Dennis Brenay, Sr. v. Michael Schartow
709 F. App'x 331
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Dennis Brenay Jr. messaged his ex (who had a personal-protective order) and she called police; Officers Sierras and Schartow went to the Brenay home.
- Interaction occurred at the open front door/foyer; Brenay Jr. stood a few inches inside the doorway and declined to step onto the porch because it was wet and he had no shoes.
- According to the Brenays, Sierras rebuffed the father, tensions rose, the father let the door swing shut, officers reached in, a struggle ensued, Brenay Jr. was tasered and arrested, and Brenay Sr. was injured; officers claim the family obstructed the arrest and resisted.
- Father and son were charged with obstructing an officer; both prevailed at trial (father acquitted by jury; son via directed verdict). Plaintiffs (parents) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful entry, excessive force (later dropped), and malicious prosecution.
- At summary judgment the district court granted qualified immunity to both officers; the Sixth Circuit majority reverses as to Officer Sierras on unlawful-entry (remanding), affirms in all other respects, and deems the malicious-prosecution claim forfeited on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Warrantless entry into home | Sierras entered without warrant, consent, or exigency when he crossed the threshold after the Brenays tried to close the door | Entry was justified by hot pursuit / exigent circumstances because Brenay Jr. was subject to arrest and moved inside | Reversed as to Sierras: viewing facts in plaintiffs' favor a jury could find no exigency and that Sierras violated clearly established rights; remand for trial |
| Qualified immunity standard | Plaintiffs argue their Fourth Amendment rights were violated and those rights were clearly established | Officers contend qualified immunity applies because hot-pursuit and other precedents leave the law unsettled | Mixed: immunity denied for Sierras on unlawful-entry claim (triable issue); otherwise immunity upheld |
| Whether hot pursuit applied (public v. private location) | Plaintiffs: Brenay Jr. had returned inside / interaction ended before arrest was announced, so no pursuit exception | Officers: doorway is a public place under Santana; arrest was underway when suspect retreated | Court: unresolved factual dispute; under plaintiffs’ version hot pursuit would not apply—creates triable issue favoring plaintiffs |
| Malicious prosecution (appeal) | Plaintiffs assert officers made materially false statements in reports that induced prosecution; claim should go to jury | Officers say plaintiffs failed to show deliberate/reckless falsity and appellate briefing is insufficient | Majority: plaintiffs forfeited the issue on appeal for insufficient briefing; concurrence disagrees and would remand on merits; panel affirms district court on this claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified-immunity two-step analysis)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (view facts in light most favorable to nonmoving party at summary judgment)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (home entry and Fourth Amendment protection)
- Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (doorway/public-place rule for hot pursuit)
- Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (consensual encounters and right to end conversation with police)
- Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676 (6th Cir.) (closing a door as evidence of refusal to continue encounter)
- Smith v. Stoneburner, 716 F.3d 926 (6th Cir.) (officer violated clearly established rights by grabbing suspect through a door after suspect returned inside)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (clearly established law requirement for qualified immunity)
- Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir.) (elements of malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983)
- Newman v. Twp. of Hamburg, 773 F.3d 769 (6th Cir.) (deliberate or reckless falsehoods in police reports can support malicious-prosecution liability)