900 F.3d 77
3rd Cir.2018Background
- On December 26, 2011, Corey Bland drove a carjacked Audi in a high‑speed, reckless flight through Newark after failing to stop for State Troopers; he ran red lights, drove the wrong way, collided with multiple police vehicles, and exceeded 100 mph.
- Multiple State Troopers and Newark officers pursued; earlier at Lincoln Park six troopers fired 28 rounds (no hits) as Bland rammed free and continued fleeing.
- The chase ended at 18th & Livingston where the Audi struck scaffolding after an unmarked trooper vehicle allegedly rammed it; officers surrounded the car and fired repeatedly.
- Bland was shot 16–18 times, suffering severe injuries including traumatic brain injury; no weapon was recovered and no officer saw Bland with a gun.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive deadly force; defendants sought summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
- The district court denied qualified immunity, finding jury issues about whether the Audi was operable and whether officers could see Bland’s movements; the defendants appealed interlocutorily.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers who fired at Lincoln Park are entitled to qualified immunity for deadly force there | Bland: firing was excessive; he did not surrender and troopers lacked justification | Officers: Bland’s high‑speed, violent flight and collisions posed an imminent deadly threat | Held: Troopers entitled to qualified immunity; precedent permits force to stop dangerous flight |
| Whether officers at the terminus (18th & Livingston) violated clearly established law by using deadly force when the Audi may have been inoperable and officers may not have seen Bland’s hands | Bland: crash into scaffolding rendered car inoperable; no visible weapon or surrender — Garner governs | Officers: prior violent flight, threats to kill, prior successful escapes, and reports of a gun justified reasonable belief of deadly threat | Held: Qualified immunity applies; no clearly established law put officers on notice that force was unlawful under these facts |
| Whether late‑arriving Newark officers (Torres, Martinez) who joined shooting are liable | Bland: they joined without confirming a threat or seeing a weapon | Defs: late arrival to chaotic, armed‑suspect scene permits assuming earlier measures were proper; reasonable to join | Held: Qualified immunity applies; White v. Pauly supports reasonable reliance by late arrivals |
| Whether district court erred in denying summary judgment due to factual disputes (operability of car, visibility of Bland’s movements) | Bland: factual disputes preclude immunity resolution on summary judgment | Defs: legal question whether, given the facts, officers violated clearly established law | Held: Appeals court reviews legal question and reverses — even accepting Bland’s factual version, no clearly established right was violated, so summary judgment for defendants is appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (per curiam) (qualified immunity where shooting a fleeing felon avoided capture and posed risk to bystanders)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (officer’s forcible termination of a dangerous high‑speed chase did not violate the Fourth Amendment)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (officers entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a fugitive reasonably believed intent on resuming a deadly chase)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (qualified immunity for officer who shot at motorist during high‑speed pursuit where officer reasonably perceived deadly threat)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (officer arriving late to an ongoing armed confrontation may reasonably assume prior steps were proper and is not required to second‑guess fellow officers)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force impermissible against an unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect — cited by plaintiff but distinguished)
- Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017) (clearly established inquiry requires closely analogous precedent or robust consensus)
