Corey Javone Dorsey v. the State of Texas
03-19-00411-CR
| Tex. App. | Jun 17, 2021Background
- Early-morning robberies of exotic dancers in Killeen: Darshay Johnson (Apr. 19, 2018) was forced to strip at gunpoint; Riana Collins (Apr. 20–21, 2018) was also robbed by two masked men. Both incidents involved a white four-door Mercedes described by victims and seen on surveillance.
- Police later stopped that Mercedes and found three occupants: appellant Corey Javone Dorsey (driver), front passenger Se’von Gambrell, and Marcus Pinkard (rear). A 9mm Smith & Wesson was recovered under the driver’s seat; a .40 caliber handgun was in the rear console. Balaclavas, gloves, and other items were in the car.
- Ballistics testing matched 9mm cartridge cases from Johnson’s robbery to the 9mm handgun found under the driver’s seat. DPS DNA testing showed Gambrell could not be excluded from some items; results were inconclusive as to Dorsey. Expert testified DNA absence does not prove non-contact.
- Dorsey was indicted and convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery (use/exhibit of a deadly weapon) and sentenced to 30 years. On appeal he raised two jury-charge errors: (1) failure to instruct that conviction required Dorsey to know an accomplice would use/exhibit a deadly weapon, and (2) failure to tailor the definitions of “intentionally” and “knowingly” to the conduct elements.
- The Third Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting both challenges: it held no deadly-weapon instruction was required beyond the charge given, and any failure to tailor mens rea definitions did not cause egregious harm given the charge as a whole, the evidence, and counsel’s arguments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury should have been instructed that to convict Dorsey of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon the State had to prove he knew an accomplice would use/exhibit the weapon | No additional instruction required: the indictment alleged use of a deadly weapon and the general law-of-parties language plus the verdict necessarily required the jury to find knowledge; evidence supported that finding | Court should have instructed jury that conviction required proof Dorsey knew Gambrell would use/exhibit a firearm (or that Dorsey personally used it) | Rejected: no error — a guilty verdict on the charged offense, coupled with the application paragraph and law-of-parties statement, was sufficient; evidence supported that the jury necessarily found knowledge |
| Whether the court erred by failing to tailor statutory definitions of “intentionally” and “knowingly” to the specific conduct elements (and whether any error was egregiously harmful) | Any drafting error was harmless: the application paragraph limited the culpable mental states to the charged conduct; mental state was not contested; record shows no egregious harm | Trial court erred in not tailoring mens rea definitions to the elements, causing prejudice | Even assuming error, not egregiously harmful: application paragraph, the state of evidence (identity disputed, not mens rea), and counsel arguments weigh against reversal; conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Bilbrey v. State, 594 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Crim. App.) (aggravated robbery elements include use/exhibit of a deadly weapon; no separate culpable mental state required for weapon)
- Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. Crim. App.) (general law-of-parties reference in application paragraph can incorporate abstract law)
- Sarmiento v. State, 93 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]) (a guilty verdict as to aggravated robbery supports the finding that defendant knew a weapon would be used)
- Arteaga v. State, 521 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. Crim. App.) (two-step framework for reviewing jury-charge error)
- Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. Crim. App.) (if no legal error exists, appellate inquiry ends)
- McQueen v. State, 781 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Crim. App.) (culpable mental states must be applied to the offense’s conduct elements)