Arteaga v. StateArteaga v. State
Lead Opinion
OPINION
delivered the opinion of the Court
This case presents a question of jury-charge error. The offense of sexual assault is a first-degree felony if the State proves that the victim was a person whom the defendant was “prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom the [defendant] was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under Section 25.01 [Bigamy],” The State alleged that Appellant, Robert-Michael-Arteaga, Jr., committed first-degree felony sexual assault of a child because he was “prohibited from marrying” the victim, his biological daughter.
BACKGROUND Trial & Appeal
Arteaga was charged in two indictments with twenty-eight сounts.of sexual assault
In the abstract portion of the jury charge, the trial court included Section 6.201 of the Family Code, which defines when a marriage is void based on consanguinity.
Arteaga appealed the convictions, arguing that based on the wording of the sexual-assault statute (Section 22.011(f)), which references the bigamy statute, the State could prove that he was “prohibited from marrying his daughter” under only the bigamy statute. Arteaga v. State,
JURY CHARGES
The first step in analyzing a claim of jury charge errоr is to determine whether the submitted charge was erroneous. Barrios v. State,
The Jury Charge in This Case
In each count of the sexual-assault indictment, it was alleged that the victim was a child who was under seventeen years of age and was a person “whom [Arteaga] was prohibited from marrying....” Section 22.011(f) of the sexual-assault statute states that,
(f) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree, except that an offense under this section is a felony of the first degree if the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under Section 25.01.
(a) An individual commits an offense if:
(1) he is legally married and he:
(A) purports to marry or does marry a person other than his spouse in this state, or any other state or foreign country, under circumstances that would, but for the actor’s prior marriage, constitute a marriage; or
(B) lives with a person other than his spouse in this state under the appearance of being married; or
(2) he knows that a married person other than his spouse is married and he:
(A) purports to marry or does marry that person in this state, or any other state or foreign country, under circumstances that would, but for the person’s prior marriage, constitute a marriage; or
(B) lives with that person in this state under the appearance of being married.
(b) For purposes of this section, “under the appearance of being married” means holding out that the parties are married with cohabitation and an intent to be married by either party.
⅜ ‡ ⅜
(e) An offensе under this section is a felony of the third degree, except that if at the time of the commission of the offense, the person whom the actor marries or purports to marry or with whom the actor lives under the appearance of being married is:
(1) 17 years of age, the offense is a felony of the second degree; or
(2) 16 years of age or younger, the offense is a felony of the first degree.
Id. § 25.01.
To guide the jury’s resolution of the prohibited-from-marrying allegation, the trial court included the consanguinity statute in the abstract portion of the charge:
A marriage is void if one party to the marriage is related to the other as:
(1) an ancestor or descendant, by blood or adoption;
(2) a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption;
(3) a parent’s brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; or
(4) a son or daughter of a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption.
Applicable Law
It is the trial court’s responsibility to deliver to the jury “a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case....”
To determine if it was error to include the consanguinity statute in the jury charge, we must first construe
1, Law of Statutory Construction
We construе a statute according to its plain meaning unless such a construction would lead to absurd results that the legislature could not possibly have intended or the language is found to be ambiguous. Boykin v. State,
If the language of the statute is plain but effectuating that language would lead to absurd results or is ambiguous, we may consult extra-textual sources to ascertain the collective intent of the legislature. Boykin,
The issue- here is what does the State have to prove when it invokes
The State argues that
Based on the structure and wording of
In the first section, “prohibited from” modifies both “marrying” and “purporting to marry.” From a grammatical standpoint, the first section is treated as a single and indivisible unit. Based on this, either both prohibitions from the first section—“marrying” and “purporting to marry”—are modified by the phrase “under Section 25.01” and require the State to prove facts that would constitute bigamy or neither requires such proof. Id. In the second section, the' phrase “prohibited from” modifies only “living under the appearance of being married.” Id, Thus, it is possible that the phrase “under Section 25.01” modifies only the second section of 22.011(f), and the State is required to prove facts that would constitute bigamy only when it alleges that’ the defendant was prohibited from living with the victim under the appearance of being married. In light of this analysis, there are two reasonable constructions of 22,011(f): (1) the State must prove facts that would constitute bigamy only when the allegation is that the defendant was prohibited from living with the victim under the appearance of being married, or . (2) the State must prove facts that would constitute bigamy as to all three allegations (i.e., under both the first and second sections of 22.011(f)). Because
To resolve this grammatical ambiguity, it is necessary to examine the bigamy statute, which should be read together with
We agree that “purports to marry” and “living under the appearance of being married” in
The statute identifies two situations when a marriage is prohibited: (1) if a person “does marry” a person other than his spouse or (2) if a person “does marry” someone who he knows is already married.
