Darlena Clarkson v. SEPTA
700 F. App'x 111
3rd Cir.2017Background
- Clarkson, a union employee since 1989, applied for a supervisory VEM Warranty Administrator position first posted in 2009; SEPTA did not interview anyone then and the position was left unfilled until relisted in 2012.
- Clarkson reapplied in 2012, was interviewed, and accepted the promotion in November 2012; days after accepting she filed an EEOC/PHRC complaint alleging the 2009 nonpromotion was retaliation for refusing a supervisor’s personal request.
- She filed a second EEOC/PHRC complaint in March 2013 alleging retaliation for filing the first complaint; both administrative complaints were dismissed and she received a right-to-sue letter.
- Clarkson sued SEPTA in 2014 under Title VII and the PHRA for gender discrimination and retaliation; the District Court dismissed her failure-to-promote claims under Rule 12(b)(6) as time-barred and granted summary judgment for SEPTA on her remaining retaliation claims.
- On appeal, Clarkson argued the 2009 nonpromotion should be tolled (discovery rule or equitable tolling) and that post-2012 actions (extra duties, an embarrassing meeting, conflicting directives, threats, gossip) constituted retaliatory adverse actions or a hostile work environment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of 2009 failure-to-promote claim | Clarkson: she could not know unlawful motivation until July 2012; apply discovery rule or equitable tolling | SEPTA: claim accrued in 2009; Clarkson failed to pursue or inquire earlier, no extraordinary circumstances | Affirmed dismissal; claim untimely and no tolling warranted |
| Whether post-2012 actions are materially adverse (retaliation prima facie second element) | Clarkson: extra tasks, forced meeting, conflicting directives, threats, gossip and disparagement were adverse and would deter reporting | SEPTA: actions consistent with managerial duties, minor annoyances, no discipline or objective harm; not materially adverse | Affirmed summary judgment; actions not materially adverse |
| Hostile work environment (retaliation theory) | Clarkson: cumulative conduct created hostile environment | SEPTA: incidents isolated/minor, not severe or pervasive | Affirmed; conduct not severe or pervasive enough to create hostile work environment |
| Causation between protected activity and alleged actions | Clarkson: timing and context show causal link | SEPTA: no actionable adverse acts, so causation question moot | Court did not reach causation because plaintiff failed to establish adverse action |
Key Cases Cited
- Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) (Rule 12(b)(6) standard)
- Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014) (summary judgment standard)
- Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. 2005) (motion to dismiss review and legal sufficiency)
- W. Penn. Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (timeliness review from complaint face)
- Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913 (3d Cir. 1997) (PHRA/Title VII exhaustion principles)
- Noel v. The Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2010) (accrual rule for promotion decisions)
- Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994) (discovery rule for accrual)
- Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (equitable tolling requires diligence and extraordinary circumstances)
- Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State Univ., 851 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2017) (retaliation prima facie elements)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (standard for materially adverse retaliatory acts)
- Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (hostile work environment standard and accrual principles)
