156 F. Supp. 3d 739
E.D. Va.2016Background
- On May 15, 2015, Caroline County Commonwealth’s Attorney Anthony G. Spencer approached defense attorney Melissa Danjczek in court, accused her of taking a DUI manual, shoved her, and grabbed the manual; the judge ordered the manual returned and Spencer removed from the courtroom.
- Spencer then swore out a criminal complaint accusing Danjczek of larceny and had a warrant served in the courtroom; she retained counsel and a special prosecutor was later appointed in her cases.
- The larceny charge was dismissed with prejudice on June 30, 2015, but press coverage allegedly harmed Danjczek’s reputation and business; she claims additional efforts by Spencer and a third party (Mahoney) to coerce or retaliate against her.
- Danjczek sued in federal court asserting § 1983 false arrest (Count One), assault and battery (Count Two), defamation (Count Five), abuse of process (Count Six), malicious prosecution (Count Seven), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Eight), and earlier asserted—but later withdrew—extortion/conspiracy claims (Counts Three and Four).
- Defendants moved to dismiss. Court dismissed Counts Three and Four with prejudice, dismissed Count Five (defamation) without prejudice and granted leave to replead, and denied dismissal as to Counts One, Two, Six, Seven, and Eight; court also granted leave to amend to add a Virginia business-conspiracy claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Count One (§1983 false arrest) states a Fourth Amendment violation and whether defendant is immune | Danjczek: Spencer caused arrest on an affidavit made without investigation, knowingly false or with reckless disregard, so no probable cause and §1983 claim valid | Spencer: Warrant and magistrate approval defeat claim; alternatively qualified/absolute immunity | Court: Denied dismissal — facts plausibly allege no probable cause and Reckless/intentional falsehoods overcome qualified immunity at pleading stage |
| Whether Count Five (defamation) survives and whether statements are privileged | Danjczek: Spencer’s statements (courtroom accusation and affidavit) harmed reputation; exhibits show nonprivileged courtroom statements | Spencer: Criminal complaint/affidavit is judicial and absolutely privileged; plaintiff failed to plead an unprivileged defamatory statement | Court: Dismissed Count Five without prejudice but held the affidavit is absolutely privileged; exhibits show courtroom accusations that are not privileged so plaintiff may replead within 21 days |
| Whether Count Seven (malicious prosecution) adequately pleads lack of probable cause, malice, and is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity | Danjczek: Spencer instituted prosecution maliciously and without probable cause; malice can be inferred from lack of probable cause and other facts | Spencer: Magistrate’s warrant and his role as Commonwealth’s Attorney bar suit via immunity; he had probable cause | Court: Denied dismissal — pleadings sufficiently allege lack of probable cause and malice; Spencer has not shown he was acting in a prosecutorial capacity entitling him to absolute immunity at initiation of complaint |
| Whether leave to amend to add Virginia business-conspiracy claim should be granted | Danjczek: Requests leave to plead Va. Code §§ 18.2‑499/500 because defendants combined to injure her business (e.g., removal from court‑appointed list) | Spencer: Amendment futile because statute protects business (not personal reputation) and plaintiff alleged injury to person | Court: Granted leave — factual allegations (solo practitioner, removal from court‑appointed list) plausibly allege injury to business and avoid futility at pleading stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (warrant immunity and the limitation on immunity where affidavit is so lacking in probable cause that belief in its existence is unreasonable)
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (standard for attacking an affidavit that contains deliberate or reckless falsehoods or material omissions)
- Miller v. Prince George’s County, 475 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2007) (an officer/prosecutor may be liable under §1983 for deliberately or recklessly making material false statements in a warrant affidavit)
- Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) (prosecutor not absolutely immune for swearing out facts that any competent witness might have performed)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity doctrine for acts intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (clarifies that clearly established law must be particularized to the specific context when assessing qualified immunity)
- Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005) (federal pleading standard for IIED/defamation in diversity cases and recognition of defamatory per se categories)