When the two statutes are considered in light of each other, the grammatical ambiguity in
S. Absurd Results
The court of appeals considered the conclusion we reach today but rejected it beсause it believed that such an interpretation would lead to absurd results based on the legislative history of the bill creating 22.011(f). The court of appeals said that, “[ajfter reviewing the relevant bills related to
J. Other Child Abuse Offenses
As a final matter, we note that children who are sexually abused by family members are not without protection. If the abuse took place over a period of time, as was the case here, a defendant could be charged with first-degree continuous sexual abuse of a child. See
Jury Charge Error
The “abstract paragraphs [of a jury charge] serve as a glossary to help the jury understand the meaning of concepts and terms used in -the application paragraphs of the charge.” Crenshaw v. State,
Here, the special issue submitted as part of the sexual-assault charge asked the jury whether it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Arteaga “was prohibited from marrying [Doe].” As we have explained, however, the bigamy statute defines when a person is prohibited from marrying another for purposes of 22.011(f), not the Family Code. Thus, the bigamy statute is “law; applicable to the case” and should have been included in the charge because the jury had to understand what “prohibitеd from marrying” meant before it could determine whether Arteaga was guilty of the allegations.
We conclude that the sexual-assault jury charge in this case was erroneous because it did not properly instruct the jury regarding the “law applicable to the case.” The next question is whether Arteaga was egregiously harmed by the erroneous sexual-assault jury charge. We conclude that he was.
EGREGIOUS HARM
Applicable Law
Because Arteaga did not object to ,the sexual-assault charge in this case, he can prevail only if he was egregiously harmed by the. erroneous charge. Almanza v. State,
Analysis
According to the court of appeals, the entirety of the jury charge weighs in favor of finding any error harmless because the consanguinity statute appeared in only the abstract portion of the lengthy charge and the application section limited the jury’s deliberations to the accusations as set out in the indictment. Arteaga,
It is reversible error when an abstract instruction is given that is an incorrect or misleading statement .of the law that the jury must understand to implement the application paragraphs. Plata,
The state of the evidence and the parties’ arguments also weigh in favor of finding egregious- harm. Per
Finally, when considering, any other relevant information in the record, the court of appeals concluded that Arteaga’s failure to raise the issue of bigamy and void marriages weighs against a finding of egregious harm. While the failure of Arteaga to raise those issues should weigh against him, it was the -State’s, responsibility to prove that Arteaga was “prohibited from marrying the victim ... under
PROPER REMEDY
The State, however, argues that even if the jury charge is erroneous, the judgmеnt of the trial court should be reformed to reflect that Arteaga was convicted of second-degree felony sexual assault, and he should be resentenced. Bowen v. State,
In Bowen and its progeny, we held that a defendant should not receive the unjust windfall of an outright acquittal when there is legally sufficient evidence to prove that he is guilty of a lessеr-included offense. This was because doing so—even though the State carried its burden to prove a lesser-included offense—was an usurpation of the jury’s role as factfinder. Thus, we have explained that,
[A]fter a court of appeals has found the evidence insufficient to support an appellant’s conviction for a greater-inclusive offense, in deciding whether to reform the judgment to reflect a conviction for a lesser-included offense, that court must answer two questions: 1) in the course of convicting the appellant of the greater offense, must the jury have necessarily found every element necessary to convict the appellant for the lesser-included offense; and 2) conducting an evidentiary sufficiency analysis as though the appellant had been convicted of the lesser-included offense at trial, is there sufficient evidence to support a conviction for that offense? If the answer to either of these questions is no, the court of appeals is not authorized to reform the judgment. But if the answers to both are yes, the court is authorized—indeed required—to avoid the “unjust” result of an outright acquittal by reforming the judgment to reflect a conviction for the lesser-included offense.
Thornton v. State,
The normative remedy for harmful jury charge error is to reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial. Almanza,
Here, in finding Arteaga guilty of first-degree felony sexuаl assault, the jury must
CONCLUSION
We reverse the judgment of the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Keasler, J., did not participate.
Notes
. In various counts, the sexual-assault indictment alleged that Arteaga intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of the victim’s vagina, anus, and mоuth. For example, one count states that,
the Defendant, on or about the 25th day of September, 2011 and before the presentment of this indictment, in the County of Burnet, and the State of Texas, did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the penetration of the sexual organ of HSB Doe, a child who was then and there younger than 17 years of-age, and a person whom the defendant was prohibited from marrying....
. Because this case concerns only Arteaga’s sexual-assault convictions, we primarily address only those.
. The court of appeals referred to the underage victim as "HSB Doe.” HSB stands for Horseshoe Bay, which is where some of the abuse occurred. We will refer to her as "Doe.”
. That provision states that,
A marriage is void if one party to the marriage is related to the other as:
(1) an ancestor or descendant, by blood or adoption;
(2) a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption;
(3) a parent's brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; or
(4) a son or daughter of a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption.
Tex Fam. Code
. In the sexual-assault indictment, it was alleged that the victim was "a person whom [Arteaga] was prohibited from marrying ...,” and in each application paragraph, the jury was instructed that it could find Arteaga guilty only if the victim was "a person whom [Arteaga] was prohibited from marrying....”
. The special issue asked, "Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that [Arteaga] ... was prohibited from marrying HSB DOE?” The jury answered, "We do.”
. The State abandoned seven of its sexual-assault allegations.
