Commonwealth v. Walters
37 N.E.3d 980
Mass.2015Background
- Defendant and victim (former romantic partners) lived together in Seekonk, MA; after breakup (2007) victim obtained a G. L. c. 209A restraining order requiring defendant to leave and stay away from the house.
- Over 2007–2008 the defendant engaged in repeated acts at the Seekonk property while the order was in effect: placing heavy equipment and boulders to block access, screwing shut shed doors, removing exterior light bulbs, leaving the water off and human waste in toilets, and removing appliances/furniture; he also posted disparaging material about the victim on Zillow and MySpace.
- In January 2011 a Facebook profile for the defendant was viewed by the victim and her partner: it displayed a photo of him holding a rifle and a quotation, “Make no mistake of my will to succeed in bringing you two idiots to justice.”
- The defendant was indicted for stalking (G. L. c. 265, § 43(a)), criminal harassment (G. L. c. 265, § 43A), two counts of violating the restraining order (G. L. c. 209A, § 7), and two counts of perjury; a jury convicted on all counts except rape/indecent assault charges.
- The SJC reviewed whether the Facebook content could qualify as a statutory “threat” (and thus support stalking), whether the Commonwealth proved the pattern-of-conduct elements for stalking/harassment, and several trial- and due-process-related claims.
- Holding summary: stalking conviction vacated for insufficient evidence that the Facebook profile was a § 43(a)(2) threat; convictions for criminal harassment, two restraining-order violations, and one perjury conviction affirmed; one perjury conviction also affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Walters' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant's Facebook profile (photo with gun + quotation) constituted a "threat" under G. L. c. 265, § 43(a)(2) and thus a "true threat" outside First Amendment protection | The profile communicated a threat aimed at victim and her partner and, in context of prior harassment and weapons conduct, satisfied the statutory threat element | The page was ambiguous, temporally remote from prior conduct, and protected speech; insufficient proof of intent to place victim in imminent fear | Vacated stalking conviction: insufficient evidence that the Facebook page was a § 43(a)(2) threat or that defendant intended to communicate a threat to victim |
| Whether the Commonwealth proved the "pattern of conduct/series of acts" element for criminal harassment (three or more incidents) | Past acts (equipment placement, boulders, removing lights, bringing accomplice Cynthia Dugas to view house, removing appliances, posting disparaging material) cumulatively alarmed the victim | Some individual acts were innocuous or explained by legitimate purposes (e.g., business sign, property access) | Affirmed criminal harassment conviction: jury reasonably found multiple harassing incidents and that their cumulative effect seriously alarmed the victim |
| Whether defendant violated the restraining order when permitted limited access to garage during specified hours (and whether trial instructions were proper) | Permitted garage access did not authorize other intrusions; placing boulders/removing light bulbs interfered with stay-away terms | The modification converted the order during those hours so defendant could not have violated it; jury instruction mischaracterized acts | Affirmed convictions for two restraining-order violations: natural reading of modification allowed access only for garage purposes; instructions appropriate |
| Whether prosecutorial errors (misstated testimony in closing; delayed disclosure of victim's e‑mails/journal entries) and evidentiary rulings warranted a new trial | Misstatements and delayed disclosure occurred but did not create a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice; e‑mails were mostly inculpatory and defense cross‑examined witness on them | Misstatement improperly bolstered victim; delayed production of e‑mails denied exculpatory material and prejudiced defense | No new trial: misstatement harmless in context; delayed disclosure not shown to be materially exculpatory and defense had opportunity to cross‑examine |
Key Cases Cited
- R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (content‑based speech restrictions are presumptively invalid)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (true threats are unprotected speech; definition and rationale)
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (context can render violent rhetoric constitutionally protected political hyperbole)
- O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415 (Massachusetts discussion of unprotected speech categories and true threats)
- Commonwealth v. Matsos, 421 Mass. 391 (threat element requires intent to place victim in imminent fear and reasonableness of fear)
- Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229 (contextual analysis of words/actions may support finding of threat)
- Commonwealth v. Robicheau, 421 Mass. 176 (verbal threats placing victim in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious harm are not First Amendment protected)
- Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
