th 1st Rep. Cong., (“The committee also believes . . . that who an individual *8 does substantial work an or im- gainful despite that otherwise is pairments considered might disabling not disabled for of а of disa- purposes establishing period These bility”). circumstances further evidence —if provide more is needed —that intended the inter- Congress Agency’s or at least pretation, understood the statu- as interpretation Futures Comm’n torily permissible. Commodity Trading Schor, (1986). v. 478 833, U. S.
Walton in to Title II that points reply stating language a claimant who is “under a shall be entitled . . . disability to a . . . benefit . . . with the first month beginning after” a of “five calendar consecutive “waiting рeriod” months . . . which” he “has been under a disa- throughout
221 423(c)(2)(A). §§423(a)(l)(D)(i), He adds 42 U. S. C. bility.” assures a this 5-month lengthy period that “waiting period” (who be “under which must time of during applicant unable And it has been to work. throughout) disability” claimant ironclad against protection thereby provides disease, such chronic, briefly but only disabling, who suffers in earlier who blood our claimant suffers pressure as the high supra, This claim not Wal- at 219. does help See example. most, it howevеr, shows, ton, might not time matter other reasonable have chosen periods —a Walton’s “waiting argument Regardless, period” disputed. II, XVI. Title to Title not Title work could only respect it uses defini- has no identical XVI waiting though period, we does tional And Walton why language. explain the same words differently should statutory interpret Department Revenue related contexts. See closely of of Industries, Inc., (1994) Ore. ACF 332, 510 U. 342 v. S. (“ of the same act words used in different parts ‘[Identical ” Sorenson to have the same are intended meaning’ (quoting Secretary Treasury, (some (1986) 851, in- U. v. omitted)). marks ternal quotation also asks us Walton disregard interpreta- Agency’s that the its formal on tion of ground enacted those response recently regulations, perhaps only to this We have similar argu- previously rejected litigation. (South Dakota), Smiley A., v. Citibank N. 517 U. S. ments. Morton, United States 835- (1996); 467 U. S. 836, n. one interpretation long
Regardless, suрra, at 220. And fact that standing. for means less reached its interpretation through
previously
see U. S. C.
than “notice and comment”
mal
rulemaking,
§553, does not automatically deprive
Chevron,
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judicial
*9
the
at 843
delineation of
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sionally
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lation of
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in Christensen v. Harris
If this Court’s
opinion
In case, this the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related of thе expertise Agency, importance question administration of the statute, complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the has given the over a of time question long period all indicate that Chevron lens provides appropriate legal which view the through of the legality Agency interpreta tion here at issue. See United States v. Mead Corp., supra; cf. also 1 Pierce, K. Davis & Law R. Administrative Treatise (3d §§ 1.7, 1994). 3.3 еd.
For these we reasons, find the Agency’s interpretation lawful.
Ill Walton’s second claim is more For purposes complex. claim, Walton what have de- making assumes we just cided, that the statute’s “12 month” duration namely, require- *10 both ments to and the to apply “impairment” “inability” work Walton also concedes that he returned requirements. to work after 11 months. But Walton claims that his work to from month 11 month 12 does not count him be- against cause it is aof “triаl work” that the statute part period to those “entitled” to Title II grants benefits. 422(c). §
U. S. And adds, C. Walton he was to “entitle[d]” benefits he because —even returned work to after 11 though months —his and his to were “impairment” work “inability” nonetheless to last” for at least “12 “expected months” before he returned to work.
To illustrate Walton’s we the actual cir- argument, simplify (1) cumstances. One, We On Year Wal- January imagine: (a) (b) ton a severe which made him developed impairment, (2) twelve) (not unable to work; on Eleven months De- later, (3) cember 1, One, Year to work; Walton returned On July Two, Year denied, and Agency Walton’s adjudicated, claim for benefits. Walton that, even he re- argues though months, turned to work after 11 had the looked at matter, ex if not but as it were to post, his looking prior return to work, the would have had to conclude that both his and his “impairment” to work “can be “inability” last expected continuous of not less than 12 period 423(d)(1)(A). § months.” He satisfied the 12- consequently month duration and became “entitled” to bene- requirement fits before he work; returned he was turn entitled to a “trial work” and his work as a period; subsequent cashier, “trial work,” should not count being him. against The Agency’s this view of the reject plainly statute. “You are entitled to a say, trial work They pe- riod” if work within 12 “you ... months of the perform onset of the impairment(s)... the date notice any before or determination decision ... ... finding you disabled.” 404.1592(d)(2) (2001). CFR This means that the regulation before the end of Year One, Agency, deciding have might (or work) found that Walton’s impairment “can inability decid- But the to last” for 12 months. Agency, expected returned to Walton in fact Year One in which after ing (or his work, inability would not ask whether work) months. could have been to last 12 is whether this
