Djuane Lamar Fletcher v. Stuwart Sherman
2:20-cv-08538
| C.D. Cal. | Dec 28, 2020Background
- Petitioner Djuane Lamar Fletcher pleaded guilty to carjacking, admitted a prior violent felony (Three Strikes) and a prior prison term, and was sentenced to 15 years; judgment entered by March 28, 2017.
- Fletcher did not file a direct appeal; his conviction became final on May 30, 2017 (60 days after sentencing), so AEDPAs one-year limitation expired May 30, 2018.
- Fletcher filed multiple state habeas petitions beginning February 11, 2019, and later petitions in state courts through July 2020; those filings occurred after the AEDPA limitations period had elapsed.
- Fletcher constructively filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 31, 2020, asserting: (1) Penal Code § 215(a) is not a violent crime; (2) sentencing enhancements under §§ 667(a) and 667.5(b) were improperly charged (Sixth/Fourteenth Amendment and due process claims); and (3) he should be allowed to withdraw his plea in light of new law (AB 1618).
- The district court determined on its face the petition appears untimely and that Fletcher has not shown exhaustion of state remedies for his federal claims, and thus ordered Fletcher to show cause by January 28, 2021 why the petition should not be dismissed as time-barred or as unexhausted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness under AEDPA one-year | Fletcher's petition (filed Aug 31, 2020) challenges conviction/sentence; implicitly contends timeliness or tolling applies | Limitation ran from finality (May 30, 2017) and expired May 30, 2018; no timely federal filing | Court: Petition appears untimely (filed >2 years after expiration); ordered show cause to avoid dismissal for statute-bar |
| Delayed accrual (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)) | Fletcher did not assert a later accrual date based on newly discovered facts | Respondent notes no record basis for delayed accrual | Court: No basis shown for delayed accrual; limitations start at conviction finality |
| Statutory tolling for state collateral review (§ 2244(d)(2)) | Fletcher's later state petitions toll when pending | Tolling only applies while properly filed petitions are pending; petitions filed after AEDPA expiration do not revive time | Court: All state habeas filings were after AEDPA expired, so § 2244(d)(2) does not save the petition |
| Equitable tolling & Exhaustion | Fletcher appears to assert claims in state courts but did not clearly raise federal constitutional theory for some claims; no equitable-tolling facts presented | Respondent: No extraordinary circumstances or diligence shown; exhaustion incomplete for several claims | Court: Fletcher did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances for equitable tolling; several claims are unexhausted; ordered show cause and warned petition may be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred or without prejudice as unexhausted |
Key Cases Cited
- Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012) (AEDPA limitations analyzed claim-by-claim)
- Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2012) (due diligence for delayed accrual under § 2244(d)(1)(D))
- Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012) (finality rules when no direct appeal is taken)
- Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008) (statutory tolling during properly filed state collateral review)
- Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 (9th Cir. 2001) (state petitions filed after AEDPA expiration do not toll)
- Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (equitable tolling requires diligence and extraordinary circumstances)
- Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (equitable tolling standard reaffirmed)
- Bryant v. Arizona Atty. Gen., 499 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (equitable tolling requires external impediment, not petitioners lack of diligence)
- Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (high threshold for equitable tolling)
- Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (requirement to exhaust state remedies before federal habeas)
- OSullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (exhaustion requires presenting claims to states highest court)
- Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) (must fairly present federal claim to state courts)
- Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court may raise exhaustion sua sponte)