David Thompson v. Heather Hebdon
909 F.3d 1027
9th Cir.2018Background
- Alaska’s 2006 voter-approved campaign finance initiative restored $500 annual limits on individual contributions to candidates and to non-party groups, set a $1,000 cap for non-party groups to a candidate, capped party-to-candidate contributions, and limited total annual contributions a candidate may accept from nonresidents to $3,000.
- Plaintiffs (three individuals and a local Republican Party subdivision) challenged four provisions under the First Amendment: (1) $500 individual-to-candidate limit; (2) $500 individual-to-group limit; (3) party-to-candidate aggregation/limit; and (4) $3,000 nonresident aggregate limit.
- The district court upheld all four provisions after a seven-day bench trial, applying intermediate scrutiny for contribution limits (Eddleman framework) and finding an important state interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the individual-to-candidate limit, the individual-to-group limit (as an anti-circumvention measure), and the party-to-candidate limit, but reversed the nonresident aggregate limit as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
- The majority concluded that Alaska’s evidence supported prophylactic limits to prevent quid pro quo corruption for the first three provisions, but the nonresident limit targeted undue influence or protection of “self-governance,” interests the Supreme Court has rejected as sufficient post-Citizens United and McCutcheon.
- Chief Judge Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing Alaska’s unique vulnerability to out-of-state industry influence and the state interest in self-governance could justify the nonresident cap.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of $500 individual-to-candidate limit | Thompson: limit infringes First Amendment; $1,000 was adequate; $500 targets influence not quid pro quo | State: prophylactic limit targets quid pro quo corruption/appearance; evidence of pay-for-votes and VECO scandal justifies limit | Affirmed — limit targets anti-corruption interest and is closely drawn under Eddleman/Buckley framework |
| Validity of $500 individual-to-group (non-party) limit | Thompson: attenuated risk of corruption via groups; violates speech/association | State: prevents circumvention of candidate limit (anti-circumvention) | Affirmed — California Medical Ass’n anti-circumvention rationale supports upholding limit |
| Aggregation/limit on political party-to-candidate contributions | Thompson: aggregation of party subunits is discriminatory compared to unions/PACs | State: party subunits are affiliated and may be aggregated; different from independent unions/PACs | Affirmed — aggregation of party subunits and limit upheld as constitutional |
| $3,000 nonresident aggregate contribution limit | Thompson: restricts his desired out-of-state donation; limit not justified | State: reduces out-of-state influence, prevents circumvention, protects self-governance | Reversed — majority: limit targets undue influence/self-governance, not quid pro quo corruption; fails fit analysis post-Citizens United/McCutcheon |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (per curiam) (distinguishes contribution limits from expenditure limits; framework for contribution analysis)
- Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (contribution limits reviewed under intermediate scrutiny; tests for when limits are "so radical in effect")
- California Medical Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (upholding contribution limits to PACs to prevent circumvention of candidate limits)
- Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (limits must be justified only by preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance)
- McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (invalidated aggregate limits; clarified permissible government interest is quid pro quo corruption/appearance)
- FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) (upholding some contribution limits and noting relatively deferential review)
- Mont. Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003) (sets Ninth Circuit two-part intermediate-scrutiny test for contribution limits)
- Lair v. Motl, 873 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (reaffirmed evidentiary standard and application of Eddleman in upholding comparable contribution limits)