The regulation question legal The accept- with the Court consistent statute. Appeals, it is It said view, not. Walton’s concluded ing *11 when re- use of the hindsight permitting rules — with the statute’s inconsistent plain claims —are viewing And, courts have here, 235 F. 191. other 3d, at language, Sec., 221 Soc. Salamalekis v. Commissioner See agreed. of (CA8 Chater, (CA6 2000); Newton v. 3d 688 92 F. F. 3d 828 Servs., Walker Human Health and 1996); v. Secretary of (CA10 Bowen, 2d McDonald 2d 818 F. 1991); F. (CA7 1986). is
Nonetheless, we lawful. believe Agency regulation Chevron, It The statute is See 843. supra, ambiguous. a about when it how the says nothing Agenсy, adjudicates after Year to treat an earlier return work. One, matter is months, 42 U. S. C. Its “can to last” 12 language expected the law as of what time 423(d)(1)(A), does say simply Indeed, a measures the from linguistic per- “expectation.” a decision- the “can be foresees phrase expected” spective, future, the not a decisionmaker maker who is into looking into to see who is back in order future, looking past “could “was,” be,” whаt then “could or have been” expected. be ex- And read “can context, purpose phrase to last” be one of pected might permitting Agency have not one of award benefits before months expired, the benefit of Fed. denying hindsight. at 42780; cf. also S. No. at 99. Reg., Rep. reason- time,
At the same seems a Agency’s regulation able, hence In ef- of the statute. permissible, fect it treats a work, actual return to pre-Agency-decision e. Walton’s if it One, return in December as were g., Year determinative With Year the expectation question. “can” not Two’s to work “be Walton’s hindsight, “inability” to last 12 And months.” use of that hindsight avoids the need for the Year Two decisionmaker effect to answer a in what highly unwieldy question grammarians call the future tense. might pluperfect course, Of administrators are of an- judges capable of this But swering kind. here the hypothetical questions concerns what must be a question eontrary-to-faet specula- tion about a future. that, however speculation often raised, would to resolve. And rarely easy prove does statute’s not demand its Indeed, resolution. purpose one ask other why, claimant who might things being equal, returns to work too for benefits early ordinarily qualify only but that return was a nonetheless should qualify if if surprise. kind medical course, as Of Walton such says, (or a rule would at lеast not help encourage discourage) claimant’s return to work. See early generally Rep. 1856,86th Sess., No. 2d But the statute Cong., does not demand that the make of this desirable end an And the has overriding interpretive principle. *12 and addressed the of work recognized disincentives problem g., e. 404.1575(d) See, §§ other 20 404.1574(c), CFR ways. (2001).
The statute’s the vast number of claims that complexity, it and need engenders, consequent agency expertise and administrative lead us to read the statute experience as to the considerable to fill delegating authority in, matters of detail related to its through interpretation, Gray Panthers, See Schweiker administration. 453 U. S. (1981). 43-44 The 34, at issue here is such interpretation a matter. The statute’s is And the language ambiguous. is reasonable. Agency’s interpretation We conclude that the is lawful. Agency’s regulation
[*] [*] [*] The of the Fourth is Circuit judgment
Reversed. in the Scalia, and concurring Justice сoncurring part judgment. join opinion.
I Part II all but of the Court’s agree regulations of the Social I that deference is owed (SSA) Security interpreting definition of Administration 1382c(a)(3)(A)(1994 423(d)(1)(A), §§ “disability,” 42 U.S.C. V). (2000). Reg. Supp. and Fed. As ed. See 65 recency acknowledges, Court of these is Smiley (citing ante, at irrelevant, see 220-221 v. Citibank (South Dakota), (1996); A., 735, N. U. United S. (1984)). Morton, n. 21 822, 835-836, States v. 467 U. S. go I does, ante, would at 219- on, therefore as Court prior interpretation of the 222, to address the defini- SSA’s “disability” Ruling, Security tion of a 1982 Social Disability Insurance OASI Disabil- Manual, State a 1957 ity Insurance Letter. begin “particular
I believe, with, do not deference” agency is interpretation ‘longstanding’ an owed “to dura- tion,” ante, at 220. That notion is an relic anachronism—a pre-Chevron days, thought of the only there to be when was statutory “long- one “correct” of a A text. standing” agency interpretation, particularly one that dated very origins likely back to statute, was more g., single meaning. reflect the correct e. See, Watt v. (1981). Alaska, 259, 451 U. S. 272-273 once But it is ac- cepted, range permis- as it inwas Chevron, there is a interpretations, sible agency and that the free to move from interpreta- one to long another, so as the most recent antiquity tion is its should no reasonable make difference. (1991); Cf. Sullivan, Rust v. 500 S. U. 186-187 Chevron U. A. Council, S. Inc. v. Natural Inc., Resources Defense U.
If, however, the wish to Court does credit the SSA’searlier interpretations purpose giving agency’s for the —both position “particular purpose relying and for the deference” upon congressional presumed knowledge with reenactment of the ante, see agency position, 219-220—then I think the Court should state those why were authori- interpretations (or tative enough Mead whatever-else-enough requires) for deference. qualify See United States v. Mead Corр., I U. S. 218 of course that more than agree notice- and-comment see rulemaking ante, at qualifies, but 221-222, that concession alone does not validate the Social Security Ruling, Insurance State Disability Manual, and the OASI , Insurance Letter. Disability two, latter I (Only might out, antedate point reenactments congressional upon relies.) which the Court
The SSA’s enacted recently from emerged notice-and-comment and merit deference. rulemaking No more need said.