526 S.W.3d 329
Mo. Ct. App.2017Background
- Plaintiff Jane Doe is a non‑citizen brought to the U.S. as a child, has lived in St. Louis County for 10 years, and received DACA in 2012; she has no other lawful immigration status.
- St. Louis Community College (SLCC) charges different tuition rates: in‑district, out‑of‑district, out‑of‑state, and international; SLCC billed Doe the international rate for Fall 2015.
- Residency for tuition is governed by 6 C.S.R. § 10‑3.010: general residency requires 12 months’ presence plus intent to domicile; subsection (7) requires “resident alien status, as determined by federal authority” for noncitizens.
- House Bill 3 (May 8, 2015) contains a preamble stating public institutions may not offer lower tuition to students with unlawful immigration status than to international students; SLCC changed its billing practice in response.
- Doe sued for declaratory and injunctive relief arguing she qualifies as a “resident alien” (pointing to the IRC definition); SLCC argued federal immigration law—not tax law—controls and DACA is not an immigration status.
- The trial court held the regulation ambiguous, treated “resident alien status” as meaning lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, and denied relief; the court of appeals affirms on the ground that DACA is not a qualifying federal immigration status.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the phrase “resident alien status, as determined by federal authority” refers to federal immigration law or other federal definitions (e.g., IRC) | Doe: federal tax definition of “resident alien” applies; DACA recipient qualifies | SLCC: context points to federal immigration law (visas, “alien” term); IRC irrelevant | Court: phrase is ambiguous but context (references to visas and “alien”) points to federal immigration authority |
| Whether DACA confers “resident alien status” under that regulation | Doe: DACA authorizes presence and work and should qualify | SLCC: DACA confers no immigration status; it is discretionary and revocable; not LPR or immigrant status | Court: DACA does not confer an immigration status that satisfies the regulation; Doe not entitled to in‑district rate |
| Whether the IRC definition of “resident alien” or the preamble to H.B. 3 controls interpretation | Doe: IRC is authoritative definition; H.B. 3 preamble supports charging undocumented students more | SLCC: IRC is tax‑only; H.B. 3 preamble is nonbinding and not in pari materia with the regulation | Court: IRC definition is irrelevant/contextually inconsistent; H.B.3 preamble not binding or in pari materia; neither source controls |
| Constitutional/preemption concerns from interpreting regulation to exclude DACA recipients | Doe: excluding DACA recipients raises equal protection and federal preemption problems; avoid such construction | SLCC: state may condition state benefits on immigration classifications that mirror federal law | Court: regulation as read (requiring federal immigration status that permits domicile) does not violate Equal Protection or conflict with federal law on these facts; DACA recipients are not similarly situated to immigrants who may establish domicile |
Key Cases Cited
- Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (separation of powers limits executive creation of immigration status)
- Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (deferred action is discretionary and revocable)
- Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (discussing limits and reviewability of deferred action programs)
- Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (state denial of benefits to aliens allowed to establish U.S. domicile can be preempted)
- City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (basic equal protection principle: similarly situated persons must be treated alike)
- Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2017) (state rules treating DACA recipients differently from other aliens raised preemption and equal protection concerns)