. Arteaga was also convicted of seventeen counts of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to 10 years’ confinement fоr each count, all of which were cumulated, and he was fined $10,000.
. When we discuss “facts that would constitute bigamy,” we do not mean that the State has to prove that the defendant committed the offenses of sexual assault and bigamy. What we mean is that, to elevate second-degree felony sexual assault to first-degree felony sexual assault under
. "An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree, except that an offense under this section is a felony of' the first degree if the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance оf being married under
. A jury need not check its common sense at the door. However, a jury’s common sense takes a back seat when the court instructs it that a statutory term has a specific legal meaning or has acquired technical or particular meaning, Kirsch v. State,
. As we explain later and in more detail, the bigamy statute identifies six ways to commit bigamy. Two are when a defendant "does many” a person who he is prohibited from marrying. Compare Tex Penal Code
. The relevant excerpt states that,
We, of course, know that she's not the defendant's spouse and we also know that you can’t marry your daughter. We don’t even need to—we all know that. You can't marry your daughter and the Court sets it out here that a marriage is void if it’s to an ancеstor or descendent by blood or adoption and then there’s another categories. You can’t marry your sister. You can’t marry your brother, et cetera.
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And then as the judge pointed out on the last paragraph, the special issue, do you find whether the defendant was prohibited from marrying HSB Doe, which we know is HSB Doe, and clearly the answer to that is we do, and so you would just write we do and your presiding juror can be—can sign that form.
Concurrence Opinion
filed a concurring opinion.
I agree with the Court’s ultimate construction of
I.
Sexual assault is ordinarily a second degree felony. But the offense becomes a first degree felony under certain, very particular circumstances set out in
if the victim was a person whоm- the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married underSection 25.01 .
This case draws our attention to an obvious question with respect to how much of
How much of what comes before the modifier “under
As it was enacted, the relevant portion of
• Sexual assault is a first degree felony;
• if the victim was a person:
• whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or
• with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married
• underSection 25.01 of the Penal Code (the bigamy statute).
Does “under
Or does it also modify the clause before that; “whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry”? The court of appeals construed it to modify only the immediately antecedent clause. Reasoning from that construction, the court of appeals concluded that Appellant was subject to conviction for a first degree felony because he had sexually assaulted his daughter, whom he could not validly marry for reasons having nothing to do with the bigamy statute. Arteaga v. State,
■ The court of appeals would undoubtedly be correct had the Legislature punctuated
if the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry, or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married underSection 25.01 .
In this hypothetical version, the comma: between the two antecedent clauses, and the lack of a comma immediately preceding the modifier, indicate that the modifier should apply only to the immediately preceding antecedent clause, not to, both. See Ludwig v. State,
But Section 22.011(f) could have been punctuated in such a manner as to make the court, of appeals construction in this case clearly mistaken, thus:
if the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married, under Section 25.01.
Or, for that matter, it could have been punctuated like this (although here it might be argued that the first comma is superfluous):
if the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry, or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married, under Section 25.01.
In either event, the comma immediately preceding the modifier makes it clear that it should apply to both antecedent clauses. See Ludwig,
Unfortunately, there are no clarifying commas in Section 22.011(f). Consequently, we are left to divine the meaning of the statute in their absence.
In Sullivan, the Texas Supreme Court identified another convention .of statutory construction that has an analogical bearing on this case: the “series-qualifier” canon.
Such a parallel structure does seem to exist in Section 22.011(f). Both antecedent clauses refer , to particular conduct that is “prohibited”—a word that does not actually appear anywhere in the Section 25.01, the bigamy statute.
This understanding of Section 22.011(f) is consistent with our previous observation, in State v. Rosseau,
II.
I believe that Rosseau was mistaken to the extent it suggested that Section 22.011(f) means that the State may only enhance an offender’s conviction to a first degree felony if it proves that he actually committed the offense of bigamy. I am convinced that Section 22.011(f) requires the State merely to prove that, ^/the actor were to actually to marry or purport to marry his victim, or if he were to live with his victim under the appearance of being married, then he would commit the offense of bigamy under the provisions of Section 25.01. On its face, the provision plainly requires no more. Though to my mind somе of the language in the text of the Court’s opinion remains ambiguous, the Court’s clarification in footnote 9 satisfies me that the Court’s understanding is the same as my own.
With these observations, I join the Court’s opinion.
. Neither does the word “prohibit” appear in Section 6.201 of the Family Code, the provision that declares certain marriages to be "void.”
, Section 25.01(a) of the Penal Code reads, in relevant part:
(a) An individual commits an offense if:
(1) he is legally married and he:
(A) purports to marry or does marry a person other than his spouse ... under circumstances that would, but for the actor's prior marriage, constitute a marriage; or
(B) lives with a person other than his spouse ... under the appearance of being married; or
(2) he knows that a married person other than his spouse is married and he:
(A) purports to marry or does marry that person ... under circumstances that would, but for the person’s prior marriage, constitute a marriage; or
(B) lives with that person ... under the appearance of being married.
Tex. Pen. Code § 25.01(a).